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MY LIFE AND ACTS

IN

HUNGARY

IN THE YEARS 1848 AND 1849.

BY

22485

ARTHUR GÖRGEI.

VOLUME I.

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PREFACE.

The resistance of Hungary to Austria and Russia was broken. Kossuth and Szemere and their partisans saved themselves, like the Poles, on a neutral territory. I rejected flight; and the majority of the unfortunate combatants for Hungary against New Austria followed my example.

Hereupon I was pardoned, and meanwhile banished to Carinthia. The decision on the fate of my companions, however, was left to the Master of the Ordnance, Baron Haynau.

The striking contradiction between my pardon and the subsequent executions might have induced the relatives of some of those who were awaiting the decision of their case to suppose that it would be possible for me, by some means, to save these unfortunate men; or, immediately after the first executions at Arad and Pesth, I was requested by letters from various quarters to exert my presumed influence with the government of Austria in favour of one or other of the politically compromised persons who had come into the power of Baron Haynau.

The failure of these applications needs scarcely to be mentioned. I had positively no influence at all to exert. I had, on the contrary, to perceive that it was my duty to suppress even the anxious cry for pardon, as long as Baron Haynau remained the absolute master

of life and death to my companions in war. *My* intercession could but kindle still higher the pious zeal of the Baron.

Not until there was a pause in the execution of the capital sentences pronounced at Arad and Pesth, and it seemed to be indicated by this circumstance that Baron Haynau no longer ruled with unlimited sway in my country, could I venture to beg attention to the logical consequences of my being pardoned, without having to fear at the same time that my intercession would completely endanger the lives of those whose deliverance it implored.

I was on the point of handing my petition, addressed to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, to the local military authority of Klagenfurt to be kindly forwarded, when the rumour, that the Monarch would perhaps visit Carinthia also on his state-progress in May 1850, roused in me the desire, as will easily be conceived, to make my request orally to his Majesty.

The rumour, indeed, was well founded; but an audience was refused me, and I was referred with my petition to the Minister of the Interior. Re-encouraged in some degree by the assurances with which Herr von Bach dismissed me, I thought it best to present through him my petition to the Monarch. This I did in the following letter:

To his Excellency the Minister Alexander von Bach.

"Your comrades will not be deceived, if they expect clemency of his Majesty"—were the last consolatory words which your Excellency was pleased to dismiss me yesterday.

How deeply they penetrated into my afflicted soul, how quickly they revived my well-nigh extinguished belief in the prevalen

of forgiving sentiments in the breast of the offended earthly dignities, let the enclosure declare to your Excellency.

It is a feeble attempt to implore the pardon of his Majesty for those who are not in the fortunate position of being able to do so for themselves.

But I know not the language which has power to reach the heart of his Majesty; your Excellency, on the contrary, cannot be a stranger to it.

My words are perhaps too bold; perhaps the use I make in the enclosed document of the reminiscences of a mournful past is calculated to thwart my purpose.

It cannot be concealed from your Excellency's sound judgment, whether both are fitted to be of use to my unfortunate companions, or whether the mischief of a contrary effect may perhaps threaten them from my ignorance of the bearing of this step.

And thus my anxious uncertainty about the consequences of the enclosed most submissive petition will excuse me for daring once more to approach your Excellency with the respectful prayer, that your Excellency would be pleased most kindly to decide, on a humane consideration of that which it was not permitted me personally to lay before his Majesty, whether the petition most respectfully enclosed in the original is worthy to be presented to his Majesty by your Excellency's gracious intermediation.

Klagenfurt, 21st of May, 1850.

My petition to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria was as follows:

YOUR MAJESTY!

When, on the 13th of August last year, I laid down our arms before the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, I begged that my unfortunate companions might be spared, as well as the deeply distressed people of Hungary, freely giving up myself in expiation of what had been done. I despised flight, and purposely avoided, after as well as before the laying down of our arms, any expression or action tending to my own safety; for I

wished at least to share the fate of my companions, if my prayer should not be granted; since my companions were guilty of no act for which they deserved a more rigorous fate than myself.

The laying down of our arms was resolved upon in a military council, at which I was not even present. I merely undertook to execute this resolution: and nevertheless, I was pardoned, while a part of the members of this military council lost their lives, another part their property and liberty.

I it was especially whose independent acts, favoured by the fortune of war, so long hostilely delayed the realisation of your Majesty's great idea of a united free Austria: and notwithstanding, your Majesty was pleased to grant pardon to me, while my former inferiors—the tools of my daring hand—were given up to the inexorable severity of the courts-martial.

In vain I sought for a point of view, regarded from which my fate and that of my unfortunate companions might be made to agree. I found none; and abandoned myself to the torturing thought, that the act of Világos, by its consequences speedily and bloodlessly terminating the Hungarian revolution, had been accounted meritorious in me exclusively, and had been rewarded with my pardon.

Deeply afflicting as this supposition is to me, I firmly cling to it, because it has become to me the ground of hope, that those of my former companions who are still alive might not much longer be deprived of your Majesty's most high pardon, if my ingenuous words were permitted to re-echo in your Majesty's soul.

The surrender at Világos, with all its consequences, would have been impracticable without the magnanimous co-operation of all those on whom your Majesty's courts-martial have since either inflicted death, or the severest imprisonment.

The dead—they rest in peace; neither affected any more by fear or hope.

But the living—they still hope. The pardon which has been extended to me, their leader, continually encourages them to hope.

For them I venture my prayer, whose boldness the sacred interests of humanity may justify, the oppressive burden of my grief may excuse.

Mercy for them implores the man who could never hope or pray for mercy for himself, although sacred duties forbade him to reject it when freely offered.

Mercy for those whom death has not yet removed beyond the influence of your Majesty's clemency.

For all, who, by love to their country, in the midst of great bewildering events, enticed from the path of duty, partly too late entered on the honourable way of return, partly could not again enter on it through insurmountable obstacles; and whose faithful love to their fatherland justifies the sure expectation, that they would repay with threefold interest their sacred debt to the great common fatherland by a devoted co-operation in healing the wounds they had once helped to inflict.

The gloomy prisons, unbarred at your Majesty's gracious nod; the purification-commissions relieved from their melancholy duty by the merciful words, "forgiven and forgotten"—would restore to thousands their liberty, their home, their respectable position in society,—to the common fatherland a great number of intelligent faithful citizens,—to the state many a capable tried servant.

The apprehension of a shameful abuse of your Majesty's pardon is contradicted by every trait in the general national character of the Magyars; and even in the non-Magyars among my unfortunate companions, this apprehension vanishes at the remembrance of their voluntary submission.

A single stroke of the pen would gain for your Majesty millions of thankfully devoted hearts—a secure refuge at any time—and thousands of millions of timorous, though voiceless, complaints would become most joyously-sounding wishes for blessings on Francis Joseph the magnanimous.

Four or five weeks later, several of my companions in arms were pardoned; those, namely, who, like myself, belonged to the category of the so-called "quitted" officers, that is, those who had quitted the rank of officers in the Austrian army before the breaking out of the war between Hungary and Austria, but on their departure

had given a written promise never to fight against the armies of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

The publication of this act of mercy induced me to address the following letter to the Minister of the Interior:

To his Excellency the Minister of the Interior,
Alexander von Bach.

His Majesty's recent act of mercy, to which all those officers owe their deliverance from the dungeons, who as "quitted" royal imperial officers had taken service in the revolutionary Hungarian army, and were for this reason condemned by the courts-martial, has surprisingly revealed the beautiful meaning of those consolatory words with which your Excellency dismissed me. The hearts of those who have now been given back to their families and to their friends overflow with loud blessings for those men who put the thought of mercy into the Monarch's heart, and made it there germinate to a noble action. None of the public voices announces their names; but nevertheless I am constrained firmly to believe that the pardon of a considerable number of my companions has certainly been most decidedly promoted by your Excellency; not, perhaps, in consequence of the hopeless steps which I dared, but rather in spite of them; for I can very well conceive that all I urged verbally and in writing, believing it to be in favour of my companions, was more fitted to incite than to conciliate. It came, however, from me, the living evidence, the irrefutable reproach, that punitive justice has by no means been dealt out in equal measure to the participators in the Hungarian revolution.

On a first superficial glance, this disproportion seems now to be equalised—let us leave the dead in peace,—for I also belong to the category of the quitted royal imperial officers. But he who, on the one hand, does not overlook the limited political horizon of the soldier, and, on the other, the events of the summer of 1848, standing somewhat isolated in history, can hardly free himself from the apprehension, that the reproach of inequality in punishing and

forgiving has gained but a broader basis by pardoning all *quitted* officers, in face of the still condemned *active* ones.

The Monarch, whose will is law to the army, was represented in the summer of the year 1848 by *two* executive powers, crippling each other, and nevertheless legitimate; the army was divided between *both* by distinct military oaths. Publicly disavowed by both, but secretly supported by one of them, a *third* national military power arose, and with fatal haste *first* hurled the firebrand of civil war from the south into the heart of the monarchy.

In the midst of this general confusion, only a few succeeded in guessing for which of the two legitimate executive powers the Monarch would declare himself, simultaneously disavowing the other; for the proclamations — which were calculated to explain to many an isolated body of troops, to which they came direct, the true will of the Monarch — were either not communicated to the others at all, or too late, and moreover in such a manner as to weaken their effect. The first steps of the soldier ordered to Hungary for the maintenance of the Hungarian executive power, already nullified in Vienna, were made consequently under the moral influence of the recent military oath, out of obedience, the fundamental principle on which the existence of every regular armed force depends.

The quitted officers already pardoned were not subjected to this influence. They broke their promise, given in the reciprocal bond when they quitted—never to serve with arms in hand against the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria — from a free, independent resolve.

By the pardon of these men, the execution of the condemnations of the active officers, still proceeding, gains an expression of rigour, which causes it not only easily to be forgotten that these also have already been mitigated in the way of mercy, but which moreover might even raise the natural compassion of the masses for those who are punished to a kind of martyr-worship, with all its traditional consequences, especially to be regretted by Austria.

The modest expression of a deeply felt thanks, which I wished to give to my words, has by degrees been changed, from continually looking at so many still-unbarred prisons, into the almost

avowed one of a substantiated intercession; and while I am aware of this, the doubt again arises, whether I do not thereby perhaps injure where I wish to benefit. This doubt would silence me for ever in behalf of my companions, were it not counteracted by the conviction, that your Excellency, recognising in all its greatness the irresistible effect of clemency upon the human heart, and disregarding the contradictory views of parties, will successfully conduct to its consummation that work of reconciliation which has already been so nobly begun.

Klagenfurt, 30th of June, 1850.

I give these documents in the Preface, because I think their contents may be calculated to serve as a pledge beforehand to the reader of the frankness of the subsequent records of my life and acts.

Those historical documents of value which accidentally remained in my possession appear in their proper places, partly given *verbatim*, partly faithfully translated from Hungarian into German.

The surprisingly small number of documents is explained by the circumstance, that I never expected to survive the revolution.

ARTHUR GÖRGEI.

Klagenfurt, 15th of August, 1851.

Note.—The reader is requested to observe that wherever *miles* are mentioned, the German long mile (= nearly 5½ English miles) is meant. In some instances the word '(German)' has been inserted before 'miles,' but it is feared not uniformly.—*Transl.*

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Enter the Honvéds. Occupations out of Hungary. Advanced to Honvéd major. Szolnok; the Volunteer Mobile National-guards. Political confession of faith 1

CHAPTER II.

Detached to the island of Csepel. Nominated commander-in-chief of the southern militia, and simultaneous extension of my military mission. Count Eugene Zichy arrested; examined, condemned, and executed by court-martial 6

CHAPTER III.

Three days' armistice after the battle at Pákozd, Velencze, and Sukoró. Vásárhelyi. Recommencement of hostilities. Perczel my commander-in-chief. The militia. Opening of the expedition against Major-general Roth. Skirmish at Tácz. Disarming of a Croat column. Philippovich in Perczel's head-quarters. Retreat of Major-general Roth. Dispute between Perczel and myself. Disarming of the Roth corps at Ozora 31

CHAPTER IV.

Advanced to Honvéd colonel, and recalled from the Perczel corps. Kálozd. Take possession of some jewels belonging to the late Count Zichy. Vásárhelyi. Pesth. Deliver up the jewels . 49

CHAPTER V.

A consultation at Kossuth's. His want of confidence in Mógа. Secret object of my recall from the Perczel corps and mission to Parendorf 54

CHAPTER VI.

PAGE

The command of the vanguard of the army of the upper Danube transferred to me. Ladislaus Csányi. Our outposts on the Lajtha. First crossing of the frontier. The head-quarters at Parendorf, and my secret mission. The troops of the vanguard. Second crossing of the frontier 59

CHAPTER VII.

First proclamation of Prince Windisch-Grätz, and its consequences. A deliberation beforehand at Móga's about the impending third crossing of the frontier. Some light on the first two crossings of the frontier. The military council in Nikelsdorf. Kossuth in Parendorf. His ultimatum to Prince Windisch-Grätz. The agitations in the camp for the offensive. A Hungarian trumpet made prisoner in the hostile camp, and its consequences 66

CHAPTER VIII.

Third and last crossing of the frontier. The battle at Schwechat. Remarks upon it 78

CHAPTER IX.

A conference with Kossuth. His experience on the flight from Schwechat. Count Guyon named colonel of the National-guard and commander of the expedition against Field-marshal Lieut. Simunich. The chief command of the army of the upper Danube transferred to me. The expedition against Simunich fails. The two meetings between Bem and myself 92

CHAPTER X.

Reasons which had determined me to accept the chief command of the army. I demand the evacuation of the frontier; Kossuth its occupation. Kossuth's dependency. Nevertheless I desire him for Dictator. My reasons. My letter to the Committee of Defence in reference thereto. Controversies between Kossuth, the Committee of Defence, and Mészáros on the one part, and myself on the other. Proofs of it 101

CHAPTER XI.

Reasons why I was not removed from the chief command when in Presburg. Why I did not, of my own accord, resign. Whether

PAGE
I did or did not aspire to the dictatorship, and why. A private letter. Establishment of defensive works at Presburg, Wieselburg, and Raab. The state of Hungary in autumn 1848, and the regular troops 122

CHAPTER XII.

Prince Windisch-Grätz crosses the frontier. It is evacuated. Presburg abandoned. Great losses. Beginning of the retreat towards Raab. Combat at Wieselburg. Continuation of the retreat as far as Raab. Patriotic devastations. An end put to them. Troops believed to be lost unexpectedly saved 133

CHAPTER XIII.

Raab evacuated without drawing a sword. Combat with the rear-guard at Bábolna. Vértesi Hegyek. Plan of defence. Undeceivings. General Perczel defeated at Moor. Offensive dispositions against Perczel's conqueror. Retreat towards Ofen . . . 139

CHAPTER XIV.

Perczel's views about his defeat at Moor. The last resolutions of the Diet at Pesth. Kossuth demands a decisive battle before Ofen, and at the same time the army to be saved and the capitals spared. The impracticability of this. Kossuth at Debreczin. Military council in Pesth. Its resolutions. Battle at Tétény. Evacuation of the capitals 147

CHAPTER XV.

The state of Hungary and the regular troops after the evacuation of the capitals. The proclamation of Waizen. The regular troops get out of the rain and under the spout 156

CHAPTER XVI.

The corps d'armée of the upper Danube. Offensive against Field-marshal Lieut. Simunich. Its interruption by Field-marshal Lieut. Csorich. Characteristics of Colonel Count Guyon. I insist on prosecuting the offensive against Simunich. The chief of the general staff proposes to save the corps of the upper Danube in the mountain-towns, and prevails 169

CHAPTER XVII.

The district of the mountain-towns. Position of the corps

PAGE
d'armée of the upper Danube before the retreat thither. Position of the hostile corps. The plan of retreat. Its execution. Position of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube in the mountain-towns . 176

CHAPTER XVIII.

The enemy attacks the mountain-towns. Zsarnócz. Turning-column of Colonel Collery. Conflict at Hodrics (22d of January) . 181

CHAPTER XIX.

The defeat of the Guyon division at Windschacht (21st of January), and its retreat from Schemnitz as far as Búcsa (22d of January), subsequently becomes known. Critical situation of the Aulich division. Saved from it. Still more critical situation of the Guyon division and that of the left wing. Final junction in Neusohl of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. A previous order to retreat by the war-minister is afterwards taken into consideration. Our lines of retreat from Neusohl towards the upper Theiss. Plan for retreating as far as the Zips. A train of heavy-loaded wagons as rear-guard. The retreat commences. A tempter. Disposition of the population 193

CHAPTER XX.

Arrival of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube in the Zips. Sudden attack at Igló (between the 2d and 3d of February). Dangerous situation of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. A possible outlet. Reasons against making use of it, and for the offensive against Field-marshal Lieut. Count Schlick. Offensive begun. Positions of the corps under Klapka and Schlick. The combinations deduced from it very unfavourable for the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. Importance of the battle at the Branyiszkó. A reckoning with the past 203

CHAPTER XXI.

Report on Guyon's victory at the Branyiszkó (5th of February). Essentially changed situation of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. Count Schlick abandons the basis of his operations. Conjectures occasioned thereby as to his next intentions. Measures against them. Surprising defensive measures of the enemy. Direct news from Colonel Klapka. Their influence on our dispositions for attack. The enemy evacuates Kaschau without striking a blow. Junction of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube with the Hungarian forces on the Theiss. Klapka's last operations against Count

PAGE

Schlick. Offensive concerted between Klapka and myself. The Klapka corps undertakes the pursuit of the Schlick corps. Lieut.-general Dembinski orders the Klapka corps from Kaschau to Miskolcz. The corps d'armée of the upper Danube undertakes the pursuit. Its results 215

CHAPTER XXII.

Dembinski becomes Hungarian commander-in-chief. New classification of the Hungarian forces. The corps d'armée of the upper Danube receives the name, Seventh army corps. Antipathies therein against Dembinski's being commander-in-chief. Causes and consequences. Measures taken against the consequences. Dembinski recognised as commander-in-chief 224

CHAPTER XXIII.

Dembinski rejects the plan of operations concerted between Colonel Klapka and myself. The seventh army corps ordered to Miskolcz. First encounter with Dembinski. Dembinski's first acts as Hungarian commander-in-chief 230

CHAPTER XXIV.

Dembinski's dispositions assume an offensive character. His dissatisfaction with Klapka and the government. His dispositions of troops. Encounter with Dembinski in Erlau. The enemy himself assumes the offensive. Dembinski's characteristics 239

CHAPTER XXV.

Position of the Hungarian army immediately before the two days' battle at Kápolna. Termination of the first day's battle (26th of February). Dembinski's dispositions for the second day's battle. Circumstances causing delay in forwarding them to the army corps. Guyon arrives too late at Kápolna 247

CHAPTER XXVI.

The second day's battle at Kápolna (27th of February). The Kmety division arrives too late at Kerecsend. Dembinski's dispositions of troops after the battle 254

CHAPTER XXVII.

Dembinski after the battle at Kápolna declines any further resist-

PAGE
ance. I disapprove of this measure, but can no longer prevent it. A private misunderstanding between Dembinski and myself. The support of the army 270

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Retreat to Mezö-Kövesd. The camp there. Battle at Mezö-Kövesd on the 28th of February. Guyon's characteristics . . 276

CHAPTER XXIX.

Dembinski intends to give the army rest. His dispositions to that effect. The army enters the cantonments. Klapka attacked at Eger-Farmos (1st of March). The army quits the cantonments. Dembinski's theory for procuring rest. Character of the Windisch-Grätz-Dembinski campaign 281

CHAPTER XXX.

The Klapka divisions refuse unconditional obedience to Dembinski. Dembinski decrees the retreat beyond the Theiss. Klapka effects it with his divisions (2d of March). I delay the retreat of the seventh army corps. Reasons for it. Dembinski countermands the retreat of the seventh army corps. My written declaration against it. I effect the retreat (3d of March) 289

CHAPTER XXXI.

The staff-officers of the army demand Dembinski's removal from the chief command. The government commissary Szemere undertakes to execute it. Dembinski's unsuccessful objections. Kossuth's arrival at the army. Interrogation of the staff-officers. Vetter appointed commander-in-chief 296

CHAPTER XXXII.

Colonel John Damjanics victorious at Szolnok. Dembinski allows us subsequently to discover his plan of operations . . . 304

CHAPTER XXXIII.

The new (Vetter-Dembinski) plan of operations. The interregnum in the army. My acts during it 309

CHAPTER XXXIV.

PAGE
Kossuth and his political opponents 315

CHAPTER XXXV.

My journey to Debreczin. Termination of the interregnum. Vetter commander-in-chief 319

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Independent operations of the seventh army corps. The Vetter-Dembinski plan of operations abandoned. Advance of the united army, as far as Gyöngyös and Hort 323

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Vetter falls sick. The chief command provisionally transferred to me. Our plan of attack. The seventh army corps conquers at Hatvan (2d of April), and thereby renders possible the execution of the plan of attack 328

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

The first, second, and third army corps separate from the seventh corps, and begin to turn the enemy. One half of the third army corps defeats the enemy at Tápió-Bicske, after the latter had previously defeated the whole first corps (4th of April). Continuation of the turning-manœuvre 332

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Battle at Isaszeg (6th of April) 342

CHAPTER XL.

On the state of affairs in Hungary 356

CHAPTER XLI.

Delayed advance against Gödöllö after the battle of Isaszeg. Retreat of Prince Windisch-Grätz towards the capitals. The seventh army corps before and after the battle of Isaszeg 360

CHAPTER XLII.

PAGE
Kossuth in Gödöllö 364

CHAPTER XLIII.

The new plan of operations. Its execution, by storming Waizen, begun on the 10th of April 1849. The sudden attack on Lossoncz (end of March), and its probable consequences 371

CHAPTER XLIV.

Details of the battle at Waizen. Continuation of operations as far as the river Gran at Lévencz. The resolution of the Diet at Debreczin, 14th of April 1849 377

CHAPTER XLV.

Crossing the Gran. Damjanics conquers at Nagy-Sarló on the 19th of April. My views on this combat. Continuation of the operations. The battle at Kéménd on the 20th of April. Relief of the fortress of Komorn on the left bank of the Danube on the 22d of April 384

CHAPTER XLVI.

Preparation for the relief of the fortress of Komorn on the *right* bank of the Danube. Sudden attack on the hostile trench in the night between the 25th and 26th of April. The relief on the right bank also effected on the 26th of April 391

MY LIFE AND ACTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE summoning cry of distress of the first independent Hungarian ministry of war, "The Country is in danger!" drew me from the quiet country-life in which I had passed the spring of 1848, on the estate of a female relative in the north of Hungary, into the ranks of the Honvéd battalions, which had just been raised.

Having formerly been a lieutenant in the royal imperial Austrian army, I was immediately invested with the rank of captain, and attached to the fifth battalion of Honvéds. The station for its formation was Raab (Györ).

There I found a captain my senior in rank already occupied in the organisation of his company. I had known this man when I served in the royal Hungarian Noble Life-guards, and knew also that, not long before, he had been pensioned as a royal imperial lieutenant on account of his mental imbecility. What services could the country expect in the time of war from one whose intellectual faculties had not sufficed for the claims of the service in the time of peace? The preferment of such a man to the rank of captain made me fear that sufficient strictness had not been exercised in the choice of the Honvéd officers. Sadder were the experiences

in this respect which awaited me. This senior comrade of mine was intellectually unfit for his post; the chief of the battalion was also morally so. He was generally recognised as a usurer well known in Pesth.

In these painful circumstances, I joyfully hailed the decree of the ministry, which suddenly transferred me from the battalion to a more independent sphere of action; and from this time I saw my battalion no more.

In Pesth, whither this decree ordered me, I received a commission to purchase for Hungary a supply of flint-muskets, then lying in Smyrna and Constantinople, and to use the greatest possible speed in transporting them to Pesth. This project failed, as the person who offered them could not be depended upon; and I was then commanded to establish a manufactory for fusees and percussion-caps; but meanwhile to furnish percussion-caps during the next year, by obtaining speedy supplies from similar manufactories already existing.

The fulfilment of this task led me, in August 1848, to Prague and Wiener-Neustadt. I visited several times the royal imperial manufactory for fireworks situated near the last-mentioned place, to learn the process of manufacturing fusees adopted there. Introduced by the then ministry of war at Vienna, I received the necessary information from the directors of the establishment in the most obliging manner.

The war of Hungary with the southern provinces of Sclavonia had almost exhausted the stock of fusees at the disposal of the Hungarian ministry of war. I was therefore ordered at the same time to provide Hungary with a fresh supply direct from the royal imperial establishment for fireworks; and assisted by the Vienna ministry of war, quickly executed this commission. On

my return to Pesth, I submitted to the ministerial president a proposal for the establishment of a manufactory for fusees and percussion-caps. But there were always more important things to be attended to. I was obliged to wait, and wait, and again wait, till at last I lost all patience, and insisted on being employed in the war against the Raizen. My request was acceded to. I had to join the suite of the minister of war, who was about to proceed to the Hungarian camp, and superintend the operations against the revolted Raizen and Serbians.

I had already waited an hour for our departure on board the steamer appropriated to the minister of war, when I suddenly received orders to remain in Pesth, and assist in the formation of a plan for the concentration of the Mobile National-guard from the four circles of Hungary, regard being paid to the strategic conditions of the country. I had immediately to take the command in one of the circles, and was appointed to that on this side the Theiss; my chief station being Szolnok. On this occasion I was advanced to the rank of Honvéd major.

In Szolnok I obtained my first insight into the state of affairs in Hungary, and was, alas, undeceived. I had supposed that all my countrymen were animated, like myself, with a determination to sacrifice every thing for the salvation of the fatherland. I confidently expected that the whole Magyar population of Hungary would rise as one man in defence of our native soil and all that renders it dear to us. But the formation of the *mobile* National-guard was already rendered necessary, in general, by a moral defect in the National-guard itself, of which the tragi-comical influence on the events of the war threatened to become an inexhaustible source of

numerous, successful, though involuntary parodies on the traditions of the heroic ages of Hungary.

To leave their own hearths, that they might defend those of their fellow-citizens, which were nearer the danger, seemed to fathers of families and proprietors among the National-guard a matter demanding most mature deliberation. With a most affecting pathos they dwelt on the far more sacred duty of preserving their own dear selves, and obstinately refused to march against the enemies of the country; and if their *mobilisation* was nevertheless sometimes successful, the country was more injured than benefited by it, because the expenses of such an organisation were, in comparison with that of regular troops, disproportionately great, while their services were just as disproportionately small, nay, were scarcely worth mentioning.

This experience had suggested to the ministry the idea of making the personal obligations of the National-guards partly transferable to others, partly profitable to the state in money or money's worth. It was granted to each battalion of National-guards, whose duty it would have been, for instance, to serve with its whole contingent during six weeks against the enemy, to send only a part of its contingent into the field, but for a proportionately longer time. These partial contingents of National-guard battalions were consequently composed of volunteers, and were thus called Volunteer Mobile National-guards. The name of the circle by which they were sent completed their designation.

By the collective expression "volunteers" were understood those also who did not serve freely, that is, those who, belonging to the poorer classes, had been forcibly levied by lot.

Szolnok is situated in the circle on this side the Theiss. The estimated number of mobile National-guards to be furnished by this district was about 5000 men, who, as it was said, were already eager for combat, and needed only to be put into ranks, to be a little drilled, and then led against the enemy. But of the 5000 men thus officially calculated upon, in the course of a month with great difficulty I got together scarcely 700, and of these hardly 100 real volunteers. This, therefore, was my contingent when, in the end of September, I was ordered to occupy Csepel, an island on the Danube below Ofen-Pesth, and to frustrate at any cost attempts to cross the Danube by Field-marshal Lieutenant Ban Jellachich, or his auxiliaries under Generals Roth and Philippovich.

Before I proceed to describe my acts, which only now begin to be of some importance, I think it necessary to explain the relations in which I then stood to the political questions of the day.

The month of March 1848 brought for collective Hungary an independent and responsible ministry based on the ancient constitution. In this ministry was vested the executive power over Hungary Proper, as well as over all the provinces united under the Hungarian crown, without distinction as to the nationality of the inhabitants. This ministry had the sanction of his majesty King Ferdinand V. of Hungary. At the summons of THAT ministry I joined the ranks of the newly-raised Hungarian troops. The royal imperial troops, of whatever nationality, who had been removed from Austria into Hungary, had already taken oath to the constitution, the maintenance of which was the first duty of that ministry. The recently-formed Hungarian troops also took the same oath. This constitution, so far as I could

judge of its influence on the welfare of my country, met with my approbation, and it was the most natural of all feelings which caused me to defend it. All attempts made by the provinces peopled by non-Magyar races to change the constitution through any other than the lawful parliamentary means, as aiming at the overthrow of the existing form of government, were considered high treason.

Whether the Austrian monarchy could preserve its former importance as a great European power, after the isolation of the Hungarian ministries (principally of war and finance) from the governing power constituted in Vienna for the other provinces; and whether Hungary, recognising the guarantees of Austrian influence as the principal condition of its own existence, would not have to sacrifice to the consolidation of collective Austria a part of its newly-acquired advantages;—these were questions, the answers to which lay beyond my sphere, nay, which, candidly speaking, I had never put to myself.

Such were my personal relations to the political questions of that day.

CHAPTER II.

My forces on the island of Csepel being insufficient to oppose with certainty, over an extent of more than two (German) miles, any attempt (supposing such probable) of the enemy to cross from the left to the right bank of the Danube, I had to endeavour, if possible, to increase my numbers there, and also to obtain powers which might enable me successfully to resist far more dangerous enemies,—the indolence, cowardice, and treason of the inha-

bitants of the district. For this purpose I requested from the Prime-minister, Count Louis Batthyányi, a document authorising me to form a court-martial to adjudicate upon cases of disobedience, cowardice, and treason, to confirm condemnations to death, and order their execution. Furnished with this document, I repaired to the place of my destination.

At the commencement of my new duties, the Prime-minister entrusted me with the chief command of a division of mixed troops stationed at Duna-Földvár, as well as of the local militia levied from the lower Danube. The original object of my mission was also extended, and the field of my operations widened; I had to prevent the junction of General Roth's corps with the troops of Ban Jellachich.

The division in Duna-Földvár consisted of about 1200 infantry from the so-called Hunyady-Schar, and some cavalry. There being no probability that General Roth would dare, single-handed, to cross the Danube, through a country where he could not count on any sympathy, it was to be expected that he would try by every means to unite as soon as possible with Jellachich. But the latter had already reached Stuhlweissenburg (Székes-Fehérvár), whilst Generals Roth and Philippovich were five or six days' march more to the south.

Not strong enough to engage the latter, I had, on the contrary, to fear that the detached division in Duna-Földvár would shortly be attacked and beaten by them, perhaps even destroyed. I therefore drew the troops from Földvár to Adony, on the right bank of the Danube, opposite the southern part of Csepel, and confined myself to crossing from east to west the line of communication between Generals Roth and Jellachich, about

Soponya, by two parallel chains of outposts, one facing the north against the camp of Ban Jellachich at Stuhlweissenburg, the other southwards against the troops of Generals Roth and Philippovich. Thus I should render impossible all communication between the two hostile corps by means of patrols, couriers, or spies. The local militia, which had been speedily levied from the strip of land occupied by the outposts, furnished them with reinforcements.

On the 29th of September, 1848, Counts Eugene and Paul Zichy, coming from Stuhlweissenburg, were stopped at the northern outpost line: on suspicion of being hostile, they were arrested, and escorted on the following day to my head-quarters at Adony.

I was at Csepel when the news reached me. To convince myself what the facts were, I returned without delay to Adony. In the streets I met crowds of the inhabitants, and of the southern militia concentrated there, evincing the most hostile excitement against the two prisoners. While inquiring what had been done with them, I met by chance two staff-officers (a colonel and a major) of the Hunyady-Schar. By a decree of the Prime-minister both were under my command, without reference to their seniority and rank. I was informed by them that, during my absence, they had already given orders to escort the counts to Pesth. I asked the reason of these orders. The colonel assumed a mysterious air, and invited me to accompany him to his lodgings. When there, he whispered to me, with evident satisfaction, that he had taken care both counts should share the fate of Count Lamberg. "The major here," he continued, pointing to him, "will take upon himself the conduct of the escort, and harangue the people in the streets of

Pesth against the counts while marched through the town. The people is certainly still disposed to execute Lynch-law on account of the murder of Count Lamberg . . . . " I could hardly believe my senses. This plan would have immolated two men to the blind rage of the populace, merely on account of their name! After having in vain endeavoured to convince its contrivers of the infamy of such an act, I was obliged to make use of my authority over them. Reversing their arrangements, I ordered that the prisoners should not be escorted to Pesth, but that they should be immediately examined, and according as they were found guilty or innocent of high-treason, should either be tried by a court-martial or set at liberty. Whereupon I received for answer: "I might try to execute this myself, and at all events take the responsibility of what I intended to do."

The execution of my order was indeed most hazardous. In the neighbourhood of Adony, on the right bank of the Danube, I had not a single man at my disposal, except the militia and the Hunyady-Schar. The militia considered as their first duty the destruction of all whom they suspected, or who were represented as being so; and both counts had been pointed out to them as traitors to the country. The Hunyady-Schar, on the other hand, was a corps of little discipline; the colonel just mentioned commanded them in person. He had organised them, he had made all the appointments; he suffered all kinds of dissolute conduct,—to him they were devoted: while they hardly knew me by name; and, besides, the relation in which I (a major) stood as commander-in-chief to their commander (a colonel) had in it something offensive to the troop itself. In addition to this, the Hunyady-Schar also had already been incited *against*

both counts; and from among the whole mass of armed men assembled there, not a single voice was raised *for* the prisoners, but every one declaimed against them.

The jeering allusion of the colonel to the consequences of my intention to liberate the two counts in case they should not be found guilty, acquired through these circumstances a dangerous significance. I soon saw that if I seriously intended to have my orders executed, I must act decisively, speedily, and in person. First of all, the prisoners had to be conveyed to Csepel, consequently across the Danube. On that island there were about 400 men of the battalion I had myself formed, and on whose obedience I could already rely; and there were there at that time only very small bands of lagging militia wandering about, against whose hostile intentions they could be sufficiently protected. There was but little means of communication, over the broad arm of the Danube, between the island and Adony; so that when once upon the island, there was no longer much to fear from the militia, and the Hunyady-Schar on the Adony shore. But the transport of the counts to Csepel was just the most difficult part of the task; and, from the evidently increasing excitement of the masses, threatened to be soon impracticable. The greatest speed, therefore, seemed necessary.

I went immediately in search of the prisoners, and found them at dinner in a house close to my own quarters, a guard being in the court-yard, and with them the officer who had escorted them hither. The house was surrounded by such dense crowds of people that it was only with great difficulty I could get into it. On entering the room of the prisoners, they were presented to me by the officer on duty; and Count Eugene Zichy,

when his name was mentioned, added, that he was the unfortunate administrator of this comitate (Stuhlweissenburg), on whom had fallen the hatred commonly felt against those who hold the office of administrator, and the more heavily in proportion to the strictness of his former administration. "I have, however," continued the count, "always been a good patriot, and formerly belonged to the liberal party." His remarks were interrupted by his companion in misfortune, who mentioned as a decisive proof of his patriotic feelings, that he had, within the last few days, resigned his post as officer in a R. I. cavalry regiment, that he might not have to fight against his native country. I requested them to reserve their defence till the time of judicial examination, and told them to prepare immediately for their transport to Csepel. I then left them, and went to arrange their escort.

As the object of this escort was less to frustrate any apprehended attempt at escape on the part of the prisoners, than to protect them from violence in the midst of the dense masses of the population of Adony and the local militia, exasperated especially against Count Eugene Zichy, I had at my command but a small number of individuals fit for the service. However, I succeeded in finding some among the soldiers of the Hunyady-Schar, who had formerly served, and were fortunately sober. Of these I formed the escort, and remained constantly near the prisoners during their removal from the place of custody to the bank of the Danube, because I apprehended some malicious disturbance from the two staff-officers already mentioned, and did not trust even the escort. Several officers of the National-guard, who had joined me of their own accord when I left Pesth for

Csepel, now continued by my side, and honourably assisted me in protecting the prisoners against the hostile designs of the mass.

It took us about half an hour to reach the Danube. Our way thither lay through the midst of the town, and then close past the camp of the militia.

At first, and so long as the crowd consisted of those whom just before our setting out I had energetically warned, in a short address, not to commit any violence against the counts, no interruptions occurred. These, however, were soon succeeded by others, who repeatedly attempted to break through the escort, and, with the most horrid imprecations, to seize the prisoners. It was now important to repress these manifestations, without having recourse to extreme measures; because on the great number of drunken persons in the crowd, a premature use of arms might have produced an effect directly contrary to that intended. The attacks even of the most furious were directed only against Count Eugene Zichy. Several crowded close on the escort, and impetuously demanded to be shewn him, that they might reckon with him; and after they were repulsed, they gave vent to their rage, generally in the most vociferous accusations against him. These had mostly reference to his inhuman treatment of those under his authority.

Amid many and various scenes such as these, which grew ever more menacing and more intimidating to the escort, we at last reached the Danube. I had previously charged some officers to have in readiness the means necessary for crossing. But at the mere rumour, that I intended to convey the counts to the island, only for the purpose of more certainly allowing them to escape,

all boats had suddenly disappeared. The officers whom I had sent vainly endeavoured to procure some. Every moment of delay evidently increased the danger to which the lives of the prisoners were exposed: close to the flat shore of the Danube, pressed down to the water's edge by the excited peasants, far from any place of protection!

Preservation without boats was impossible. At whatever cost, they must be obtained. Finding even threats unavailing, the officers had seized two millers of the place, and with these they forced their way through the crowd. I threatened them with death unless they immediately enabled us to cross. This succeeded. In a few minutes two millers' boats were ready to receive us.

Meanwhile the rage of the populace had reached its height. Close to the place where we were awaiting the boats, several hundred scythes, intended for the militia, were piled up. A party of my own battalion guarded them. The escort having directed its repulses mainly against our armed assailants, those nearest us now were almost wholly without arms. The rising bank of the river enabled the masses to have constantly in view the objects of their hostility. This circumstance was particularly favourable to the instigators against the counts. As often as they were recommended to the vengeance of the crowd by any agitator, he could at the same time distinctly point them out. This increased the effect. Short addresses, to the purport that both of them would long ago have been hung on the nearest tree, had they been poor peasants, and not high and noble counts; that there was no law for punishing counts, and no justice for peasants, &c. &c.,—were continually re-echoed by a thousand voices.

With increasing anxiety I counted the moments till the arrival of the boats. At last they came. But scarcely had we proceeded to embark, when suddenly one of the mass cried out: "Don't let them cross; we shall be deprived of our just vengeance!" and in an instant a dense forest of weapons of every kind bristled over the heads of the unarmed crowd in front, who now rushed towards the pile of scythes, that they also might arm themselves. The party on guard drew back terrified. The escort also began to waver.

Matters had now come to extremities. I called to my people to take courage, and commanded them to shoot dead, without hesitation, the first man who should dare to advance a step.

The cocking of the muskets fortunately checked the foremost of the assailing peasants; they hesitated, and before the rest could encourage them to renew the attack, I was in the boats with the escort and the prisoners, and already some strokes from the shore.

Immediately on arriving at the island, I called together the court-martial, which was to examine and pass sentence on the counts. I had succeeded in saving them from the fury of an enraged mob, but could not, without acting contrary to my convictions, save them from the stringency of the articles of war.

The examination and court-martial were held in conformity with the prescribed regulations of the royal imperial Austrian army; these, as well as the articles of war on which they are based, having been introduced among the recently-formed Hungarian troops. The office of president devolved upon me. I had at my disposal only the two staff-officers of the Hunyady-Schar already mentioned; and neither of these could I con-

scientiously permit to decide on the life or death of the men whose destruction they had already resolved upon.

The basis of the proceedings was the written report of the commander of the outposts on the capture of the counts, which was accompanied by the documents discovered on searching the articles of wearing-apparel and carriage of the Count Eugene Zichy.

Among the latter were numerous copies, still wet from the press, of two proclamations; one of which was addressed to the Hungarian nation, the other to the troops in Hungary. At the bottom of both had been printed the name of his Majesty King Ferdinand V. of Hungary, with the date: Schönbrunn, 22d September 1848. The legal counter-signature of a responsible Hungarian minister was wanting to both. Their contents were calculated to encourage the South-Sclavonian provinces of Hungary, which had revolted against the lawful executive in Pesth, in their attempt to overthrow the lawfully existing government, and even to seduce the troops, who had sworn to the constitution of the country, to participate in this revolt.

Besides these proclamations, an open letter was found among the papers, in the following words:—

"*To the Royal Imperial Brigadier-General Von Roth.*

"GENERAL,—At the request of Count Eugene Zichy, I have decided that a safe-guard and every protection be given to the Count.—Stuhlweissenburg, 27th September, 1848.

"JELLACHICH, *m. p.* (*manu propria*), Field-Marshal Lieutenant."

Count Eugene Zichy's own depositions were in substance as follows:

When the Archduke Stephen, palatine of Hungary,

a short time since, came to Stuhlweissenburg, with the intention of remaining near the Hungarian camp, he (Count Zichy) had for the last time left his usual residence, Kálozd, and repaired to Stuhlweissenburg. There he remained even after the departure of the archduke palatine, and the retreat of the Hungarian army. Soon afterwards, the Croat army under the personal command of Ban Jellachich had reached and occupied the town. All the civil officers of the comitate of Stuhlweissenburg, whom the Croats could capture, had been kept prisoners in the comitate-house. This caused the inhabitants of the town to address themselves to him (Count Zichy), whom the Croats had left unmolested, with the request that he would induce Ban Jellachich to prevent his Croats from plundering. This request he had made, and with success.

When he (Count Zichy) had afterwards heard that General Roth was approaching Kálozd with a Croat corps of 10,000 men, he asked from Ban Jellachich a safe-guard (*Sauvegarde*), that he might protect the poor inhabitants of the place against the robberies of the Croats; whereupon Ban Jellachich had given him the above-mentioned letter to Roth.

Armed with this letter, after the main army of the Croats had taken their departure for Velencze, he had left Stuhlweissenburg, accompanied by his cousin, now his fellow-prisoner, for the purpose of repairing to Kálozd, there to await the arrival of General Roth, and obtain from him protection for the poor inhabitants of the place against the plundering of his soldiers; but immediately after to return to Stuhlweissenburg, and from thence start for Presburg. His stay at Kálozd was to be only for a few hours.

He had neither disseminated the proclamations found in his carriage, nor had he wished to do so. The originals had been brought by Count Mensdorf, a royal courier, from Vienna, and printed in Stuhlweissenburg by order of Ban Jellachich. The copies which lay before us had been left behind by two officers of the Croat army quartered in his house at Stuhlweissenburg, and in mistake packed up with his things by his valet.

To weaken the suspicion that he had intended to carry these proclamations to General Roth's camp, Count Zichy constantly renewed the protestations of his patriotic sentiments. I was thus induced to ask him how it happened then, that, being so patriotic, it had not occurred to him to transmit to the Hungarian camp the news of the menacing proximity of the Croat auxiliary corps, which he had been aware of two days before his arrest, as was plain from the date of the letter of protection, which lay before us.

The justification of Count Zichy was to this effect: He had been unable to leave Stuhlweissenburg before the 29th, because Ban Jellachich and his army did not quit the town sooner. Until that day it had been surrounded by Croats. These would have stopped and plundered him (Count Zichy), had he attempted to leave Stuhlweissenburg before the departure of the enemy, his letter of protection being in force only for General Roth's camp. When at last, on the 29th, he had left Stuhlweissenburg, he believed it to be superfluous to transmit intelligence to the Hungarian camp of the approach of the Croat auxiliary corps, supposing, as he did, that it was already generally known. Besides, he had immediately announced at the station (where he was

arrested), that General Roth was advancing with his corps.

The charge against Count Eugene Zichy consisted:

1. In an understanding with the enemies of the country.

2. In active participation in the open revolt of the South Sclaves against the government lawfully existing in Hungary, by propagating proclamations intended to abet the revolt.

As most direct evidence of the first crime there lay before us the letter of protection; as evidence of the second, the proclamations. In his statement Count Zichy had endeavoured to weaken both these proofs.

He called the letter of protection (*Schutzbrief*) an ordinary letter of safe-guard (*Sauvegardeschreiben*), such as is often given during war by the commanders of troops even to the inhabitants of an enemy's country, from innocent and humane considerations. But in regard to the proclamations, he affirmed that they had been packed up with his luggage by mistake on the part of his valet.

To clear himself still more distinctly from the suspicion of both the crimes contained in the accusations, he repeatedly endeavoured to introduce into his statements protestations of his patriotic sentiments; and excused himself for having neglected to transmit the news of the approach of the hostile auxiliary corps of Croats, from the supposition that their advance was already generally known. He moreover adduced, in proof of these patriotic sentiments, the circumstance that, when he found Hungarian outposts in Soponya, he had, in evident contradiction to that supposition, immediately communicated to them the news of the approach of the hostile auxiliary corps.

The rules of the court-martial allow of no defence. The *votum informativum* of the auditor or law-officer, customary in the ordinary military tribunals, has no place in the court-martial.

The auditor, or, in his absence, his deputy, at the conclusion of the examination, has to communicate to the president of the court-martial only and secretly, his opinion as to the sentence which the law prescribes; and he, after having considered the opinion of the auditor, decides for himself, and communicates his decision secretly to his fellow-judges, calling upon them to notify their assent by drawing their side-arms, or their dissent by omitting this act: all the members of the court-martial vote at the same time.

According to these rules, the right of forming a positive judgment in a court-martial is exclusively reserved to the president: all the other members—not excepting even the auditor—are confined within the narrow bounds of rejecting or ratifying, by swift resolve, the proposed judgment, without previous consultation, nay, without having had even the time necessary for mature deliberation. Thus the law claims the decision on the life or death of those brought before a court-martial almost entirely for the president; and it is therefore his duty, in the secrecy of his own conscience, to undertake the defence of the accused against the judicial opinion of the auditor.

Viewed in this light, it was my duty to consider in his favour the value of those declarations of Count Eugene Zichy, by which he had endeavoured to weaken the force of the before-mentioned charges.

The most serious accusation was the attempted dissemination of the enemy's proclamations. Count Zichy

having asserted that his valet had by mistake packed up the proclamations with his luggage, I had to endeavour to find proofs of the credibility of this assertion in the coincident circumstances. But in vain! For the proclamations had been left behind them by the officers of the enemy quartered in the house of Count Zichy; and it appeared most probable that Count Zichy, as proprietor of a house in the town of Stuhlweissenburg, which certainly had several rooms, did not, considering his oft-protested patriotic sentiments, occupy the same room with the enemy's officers, nor even hold any friendly intercourse with them. The proclamations, therefore, could only have been left in one of the rooms occupied by the officers while quartered in the house. Further, according to his own declaration, Count Zichy resolved, immediately after the departure of the officers, to go to Kálozd for a few hours only, and to return immediately to Stuhlweissenburg. On such short excursions much luggage is not commonly taken, but generally only such articles as are daily, nay, hourly needed. From what has been already said, these articles could scarcely have been left lying in the rooms just quitted by the officers of the enemy, consequently not near the proclamations, by possibility forgotten in these rooms.

In the face of these probabilities I, alas, could not comprehend how it could have happened, that while the valet was engaged—probably in the sitting-room of his master—in arranging the articles necessary for a journey of only some hours' duration, the proclamations left lying in another room had so fallen into his hands as, by *mistake*, to have been packed up with them. The pretty considerable bulk and the striking shape of the forty-three pieces (this was the number of proclamations found)

of coarse printing-paper in half-sheets, when lying among the other articles, were sufficient to contradict the assumption of such a mistake.

It would have sounded far more credible, that the proclamations had been *intentionally* packed up by the valet, and of course, considering the patriotic feelings of his master, without his knowledge.

But Count Zichy, on the discovery of the proclamations in his carriage, might have immediately perceived the danger which threatened the life of his valet in consequence of this discovery, and, secure in the consciousness of his own innocence—in spite of the indignation which, considering his oft-asserted patriotic sentiments, he must have felt at the *intentional* act of his valet—might have had a kind of generous compassion for him, and have resolved to represent the evidence of his crime as the consequence of a mere mistake.

I at least could very easily conceive the possibility of such a fit of generosity; and had hereby to be only still more incited to weaken the dangerous suspicion of traitorous understanding with the enemies of the country, which the Count, by a noble emotion of the heart, might in a most critical way have turned off from the guilty head of his valet on to his own innocent one,—by developing, where possible, the positive proofs of his asserted patriotic sentiments, from the coincidence of his own declarations with the motives for the facts now before me, these motives becoming consistently discernible by means of the accessory circumstances.

For this purpose there were, however, in the Count's own declaration, only three points, in some degree favourable, to be taken into consideration. The Count had declared that:

1. At the solicitation of the inhabitants of Stuhlweissenburg, he had interceded with Ban Jellachich to put a stop to the robberies of the Croats.

2. He had requested the letter of protection from Ban Jellachich likewise, only with the intention of protecting the poor inhabitants of Kálozd against the robberies of the Croats of General Roth. Finally,

3. He had immediately communicated to the first Hungarian soldiers whom he unexpectedly met near Soponya, when on his journey from Stuhlweissenburg to Kálozd, the menacing approach of General Roth with his corps of 10,000 Croats.

But however favourable the light thrown on these points, it could not be overlooked that Count Eugene Zichy possessed a house in Stuhlweissenburg, and that Kálozd was his own estate; and that consequently the personal interest which he had in seeing Stuhlweissenburg as well as Kálozd spared from the robberies of the Croats, was quite sufficient to impel him to the acts mentioned under (1.) and (2.), even in a total absence of patriotism.

But the third point seemed, from the coincidence of the simultaneous circumstances, far more calculated to testify against, than for, the patriotism of the Count. For, had he been well affected to his country and its defenders, the unexpected challenge of a Hungarian outpost must either have joyfully surprised him, or awakened in him the most anxious solicitude for the safety of his country's troops, exposed to the attacks of a hostile corps of 10,000 men. Both feelings could only have decided him to hasten as much as possible the communication of his certain knowledge of the threatened danger. Had the Count been well disposed

to his country and its defenders, the thought that, forced by circumstances, he had been obliged to apply to its enemies for the necessary protection to his person and property, would have been painful; the challenge of the Hungarian outpost must have filled him with the joyful hope that behind this outpost there stood an army of his countrymen sufficiently strong to deliver him at once from his painful position; he must have longed for this deliverance, and made haste to ensure it by a behaviour fitted to awaken confidence. Nay, even had the Count, in sight of the hostile armies, remained entirely neutral in his feelings, the challenge of the Hungarian outpost must have decided him, if conscious of the purity of the object of his journey, on the score of prudence at least, instantly and freely to produce the letter of protection from the Croat general, for the very purpose of proving the purity of his intention, and of preventing the suspicion—equally dangerous and unworthy—that he, a Hungarian subject, lived in treasonable communication with the rebels against the lawfully-existing order.

But Count Zichy had to be *forcibly* arrested; and only after this had taken place, did he mention the menacing proximity of the auxiliary corps of Croats, asking his captors if they did not know that General Roth was approaching with 10,000 men. But the Count *concealed* the enemy's letter of protection. This was discovered only in consequence of the forcible search among his articles of dress.

This circumstance, as well as the resistance to the challenging outpost, which necessarily preceded the forcible arrest of the Count, made it easier to recognise the meaning of a menace than of a friendly communication

in the Count's question, whether they did not know that General Roth was approaching with 10,000 Croats; and testified not only against his self-asserted patriotism, but much more to the existence of a mode of thinking and acting, which had every thing in common with that of the *open* enemies of the country—except its *openness*.

The reflections to which another point in the Count's statement gave rise, led unfortunately to the same conclusion.

When the proclamations discovered in the carriage of Count Zichy were laid before him during the examination, he distinctly recognised them as the same which the enemy's officers, who had been quartered in his house at Stuhlweissenburg, had left there. He must consequently have seen these proclamations during the time that elapsed between the departure of the officers and his own setting out from Stuhlweissenburg.

Had the Count been a true patriot, he would immediately have destroyed these proclamations. For he knew every detail of the manner in which their originals had reached Stuhlweissenburg; and could not have been ignorant of their dangerous tendency as regarded the lawfully-existing order of things in Hungary.

The speediest destruction of those copies was, moreover, in his power, without the slightest risk; the enemy's officers, who had brought them into the house, and had forgotten them there, having marched away with the whole of their army.

But Count Zichy had neglected to do this; and hence it appeared—as has already been pointed out—that the existence in his breast of the patriotic sentiments, asseverated by him during the examination, was wholly untenable.

His statement, that these proclamations had come into his carriage only by a *mistake of his valet*, now indeed became more credible, because very probably the Count had himself brought them into his own sitting-room, and consequently near to the articles which were to be taken with him on his short journey. But through the barefaced senselessness with which Count Zichy dared to affirm during the examination, notwithstanding the letter of protection, the contents of which expressed an almost unlimited confidence on the part of the hostile general in the friendly disposition of his *protégé*, that he had neglected to transmit to the Hungarian camp the news of the approach of the auxiliary corps of Croats, only because he had supposed that it was already generally known; through the same barefaced senselessness with which he adduced, as a proof of his patriotic sentiments, that he had communicated the news of the near danger from the enemy to the first Hungarian outpost which he met at Soponya,—he had entirely destroyed the credibility of all his other statements during the examination; and the evidence on which both the points of accusation against Count Zichy were founded, acquired only so much the greater weight from his contradictory declarations.

Upon this evidence, the officer who acted as auditor of the court-martial had delivered his judicial opinion: That Count Eugene Zichy, for being in an understanding with the enemies of the country, and for active participation in the South-Sclavonian rebellion by propagating proclamations drawn up in its favour, as guilty of high treason—(the Hungarian original copy of the judgment contains the expression, "traitor to the fatherland")—be punished with death by hanging.

Before I, as president of the court-martial, adopted this opinion of the auditor as my own decision, I had to make it clear to myself, whether, and how far, from the evidence before me and the coincidence of the circumstances, I was morally convinced that, contrary to the declarations of Count Zichy, he was really guilty of both the crimes with which he was charged.

Although my deliberations in favour of the Count had led to the unfavourable result, that he did not feel the slightest sympathy for the legitimate cause of his country, still it was not placed beyond a doubt that he lived in *actual* understanding with its enemies. His violent behaviour, in consequence of which he had to be forcibly arrested; his question, resembling a threat, addressed to the Hungarian outposts, whether they did not know that a Croat auxiliary corps was already close at hand; his secreting the enemy's letter of protection;—all this might just as well have had its origin in the Count's intractable nature, and in his habit of never treating inferiors otherwise than brutally, as in his surprised consciousness of guilt, and sudden perception that an imposing carriage alone could rescue him from the danger of being rigorously searched, and, after the discovery of the letter of protection and the proclamations, hung on the nearest tree as an enemy's spy.

The contents of the letter of protection only could furnish the principal proof of the Count's real understanding with the enemies of the country; and this letter appeared, at first sight, nothing more than the concession of a so-called safe-guard, or protective watch-post (*Schutzwache*).

By 'safe-guard' is generally understood that usage in war which is commonly applied in those cases in

which the act concerns the interests of humanity in their widest sense, for the preservation of human lives or things which either could never have had, or have already ceased to have, any influence on the operations of war.

In such cases, for instance, the general who leaves a place appeals to the humane feelings of his advancing adversary, when he avails himself of this usage of war, probably introduced into the armies of all civilised states.

In the Austrian army this usage of war consists in placing the persons or things in question under the care of a special protective watch-post, whose duty it is to protect what has been confided to it from every kind of injury until an opportunity offers of consigning to an officer of the enemy—the higher in rank the better—the written request, in such cases always indispensable, addressed by its own general to that of the enemy, and with it, at the same time, what had been placed under its protection.

Protective watch-posts of this kind are generally not made prisoners by the enemy, but are duly escorted either to their own outposts, or at least far beyond the chain of those of the enemy. Hence their name 'safe-guard,' which passed over to the custom itself. This is undoubtedly the noblest blossom of the most chivalrous mode of carrying on war.

The chief condition, however, for the performance of this usage of war with security is, that its application neither may nor can cause any advantage whatever to the general as such. This circumstance must be so plain as to be evident to the enemy also.

To travellers capable of bearing arms, the safe-guard is applicable only in very rare cases; in particular only

when their former as well as their present sphere of action is evidently remote from the cause of the war, as also from the war itself.

But a letter written by a commander-in-chief of an army, and given to a traveller whose relation to the war does not correspond to these conditions, in order that the possessor of this letter may be considered as a friend and not as an enemy by an isolated corps of the *same* army, within the circuit of whose operations he intends to move,—such letter can never bear any analogy to the humane war-usage of the safe-guard.

The letter in question, even if only that part of it be considered in which a safe-guard is assigned to Count Zichy in General Roth's camp, was consequently nothing else than an especially favourable passport given by the enemy; the mere granting of which forced on one the supposition that the writer of the passport—in this case the enemy's commander-in-chief—had already received indubitable proofs of Count Zichy's sympathy with the objects of the war in which he was engaged. The correctness of this supposition appeared to be still more confirmed by the concluding formula of the letter—namely, that "every protection be given to the Count."

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that a letter of protection of the same tenour, *mutatis mutandis*, granted to a harmless person—for instance, to a man of scientific celebrity, that he may not be interrupted in his journey, undertaken to make researches in the natural or other sciences—would have led at worst to the temporary loss of the bearer's personal liberty; it being assumed as a matter of course, that his conduct towards the outpost who stopped him had not been so suspicious as that of

Count Zichy. But Count Zichy was, as is generally known, neither a person of scientific, nor, under the then existing circumstances, of an otherwise *harmless* celebrity. By the constitution recently sanctioned by the king, he had, like many others of his rank and political creed, been deprived of an influential position in the country, of many of his privileges of nobility, nay even of a considerable part of his revenues. That he therefore longed again, like many others of his rank and political creed, for the ante-March fleshpots of Egypt, and that he had sympathies for the overthrow of the recent Hungarian constitution, and especially for the Croat invasion on account of its feudal-reactionary character,—was more than probable. Of Magyar origin, he had, however, by actions to prove this sympathy to the enemy's general-in-chief, before he could obtain the letter of protection which lay before us.

Consequently this letter of protection, in accordance with the events which preceded its discovery, made it in fact evident that the Hungarian subject, Count Zichy, had an operative understanding with the enemies of his country.

Once arrived at this moral conviction, I positively could no longer adduce any argument to shew that Count Zichy had not *himself* taken these proclamations with him from Stuhlweissenburg to Kálozd, intending to hand them over to General Roth that he might disseminate them. Being aware of the proximity of the hostile auxiliary corps to Stuhlweissenburg, and comforted by the supposition that his country had no troops between that place and the enemy's main army, the execution of such a design appeared to Count Zichy to be altogether without danger, and the opportunity therefore ex-

tremely favourable for rendering an important service to the party to which he adhered, without any sacrifice to himself.

But these considerations led to the further moral conviction that Count Zichy had really endeavoured to disseminate the hostile proclamations, and that he was engaged in the execution of this design, when he was unexpectedly stopped and arrested by our outposts.

In accordance with this conviction, the motives also were revealed which had induced Count Zichy to state, that the proclamations were in his carriage by a mere *mistake*, and not from the criminal *intention* of his valet. It was by no means the impulse of a generous compassion which had drawn from the Count this assertion; but the fear of being confronted with his valet, from whose attachment he might expect that, to exonerate his master, he would perhaps take upon himself a mistake, but certainly not the criminal intention, the avowal of which might be followed by the punishment of death.

After all this, I was deprived, on the one hand, of any valid reason for coming to a conclusion different from the judicial opinion of the auditor; while, on the other hand, the great danger in which the country was at that time, and the importance of a successful accomplishment of my mission towards averting it—on which account I had been invested with powers so unusually ample—demanded the strictest application of the laws of war against crimes of that kind.

I therefore passed sentence: That Count Eugene Zichy had really committed the crimes of which he was accused, had thereby forfeited his life, and deserved the punishment of death by the halter.

This sentence was unanimously adopted by the whole

court-martial, and was carried into effect after the delinquent had received the last offices of religion.

Count Eugene Zichy's fellow-prisoner, Count Paul Zichy—against whom the proofs requisite for the proceedings of a court-martial did not exist—was handed over for trial to the ordinary tribunals.

CHAPTER III.

THE first important battle, which was fought on the 29th September, 1848, between the Hungarian army and the Croats, at Pákozd, Velencze, and Sukoró, led to a three days' armistice. During this interval the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army, the Austrian General Móga, held a council of war upon the operations to be next undertaken. Before this council was summoned, I had received orders from the commander-in-chief to draw back my outposts from Soponya, and to proceed with a part of my detachment, on the 1st of October, to Ercsény (Ercsi) on the right bank of the Danube, above Adony. On the 30th, immediately after the termination of the court-martial against the Counts Zichy, I obeyed these orders.

On the 2d of October a lieutenant of the Hunyady-Schar, named Vásárhelyi, arrived at Sziget-Ujfalu, on the island of Csepel, opposite Ercsi, with a report that, soon after the Counts Zichy had been conveyed from Soponya to Adony, a suspected individual had been stopped on the line of outposts near the former place; had taken to flight at the first challenge of the vidette;

and while escaping had thrown away a crumpled-up note. This note had been found by the pursuing patrol, and handed over to him (Vásárhelyi). In a few lines, without legible address or signature, it mentioned a hiding-place in Count Zichy's castle at Kálozd, "where," thus the document ran, "may be found what is sought for." This hint had determined him (Vásárhelyi) to undertake immediately an expedition to Kálozd, hoping to find there a large supply of arms. When arrived at Kálozd, he got hold of the count's intendant, and forced him to point out the hiding-place indicated in the note. But, instead of the supposed supply of arms, only two iron chests, securely locked, were to be found; and these he had immediately brought away to save them from the Croats, who were just approaching. He was ignorant of the contents of the chests, as they remained locked.

I asked to see the note in question; but received for answer that, having found out the hiding-place, the identity of which with that indicated by the note was undoubted, he had taken no further heed of the note, which had been lost by him while engaged in searching for the hiding-place. Moreover, he thought the chests he had brought with him would be sufficient proof of the correctness of his statements.

I found, in fact, no reason to doubt them; and having convinced myself that neither of the chests had been opened, I ordered Vásárhelyi to escort them without delay to Pesth, and deliver them to the government. At the same time I sent by him a report of the whole affair, in which I recommended him to the attention of his superiors for promotion out of his turn.

Meanwhile the armistice had been made use of by Ban Jellachich for such a speedy flank-march from his

position, after the battle on the 29th September, towards Raab, that it became impossible for General Roth to overtake him with his auxiliary corps, which was consequently exposed to the danger of meeting with total discomfiture, a few days later, by being separated from the Croat main army, as well as from the Croat-Sclavonian frontier, by Hungarian forces.

On the 4th of October hostilities recommenced between General Móga's troops and those of Ban Jellachich.

I was incorporated with my detachment into the corps of Moriz Perczel, who was then colonel and commander of the so-called Zrinyi-Schar, which had been appointed to act independently against General Roth's Croat corps. This I learned only on the evening of the 3d of October in Adony, whither I had returned from Ercsi; and as, according to a previous decree of the Hungarian commander-in-chief, I retained my independent position, and was entrusted with the same mission, I had already issued my arrangements against General Roth for the following day.

Moriz Perczel thus took, on the evening of the 3d of October, the principal direction of the expedition against General Roth, and assigned to me the command of the vanguard. He made no changes in my previous dispositions.

Our object was, in the first instance, to get between General Roth and the road to Stuhlweissenburg, and either drive him back to the south, or at least detain him till we should be sufficiently reinforced to defeat him. In the latter case, the militia, organising in the south of Hungary, on the right bank of the Danube, was charged to render his retreat into Croatia as difficult as possible.

The brief instructions for this purpose, which I, as commander-in-chief of the southern militia, gave to my sub-commanders, were nearly these:

"The militia is not to be employed in open combat against regular troops, especially if these are provided with artillery: open combat, therefore, is to be avoided as far as possible. It is to alarm the enemy by the successive display of constantly changing and augmenting masses *beyond* the reach of his guns; to obstruct his movements, by destroying the most important means of communication in the hostile district of operations (defiles, dams, bridges, &c.), as well as by removing the facilities for transport existing in the neighbourhood; and to expose him to the most destructive privations, by consuming the nearest provisions, and secreting the more remote. These are the duties to which the militia has to confine itself."

That, in fact, I could scarcely expect more useful services from the militia, the following statements will show.

As commander-in-chief of the southern militia, I was never in a condition to know, even approximately, what numbers I should have at my disposal at any given time, or in any appointed place. The militia came, and the militia went, just as it felt inclined. Generally, however, it came when the enemy was far off; when the enemy approached, the militia departed. In a word, it liked to avoid seeing the enemy. When by accident, however, and in spite of every precaution, it had the misfortune to come so near the enemy as to hear his shots, it shouted "Treachery!" and ran away as fast as it could. The utmost degree of physical weariness was on such occasions the only means of bringing the militiamen to a stand, that is, to a lying down.

These good people were mostly armed with scythes, and a very few of them with old rusty muskets, to which "going-off" was almost as rare an occurrence as it was to their scythes.

The militia-men had a particular predilection for cannons. These they drew after them with enthusiasm, even without orders. Their first question to the person who presented himself as their leader, always was, whether he had cannons. If his answer was in the affirmative, they joyfully prepared to march; if not, he could scarcely reckon on any considerable number of adherents. For this reason their leaders very often made use of the artifice of assuring them that they had sent their guns already in advance against the enemy. Clumsy as this trick was, it was sometimes sufficient to keep the militia-men on their legs for some days.

The attachment of the militia to heavy guns (naturally to friendly ones) was severed in the first moment of danger from the enemy. It might be calculated with certainty, in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred, that from a zealous expedition of militia with artillery, in a very short time all the men would return, somewhat exhausted indeed, yet otherwise unhurt, but without the cannons.

The resolute leader of a well-disciplined corps of from 8000 to 10,000 men could therefore hardly be effectually misled, in his operations, as to the hostilities practicable with such a militia. Yet in the circumstances of the auxiliary corps of Croats under the command of Generals Roth and Philippovich—abandoned by Ban Jellachich, probably from higher considerations—the hostilities even of this militia sufficed to prepare the ruin of the Croat corps, nay finally to accomplish it.

Perczel's whole corps, which, besides the militia just described, was employed against Roth, consisted of scarcely 3000 men, with 200 horses and eight pieces of artillery; all, except the cavalry, being freshly-organised troops.

The main body of this army left Adony on the 4th of October, at daybreak, to traverse, in the shortest time, by Seregélyes, all roads leading from the south to Stuhlweissenburg, and ascertain first of all how far General Roth had already advanced towards that place. A squadron of hussars, a company of the Hunyady-Schar, and four guns, formed the vanguard.

A flank-column, consisting of a part of the militia and two companies of the Hunyady-Schar, had been sent from Adony, by Sárosd, to Aba, to endeavour to effect a junction with the militia—which lay still more to the south, on the road from Aba to Bogárd—and by a change of direction towards the east to prevent the escape of the enemy from Kálozd—where we supposed he was—into the less-protected territory lying between the Danube and the channels of the Sárviz, by which, with the dispositions already made—thanks to our tactic and strategic inexperience—the possibility of righting ourselves would have become very problematical.

The dispositions for this day, 4th October, were:

Vanguard: Seregélyes.

Southern flank-column: Sárosd; its advanced posts as far as Aba and Sárkeresztur.

Main body: Szolga Egyháza.

Arrived at Seregélyes, I learned from a scout, that in the forenoon the enemy had been seen on the road between Soponya and Tácz, marching towards Stuhlweissenburg; and I at once resolved to advance im-

mediately, on my own responsibility, with the vanguard to Tácz, and attack him. I took my way thither by P. Bárand and P. Fövény, of which I informed Colonel Perczel, and at the same time desired him to follow me speedily, that the enemy might not escape us.

Towards evening—though still in broad daylight—I stood before Tácz.

The place was occupied by infantry, and, according to my information, by two battalions. Having only one company of infantry at my disposal, and that one having never stood fire, I ordered a section of hussars to attack the village, though occupied by infantry, and this contrary to every existing rule of tactics, reckoning on the Croat's dread of the hussars, even then well known. The attack, supported by some discharges of cannon, was made by the hussars with their accustomed energy, and after a few minutes the enemy was in wild flight towards Soponya, and the village of Tácz in the possession of our troops.

During the night we bivouaked at P. Fövény, and had our outposts in Tácz.

I heard nothing from Perczel during the whole night, and was therefore obliged, at daybreak on the 5th of October, to retreat from Fövény to Seregélyes, lest I might perchance be cut off from our main body by a hostile column advancing on the road from Aba to Stuhlweissenburg.

Scarcely had I left P. Fövény, when this apprehension appeared to be justified by the report of a patrol, that the enemy was already marching between myself and Perczel on the above-mentioned road to Stuhlweissenburg.

Now the enemy was already nearer to this town than

myself; and if I did not succeed in getting the start of him on the parallel road from Tácz to Stuhlweissenburg, General Roth's junction with Ban Jellachich, in my opinion, could no longer be prevented; for I had even then no idea of the speed with which Ban Jellachich had been striving to execute his famous flank-movement, and consequently could not suppose that a Hungarian column was already in Stuhlweissenburg.

Leaving the infantry behind, I had again returned with the cavalry and artillery, by P. Fövény, to the road from Tácz to Stuhlweissenburg, and was on a forced march thither, when I met, coming from that direction, a patrol of hussars, which had been sent to seek a junction with Perczel, and from whose report I concluded that the enemy would no longer find the troops of Ban Jellachich in Stuhlweissenburg, but our own. We naturally availed ourselves of this favourable circumstance immediately to turn our front again to the road from Aba to Stuhlweissenburg, on which we resolved, at any cost, to attack the advancing enemy.

In the execution of this project I was interrupted, however, by two *parlementaires* (trumpets) from the hostile column (it was the commander of the troop himself and his adjutant), who came to declare to us that the Croats had entered Hungary with no hostile intention, and that least of all would they fight against the royal imperial troops.

I was just then enveloped in a *Szür.** In reply to this declaration of the *parlementaires*, I threw off the Szür, and accompanied this display of my Honvéd uniform with the question, whether the *parlementaire* and his troops had likewise no hostile intentions against

* A top-coat made of coarse thick woollen stuff.

me and mine, who, though we were not royal imperials, were nevertheless good royalists. His answer was confined to the repeated assurance that the Croats had not entered Hungary as enemies. A general hilarity followed this ingenuous assertion.

I contented myself, in reply, with taking out my watch, and fixing the time when I would attack, if they had not previously laid down their arms. Fifteen minutes appeared to me quite long enough for consideration. Before the expiration of the time, I received the report, that the hostile column would make no resistance. It amounted to above 1000 infantry.

The cheapness of this not inconsiderable advantage made me at first suspicious, and I took the greatest precaution in approaching the spot where the Croat troop awaited to be disarmed. But I soon learned that while their commander was treating with us, our main body had suddenly made its appearance on their only line of retreat to General Roth's main body.

Perczel had left Seregélyes early on the 5th of October to follow his vanguard, and reached the road from Aba, on which the Croat column had advanced towards Stuhlweissenburg, only after it had already carelessly passed at the height of Seregélyes. This happy accident obtained for us, without combat, a proportionately large number of prisoners, as well as their muskets—of incomparably greater value to us.

While Perczel was occupied with arrangements respecting the prisoners of war who had laid down their arms, he having with his main body reached the hostile troop before myself, a prisoner was sent to me by my outposts in Tácz. This man, a courier of General Roth, had received a letter from his general, addressed "To

the commander of the royal imperial troops in Stuhlweissenburg," with orders to take it to this place.

From this letter it was evident that General Roth had been abandoned without orders to his fate, and was then actually in a very critical position. This might also have induced him the same day to seek for a mediation, on the way to which he was met by Moriz Perczel. Immediately after the events just related, Colonel Perczel marched with his main body to Tácz; and a few hours after our arrival there, General Philippovich, as General Roth's delegate, appeared before the line of our outposts, and was conducted to the colonel's head-quarters.

Here he declared that the former conflicts between the Croat and Hungarian troops were merely the consequences of misunderstanding, and desired an unobstructed retreat into Croatia. Perczel, on the other hand, required an unconditional surrender. As might have been expected, no arrangement was come to; and towards evening hostilities recommenced.

We immediately advanced to Csösz, and remained encamped at the southern extremity of this place during the night of the 5th of October. But the enemy left Soponya on the same night, hoping to get the start of us in his retreat by Láng, Kálozd, and Dégh, towards Croatia.

On the morning of the 6th of October, with the cavalry of our corps (two squadrons of hussars), I hastened after him, along the route just mentioned. Perczel was to follow as quickly as possible with the artillery.

Not until after we reached Láng did I ascertain that the enemy had passed Kálozd towards Dégh. At the same time, a shorter route from Láng to Dégh was pointed out to me, without touching Kálozd. Whilst

with the cavalry I pursued the longer route by Kálozd, I recommended Perczel, who meanwhile had scarcely left his camp at Csösz, to take the shorter road, that he might retrieve the time lost. The result of later inquiries, however, shewed that the direct line of communication between Láng and Dégh was impracticable for heavy trains. This I reported to Perczel without delay, and expressly warned him, still in time, against taking the route just recommended, unless its practicability could previously be placed beyond doubt.

Perczel, however, gave no heed to this warning, but marched from Láng, not by Kálozd, but directly to Dégh, encountered serious obstacles, and did not arrive with his fatigued and hungry troops till late in the evening; whereas I and the hussars had come up with the enemy about mid-day, but was unable to attack him with success, or effectually disturb his orderly retreat.

This new loss of time, which the enemy well knew how to improve, gave them another important start of us; while our troops had been uselessly and excessively fatigued.

The conclusion was evident, that the frequent repetition of similar blunders would frustrate our object, which was, in fact, nothing less than the total destruction of Roth's corps.

This apprehension of mine contrasted strangely with the contents of a despatch from the Committee of Defence of the Diet, which reached me on the morning of the same day. In it I was charged; as independent commander of our expedition against General Roth, so soon as I should have annihilated his corps, to prepare a similar fate for another hostile chief of faction, whose name I forget.

I had communicated the original of this despatch to Perczel before he left the road to Kálozd with our main body, and intended at first to leave the reply to him. But irritated at the prolonged non-appearance of the main troops, I resolved, during the afternoon, to answer it myself, which I did as follows:

"Having since the 3d of this month been removed from the chief conduct of the operations which have for their object the destruction of the auxiliary Croat corps commanded by General Roth, it was with no small surprise that I learned by a decree which I received to-day from the Committee of Defence, that I was expected not only to annihilate the said corps, but likewise to repulse the Serbians, who threaten an irruption into the country.

"The Committee of Defence seems to be utterly ignorant of the state of affairs in the camp; and I take the liberty hereby to declare, that I can by no means hold myself responsible for the success of the expedition against Roth, convinced as I am, that it would be the greatest injustice to call one man to account for the faults of another.

"Our cause is too sacred for me to hesitate to speak the truth, even when so doing may have the appearance of mean jealousy.

"This premised, I would call the attention of the honourable Diet to the fact that, besides oratory and good will, military knowledge is essential to the right management of troops.

"The command given to me on the 2d, I had to deliver up to Perczel on the 3d.

"Dégh, 6th of October, 1848."

At the same time I wrote to Perczel, reproaching him with the loss of time caused by his imprudence, and announcing my firm resolution to proceed for the pre-

sent according to the tenour of the above letter, and more energetically against him, in case, through his fault, this campaign should miscarry, to the great detriment of the country.

By this I intended, either to make Perczel—whose military abilities unfortunately did not inspire me with the least confidence—receive more tractably my counsels relative to the conduct of the war, or to effect my removal from his corps; because I really could not accustom myself to the spirit in which he began to act, and which had been evident enough even on the first day.

Nevertheless I employed the afternoon—which had not been improved for any important operation against the enemy—in observing the movements of the Croat corps, which retreated on the same day from Dégh towards Ozora, along the river Sió, followed by me with a few hussars to the edge of the forest lying between these places, and in collecting as exact information as I could respecting the motions of the southern militia (of Tolna), which had been placed in the rear of the enemy.

This information was favourable enough. The passages over the Sió, which lay in the enemy's line of retreat, it was reported, had already been destroyed, so that we should be certain of reaching the enemy, thus retarded, on the following day near Ozora. The inhabitants of the district, however, thought it would not be advisable to cross the forest with artillery, because the transport of heavy trains along the very deeply-rutted roads of this sandy soil would be extremely difficult. For our purpose—I was further informed—the forest could be skirted only at its eastern extremity, by a pretty good way through the fields leading from Dégh by Szilas-Balhás to Ozora. But this was a considerable cir-

cuit; and it would accordingly be advisable for the column to set out on its march to Szilas-Balhás before nightfall, that it might not be too much exhausted when it made its appearance next morning on the battle-field.

The northern edge of the forest is about an hour's march from Dégh. As far as this I had followed the enemy. To follow him further seemed dangerous, nay superfluous; since the inhabitants of the district all agreed in asserting that he could take only one direction, namely, to Ozora, if indeed he intended to cross the Sió. I therefore returned with the vanguard to Dégh, and immediately sent the artillery—which arrived first of the main body—together with the cavalry, to Szilas-Balhás, without waiting for Perczel's arrival, or asking his consent.

It was night before Perczel himself reached Dégh. He vehemently called me to account for the last letter I had written to him; and went so far as to scoff at the impotency of my proceedings against him.

"Perhaps you do not know," he exclaimed, "that *my* party is the predominant one, not only in the Diet, but also in the Committee of Defence; and that I need only pronounce a single word to crush you at any moment!"

My answer, that I did not serve his party, but my country, and was there for its welfare even against his party, irritated him still more. He formed the leaders of the several independent divisions of his corps into a kind of purifying commission, and cited me before it. He claimed the presidency of the commission for himself.

"This major," thus he opened the proceedings, pointing to me, "has himself confessed, as you know, gentle-

men, that he did wrong, when he, the day before yesterday, as commander of my vanguard, advanced with it to Tácz, while the main body was still in Szolga Egyháza, and dared, on his own responsibility, to attack this place, where the enemy was in great force. Further, this major yesterday evening moved on with the vanguard from Tácz to Csösz, again without my authority, and even without my knowledge. He also dares to censure my conduct, and to denounce me to a government which has been called into power by my party, nay is composed of my party." (Several members of the commission expressed great indignation.) "Justify yourself!" cried Perczel to me, after he had finished.

"The severe criticism," I replied, "to which I subject my own actions, entitles me to be equally severe on the actions of others. You have to-day led your main body," I continued, "contrary to my representations, by a road, of the practicability of which you could not have been convinced. In consequence you encountered obstacles, to remove which cost you the time that, had you listened to me, you might have saved, and employed in overtaking and attacking to-day the fleeing enemy. To make up for the time lost is no longer in your power. By your fault the enemy has gained an advantage which, wisely improved, may place him beyond our reach. A lucky accident can alone make good this loss. And this, if it should happen, will be more than *you deserve*. But even the luckiest accident would be without benefit to us, if such a fault as you committed to-day be repeated. This is the expanded meaning of the few words I wrote to you this afternoon.

"I could have left matters as they were, had I not received—as you know—a despatch from the Committee

of Defence, wherein I am treated as independent commander, and held responsible for the success of this expedition. I owe it to myself to refuse to be accountable for *your* faults. This I have done in my reply to the Committee of Defence; and at the same time warned it in future to be more cautious in the choice of independent leaders. And that you might know how you stand with me, I at the same time informed you of the step I had taken against you. If my conduct appears to you to be insubordinate, you can inflict on me the punishment which the law prescribes. But he is a scoundrel, who, in consequence of such open demeanour, has the impudence to accuse me of denouncing him!"

After this reply, there were apparently only two ways open to Perczel; either to retract the accusation of denunciation he had brought against me, or the duel.

Perczel found a third: he called for the guard, and ordered me to be immediately shot.

It seemed as if I should hardly have the necessary time left me to prepare for death. Several members of the assembly, however, interceded so energetically in my behalf, that Perczel preferred at last to let me live, and to retract his accusation.

It was unfortunately impossible to pass over here in silence this scandalous scene, because a knowledge of it is indispensable towards forming a judgment on the position which Perczel, after this, constantly endeavoured to take against me.

Immediately after this scene, the purifying commission—together with myself, who had been accused before it—was changed into a council of war; and I now reported my recent information respecting the movements of the enemy, as well as concerning the positions and

doings of the militia in their rear; further, as to the dispositions I had made in consequence of this information. These latter again enraged Perczel against me. With reason he objected that I had no authority for making such dispositions; but with less reason, that his corps was thereby denuded of the whole of its artillery and cavalry, and that a judicious arrangement of the troops for the following day was now impossible.

"You have crossed," he exclaimed, "all my plans by this precipitate, self-willed, bad arrangement. I intended to awe the enemy by passing *en front* the forest between Dégh and Ozora with my whole corps. This is now no longer possible, you having sent my cavalry and cannons God knows where!"

After I had made some remarks on the impracticability of this strange scheme, I declared that I was willing to take the responsibility of the dispositions I had made, if the infantry was employed agreeably thereto. I meant that the column making the circuit of the wood, after being well re-inforced by infantry, should open the attack; while the rest of the infantry, crossing the forest lying between Dégh and Ozora, *à cheval* of the road connecting these places, and occupying the south edge, was kept *en réserve*, and only in case the enemy, in spite of the attack of the column, attempted to break through towards the east in the direction of the still-remaining bridges over the Sió, should rush out and attack him flank and rear; or, in case he aimed at seeking refuge in the forest, should endeavour to prevent him.

"If," I added, "the Croats nevertheless conquer, we are too weak to hinder their retreat into their own country. But if they do not succeed, or if they shrink from a battle, they will then be forced by us to the west to-

wards the Platten lake; and thus enclosed between the lake, the Sió, and our troops, there will be no alternative for them but either to surrender or fight for their lives."

After a long and vehement debate, this proposal was adopted.

I undertook the command of the column that was to skirt the wood; and early in the forenoon of the 7th of October, 1848, reached its southern side; the enemy being encamped to the north-east of us, in a great hollow square within gun-range. The heights on my left, as far as the river Sió, had been occupied since the preceding evening by the local militia of Tolna. The commander of this division of the militia had unquestionably a very large share in the successful issue of this expedition.

On the report of a patrol of hussars, that Perczel had already reached the southern edge of the forest, to the north of the hostile camp, I gave the signal to attack. But before the as yet unpractised artillerymen could execute this order, a trumpet advanced from the hostile square, and rendered any attack superfluous.

I was not present at the parley which took place. But when it was ended, Perczel ordered his sub-commanders to assemble near the enemy's square. He had likewise summoned the hostile general and his superior officers.

I arrived at the place appointed for meeting just at the moment when Perczel had decided on the fate of the latter. They, as well as the soldiery, were to lay down their arms, and were ordered to be escorted to Pesth, but the soldiery to their own country. Meanwhile, however, the whole hostile corps were to remain

together in the camp, until the best of our troops had been marched round them, as it were in triumph. By this Perczel intended to distinguish in an especial manner several divisions of his corps. But scarcely were the rest of the army, including the militia, aware, from the incessant shouts of *Eljen* (*vivat*), that the proximity of the enemy no longer endangered their lives, than they of their own accord left their ranks, and came running up in wild disorder, that they also might have a closer view of the Croats.

In spite of the urgent representations of his subcommanders, Perczel seemed to take pleasure in this confusion. It was not till the militia began to seize on the bayonet-muskets, which the Croats had laid down, intending to carry them off as memorials of this glorious day, that Perczel perceived, too late, the consequences of his weakness.

With the exception of twelve antiquated cannons, out of the whole equipment of Roth's corps, he could place only a very small portion at the disposal of the Committee of Defence.

CHAPTER IV.

On the 7th of October, 1848, the Croat corps of General Roth had ceased to exist; the southern militia was on its way home; and Perczel was proceeding with his troops to Ozora, where he rested during the 8th. On the same day I was promoted to the rank of Honvéd colonel, and received an order to return immediately to Pesth. I

left Ozora on the 9th, and arrived late in the evening at Kálozd, where I had to halt for fresh horses. Here I heard by chance that the intendant of the late Count Eugene Zichy had secreted "a great quantity of very valuable jewelry," being part of the estate of his lord, and that he kept it concealed, with the intention, probably, of withholding it from the state; to which now —so every body said—the Count's whole property belonged.

To ascertain in the shortest way how far this rumour was true, I went, accompanied by several officers of my suite, among whom was my auditor, and conducted by the principal informer, to the residence of the said intendant; and having previously stationed some attendants on the outside, and also at the several points of communication in its interior, with the auditor only I entered one of the rooms to obtain, by surprise, a confession from him, in case he intended concealment. This precaution, however, seemed superfluous; the intendant declaring, without circumlocution, that he had several valuables concealed; and that he was very glad of this opportunity of being relieved from the charge of them. Accordingly, while he went to fetch the articles in question, I called into the room the officers who had remained outside, and having given him a receipt for them, took possession, in their presence, of several really valuable things; after they had been inspected, a list made of them, and the cases sealed that contained them.

On this occasion I learnt from the intendant that, immediately after the arrest of the Count, a certain Lieutenant Vásárhelyi and his men had arrived at Kálozd, had searched the castle, and had forcibly carried off some iron chests containing valuables, a great number

of costly weapons, and also a *bátard* (state-carriage) drawn by four beautiful horses; that a few days later, when the Croats had retreated, the Count's stud had been plundered by several officers of Colonel Perczel's corps; that the castle, especially its kitchen and cellar, had been constantly put in requisition by officers; that those formerly subject to the Count did great damage to the estate; and much more to the same effect.

To put an end to the latter disorders (the extortions on the part of the officers having necessarily ceased, the scene of war being now removed to remote districts), I left my auditor in Kálozd, that he might make a complete inventory, in the shortest possible time, of the whole property of the Count, both fixed and movable, and place the said property under the superintendence of the functionary from whom I had received the jewelry; and, in particular, that he should proclaim martial law against all who, from covetousness or malice, dared to injure the property of the late Count. And to give weight to this measure, I left a trusty officer with twenty-four men as garrison in Kálozd.

Having made these arrangements, I left Kálozd, carrying with me the jewels, and continued my journey to Adony without interruption.

The 10th of October was spent at Adony in transacting several military affairs. Towards evening, the steamer which was conveying Generals Roth and Philippovich, with their officers, to Pesth, arrived at Adony. I availed myself of this opportunity to reach Pesth early on the morning of the 11th; and directly after my arrival, drew up the following report to the Diet:

"HONOURED DIET,—On the 9th of this month, passing through Kálozd, I learned:

1. That certain jewels, which had been the property of Count Eugene Zichy, executed by sentence of court-martial for high treason, were in the custody of the seignorial Hofrichter Konrad Durneisz.

2. That the inhabitants of Kálozd, by their continual plunderings, are injuring the movable portions of the property especially, which now belongs to the state.

I have consequently, in the name of the Diet, and counting on its subsequent sanction, ventured to take the following steps:

1. I have received from the Hofrichter Konrad Durneisz the jewels specified in the enclosed inventory, and hereby deliver them up into the hands of the president of the honoured Diet.

2. I have charged the local authorities of Kálozd, by the resolution here enclosed, to proclaim martial law against all who in future should dare to injure the movable or other property belonging to the estate of Kálozd.

3. I have instructed my auditor, G. R., to make an inventory of the whole estate of Kálozd, with all its movables, and to place it, together with the official inventory, under the superintendence and responsibility of the said Konrad Durneisz, and subsequently to report upon the proceedings.

4. I have charged Major K., who was stationed in Kálozd on the said day, to leave there, till further orders, an officer with twenty-four men for the formation of a court-martial. Pesth, 11th of October, 1848." (My signature follows.)

In this report the president of the Diet is said to be the person into whose hands I deposited the jewels taken by me at Kálozd; while it was actually Kossuth in person who received them from me, in the presence of several members of the Committee of Defence.

The cause of this contradiction is, that when I wrote this report in Hungarian, reproduced here in a German

translation, I was not aware of the true position of the Committee of Defence, and for security addressed it directly to the whole of the Diet, knowing that the Committee of Defence was composed of members of the Diet.

I therefore myself took this report, with its enclosures, the inventory of all the jewels I had received in Kálozd, the jewels themselves, and the document for proclaiming martial law in Kálozd, to Kossuth, who was then staying at the Queen-of-England hotel. He was so unwell as to be confined to his bed. This, however, did not prevent him from taking a personal share in the most important affairs of the day. I was therefore admitted to him; and handed over to himself, as has been already stated, my report to the Diet, with the jewels and the other documents. I also remember that, at my especial request, the contents of the cases were immediately compared with the original inventory, in the presence of Kossuth and several other persons, and were found intact. But whether the correct delivery of the jewels was certified to me in writing or not, I cannot now remember. It is also very possible that, having been personally present at the comparison of the jewels with the inventory, and being thereby satisfied that nothing was missing, I afterwards wholly forgot to ask for a receipt: as in the course of this day I was not only a passive spectator, but also an active participator in the transaction of matters of the highest importance, and well calculated to make me neglect so ordinary a precautionary measure.

CHAPTER V.

THE degree of firmness, so unusual at that time, which I had shewn as president of the court-martial against Count Zichy; the open and decided blame with which I had censured freely, and even in writing, the armistice concluded with Ban Jellachich, immediately after it was agreed upon; the success of the Hungarian arms against Roth's corps, which my friends attributed more to the measures I had taken, single-handed, against the will of Perczel, than to what had been done in executing his orders;—all this might have directed the attention of the leaders of the Hungarian movement towards me, and made them believe that I was the man who would succeed in giving decision to the wavering operations of Móga's army.

In the course of the very day on which I had delivered Zichy's jewels to the Committee of Defence, I and one of my comrades, who had been promoted at the same time as myself to the rank of Honvéd colonel, were invited by Kossuth to a consultation on the question, whether the time had not now come for promoting, off-hand, several Honvéd staff-officers even to the rank of general. This, Kossuth thought, appeared to be the sole guarantee that the staff of command would fall into trusty hands, when vacated by the hourly-expected resignation of General Móga and that of his comrades, Generals Teleki and Holtsche, or by their being suddenly pensioned, which seemed necessary.

My comrade spoke first, and declared himself deci-

dedly against this measure. "By so doing," he exclaimed, "you would commit a crying injustice; because the greater number of staff-officers of Móga's army are our seniors in rank, and are more deserving than ourselves.

"Be the ground on which you stand as an independent Hungarian government," he added, "ever so legal, you cannot maintain yourselves at present without the regular troops. And yet you do all you can to weaken their sympathies for the just cause of the country. It is in the soldier's nature to be attached to his superior, so long as that superior conscientiously fulfils his duties. Any slighting of the superior becomes, in that case, likewise a mortification to the inferior. I will not affirm that those divisions whose commanders should be slighted by our promotion would instantly forget their oath to the Constitution; but discontent is to be feared; and a dissatisfied army has seldom succeeded in nailing victory to their colours."

This was in entire accordance with my own views; and I hastened to throw a still clearer light upon the consequences of our sudden promotion, dragged in, as it were, by the hair of the head. "We ourselves," I exclaimed, "once belonged to these bodies of troops, and occupied therein somewhat inferior positions; and now, after a short space of time, unmarked by any exploits, we should suddenly appear as the commanders of those who, a short time before, were our superiors. Even although I admit that, in spite of all this, we might still reckon upon a certain obedience, nevertheless by no means upon a cheerful, unwearied one; and least of all, upon the affection and confidence of troops who would see their former and sometimes distinguished

leaders slighted by us, the *parvenus* (as they would now call us).

"You fear," I continued, "the political tendencies of the present leaders of the troops? The soldier generally cares very little about politics. He does what he is ordered, and asks *distinct* orders; he requires in his chiefs, on every occasion, a decisive coming forward and leading the way. This is applicable to the officer as well as to the soldier. None of my present comrades, after they had sworn to the Hungarian Constitution, would ever have imagined that they had to follow any orders except those of the Hungarian Ministry of War, had they not been allured from the distinctly-marked and straight course of *blind* obedience into the intricate labyrinthan way of the deliberative one. This has been done. The government in Vienna, as well as that in Pesth, conscious of their weakness, have both forced the army into this field; and now they expect from it—the former, the restitution of its power over Hungary; the latter, the preservation of what has been gained.

"But the leaders of the independent bodies of troops, distrusting as Hungarians the government in Vienna, and as soldiers that in Pesth, have become irresolute; and this irresolution has already spread itself into the lowest ranks of their inferiors. The Committee of Defence seems to be aware of this, and thinks that the most appropriate remedy for the evil is to promote us, and send us to Móga's army; but this measure would only cause the irresolute troops to become also dissatisfied.

"The present commanders of the regiments must be distinguished and promoted. If they accept these

favours, they are permanently gained, and with them their inferiors; if not, away with them!

"If the maintenance of the Constitution is at all possible by force of arms, it can be effected only in this way." — —

"And who are the staff-officers in Móga's army," asked Kossuth in return, "whom you believe to be the most meritorious and most to be relied upon?"

I had no answer to give, because Móga's army was entirely strange to me; but my comrade named several, and the promotion of some of them was immediately decided on.

Soon after this, my comrade withdrew. I wished to do so too, but was detained by Kossuth; and then, for the first time, I learned the real object of my recal from Perczel's corps.

The whole of the Committee of Defence had a particular distrust of General Móga and those nearest him. The doubtful issue of the first engagement with the invading Croat army on the 29th of September, at Velencze, Pákozd, and Sukoró; the discouraging disorder in which the defensive position, victoriously maintained by our troops till the end of the battle, had been left by them during the succeeding stormy and dark night, to take up another at Mártonvásár; the armistice of three days, which had been granted immediately afterwards to Ban Jellachich, by the skilful improvement of which the Croat army had been enabled to retreat without opposition across the Lajtha; the want of energy with which the consequent pursuit of Ban Jellachich had been prosecuted, and its sudden abandonment at the Lajtha at the very moment when it could apparently have been persevered in most successfully;—these were

the facts which had shaken the confidence of the Committee of Defence in the straightforwardness of General Móga's war-operations.

But as the royal Commissary Ladislaus Csányi, invested with unlimited authority, and associated with him, continued, in his reports to the Committee of Defence, positively to deny that there was any ground for suspecting Móga, the members of the committee, fearing lest the general and his associates had already succeeded in imposing on Csányi also, were desirous of obtaining the judgment of a competent and trustworthy man, formed from his own inspection, on the movements of Móga. I was to be this man; and therefore received the secret mission to repair immediately to his headquarters at Parendorf, there ostensibly to place myself at the disposal of the commander of the army, but really to penetrate into the spirit of the man, and instantly to reveal the least indications of treachery.

I confess that I did not myself approve Móga's war-operations; I attributed to him, however, less of intentional treason than of want of penetration and resolve. Nevertheless, I thought treason possible, and accepted the mission; with this modification however, that I should not confine myself to merely disclosing actually existing treacherous designs, but, at the same time, should endeavour to frustrate them at whatever danger. This modification was unconditionally sanctioned by the Committee of Defence, and had almost led to my further promotion, namely, to that of Honvéd general. Kossuth, at least, spoke about his intention of having a general's commission immediately prepared for me to take with me, that I might thereby be prospectively empowered *in flagranti* to assume the command of the army,

if necessary; passing over all the other royal imperial generals, besides Móga, who were with the army. This measure, however, was not carried out; why, I never knew.

In the night between the 11th and 12th of October I was already on my way to Parendorf, and reached Móga's head-quarters early on the morning of the 13th.

CHAPTER VI.

Móga immediately assigned to me the command of the vanguard, at that time the outposts on the Lajtha; while its former commander was employed upon another point.

Before I entered on my new post, I had to announce in person to the royal Commissary Csányi my arrival at the army. On this occasion I saw him for the first time. He was brief with me. His manners, his whole exterior, distinguished him favourably from all the other civil authorities of the Hungarian revolution: it at once inspired confidence and commanded respect. These qualities are certainly not always the emanations of a manly character: in Csányi they were. The man who had impressed me at first sight, I learned afterwards to revere.

The most advanced Hungarian videttes stood on the right bank of the Lajtha, being in connexion, with some intervals, from Wilfleinsdorf to Hollern; the staff of the outposts was quartered in the railway station at Bruck, quite near to the Lajtha, consequently on the outmost

line of the videttes. The main troop of the outposts encamped at scarcely a quarter of an hour's distance behind it.

Immediately after I had entered on my new post I asked to be allowed either to draw back my main troop or to advance the line of my videttes, because to observe the enemy was altogether impossible while prohibited from crossing the Lajtha; and the protection of the army, under the present establishment of the vanguard, was defective in the highest degree. As the outposts were now situated, the enemy could at any time and by single patrols alarm not only the main troop of the outposts behind Bruck, but likewise that of the army before Parendorf.

To these representations I received for answer, that it was no longer worth while to undertake comprehensive changes in this respect, the army being about to cross the Lajtha in a few days. In fact the first advance took place on the afternoon of the 17th of October.

The dispositions I received were: to march about half an hour's distance on the way through the fields from Bruck to Fischamend, and establish the outposts in an extensive semicircle from Wilfleinsdorf to Pakfurth.

The main army passed likewise through Bruck, and encamped *à cheval* of the main road from Bruck to Schwechat at the same height as the main troop of the vanguard.

It happened to me in this expedition, as it often does in manœuvres in time of peace: before the outposts were established, there came an order to fall back. The main body of the army marched again across the Lajtha before midnight; and I was obliged, notwithstanding all

my renewed representations, to take up with my brigade my old, unchanged position behind the Lajtha.

The general staff in Parendorf had kept secret the cause of this sudden return to the former camp. It was only whispered that the Committee of Defence had itself commanded this "Halt!" and "Right-about!"

It appeared now as if it were intended to confine us to the defensive; because I received, directly after our return, strict orders to destroy all artificial passages over the Lajtha, as well as to render the existing natural ones impassable, and to occupy them. The latter part of my orders could not be executed, on account of the great extension of the line and the shallowness of the river, so that it became useless to carry into effect the first part of them. The general staff, however, would listen to no counter-representations: the bridges had to disappear.

In the head-quarters at Parendorf a momentarily impending attack on the part of the enemy was every day talked of; and nevertheless the troops were dislocated in such a manner as even the leisurely routine of the service in time of peace would not have excused. Of many a body of men even the chief of the general staff could not tell whether they still existed, or where. Others of them, about whose distribution he gave the most detailed accounts, suddenly made their appearance in an opposite direction; their arrival having been preceded by very alarming reports from thence, of the approach of some *hostile* corps, which, by the way, could with just as much probability have come from the moon.

It cannot be denied that all this seemed to indicate the existence of systematic treason; but be this as it may, the proceedings in the Hungarian head-quarters

at Parendorf made me feel that they were merely the consequence of the very same perplexity under which the Pesth Diet, with the Committee of Defence at its head, was labouring.

Deliberately planned treason presupposes a fixed determination. But over Parendorf, as over Pesth, there then hung the heavy thick mist of an indistinct perception of what ought really to be done.

In a few days after my arrival at the camp, I felt that my ambiguous mission had entirely failed; failed especially in *that* sense in which it had been conceived and undertaken by me.

Determined, at any price, to force the commander of the army, whom the gentlemen of the Committee of Defence believed to be a secret ally of the chief of the Croat army, to reveal his intentions, I had found in him a straightforward, open man, who had already, long before my arrival, declared, without being called upon to do so, that although he would still continue, in obedience to the emperor's orders, to defend Hungary against the attacks of the Croats, yet that he would not cross the frontiers of the country unless compelled; and that he declined, beforehand, to be responsible for the consequences of such a step.

I had therefore either immediately to abandon my ambiguous position in the camp, or to lower myself by denouncing the pitiful intrigues plotted from purely selfish motives by a few coryphei of the camp as well as of the head-quarters; their sole object being, in case of a favourable issue of Hungarian affairs, to elevate their contrivers as high as possible, and, in an unfavourable one, to save them.

Choosing the former, I devoted all my attention to

the accomplishment of those duties which devolved on me as commander of the outposts.

My brigade consisted of five battalions of volunteer National-guards—a second edition of the local militia augmented by fire-arms. These battalions, however, were already divided, like the regular ones, into companies, and provided with officers; but the latter were, with a few exceptions, almost wholly destitute of military knowledge.

I compelled them to employ the time of easy outpost-service in that training of which they stood so much in need. This, of course, was not possible without the use of severe measures. These produced discontent, opposition. Frequent and urgent complaints of my despotic severity reached the head-quarters; but meeting with no attention, were carried to the royal Commissary Csányi. It was fortunate for me that Csányi was an old soldier, and knew how to estimate such complaints. There was nothing left for the poor malcontents but to bite the sour apple, and learn to obey. So difficult was this, that it cost many a man his life.

To accustom my brigade to the divers nerve-shaking aspects of war, I often caused the chain of videttes, as well as the camp behind Bruck, particularly at night-time, to be thrown into alarm; I took advantage of every rumour about the enemy, however vague it might be, to make my troops believe that he was actually marching against us; and at such times sent out across the Lajtha, on my own responsibility, small divisions as reconnoitering patrols; and so forth.

This latter experiment drew on me a severe reprimand from the head-quarters. Because, it was said, we had to act on the defensive, and to avoid all offensive.

hostilities, that we might not provoke the opposing troops to sanguinary reprisals; as we did not know whether they belonged to the Croat or to any other corps.

But as a contradiction to this reprimand, in the course of the next day a Honvéd captain made his appearance with an *improvised* section of pioneers, for the purpose of restoring the recently-destroyed bridges, so far as was absolutely necessary.

Scarcely was this work finished, when the dispositions for a second advance over the Lajtha, on the 21st of October, followed.

This time we broke up in the morning, and halted only near Stix-Neusiedel, in face of a weak division of cavalry that awaited us between Gallbrunn and Stix-Neusiedel, which the fire from two batteries compelled to retreat behind Gallbrunn. According to some of the inhabitants of Stix-Neusiedel, Gallbrunn was occupied by hostile infantry, and I received orders to take it by storm. It did not come to this; for another "Halt!" and "Right-about!" of the Committee of Defence suddenly stopped the advance of my storming-columns against the place, which was, moreover, unoccupied. We accordingly encamped between Stix-Neusiedel and Gallbrunn *à cheval* of the road, and marched next morning at day-break back to Parendorf,—I with my brigade once more in our old, inevitable position behind the Lajtha.

During these two advances it was always distinctly said that our offensive movements were against Ban Jellachich's army, which had to be attacked and destroyed in behalf of the young constitutional liberty of Austria, not only on this side the Lajtha, but also beyond it.

If, on the other hand, it was asked why the pursuit of Ban Jellachich had been at all interrupted, the answer was, that at that time they had, of necessity, to respect the territory beyond the Lajtha as neutral ground, in the confident expectation that the Croats would be disarmed by Austria, the remainder of Ban Jellachich's army broken up, and consequently the originators of the unhappy civil war be deprived of the power to renew it.

Thus reasoned the non-military men, in opposition to the views which had gained ground among the *regular* troops of the camp at Parendorf, including the two Honvéd battalions which were there. Though scarcely one of these divisions, when engaged in the pursuit of Ban Jellachich, would have given it up within the limits of the country without positive orders, they all, nevertheless, now believed that, by having driven the enemy beyond them, they had done as much as their new military oath (to defend the Constitution of Hungary) required of them; while by the aggressive crossing of their own frontiers they feared to violate their old oath of fidelity to the monarch.

In consequence of this apprehension, several deputations of officers appeared before Csányi, to declare, in the name of the troops to which they belonged, their opinion that the Lajtha ought *not* to be crossed.

I do not know in what way and by whom the regular troops had been so successfully relieved from this fear, as to take part in the two expeditions beyond the frontiers on the 17th and 21st; because I had always abundant occupation in Bruck, and seldom went into the camp at Parendorf; and then only on account of some pressing affair relating to the service.

As for myself, it was perfectly plain to me what

was the duty of every Hungarian, soldier or not soldier, in the then existing circumstances. Obedience was due to the executive power appointed by the collective Hungarian Diet, so long as the Diet itself continued to act in accordance with the constitution.

The administration of the country by the Committee of Defence, instituted by the Diet in the stead of the retired ministry of Batthyányi, was, it is true, not based on the constitution. But, in the face of the Croat invasion, supported by the minister of war at Vienna; in the face of the subsequent illegal nomination of the unfortunate Count Lamberg as commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Hungary (the Croat included), and he having been just as illegally authorised to dissolve the Hungarian Diet,—the formation of the Committee of Defence was, after the retirement of Count Batthyányi, only a measure demanded in self-defence.

CHAPTER VII.

THE interruption of the second offensive attempt on the 21st of October was caused by the necessity of waiting for Kossuth, who was already approaching with a reinforcement of 12,000 men and several batteries.

Meanwhile the first proclamation of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz reached the regular troops in the camp at Parendorf. It was evidently intended to intimidate, but totally missed its aim. The officers of the regular troops felt only a just indignation that

Prince Windisch-Grätz should suppose that they would break their military oath, and could be recalled under a threat of capital punishment, from a post which had been entrusted to them by their monarch, and for which they had been mustered by his nephew, the Palatine of Hungary, *against Ban Jellachich.*

The appearance of this proclamation, however, had a considerable influence on the general discussions upon the question, whether the Lajtha was to be crossed again, or not. For numerous voices rose once more *against* the crossing of the Lajtha; because, as it was thought, the offensive would then no longer be directed against Ban Jellachich alone, but also against Prince Windisch-Grätz, who, correctly speaking, had hitherto committed no act of hostility against Hungary. Nevertheless, others contested this opinion, asserting that Prince Windisch-Grätz had already openly enough shewn his hostility to Hungary, by joining Ban Jellachich; and that the very fact that he had done so, was a still further justification of the offensive. The majority, however, dissented from the latter opinion.

According to my judgment, the decision of the preliminary question—whether, and how far, the crossing of the frontier was necessary, or not for the protection of the endangered Constitution—was the indispensable condition of both propositions. But that decision appertained to the Diet alone. So long as it was unknown, any participation in the agitations for or against the offensive seemed to me to have no object. I kept myself aloof from them.

But when, soon after the appearance of the above proclamation, I was summoned to the head-quarters, and was directly called upon by Móga, in the presence of

several staff-officers, to state undisguisedly my opinion about the impending offensive, I then declared myself, from purely military considerations, decidedly *against* it.

"Yes, here," exclaimed Móga, in evident agitation, "all cry out against it; but before the Commissaries no one ventures even to open his mouth; and I am then always outvoted. On you alone," continued he, turning towards me, "I still rely. Take courage, and speak before the president as undisguisedly as you have now spoken here."

Only after this scene did I begin to comprehend how it could incidentally have happened that the Lajtha had already been twice crossed; and that the offensive thus begun had notwithstanding been again broken off, without our having, as it were, even seen the enemy.

The solution of this enigma evidently lay in the insignificance of the majority of those persons, who by virtue of their position in the camp as well as at the head-quarters, were called upon to exercise an influence on the decisions of the council of war. *On this side* the Lajtha, they voted, out of fear of the Commissaries, *against Móga*, and the frontiers had to be crossed on the offensive; but *on the other side* the Lajtha, out of much greater fear of the enemy, they voted *against the Commissaries*, and Móga was allowed to lead the army back again to Parendorf.

Such experience might have determined the commander of the army to augment his council of war, before the arrival of the President Kossuth, by some new members, on whom somewhat more of reliance could be placed. This was probably the reason of my sudden call to the head-quarters. I was late, and did not enter the room in which the council of war was held until

after all the other members had already expressed their opinion about the offensive, which was similar to my own. My colleagues, in giving their votes, had probably allowed the formula in use previously to March, "as in duty bound, agreeing with his Excellency the high-born Referant," to display itself so strongly, that Móga prospectively saw himself once more abandoned, if, with *this* council of war, he should bring the subject under discussion before Kossuth, the president of the Committee of Defence. Hence the indignation with which he received my declaration also; and hence likewise his urgent request, superfluous in my case, that I would defend, before the president himself, the conviction I had just expressed.

An opportunity for so doing was about to present itself in a few hours. Kossuth was expected in Nikelsdorf (Miklósfalva) on the evening of the same day; and Móga resolved to receive him there with the assembled council of war.

A part of the reinforcement which Kossuth brought with him had already reached Nikelsdorf, when we arrived thither from Parendorf. Kossuth also soon made his appearance. A quarter of an hour afterwards the council of war was assembled in his temporary lodgings, and presided over by him.

Kossuth opened the deliberation with a speech calculated to represent the crossing of the frontiers of the country in favour of besieged Vienna as a moral necessity for Hungary, and any thought of neglecting to do so as a dishonourable one. He depicted in glowing colours the merits of the inhabitants of Vienna in respect of the young liberty of Hungary; their magnanimous sacrifices for Hungary's welfare; and finally, the miseries of the

blockade, which, in so doing, they had brought down upon their city.

"Vienna still stands"—thus he concluded his speech —"still unshaken is the courage of her inhabitants, our most faithful allies against the attacks of the reactionary generals. But without our assistance, they must nevertheless succumb; for they fight a too unequal battle.

"Let us, therefore, make haste, gentlemen, to pay a debt which must appear sacred to us, mindful of what we owe to our brethren in Vienna.

"We must to the help of the inhabitants of Vienna! The honour of the nation demands it of us. And we can do it with an assurance of victory; because I bring to the brave army, which has but recently driven before it the fleeing enemy over the frontiers, 12,000 warriors—untried indeed, but animated with patriotic ardour for the fight, and burning with desire to contend with their tried comrades for the laurel on the battle-field. Yes, we will do it! We will advance! Our friends in Vienna are anxiously reckoning upon it; and the Hungarian has never abandoned his friend!"

Móga spoke next, evidently having in view mainly to divert the discussion from the field of sentimental politics, and partly to remind us of our military oath, partly to call attention to the want of discipline in the army, and thereby give us a hint from what point of view solely and exclusively we had to judge of the advantages and disadvantages of the offensive, as well as of its admissibility or inadmissibility, and to give our votes accordingly. He concluded his speech, certainly not an ineffective one, by an energetic appeal to all the members of the council of war to speak out fearlessly their convictions.

A long silence was the comfortless answer to this invitation. I refrained from speaking, out of consideration for my seniors. But when Móga had reiterated his appeal with the words, "Now then, gentlemen, speak! you have spoken very decidedly in Parendorf!" I put all regard for others aside, and began: "Though one of the youngest members in this assembly, both in rank and in experience, yet I speak first, because the silence of my seniors seems to indicate that they wish to reserve to themselves a later opinion.

"The President has thrown light upon the necessity of the offensive in favour of Vienna in a political point of view.

"Neither is the solidarity between our fighting in self-defence and the insurrection in Vienna clear to me, nor do I know the intimate connexion between the events at Vienna and those at Pesth; nay even about the naked facts only unvouched-for reports have occasionally reached me.

"The *pressing necessity* for our offensive against the hostile army on the other side the Lajtha I must therefore leave to be decided by those who, from their discernment in political matters, their knowledge of the connexion and real nature of the events beyond the frontiers of our country with those in its interior, as well as from their public position, are called thereto.

"If I am ordered to cross the Hungarian frontiers with a hostile intent, being incapable of judging at present of the political tendency of this step, I shall obey without contradiction. But if I am asked whether, in our present circumstances, I advise the offensive, I can give an answer only from a military point of view, and that from the following considerations:

"Apart from the numerical superiority of the enemy, we have to ask ourselves not only whether our army is in that condition which is necessary for the success of any offensive operation in general, but in particular when such an operation is to be carried on in a neutral, not to say hostile territory.

"Troops intended to act on the offensive must be capable of manœuvering; that is to say, each division must have the dexterity to execute the movements ordered in the prescribed time, and in unison with the adjoining divisions.

"Only a very small part of our army is capable of manœuvering. The few regular troops and one or two Honvéd battalions excepted, it consists of divisions which fall into confusion in the simplest movements *on the exercise-ground;* and they are in general commanded by men who, from their inadequate military knowledge, are calculated only to heighten the confusion when once introduced.

"On the battle-field, a movement executed with precision by separate divisions in critical moments often decides the contest; but mostly the calm and orderly keeping together of the troops, confiding in the firmness of their commander; and the calm resolution of the latter, relying upon the steady obedience of his inferiors. In all the divisions of the National-guard and the Volunteers, these being the elements of which almost two-thirds of our army consists, we cannot suppose this reciprocal confidence, because the conditions necessary for it are wanting.

"Every offensive, to be carried on successfully, further requires certain, regular supplies for the troops; otherwise it miscarries from their physical weakness.

Disciplined troops can be furnished with provisions for several days in advance; not so the undisciplined. It seems burdensome to the National-guard, as well as to the Volunteer, to drag with him his own rations for some days on the march, already toilsome enough without this. He satisfies his present hunger, and sells or gives away the rest, or even, without hesitation, throws it away. Hence arises the necessity for having even their next day's provisions carried after the troops; and the army is encumbered by a train of wagons which alone is not infrequently sufficient to impede its motions just at the most critical moment. Moreover, even if we deny the existence of this latter fatality, it is still true that, from the utter want of a regular internal management in the divisions, even when the provisions are carried after the army, still the support of each man is not secured; because the officers do not know how to manage and superintend judiciously the equal distribution of the provisions; or rather, in their stupid indolence, they do not trouble themselves at all about it. And so it happens, as I witness almost daily among my own brigade in the camp, that in one and the same battalion, to which even more than the abundantly sufficient total-ration is given in mass, some companies are hungry, while the others have a superabundance, and overload their stomachs from fear of a fast-day being near at hand. What the worth of a famished soldier is, probably every one of the gentlemen present can judge from his own experience.

"The offensive requires, finally, troops hardy and accustomed to fight. The majority of ours belong not to this category. On the battle-field two opposing powers contend for the mastery over the steadfastness

of the soldier. Honour, patriotic enthusiasm, perhaps also the fear of the punishment which the articles of war decree against the cowardly soldier, urge him forward; while the death thundered against him from the enemy's artillery frightens him back. According as the one or the other of these two powers gains the upper hand, the troops vanquish or are vanquished. The history of war teaches us that young troops, although well disciplined and well led, more frequently experience the latter fate. What destiny could we prognosticate for our undisciplined and ill-led battalions?

"And besides all this, I must also express my apprehension, that by this offensive we are in danger of losing for ever the sympathy supposed to be felt for us on the other side the Lajtha; for what the Croats have spared, our Volunteers, our National-guards will hardly spare,—the property of the rural population. During our second advance to Stix-Neusiedel I saw with my own eyes the traces of the devastation which our troops left behind them in that district as their memorials; and as yet no scarcity of food had taken place, which, considering the defective preparations for our support, is the more certainly to be expected the farther we advance. Though I have heard from time to time complaints about the thefts committed by the Croats, I found nevertheless, for instance, the expensive props of the vine-grower left untouched in all the vineyards; but these, after our departure, in spite of the complaints of their proprietors, and notwithstanding the strict prohibition, were burnt, and the cultivated fields maliciously trodden down. The Hungarian militia-man seldom makes a distinction between the German who fights against us, and the Ger-

man who wishes us victory or at least remains neutral. *Hiszen csak a németé!* ('It belongs only to the German'), so runs the common saying, by which he thinks himself authorised to commit every kind of devastation on a foreign territory. Such abuses can be prevented only by the strictest discipline; but I must once more repeat, it is in this very thing that we are deficient.

"As I might, however, be reproached with exaggeration, I will run the risk of a harmless test, the result of which will shew us whether we can hazard or not the proposed offensive.

"Let us issue an order, for instance, that the whole camp be ready to start on the day after to-morrow at five o'clock in the afternoon, and let us convince ourselves how far this order has been executed. If we find the whole camp duly prepared—though not just precisely at the fixed hour, yet say two hours later—then will I unconditionally vote for the offensive."

Kossuth was evidently displeased with my declaration, and put to me the question: "How high did I estimate the enthusiasm which his address would call forth among the troops."

"In the camp, and immediately after the address, very high; but after the endurance of hardships, and in presence of the enemy, very low," was my answer.

"Then you think," he asked again, irritated, "that we shall not bring back a single man of our army?"

"For the safety of the National-guards and the Volunteers," I replied, "their nimbleness is to me a sufficient guarantee; but the few good troops which we possess might be ruined by it, and with them the material which we so pressingly need for training up a useful army." — —

Kossuth concluded the deliberation without a decision being come to; but he held out a prospect of its being resumed at Parendorf. Hereupon I took my leave, and returned immediately to Bruck.

On the following day Kossuth arrived at Parendorf. His first official act in the camp was to assemble the officers of the regular troops before his lodgings, and read to them a letter addressed to Prince Windisch-Grätz, wherein, so far as I remember, he pointed out the right of the Hungarians in opposition to Ban Jellachich and his party, and, based upon this, demanded of the Prince that the Ban and his corps should be disarmed, that it might thereby be shewn that the Hungarian constitution, recently sanctioned by the king, was deemed sacred. He demanded likewise, I think, the raising of the blockade of Vienna; but especially, within a short, fixed time, a satisfactory answer to this letter, in default of which Hungary would be compelled to attack and annihilate her enemy and his allies, even on neutral ground.

Two trumpets took their departure with this ultimatum to Prince Windisch-Grätz, immediately after it had been communicated to the officers.

The contents of this letter, which I have here given only very superficially, met with considerable sympathy from those present, so far as I could remark; and it might be foreseen that the agitation for the offensive in favour of Vienna, if continued in this way, would not be unsuccessful. Kossuth might have reckoned on this, and therefore have resolved by such means to weaken in its consequences the defeat sustained in the council of war at Nikelsdorf. Several members of the Diet, who made their appearance in the camp as Hungarian *chasseurs*, likewise did all they could to gain parts of the army

for the offensive; while Kossuth carried on the agitation on a much larger scale, went from one division of the encamped troops to another, and endeavoured by the fire of his oratory to animate them for the combat against the enemy beyond the Lajtha.

A regular council of war, like that in Nikelsdorf, so far as I know, was not again held. The whole deliberation was protracted by discussions repeated at haphazard, which became daily more general, so that the whole camp soon took part in them. Sympathy for the offensive was visibly increasing.

At first, indeed, several regiments declared that in no case would they cross the Lajtha against Prince Windisch-Grätz, because this would be an act of open revolt. But after the boldest defenders of this opinion had, one after another, been very plainly threatened with dismissal—and thus officers already high in station would have been suddenly exposed to an uncertain fate—the monitors gradually decreased in number, and soon the last was silenced.

Meanwhile the answer of Prince Windisch-Grätz was eagerly expected. But of the two trumpets—a Honvéd colonel and a captain of the National-guard—only the latter returned; the former having been taken prisoner in Ban Jellachich's camp, and not again set at liberty.

This violation of the law of nations completely destroyed every opposition, which was perhaps still striving to maintain itself in the camp of Parendorf, against the proposal of the President to hasten to assist the oppressed inhabitants of Vienna. Kossuth appeared, therefore, to be willing to wait only for still more exact intelligence from Vienna; but when, instead of this, the thunder

of the great guns from the capital reached our ears, then at last it was said that no more time was to be lost; and the advance began on the 28th of October.

CHAPTER VIII.

With the right wing continually leaning against the Danube, and on the left protected as much as possible by the chief body of the cavalry,—the main body of the army advanced in three columns to the Fischa.

My brigade was the vanguard during the march; but in the battle-array it had to form the left wing of the centre.

The head-quarters remained during the night from the 28th to the 29th of October with the reserve to the east of Enzersdorf, near the Fischa, on the edge of a small wood. The right wing stood near Fischamend, the left near Margarethen-am-Moos. The villages Schwaadorf, Klein-Neusiedel, and Fischamend, were occupied by our outposts.

My brigade was encamped close by Karlsdorf. In conformity with an order I had received, I kept up a large fire during the whole night on the highest point of the nearest environs, to announce our advance to the inhabitants of Vienna.

On the 29th we passed over the Fischa, without, however, marching more than a (German) mile* this day in the direction of Schwechat.

* Equivalent to 5⅝ English miles.—*Transl.*

During the following night we bivouacked in a somewhat concentrated position on the eminences between the Fischa and the Schwechat.

Scarcely had darkness quite set in, when the officer of the general's staff, Nemegyei, present with our left wing, saw visions, which, with a rare scrupulosity, and to our no little trouble, he committed to paper, in the form of reports to the commander of the army, "that we had already been turned." The Raab scythe-bearers, consisting of several thousands, were immediately sent thither from the reserve for the security of the left wing. They reached the camp of my brigade without accident. From us they had perhaps still half an hour's march to the ideally-menaced point: but the ordnance-officer of the left wing, who had been appointed to conduct them thither, lost the direction, and led them circuitously about during several hours, till at last they stopped from sheer exhaustion, and left to Nemegyei alone the unequal combat with the spectral turning-column of the enemy.

Insignificant as this incident seemed to be, it actually exerted an important influence on the disgraceful issue of the approaching battle. The troops of almost the whole centre, but especially those of its left wing (my brigade) were already, early in the morning of the 30th, physically exhausted, morally shaken; they had had no rest, and were quite unable to resist the fatal effects of the terrible rumours of the preceding night. As I had foretold, I saw the enthusiasm, which had really been very vividly kindled by the President's fine speeches in the Parendorf camp, already on the point of extinction. We had lost the battle before it had been begun.

Early on the morning of the 30th of October my brigade had been advancing for a long time, when I received orders instantly to halt, and allow myself to be overtaken by the whole line; the duty assigned to my brigade, to form the vanguard of the army, being no longer practicable, on account of the visible proximity of the enemy opposite all points of our extended line. I obeyed.

Soon afterwards an active engagement of artillery commenced on the extreme right wing, and revealed to us that it had already advanced disproportionately far. At the same time serried lines of the enemy shewed themselves on the eminences of Schwechat. I thought that, by attacking them, I should be the means of procuring for our right wing more favourable chances of combat; and my left being secured by the brigade of cavalry against being passed round, the centre of the army also already slowly following us, I resolved, contrary to the received orders, and on my own responsibility, to attack.

Whilst still twice as far from these lines as the range of their guns, a second order from the commander-in-chief interrupted me in the execution of my project. "I must halt," it said, "and attack only after express orders."

Meanwhile the right wing had advanced to Mannswörth, and the contest between the *tirailleurs* began on the eastern limit of this place. From a hill in front of my brigade I could observe it almost in detail. With an unusually intense interest I watched its progress: it was the first obstinate encounter of *tirailleurs* of which I had been an eye-witness.

Our troops, quite contrary to my anticipation, con-

ducted themselves very bravely; especially a battalion of Szeklers, and the second volunteer battalion from Pesth, under the command of the daring major of the National-guards, Count Guyon. On this occasion he had incontestably the greatest merit; for he was always to be seen foremost where the danger was greatest. These battalions earned for themselves on that day renown for courage.

The battle round Mannswörth was still not completely decided, when the centre of the army arrived in the same line with my brigade; and I was ordered to gain the height in front of Schwechat, southward of the road from Schwaadorf to Schwechat, and there to wait till commanded to attack that place.

In the execution of this order, I met with no obstacle; the hostile lines, which had at first shewn themselves before Schwechat, having meanwhile again disappeared.

The other brigades of our centre developed themselves to my right, north of the road just mentioned, on the open space between the latter and the army's extreme right wing, which alone fought round Mannswörth.

From the north-eastern extremity of Schwechat my neighbouring brigade was saluted by an insignificant discharge from the enemy's artillery; whereupon the provisional chief of our general's staff, Major Pusztelnik —to whom, in the stead of the regular chief, Colonel Kollmann, had been committed, for his *début* as it were, the management of the details of this offensive—ordered all batteries of the first line to fire.

Though I saw no enemy before me, nevertheless, supposing that Schwechat might be held by him, I also made my battery play upon the place, intending thereby to facilitate the ensuing attack of the *tirailleurs*.

The attack had scarcely begun, when another "Halt!" from the general-in-chief interrupted it; and condemned the whole centre, without regarding the advantages which had already been gained on the right wing, to await, inactive, the issue of the battle which was just threatening to open on our extreme *left* wing.

In fact, when taking possession of the eminences near Schwechat, we had remarked the advance of a very strong column of hostile cavalry from Zwölfaxing towards Rauchenwarth, whose movements plainly shewed that they intended to turn our left wing.

Colonel Michael Répásy, commander of the left wing, had remained unusually far behind, while we were advancing from the last bivouac; so much so, that after the drawing-up of the centre on the eminences near Schwechat, there was an interval of more than a quarter of a mile ($1\frac{7}{8}$ English) between its (the centre's) left wing and that of the army. This lagging of Colonel Répásy was adduced as the principal reason for the orders to halt, which so frequently interrupted the advance of the centre.

It was, however, inexplicable to us, who were in the centre, why the general-in-chief did not prefer to push on more quickly the left wing, which consisted only of cavalry, instead of constantly keeping the centre back; and not less inexplicable was the reason for our being drawn up so as to be exposed to the grape-shot from the enemy's position, beyond which we could very distinctly observe speedy preparations making for an attack with artillery on our unprotected fronts, without being allowed either to prevent or avoid it.

As we stood there in a state of inaction, we were not much better off than if we had been placed within the

most efficient gun-range of a fortified hostile position, and ordered patiently to wait till the unprepared enemy, at his leisure, had taken his measures against us.

The orders of the general-in-chief evidently indicated his desire to await the hostile attack; but in that case we ought to have retired at least four times artillery-range, so as to draw the enemy completely out of Schwechat, and deprive him of the preponderating advantage of his protected position and the employment of his forces.

By this retrograde movement of the right wing and of the centre, the dangerous interval between the latter and the left wing, which the enemy seemed just then intending to attempt, would likewise be judiciously closed; for opposite to this interval, in the direction, namely, between Zwölfaxing and the Treasury paper-manufactory, a not insignificant division of the enemy's army, isolated from their turning main-column, was suddenly observed, which, though presumably destined only for communication between the turning-column and their principal position at Schwechat, would nevertheless by its further advance have endangered, first of all, the unprotected left wing of our centre, and consequently immediately my brigade.

I therefore resolved in person to seek for the general-in-chief, and induce him to alter his plans.

I found him in company with the President, the Commissaries, and several deputies, at a point in the rear whence the whole of the arrangement of the army could certainly be surveyed, but not at all its disadvantages in regard to locality and tactics, in their details. I told him my apprehensions; he paid no attention to them. Exasperated at this, I could not refrain from remarking

that, from the point on which he stood, he was quite unable to judge of the position of the foremost line.

"I stand where I can survey the whole; and do you execute in silence what I order!" replied the general to me, in a haughty tone of reprimand.

Kossuth interfered accommodatingly, and asked for a repetition of the details of our position, and the disadvantages attached to it. But I was now no longer sufficiently collected to reiterate a circumstantial explanation of all these matters. I replied, briefly and abruptly, that the dispositions were of such a kind, that I did not feel inclined to charge myself with the responsibility of their consequences; and rode back in haste to my brigade, without waiting for the President's intervention.

The hostile divisions, observed opposite our gigantic interval, seemed to have come considerably nearer during my absence. Sharper eyes than mine discovered that they consisted of cavalry.

I had only six platoons of the tenth regiment of Hussars (William) at my disposal.

The battalions of Honter Volunteers and Gömör National-guards formed the flank (left) of my position, disposed in form of a hook; they stood to the south of a deeply-cut field-way, leaving Schwechat in the direction towards Rauchenwarth. This seemed to me to present a sufficient obstacle to an attack of cavalry directed against my left flank; and I consequently drew back these battalions to the ground lying to the north of the field-way.

The position of my brigade, which consisted on that day of four battalions, eight pieces of artillery, and six platoons of hussars, was accordingly as follows:

On the right wing, next to the high road, stood the Nógrád battalion, on its left and near it two guns; then the first battalion of Pesth Volunteers: these divisions faced Schwechat. To the left, farther back than the first battalion of Pesth Volunteers, and forming a hook with it, stood the battalion of Honter Volunteers, with their front towards Zwölfaxing; on its left and near it the Gömör National-guards; then, again, two pieces of artillery. The cavalry was there only to protect the guns, on account of want of confidence in the foot-soldiers.

Pusztelnik had borrowed four of my guns, intending with them to betake himself to the continuation of the south-eastern outlet of Schwechat—far beyond the reach of my position — and by cannonading it, prevent the enemy, as far as possible, from debouching on that point. Not till the next day did I see these guns again! But the enemy did debouch nevertheless, and took us by surprise with a fire of artillery truly murderous at so short a distance, and far surpassing that of my four guns.

By his first shots he at once threw my battalions into irremediable confusion. The Gömör National-guards ran away first. These were followed by the Honter Volunteers, after they had overturned their commander, horse and all, in his endeavours to stop them. Only with the greatest efforts did he succeed in working his way out of the agglomeration of the ranks, who, in their panic terror, were rushing headlong over one another. By my orders he hastened in advance of his fleeing battalion, to rally it, if possible, out of the reach of the enemy's batteries, and lead it forward again.

Meanwhile I hoped to hold the place with the first

Pesth battalion, which I supposed to be still firm. But then I wished to attempt to storm the hostile battery. Had not my battalions times innumerable solemnly promised that they would follow me till death! Nevertheless, by anticipation, I gave up all hope of the return of the Gömör National-guards.

During the first minutes of the cannonade from the enemy, being exclusively occupied with the Honter Volunteers, I had not observed what was taking place in the first Pesth battalion. I now found it also already in confusion; and its commander, the National-guard major, Count Ernest Almássy, almost beside himself with exhaustion, in consequence of his strenuous efforts to keep his men together. I saw in an instant the impossibility of maintaining the position with this battalion until the return of the Honter Volunteers; and yet I madly believed it possible to animate it to storm the hostile batteries. "Forward! forward against the guns!" shouted I to the irresolute; and Captain Gózon of the battalion seized the banner, ran ahead with it some fifty paces towards the enemy, planted it in the ground, and cried in Hungarian, "Hither, Magyar! here waves thy banner!"

From thirty to forty of the most courageous followed the intrepid man. But whilst the foremost rank joined them only laggardly, those behind deserted more and more; and after a few minutes the battalion resembled a misshapen elongated reptile, for the greater number crawled away on all fours, while those who fled erect tumbled over them. In vain did Captain Gózon again hold up the banner, wave it high in the air, and exhaust himself with inspiring shouts; in vain did the commander of the battalion, with his adjutant, at last fall

on the fugitives — they were no longer to be stopped; and even those few who had advanced at Gózon's first call, quickly deserted him again one after the other; and he soon stood there alone with the banner.

I rode up to him, gave him my hand as a mark of my esteem for his heroism, and recommended him to save the banner.

Saving my guns was of far more importance to me. Those of the left wing had already been dragged away by the battalions in their flight. Only those of the right wing remained.

With anxious solicitude I therefore hastened thither, and imperiously demanded of the commander of the battery, what he still wanted there by himself. He excused himself by saying that he had received no orders to retire.

"Now, then, make haste and be off!" I exclaimed; quite overlooking, in my excitement, the stoical courage evinced by this excuse.

But the man had the blood of a fish in his veins. "There are still some charges here," replied he, in a Bohemian-German dialect; "may I not first fire them off?" I was almost ashamed of my anxiety before him. Irritated, I gave a bluff consent, and turned my horse towards the high road, to see what had happened meanwhile to my neighbour brigades.

I had supposed that the Nógrad Volunteer battalion to the right, in the rear of the guns, had run away long ago. My surprise, therefore, was indescribable, when my first glance in this direction fell on the serried and immovable mass.

It stood in the direction of the most violent fire of the hostile batteries, though in a gently-sloping hollow

protected from it. This circumstance I overlooked, however, in the first instance, and thus believed that I had before me a battalion of heroes. "Advance swiftly to cover the retreat of the artillery, and then form the rear-guard!" I called, encouraged, to the commander, and thought I should still accomplish wonders with such heroes. What a deception! Scarcely was the battalion out of its covert and exposed to the balls of the battery, when the commander shouted with all his might, "Volunteers, forward!—fire, all!"

But the volunteers remained immovable; the whole mass discharged their high-presented muskets at the hussars, who, in protecting the retreating guns, were just passing close by their front (fortunately none of the shots hit); and the next minute the battalion of supposed heroes was already on its way to join the rest. One of its men alone disdained to take part in the general flight, and acted as if he would of himself form the rear-guard of my whole brigade.

Thus, out of nearly 5000 men of those National-guards and Volunteers about whose valour I had already heard so many tirades; who, as they themselves had repeatedly asserted, were burning with desire to measure themselves with an enemy whom they never mentioned but with the greatest contempt,—there remained to me, after a short hostile cannonade, *a single* man! and this one was an elderly, half-invalid soldier!

The firmness with which at Nikelsdorf I had opposed the President's urging to the offensive, proved, I should think, clearly enough that I was perfectly prepared for an unfortunate *début* of these "inspired legions;" but what I had just experienced far exceeded my worst apprehensions.

I thought I should have sunk into the earth for shame at the unspeakable cowardice of my countrymen, and wished that a ball would strike me from my horse!

Of my once-numerous suite, only my younger brother and a first-lieutenant of the tenth regiment of hussars had constantly kept near me during moments of danger. Accompanied by them I sorrowfully left the field of battle—the witness of our shame—and had then no presentiment that the honour was yet reserved for us of taking part in future combats, the consequences of which would embitter to the victors of Schwechat the memory of this day.

Slowly I rode towards the midst of the centre. I almost feared the sight of my comrades, whom I supposed to be still engaged in the battle with their brigades. Alas, I had no reason for fear. The whole of our forces from Schwechat to Mannswörth was as if swept away. The other brigades were said—incredible as it seems—to have taken to their heels even before mine.

Like a scared flock, the main body of the army was seen hastening in the greatest disorder towards the Fischa for safety. The broad plain was literally sown all over with single fugitives; nowhere, as far as the eye could reach, was a compact division to be perceived.

It was to be expected that the enemy would take advantage of his victory, resolutely pursue, and render it impossible to get our train of artillery safely across the Fischa. This was confirmed by his advancing batteries.

Nothing else than a desperate combat by the rear-guard could now save the army. At whatever cost, something must be done to effect this. Fortunately the horses of my two companions were still pretty fresh. I there-

fore despatched one of them in the direction of Schwaadorf, the other towards Fischamend, after the fugitives, to stop and assemble as many as they possibly could.

The result of their exertions was hopelessly small, about 1000 men in all, and even these were continually on the point of running away again. I no longer saw any hope of preservation.

But, next to God, the enemy was on this day merciful and compassionate to us, for—he did not pursue us.

Unmolested we reached before night the opposite bank of the Fischa; and equally unmolested on the next day we entered again the "legal ground" of our country.

Scarcely had the last sound of the artillery before Schwechat died away, when the strangest opinions were heard as to the real cause of the failure of our offensive operations.

For instance, the masses of deserters from the National-guards and Volunteers—who had at their command a surprising readiness for interpreting every defeat sustained through their cowardice, as being the inevitable result of some treason—asserted that the inhabitants of Vienna, secretly leaguing with Prince Windisch-Grätz, had exhorted us to hasten to their assistance, and had during the battle united themselves with the hostile troops against us. Absurd as this story sounds, it was but a natural consequence of those agitations which had led to the expectation of a sally of the inhabitants of Vienna simultaneously with our attack, and thus of the easiest victory over the blockading army.

Móga's dispositions during the offensive, but especially during the conflict, were likewise severely criticised; and by many of his inferiors expressly interpreted as if he had wished to deliver the whole army into the

enemy's hands. That this had not succeeded—they further said—was owing to Prince Windisch-Grätz, or rather to his sub-commanders, who purposely allowed us to escape with only a black eye.

But the civil coryphei of the Hungarian movement diffused *these* opinions very diligently throughout the country; on the one hand, to weaken the just reproach that they by their agitations for the crossing of the Lajtha had led the nation to take a foolhardy, pernicious step; on the other hand, to revive the drooping courage of the people, by pointing to sympathies, which they said existed for the cause of Hungary *even in the Austrian army.*

A conscientious estimate of the peculiar circumstances under which the battle of Schwechat had been fought, scarcely permits, however, an unreserved concurrence in this somewhat bold judgment.

It cannot certainly be denied, on the one side, that our general's dispositions here and there led to the suspicion that he intended to deliver his army into the enemy's hands. On the other side, it must be admitted that the enemy had entirely confined the pursuit of our deserting centre and right wing to sending at random after us his projectiles from two or at most three positions he had taken up for his artillery when advancing; while his gigantic turning-column, opposed by our quite isolated feeble left wing under Répásy, discontinued its attacks just at the moment when it had become impossible for our general to reinforce the left wing. It must further be granted, that the enemy could have been hindered from pursuing neither by a sally of the inhabitants of Vienna, nor by the supposition that our flight was merely a feigned one. All this taken together con-

sequently furnishes reason enough for the supposition, that he intentionally let us escape with only a black eye.

But I oppose to this, that it cannot be imagined there was, either on the part of Móga or on that of his subcommanders, a clear knowledge of what they really intended to do on the day of the battle at Schwechat. And I find the more natural explanation of the defective leading of our army, as well as of their unexpected preservation, partly in the embarrassment, easily conceivable after thirty years of peace, of the opposite leaders and their troops; partly perhaps also in the circumstance that the national excitements of the year 1848 had not yet succeeded in so completely effacing from the ranks of the regular troops of both armies the remembrance of the fellowship which had existed among them shortly before, as that it would have been possible for them to fight against each other like embittered enemies.

CHAPTER IX.

Early on the 31st of October, I had received, during the march, an order from the commander of the army not to lead my brigade again to Bruck, into the inevitable position on the Lajtha, but to Kitsee (Köpesény), and to encamp before that place.

Here consequently there reached me, in the night between the 31st of October and the 1st of November 1848, the President's order to appear before him with-

out delay at Presburg (Pozson). At the same time I was invited to the head-quarters (in the seignorial castle of Kitsee), Móga wishing to speak to me previously.

It was past midnight when I arrived at the head-quarters. I found Móga already retired to rest; but his adjutant was waiting for me, and communicated to me beforehand, that his chief, in consequence of a fall from his horse, by which he was severely bruised, had become incapable of continuing the command of the army, and had proposed *me* to the President as his successor.

I therefore rode immediately to Presburg; and very early in the morning of the 1st of November I stood beside the President's sick-bed; for, in the delicate state of his health, the recent events had brought on a kind of fever. A violent fit, he assured me, had just left him.

He invited me to take a seat near his bed, as our conversation might be of some duration, and complained first of the excessive cowardice of the National-guards and Volunteers, still more of the battalion of the foot-regiment Preussen, and especially of its commander, Major Gyözei,* a coward beyond compare. This battalion, according to Kossuth, stood in the second line of the middle brigade of the centre (in the array before Schwechat my neighbour brigade to the right), and at the beginning of the hostile cannonade had taken to flight the first of all, nay, during the flight had thrown away even their havresacks and cartridge-pouches.

I remembered, indeed, to have noticed, during my last ride over the position occupied by our centre, in

* This was his Magyarised name; his German name is unknown to me.

the direction indicated, a remarkably great mass of equipments, with white straps, that had been thrown away, and far around not any dead or wounded to be seen.

However, said Kossuth, the National-guards had afterwards succeeded in disputing with this regular battalion the palm of greater cowardice. Because when he had left General Móga, after many vain attempts to put a stop to the flight which now had become general, and had hastened back in his carriage to Fischamend—as was natural, only with the intention of stopping the fugitives at the bridge of the Fischa—he found it already occupied to such a degree by deserters, that he could himself get over it only in consequence of the very energetic efforts made by his armed followers.

"And this was much," added Kossuth, in an explanatory manner; "for I had not remained a great while after the commencement of the retreat, on that point behind the place where the reserve of the army stood—where, shortly before the hostile attack on our centre, we had for the last time spoken together in the general's company—and had ridden pretty quickly from thence to Fischamend!

"I was now obliged," continued Kossuth, "to defer the execution of my original design to a point lying still farther on. I ordered fresh horses to be put to my carriage, and availed myself of the time while this was being done, to address those who were fleeing close by my side, and so perhaps stop them. But in vain. They only waved their hats in friendly salute, wishing me many times long life, and ran on unheeding.

"Though disgusted in the highest degree at such conduct, I could not but see the impossibility of damming

up any where in the midst the stream of fugitives without the energetic co-operation of a compact troop; and this confirmed me still more in my resolution to overtake those who had fled farthest, before I should venture again to attempt rallying them.

"Meanwhile the fresh horses had been put to the carriage. I had no time to lose, and urged haste. But however broad the main road might be, I was nevertheless every here and there again and again interrupted in my swift journey by a new dense multitude of fugitives.

"Behind almost each of these crowds I was obliged to make a formal speech from my carriage, to be allowed at least to drive on before them. And thus it happened that, in spite of the repeated change of horses, I could not overtake the first of the deserters before I was in front of Presburg, in the so-called Au. There at last, eight (German) miles from Schwechat—the fellows must clandestinely have taken to their heels at the earliest opportunity after the first discharge of artillery—the danger from the enemy appeared to them no longer sufficiently great to make them run farther. They were camping contentedly along the road, and were just taking some refreshment when I arrived among them. Beside myself with indignation, I resolved to sentence them to the severest punishments; and for this purpose asked the name of the division to which they belonged. But the wretches felt themselves even flattered by my 'kind inquiry;' and while some of them repeatedly called to me with self-satisfaction that they were the National-guards of the comitate of Komorn, the rest bellowed continually, 'Eljen Kossuth!'"

When the President in the council of war at Nikels-

dorf—evidently, offended at my unreserved description of the state of discipline existing in our army—had put the question to me, with a malicious sneer, whether I seriously feared that we should not bring home a single man from the offensive across the Lajtha, I answered, "I was not alarmed about the National-guards and Volunteers—they had nimble legs!" I could not now feel otherwise than astonished to see how perfectly the President's own experience justified my then doubted judgment. Still I refrained at this time from making any remark upon it; because Kossuth appeared to me not only physically but also morally shattered.

However, he was not the latter by any means. Although, after his recent journey from Fischamend to Presburg, he could no longer answer so decidedly for the heroism of the National-guards and Volunteers as he had previously done, nevertheless he still attributed the chief blame of the disgraceful issue of our offensive in favour of Vienna to the indecision of the commander of the army; and strenuously maintained that a more determined leading of the troops would have been followed by victory.

"The accident which has made Móga suddenly incapable of service," added Kossuth, "I consider as a hint to remove for ever from the command of the army all politically-wavering elements. This seems to me especially necessary at the moment when it is important to prepare for the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich—who has meanwhile already hostilely penetrated into the country from the north as far as Tyrnau (Nagy Szombat)—the fate of Generals Roth and Philippovich, and thereby simultaneously to destroy on the one hand a not inconsiderable part of the hostile forces,

and on the other to rekindle anew the enthusiasm of the country, depressed in consequence of the disaster at Schwechat,—and thus, as it were, kill two birds with one stone.

"I have therefore advanced Count Guyon from major to colonel of the National-guards, and made him commander of the expedition against Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich. His heroic conduct before Mannswörth is a guarantee to me that this expedition will at least not fail from its leader's want of decision. It might indeed more easily miscarry through his unskilfulness; for I distrust the military knowledge of Guyon. To obviate this, I have placed by his side as counsellor the chief of Móga's general staff, the Honvéd colonel Kollmann. But then, according to our system, Kollmann, as Honvéd colonel, and still more as his senior in rank, is properly Guyon's superior; and he must consequently first of all be won, as he best may, to a voluntary subordination to the commands of the latter. For this, however, and especially the more to expedite the preparations for this expedition, in which the most trusty troops of the army shall be employed, I need the vigorous assistance of an energetic commander of the army. Would not *you* undertake the command of the army? *You* seem to me to be above all others the right man for this post!"

"What, then, will my senior comrades in the army say, when they see themselves passed over, on my account, and without reason?" replied I, interrogatively.

"I have thought of that," answered Kossuth, "and had already offered to several of them the staff of command, as soon as I knew of Móga's accident; but have received just as many answers declining to accept it.

Hereupon *you* were proposed to me for this post by Móga. As to what your comrades will say to it, you may therefore, I think, be perfectly easy. They will be nominated generals together with you, only you receive the seniority of rank. If therefore you accept the staff of command, endeavour above all to set on foot as quickly as possible the expedition against Field-marshal Simunich, and to arrange any differences between Kollmann and Guyon, if such should arise, before they personally fall out, and thus render mediation impossible."

"I accept the staff of command," I answered, "and will immediately go in search of those gentlemen; but I must remark, that I despair beforehand of any favourable result from my mediation. Why do you not prefer to entrust Kollmann with the command of the expedition, and associate Guyon with him as sub-commander?"

"Because before Schwechat I had an opportunity of having confirmed by my own observation the ambiguous reputation which Kollmann has with the army," replied Kossuth. "You should but have seen the pitiful countenance with which he was stealing about before Schwechat among the commander's suite, and how it at once became irradiated with joy, when, after the beginning of the general flight in the centre, his leader turned his horse towards the preserving Fischa. I cannot tell, however, how much of this delight is to be attributed to the tranquillising thought that he (Kollmann) in the general's suite could now honourably withdraw himself from the approaching danger, and how much to malignant satisfaction at the baffled *début* of his substitute Pusztelnik. This much, however, appears to

me to be certain, that Kollmann is destitute of those moral qualities which, to ensure its success, I presume to be indispensable in the leader of the expedition against Simunich.

"Moreover I have already definitively charged Guyon with the command of this expedition. If Kollmann, therefore, should persevere in refusing to recognise the former as his chief, then Pusztelnik must again act in Kollmann's place."

Agreeing with this measure, I left the President, and made a vain attempt to arrange the wished-for understanding between Kollmann and Guyon, conformably with Kossuth's intention. In the meanwhile, however, they had already had words; and Kollmann steadily refused to lead the expedition under Guyon's command. Pusztelnik was consequently associated with the latter as chief of the general staff. Part of the troops for this campaign left Presburg before daybreak, and all of them in the course of the 1st of November. The rest of the army, in the mean time, was distributed, for the protection of the frontier, on the right bank of the Danube from the Neusiedel lake to Presburg; on the left from Presburg to Hochstetten.

Kossuth awaited the issue of the expedition in Presburg, whither also my head-quarters were transferred.

A few days after the commencement of the expedition I received an invitation from the President to a *rendezvous* with the Polish general Bem, who had just arrived at Presburg from Vienna, and was immediately to start for Guyon's expeditionary corps, to give a new and favourable turn to the operations of the latter, which were already near becoming a failure.

In consequence of this invitation I saw Bem for the

first time, without knowing more of his former fortunes than his sudden appearance in Vienna in the course of the past month of October, and his participation in the defence of that city.

Our conversation was very short. He communicated to me that Kossuth was sending him to Guyon to assist him both with his advice and co-operation.

Some days after this, Bem had again come back to Presburg; and, as Kossuth had already set out for Pesth, he invited me, through Csányi, to a conference. This time it lasted somewhat longer. Bem told me that he had reached Guyon a day too late to be able to exercise any effective influence on the course of this unfortunate campaign. He then remarked, what distinguished talents Guyon possessed as a general; but that the officers of the regular troops were still not quite uniform in their obedience; and so on. Finally he declared that he should go to Kossuth at Pesth, that he might be employed somewhere in the field.

Bem's presence produced a depressing effect upon me. I knew neither whence he came, nor what were his aims. His emerging in Vienna, which has remained inexplicable to me; his doings there, which I knew only by report; and now suddenly the devotedness, just as inexplicable, which he constantly protested for the defence of my country,—these circumstances led me involuntarily to suppose him to be something of a "knight errant" in a modern revolutionary style of warfare. My country's cause appeared to me to be too sacred, too just, not to make me feel a decided aversion to the companionship in arms of such elements. Moreover Bem's favourable judgment with respect to Guyon, as well as the contrary in regard to the body of officers of the regular troops, so diame-

trically contradicted my own experience, that I found therein very little reason to expect for my country any enduring success from Bem's doings in the field of battle.

Except on these two occasions at Presburg, I have never seen Bem, nor have I had any other direct intercourse with him.

22485

CHAPTER X.

THE Constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest. The nation had acknowledged this, and had unanimously risen to the conflict. Their leader was the man of their confidence—Kossuth.

But being no soldier himself, he under-estimated the importance of the soldier, and believed that the thunder of the enemy's artillery would be silenced by the mere war-cry of masses of people brought together by extemporised declamations.

Soldiers—myself among the number—had warned him against such a dangerous self-deception. The warning was unheeded by him; and before Schwechat he paid dearly for his experience.

Then he offered *me* the command of the defeated army.

I hailed this step as a proof that Kossuth had for ever sacrificed to the welfare of the country his anti-military enthusiasm, and accepted this important post with the clear conviction that the combat of the nation for its rights was a combat in self-defence, and in the

firm belief that it would remain so: I accepted it, because I felt inwardly the vocation for it, and that by refusing it, I should have violated my duty to my country; finally, because the higher I stood, the more likely it seemed to me that I should be able to inspire my fellow-citizens, by my own example, with that devotion to the just cause of the fatherland, without which it was vain to think of saving it.

But even during the first days of my new sphere of action I found that the day of Schwechat had neither cured the civil rulers of the error of allowing, in the disposal of the armed forces, political considerations to prevail at the expense of strategic ones, nor had it deterred them from the repetition of the experiment of making war without soldiers.

My proposition was,—on the right bank of the Danube to move back with the main army to Raab, with the advanced corps to Wieselburg (Moson); on the left, to protect Presburg and defend the principal passages across the White Mountains (Fehér Hegyek) with strong isolated detachments only, which, in case of the advance of a superior force of the enemy should effect their retreat, on the one side to Leopoldstadt (Lipótván), on the other to Komorn (Komárom): further, to reorganise the active army, to transfer the seat of government, and of the Diet, together with the *cadres* of the battalions about to be raised, behind the Theiss; and to make use of the end of autumn for raising troops, for establishing magazines and depôts, and in general for the organisation of a trusty, well-regulated army. It was, however, rejected.

In opposition to this, it was said that *the frontier must remain occupied*, and the reorganisation of the

army be carried on in face of the enemy; because that with every handbreadth of country lost, there was also a falling-away from us of a part of the people. Their sympathies for the maintenance of the Constitution were not yet sufficiently well-grounded to be able to resist the discomfiture sustained in a combat remarkably unfortunate for us. Above all, the discouraging effect of the defeat at Schwechat must be mitigated as much as possible by the maintenance of the frontier. Then would the inhabitants, especially those of that part of Hungary which is situated next to the seat of the Austrian government, accustom themselves in a very short time to the absence of their former relation to Austria, being obliged, in consequence of the blockade of the frontier, to break off their commercial connexions with the non-Hungarian territories of Austria, to confine their mercantile activity to the interior, and thus mark the more abruptly the frontier of Hungary towards Austria. Moreover, by means of the hermetical blockade of the frontier, the exportation of provisions to the capital —to the detriment of the hostile army concentrated in and around it—would also be entirely prevented; the buying-up of the supplies of corn and hay stored in the frontier comitates, and amassing them in the fortress of Komorn and its environs, would be secured, as well as a favourable market for the new Hungarian paper-money.

In vain did I call attention to the fact, that in spite of all this, by the occupation of the frontier they were merely striving for transitory and secondary advantages, and abandoning for these the durable and most important benefit which the possession of a well-organised armed force would secure to us; while the reorganisation of

the army, during the harassing service of the outposts along such an extended line of frontier, would be rendered very difficult, nay almost impossible.

I was outvoted, and might consider it fortunate that at least no objection was made to the reorganising of the army; by which I understood nothing less than the disbanding of the battalions of National-guards and Volunteers, and the formation of regular Honvéd battalions out of the material thereby gained.

But scarcely had Kossuth left Presburg to return to Pesth, when my exertions in this direction also began to be most obstinately obstructed.

Even during the President's sojourn of some days at Presburg, I had frequently had occasion to perceive that he was opposed to my purely military plans, not perhaps from his own personal conviction, but only in consequence of the most prejudicial influence of those about him, who had not been very happily chosen for the furtherance of the good cause. The difficulties which he suddenly raised from Pesth against the reorganisation of the army as I had proposed it, although he had seemed perfectly to agree with it when in Presburg, plainly confirmed this supposition. The source of these difficulties, again, could be found, in my opinion, only in external influences, and very probably in those of the members of the Committee of Defence. Though I scarcely knew them by name, it was nevertheless sufficient to know that they likewise were not soldiers, and that the power of the leaders of the army had always been a thorn in the side of the civil power.

But by this miserable petty jealousy the salvation of the country might be wrecked, notwithstanding the most heroic perseverance in fight on the part of the nation.

All, consequently, depended on creating a supreme power in the state, which being unrestricted, would consequently be raised above all such jealousy.

But this power must be vested in *one* person; it could only be the dictatorship. The one and only possible dictator of Hungary at that time was Kossuth.

Though not quite adapted for it, being ignorant of war, and disinclined to the measure of maintaining a standing army, which, however, is indispensable in the modern system of warfare; he nevertheless appeared to me to be much less obstructive to the successful progress of our cause than a governing *collegium*, like the Committee of Defence, in its nature practically irresponsible, and to whose proceedings the proverb of too many cooks was very often strikingly applicable.

As dictator—thus I reasoned—Kossuth would have to choose his residence with the principal army of the country, therefore with the army of the upper Danube. If once for a longer time in his direct proximity, I hoped soon to gain him over to my conviction, that the salvation of the country was not possible otherwise than with the assistance of a well-disciplined armed force, consequently neither with National-guards nor with Volunteer corps. And if theory had not been sufficient for this purpose, new practical experiences *à la* Schwechat would do the rest in a very short time.

Once cured of his illusion on this point, Kossuth would probably also have soon duly subordinated the political motives for the employment of the armed forces to the strategic considerations.

From these remarks the occasion is evident of the following letter to the Committee of Defence, in this instance written in German.

"*Presburg*, 11*th November* 1848.

"On the 31st of October in the present year I was invited by the President to take the command of the Hungarian army of the upper Danube.

"I undertook it—and with it the obligation to do whatever might contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the salvation of our oppressed country.

"No true patriot ought to conceal from himself, that the danger is great, is very great, and unfortunately may become still greater.

"The history of all nations, which, though at one time near their ruin, have elevated themselves again to that stage of existence which includes the conditions of a permanent endurance, teaches us that there are moments when all lesser considerations must give way, if the whole is to be saved; teaches us further, that without unity of will preservation is impossible; teaches us finally, that this unity can be obtained only when the confidence of the whole nation, or at all events of a preponderating part of it, concentrates itself in *one* man, and when the nation, placing this one freely over themselves for a certain time, voluntarily does homage to his will. So has it hitherto been, and so will it continue to be. I do not believe that the course of the world will take another direction out of love to Hungary.

"Whether all Hungary already stands so near the brink of ruin, that the hand of a firm dictatorship can alone save it from destruction,—this may be judged of by those men who have considered it adapted to the times to place the greatest part of the Hungarian army under the orders of a mere private individual. But that this part of the army has been brought by recent events

very near to total dissolution, is a fact which no military man by profession can deny.

"To find out with whom the blame of this rests, must be postponed to a time when the mental excitement, which just now seems to be ever on the increase, shall have subsided, and given place to a calm, comprehensively just, nay considerate judgment of all the circumstances. But at present there must be speedy help."

(The original contains here, by way of parenthesis, an attack against the then predominating mania for indulging in suspicions. What follows connects naturally word for word with the preceding.)

"My business is to propound *how;* and I therefore declare my convictions as follow:

"1. All nepotism in the promotions must for ever entirely cease.

"2. All irregular bodies of troops must be strictly kept apart from the regular, and placed under their own separate commanders.

"The best plan would be, to disband immediately all irregular troops; to pre-engage separately those individuals among them who are bound to military service, and to employ them for completing the bodies of regular troops already existing.

"The rebaptising of the so-called Volunteer battalions to Honvéd battalions is a very unhappy experiment. The name is changed, but the child remains the same.

"The Volunteer battalions are worth little or nothing, because only a very small number of the officers and subalterns understand their duty. Can we promise to ourselves more from these appointments, when they are

called Honvéd instead of National-guards? The greater number remains notwithstanding *asinus in pelle leonina.*

"Some have advanced the opinion, that one battalion of Volunteers or National-guards placed between two Honvéd battalions is equivalent to a third Honvéd battalion. So long as it does not come to bread-breaking,* this may be so; but at the first grape-shot the Volunteer battalion runs voluntarily away, and as a rule carries off with it involuntarily both Honvéd battalions to its right and left. There have been exceptions, but how many?

"The officers of the Volunteers, if they wish to pass over into the ranks of the Honvéd, ought previously to undergo an examination before a commission composed of tried, skilful officers; and if this examination proves satisfactory, they should be transferred, but only as juniors in rank. A few exceptions, the reward of distinguished merit, might be made, according to the decision of the commander-in-chief of the army alone. Moreover,

"3. The promotion of officers within certain limits ought to be confided to the commander of the army alone. Either the commander of the army deserves this confidence, and then there is no risk run; or he does not deserve it, and then away with him! Only no half-measures!

"4. The commander of the army is made responsible for all the dispositions of troops; but then nobody except himself ought to dispose of his army.

"An army without unity in the command is like a man who has fallen out with himself; neither from the one nor the other can any thing decided be expected.

* i. *e.* while there is no danger.—*Transl.*

"5. The army needs rest and refreshment; for it is depressed physically and morally. Rest and refreshment it cannot find here in Presburg;—Presburg, on account of the overpowering forces of the enemy menacing simultaneously from Austria, Moravia, Silesia, and Gallicia, is an untenable position, and will soon become the grave of our army.

"6. All the Volunteer battalions are covered with vermin, because since Jellachich's entrance into Stuhlweissenburg, where they lost their stock of body-linen, they have only *one* set a-piece. If they wish to wash it, they must wear their cloak all day long on their naked body. In the field this might do; but here, in these close quarters, the pedicular disease has got the upper hand to such an extent, that there are individuals whose skin is already quite ulcerated. At least one set of body-linen for change per man, and more suitable quarters, together with rest, are the only means of remedying this disgusting and dangerous malady.

"Fresh linen may be sent us, but not better quarters and rest.

"The constant watchfulness requisite to secure an extended open city like Presburg from hostile surprises, is too great to leave to the troops the resting-time needful for their absolutely essential purification and refreshment. On the other hand, Presburg does not afford sufficient space for quartering to enable the troops required for its security to be lodged in such a manner as their preservation urgently demands.

"7. All the divisions of the National-guards which did not engage themselves for the duration of the war must be immediately disbanded; because while this real public scourge costs immense sums, on account of the

enormous compensation which was secured to it by the comitates for the period of its services, it seems to exist only for the purpose of scoffing at the laws, and pestiferously infecting our best-disciplined troops with the bad spirit by which it is itself pervaded. Therefore away with it! Better no army at all, than one in whose separate parts the laws are scoffed at in the most scandalous manner.

"The Œdenburg National-guards 'on foot,' at the mere news that the enemy was approaching, immediately deserted to their homes; those 'on horseback' did the same a few hours later. All that remained of them was the commander and some officers!

"At the request of the President Kossuth, I have taken the command of a part of the Hungarian army, and it is my most sacred duty to see that its honour is preserved unsullied.

"A whole army may be beaten, and forced to yield, without injury to its honour; but if a single division of it plays the coward and runs away without having even seen the enemy, the honour of the whole army is stigmatised.

"I expect, from the ever-lauded equity of the honourable Committee of Defence, that I shall not be expected again to hazard the honour of my brave army by receiving into its ranks divisions which deserved rather the disgraceful name of 'Mob of runaways,' than the honourable one of 'Defenders of the fatherland.'

"8. From points (5.) and (6.) the proposition naturally follows: to occupy Presburg only so far as is absolutely necessary with a part of the army; and to remove the head-quarters and the main body to some other place which offers greater advantages as well for

the defence of the country as for the reorganisation of the army.

"This proposition I shall have the honour of laying before you in my next letter." (My signature follows.)

This letter had as its consequence just the contrary of what I intended; for now Kossuth, together with the Committee of Defence and the War-ministry, opposed more decidedly than before all my propositions and measures tending to the consolidation of the army.

The following extracts from the rough draughts of several letters sent from Presburg to Kossuth in Pesth, being accidentally at hand, furnish evidence of this. The originals are drawn up in Hungarian. I give the passages quoted from the German translation.

"*Presburg*, 15*th November* 1848.

"HONOURED PRESIDENT,

* * * *

"According to the purport of a decree of the Committee of Defence, the individuals qualified for filling the positions of staff-officers are to be proposed by the commander of the army and the royal commissary; but those fitted for becoming subalterns by the regiments or battalions and the royal commissary.

"This decree, indeed, deprives me of the right of appointing officers up to the rank of captain, and of the sole right of proposing those from captain upwards, which had been confided to me by you, honoured President. But this is not what troubles me most: it is rather my experience that even this more recent decree is not inviolably observed, as I have perceived from the

promotion of Major Száz to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

"Major Száz decamped somewhat nimbly from Mannswörth, leaving to its fate a division of his battalion which was placed next to the enemy. This is a fact; and it is in my opinion—without wishing to dictate—reason enough for *not* proposing him for promotion. My good Major Száz, however, has not fallen on his head: he is suddenly taken ill, needs the Kaiser-bath at Ofen, sets out immediately thither, and, look you, now he is already lieutenant-colonel!

"In the nomination of officers and in promotions there reigns generally speaking frightful abuse. To-day, for instance, I read in *Közlöny**—I must confess with surprise—the promotion of my younger brother to the rank of captain. He had already been made Honvéd first-lieutenant without either myself or him knowing how this could have happened; for I had promoted him only to a lieutenancy in the National-guards, and at the same time appointed him my adjutant (because I could make the best use of him in the organisation of the Volunteer mobile National-guard); but had firmly resolved to take no such further step for him as could even in the remotest degree have the appearance of favouritism. I do not know consequently whom my brother has to thank for these favours. But thus much I know, that both of his promotions are just as irregular as innumerable others; and I am much inclined to suspect that his latter advancement especially is nothing else than a deep-laid scheme to frustrate my exertions for the abolition of nepotism. But this does not at all divert me from my purpose." * * *

* The official gazette of the Committee of Defence.

"The sergeant-majors of hussars, V. and H., who have been promoted to the rank of lieutenants, I pray to have removed to another regiment, because these are the persons who, when in Gallicia — for the purpose of enabling themselves to return with their men to Hungary — carried along with them their superior officer, whom they bound; and thus committed the greatest military crime, though from patriotic motives. The country rewards their zealous patriotism by promotion; but the service strictly requires that they be removed from the ranks of that body of troops, where they serve only as dangerous examples of rewarded disobedience."

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"The period of service of the battalion of the Borsod National-guards expires on the 20th of this month; and already on the 10th have these people demanded to return home. The royal commissary Csányi has attempted to induce them to remain longer on duty. But they have repeatedly declared, that they will positively not continue any longer; for they are not such fools as to expose again their dear lives in the last five days of their service, after the good God has preserved them hitherto from the fire of the enemy's guns.

"I have consequently not the least reason to lament the departure of these zealous patriots; but certainly cause enough to complain of the loss of so many good muskets and equipments. I have therefore desired the royal commissary at least to retain their arms for the defence of the country, though he dismiss the men. If this succeeds, we shall have gained more than we shall lose; for the fifteenth Honvéd battalion, which loiters

about in Presburg without arms, can then be immediately supplied with the muskets of these Borsoders."
* * * * (My signature follows.)

"*Presburg, 17th November* 1848.

"HONOURED PRESIDENT,

"When I spoke earnestly against the formation of volunteer battalions, and the employment of the scythe-bearers in the field, I was not listened to by you, honoured President, because, according to your views, enthusiasm of itself is sufficient to stand in the stead of order, perseverance in sustaining the toils and hardships of war, obedience, discipline, and more of the like military and *only* military virtues. Would God it were so! matters would then be quite different with us. But, alas, Hungarian enthusiasm seems to be only a straw fire.

"I have already reported the conduct of the Borsod National-guard.

"The day before yesterday, the Honter Volunteer battalion, intended to be employed against the enemy, arrived without arms on the muster-ground. The men declared at the same time that they had been sent by their comitate only for a service of from six to eight, or at most of ten weeks' duration, and that this time had expired long ago. Consequently they would not move another step against the enemy.

"The accompanying report of the commander of the battalion, with its documents, gives a more particular explanation of this occurrence, as well as of the deceptive means which had been employed by the local authorities of the comitate of Honter in enlisting the volunteers.

"The men of the battalion of Zemplin National-

guards (engaged for six months) are also in a state of excitement, because they likewise have been deceived by their comitate, inasmuch as it has not sent them the necessary articles of clothing. And in the cold November nights a man is frozen if his cloak is the only cloth garment which he has as a protection against the cold. To-day two Zemplin National-guards appeared before me, in the name of the whole battalion, with the request that I would permit them to return to their homes, because the cholera was ravaging their comitate in a dreadful manner.

"This morning I expect similar requests from all the Volunteer battalions.

"To those of the Zemplin comitate I have answered, that I would lay their request before the Committee of Defence; but that until the arrival of a decision in their favour, they must perform their duties, otherwise I should be obliged to punish most severely those who were refractory.

"The period of service of four-sevenths of the Gömör National-guards also expires about this time. These most certainly do not remain!

"The metamorphosing the Volunteer into Honvéd battalions does not succeed well. Only very few of the men can be pre-engaged. Thus it is chiefly the officers who are favourable to this metamorphosis; so that, notwithstanding their ignorance and uselessness, they may for a still longer period receive their large pay, and continue to play their pranks in the capacity of officers.

"They agitate against the examination of officers, instead of acquiring some solid knowledge. One of the most zealous among these agitators is a captain of the National-guards, Sigismund Thaly, of the Eszterházy

battalion, whose company will be dismissed to-morrow, their time of service having expired. On this occasion dismissal likewise awaits him, unless he shall previously undergo the examination. He now suddenly demands a fortnight's furlough. I see through his plan. He wants a certificate of leave of absence, to prove in Pesth that he is still really in the service; supported by it, he would certainly find ways and means to be transferred into one or other of the Honvéd battalions. This calculation of the captain of the National-guards, Sigismund Thaly, is a pretty little scheme, and perhaps not entirely without prospect of success, because several cases have already shewn, that to be promoted one need only go to Pesth.

"Of the said Eszterházy battalion three companies will set out the day after to-morrow for their native fields (*i. e.* two more besides the company of Captain Sigismund Thaly). To detain them here any longer is an impossibility; but I will at least make them leave their arms behind them.

"'Your army is already weak, and yet you weaken it still further!' might be said of my not forcibly detaining the home-sick. I know this well, but still cannot do otherwise; and the less so, as I have a settled conviction that though my small army, by such departures as these, will certainly be weakened in numbers, it will nevertheless be morally strengthened; for in war there is nothing more disheartening to the soldier than the apprehension of being left in the lurch by his comrade.

"I have so disposed of my forces as to keep the enemy in check from Œdenburg as far as Nádas. I must, however, confess that, despite all one's energy,

with troops insufficiently protected against even the frosts of autumn, this is not only difficult to accomplish, but also exposes the army itself to very great danger. The brigade at Nádas, in particular, appears to me to be a second Leonidas troop, not so much on account of the overpowering forces of the enemy, as from their endurance of the hardships incident to their circumstances of time and place, their disproportionately arduous service, and their want of clothing.

"A few days since the cholera also began to insinuate itself into the army, and this to such a degree, that out of twenty-nine who fell sick, eleven died. But all this cannot be otherwise, because, according to your opinion, my task is, with a corps of scarcely 20,000 men (of whom two-thirds are good-for-nothing volunteers), to defend at the same time the north of Hungary, the city of Presburg, and moreover the comitates of Wieselburg and Œdenburg."

* * * * * *

"The Committee of Defence has not yet authorised me to employ the troops according to my own discretion.

"Probably my opinions are rather too radical, in maintaining that it can by no means be decided in Pesth, whether the so-called 'pass' of Nádas (across the White Mountains) can be defended with block-houses or not. It seems as if in Pesth a different opinion prevailed on this subject, as well as about promotions."

* * * * * *

"I take the liberty, honoured President, of again calling your attention to some illegal promotions.

"The comrades of a certain Mérei, subaltern officer in the first Honvéd battalion, intended to expel him, because he had suddenly pretended to be ill in the camp

at Parendorf immediately before the offensive over the Lajtha. He repairs to Pesth, and, look you, becomes captain in the eighteenth Honvéd battalion! Soon afterwards a sub-lieutenant of the first Honvéd battalion is appointed first lieutenant in the eighteenth battalion, but declares, on finding Mérei there, that he cannot accept the promotion. Now the body of officers of this battalion will enter a protest against Mérei's being associated with them.

"Béldi, formerly a sub-officer in the hussars, had stolen something from one of his superiors, was punished for it by running the gauntlet ten times, and being dismissed; but notwithstanding this he is now an officer in a Honvéd battalion." * * . * *

(My signature follows.)

In spite of the assurance of victory which characterised the proceedings of the then civil rulers of Hungary, and declared itself plainly enough by their persevering in the idea—to say the least of it, very naive in the eyes of a soldier—of fighting the battle of liberty with Volunteers and National-guards; Kossuth was nevertheless one day suddenly overtaken with anxiety, lest the enemy should concentrate his forces, which were considerably superior to ours, upon a point beyond the Lajtha —if not unobserved, yet unhindered by us—and then at once somewhere break into the country, without our being able to stop him. Associated with this anxiety was also the apprehension of the possible extinction of the sympathies of the people for our cause, notwithstanding our occupation of the frontier.

Both fears caused Kossuth urgently to request that I would not always stand so inactive on the frontiers,

but rather open a regular war of partisans* against Austria; surprise the enemy with the rapidity of lightning, at one time here, and immediately afterwards in another place, then in a third, and so on—God knows where else;—and thereby prevent him from concentrating his forces on a fixed point, or at least induce him to think they were every moment necessary somewhere else, and even to attempt to realise it: thus he would fatigue and dispirit his troops, and render them unfit for the execution of the offensive dreaded by Kossuth.

In such a warfare Kossuth saw at the same time a rich source of warlike heroic adventures, which, duly diffused by the daily press, would serve to counteract the apprehended extinction of the sympathies of the people for our struggle.

These requirements of the President—occasioned at first by an order of the enemy to his army, which led us to expect a speedy irruption into Hungary, and of which Kossuth had subjoined a copy to his letter to me—caused me to answer him *verbatim* as follows:

* * * * * *

"The order of the enemy to his army, which you have communicated to me, informs me that it is in fact no longer in my power to prevent his concentration; because it has already been most conveniently effected on the other side the Lajtha, and he can advance across our frontier almost in parade-march,—for instance, at Kittsee (Köpcsény), where neither bridges nor defiles interrupt his great undertakings.

"Do not take this remark for pusillanimity. If

* Kossuth erroneously called this mode of warfare "guerrilla combats;" and entering into his idea, I have retained this appellation in my letter of reply to him.

there be one who does not despair of the cause of our country, *I* am the man! But let us not deceive ourselves in relation to the greatness of the danger, of which I recognise the factors more in the feeble patriotism of our countrymen than in the numerical superiority of the enemy. The comitates of Presburg, Neutra, Trencsin, Wieselburg, and Œdenburg, are so many hothouses, if not of open antipathy against us, at least of the most pitiable inaction.

"The so-called 'guerrilla warfare' would certainly find in me its most zealous champion. In our present condition, however, such a war is impossible. Impossible, because the rural population does not stand by us, but shuts its doors against its starving countrymen. Impossible is such a war, because our infantry are almost barefooted, and our cavalry, on their enfeebled horses, are scarcely able any longer to stagger after the infantry; and then the teams of the artillery! But the saddest matter of all is, that we have no hope of soon bringing our horses again into good condition; for the hay is bad, and the oats are likewise none of the best! Impossible is a war of that kind, because scarcely a battalion can march even the distance of one station without dragging after it a long train of wagons: now the most essential requisite for the so-named 'guerrilla divisions' is facility of motion. For so-called surprises, which are made only at short distances, the enemy is too far off."

* * * * * *

(In the same letter I throw light circumstantially on our precarious situation in the position which has been taken up on the frontier, as follows:)

"In my opinion, Presburg can be defended, unless the garrison is to be sacrificed, only so long as there re-

mains in our possession, on one side Nádas, on the other Parendorf, Gattendorf, and Kittsee.

"The brigade at Nádas will maintain itself until the enemy menaces it by a wide circuit in its rear; or forces a passage on the spot; or finally, (if neither of these cases should happen) so long as Presburg is not abandoned by us, which must inevitably take place (the opening of the hostile offensive with an isolated attack on Presburg being presupposed,)* so soon as the enemy shall have succeeded in taking the first of the redoubts; partly because I should no longer be able to depend upon our still-young soldiers, partly because the redoubts further back are altogether insufficient, from their construction, for defence.

"With Presburg the north-western comitates certainly fall likewise: however, all in vain! With my small army, I must by no means engage in any war on the frontier; for this would be to abandon it in detail, and with it at the same time our country. This is my conviction!" * * * *

"I am very sorry, honoured President, that this conviction of mine is diametrically opposed to what you anticipate from the 'guerrilla war.' With what hearty good-will would I accede to the carrying out of all your projects, were it in any way possible under the existing local circumstances!

"The defile of Nádas is said to be a pass which might be rendered impracticable with little labour. For the last six days, under the protection of a strong brigade, considerable forces have been working at it; and the whole result obtained is, that if this point be left by

* The sentences in parentheses are not in the original rough-draft; they are inserted only for the easier understanding of the passages cited.

us to-day, the enemy will restore the road in two days' time. And soon this point *must* be quitted, because the men cannot endure the fatigue much longer. One third of the brigade is unfit for service from the want of foot-gear; 500 men are already ill. Half of those who can do duty are constantly at the outposts, day and night, under the open sky, and not even the Honvéd soldiers have cloth garments." * * * *

(My signature follows.)

CHAPTER XI.

If we take into account the numerous controversies between the Committee of Defence and myself, which prevailed during the first period of my chief command of the army, as well as the categorical language in which I asserted my convictions; and if it be considered how easy it was to foresee that but a single step separated such language from action;—the question comes prominently forward: what could have induced the revolutionary rulers of the civil power in Hungary to refrain from removing me even at that time from the chief command of the national army?

The answer to this question may perhaps be found in the circumstance, that the more skilful and experienced military men constantly refused to accept the chief command; whilst those who were eager for it possessed the confidence of the government even less than myself.

The royal commissary Csányi—who was present with the army, and who, having formerly been a soldier, generally coincided in my views—by the firmness with which he exerted his weighty influence with the government in my favour, may also have essentially contributed to my retaining the chief command of the army.

Another question will be: what was it that prevented me, in spite of the controversies just mentioned, from resigning the chief command?

The answer to this question is plainly and simply to be found in the motives which had determined me to accept the command at all.

The obstacles already presented by the head, body, and tail of the Committee of Defence to my endeavours, which were the result of my clear conviction of what Hungary needed, were not sufficient to discourage me. But at that time I had no presentiment whatever of the existence of those political tendencies, which, to my great surprise, Kossuth disclosed to me five months later. (It seems even problematical whether Kossuth himself had then the slightest idea of what five months afterwards appeared to him to be so indispensably necessary for the salvation of the country.)

My political penetration extended no farther at that time than to the perception of those intentions which, hostile to the constitution of my country, were entertained on the other side the Lajtha. And these intentions had protruded so far out of their effete constitutional mask, that they could easily be discovered even by that part of the nation from whose hands the hard swelling caused by their recent toils had scarcely disappeared.

But the circumstance, that this very part of the na-

tion, in spite of all this, did not recognise these intentions, and even after it had recognised them, still continued to be averse to contend for the preservation of the benefits which had been conferred on it whilst it was in a dream;—this, I say, was only a most afflicting proof of the pernicious influence produced by its hitherto depressed position on the moral and spiritual development of by far the greater number of my countrymen. Yet this very circumstance justified in my eyes the combat; even though its success should be confined for the present merely to rendering impossible the re-establishment of their former dependent condition.

Even in this case—the most unfavourable that could occur—the combat had, however, a still higher import.

To metamorphose Hungary into a conquered province of Austria—an object towards which, with uninterrupted constancy Vienna had been directing all her endeavours for three centuries—seemed now to be also the main purpose of the great armament beyond the Lajtha. It had now been decided that Hungary, as a state, should at last expiate by its utter destruction the manifold annoyances which its former constitution—commendable only in default of a better—had caused to the divers *fathers* of the country, and to their household and public servants. This destruction, with regret be it spoken, had already been partly prepared during several years by the national arrogance of the original Magyars. Now it was that those on the other side the Lajtha almost believed they had but to strike the finishing blow.

The nation owed it to its honour not to await this blow in slavish humility, perhaps even on its knees and with bended neck.

I seemed to have been destined to be one of its last leaders; and though nothing less than a national enthusiast, yet the grandeur of the situation filled me to such a degree with the idea of identifying my personal honour as a free man with that of the nation, that it soon became my leading sentiment.

It was this idea especially which often made the employment of extremely strict, nay even harsh measures appear to me to be a duty; and probably the involuntary gleaming of this idea through the mysterious gloom which concealed the motives of my actions—in addition to my remarkable taciturnity in decisive moments—had called into existence the almost superstitious confidence with which the nation—so uniformly and to the last deceived in regard to its desperate condition by Kossuth and his party—looked to me of necessity as its saviour, at that time also when, with a simultaneous disregard of every humane consideration, a last vain attempt for salvation could be dared.

A third question will be: whether I did or did not attempt, when in Presburg, to obtain for myself the dictatorship; and what were my reasons? Did I not distinctly hear an inward call to seize, even with despotic power, upon the march of my country's destiny; had I not even at that time a firm conviction of the necessity of a dictatorship; had I not been able to foresee that Kossuth would be just as unsuccessful a dictator as he had been a successful agitator?

In the face of all these truths, unless I were to deny their existence, it would be incomparably more difficult for me to answer this question in a mysterious than in a clear and distinct manner.

Have I ever aspired to the dictatorship?

No.

Why did I never make any effort to obtain it?

Because the dictatorship in my hands would have been an impossibility, nay a sheer absurdity.

Why would the dictatorship in my hands have been an impossibility, a sheer absurdity?

Because I spent the whole of my early youth, up to the month of April 1848—precisely the season best adapted for acquiring information—beyond the frontiers of my native land, almost apart from any connexion with it, and nearly ignorant of my country's customs, usages, and laws, and above all, wholly deficient in even a superficial and general acquaintance with the civil administration; ignorant to such a degree, that in strictly political matters, for instance, I was obliged to believe, generally on the mere word of the Committee of Defence, that their measures were judicious, and favourable to the idea that directed all my efforts.

Because, being still unknown to the country, and not possessing the confidence of the nation, I could, under the most favourable circumstances, only have usurped the name without the real power of a dictator; and because, even when, somewhat later, a part of the nation began to put confidence in me, my power as dictator—considering the difference between my political views and those of Kossuth, who still continued to be the most popular man in Hungary—would have been by so much the more precarious, the less I was able to replace his civil administration by a more suitable one, and to render his agitation against me abortive by more effective counteraction.

These are the reasons why the idea of obtaining for myself the dictatorship was a sheer absurdity. I never

thought of it, so long as the events of the war and their results left even the narrowest field for the exercise of the civil government.

Instead of this, with a frank acknowledgment of all my deficiencies in that matter, and chiefly only that I might not lose all my influence in the adjustment of the approaching struggle in self-defence, I often accommodated myself even to positively unsuitable decrees of the civil government; and this principally at the commencement, when my removal from the chief command would have been an easy task to the Committee of Defence.

Thus it happened that, in spite of the numerous controversies between us, we all remained at our posts —Kossuth, the Committee of Defence, and the Minister of war on one side; myself on the other. My adversaries, however, at the beginning, apparently only through *pure* dread of the phantom of a military government, placed me in situations, against whose undermining influence on my determination to follow steadily the course I had chalked out for myself, I took refuge in sarcasm, my constant and faithful ally when driven almost to desperation.

The following passage, from one of those letters which I wrote during my sojourn at Presburg, is, it must be admitted, a rather trivial production in this strain. At the same time this passage sketches very faithfully the critical position of the army on the upper Danube, and not less faithfully the moderation of my hopes for the future.

"*Presburg*, 21*st November* 1848.

"DEAR FRIEND,

"When I shall have been gathered to my fathers, if

your hand has not mouldered in the grave, sit down and write the history of Don Quixote the younger; in me you will find the hero of the romance.

"He who never saw a revolutionary army, may undertake a pilgrimage to my camp. There is a commander-in-chief, with staff and suite, not one of them over forty! There are also soldiers; but the real soldier amongst them blushes for his comrades. To command, is here to make oneself ridiculous. A reprimand is declaimed against as an impertinence, punishment as a tyranny. Therefore thought I with myself in my simplicity, 'Eat, bird, or die!'* and drive these worthless fellows to the devil,—that is, if I do not previously order them to be shot. The cholera assists; and if the enemy does his part, the trio will soon have finished the game.

"But I cannot comprehend this fellow. He is at least twice as strong as I am; his troops are well drilled and well equipped; yet he does not attack!

"Can this be mother-wit; and can he have so much calculation as to wish to destroy us through inaction? I cannot believe it, and smell a rat—in good German, *paura*. So much the better for us! All his patrols ask only for hussars; my first attempt shall be, to make him ask for the Honvéds also. The young fellows are not much disposed to venture themselves, unless they have each a cannon in their haversack, and besides that one hussar on their right, and another on their left hand. But patience! The fever will abate at length—(it is true the Hungarian fever generally lasts a good while)—I hope it will do so before next spring, that is, if we live

* A proverb expressive of the necessity of yielding to the force of circumstances.—*Transl.*

so long; then you may rejoice, *trifolium*, Windisch-Grätz, Jellachich, Hurban!*

"Of guns I have already enough to feed pigs with. This very day I have written to Kossuth not to send me any more. I do not trust the Volunteers; they run away very good-naturedly, and leave me stuck fast in the mire.

"But I have no percussion-caps; and you, in all probability, are no better off. There will be good fun. Is there no supply at all of Belgian caps? Shouldn't you think that, in the end, a flint-musket would be even better than a percussion-musket—without caps!

"When messieurs the commanders of the battalions ask me for caps, I give them the stereotyped answer: 'I am very glad that I have none. You hit nothing; attack with the bayonet!' Good God, what long faces!"

* * * * * *

The establishment of the fortifications at Presburg, as well as those at Wieselburg and Raab, furnished me with abundant matter for similar reflections.

When I arrived at Presburg, the defensive works were already half finished. They seemed to me wholly superfluous, considering, on the one hand, the menacing position which Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich occupied in our rear, and on the other taking into account the very probable supposition that the main forces of the enemy, advancing by Œdenburg and through the

* Prince Windisch-Grätz, Ban Jellachich, and Hurban (the latter a Sclavonian ecclesiastic from one of the northern comitates of Hungary), were then considered to be the representatives of the movement which aimed at the overthrow of the Hungarian constitution and the destruction of the "State of Hungary."

forest of Parendorf, would enter the interior of the country; and thus, in an indirect manner, force those of our troops, stationed on the road to Presburg and near that fortress, to retreat in the direction of Komorn. But these fortifications were likewise unsuitable in regard to their disposition as well as to their execution. Nevertheless, they had the sympathy of the country, and had to be continued. Besides, if I had ordered them to be suspended, this would have deprived me of all influence for the immediate future.

With the defensive works at Wieselburg and Raab the case was different. These had, generally speaking, my approbation so far as the necessity for their establishment was concerned; and this as precautionary, in case the enemy should defer acting on the offensive till the following spring. From want of time, however, I was obliged to leave the planning of the works, as well as their execution, entirely to Kollmann, who was then considered the most celebrated man in his profession.

Unacquainted with the nature and disposition of the ground near Raab, I had entertained the mistaken notion that with a force so disproportionate to that which the Prince Windisch-Grätz had at his command, I should succeed in stopping at that place the further progress of the enemy; and it was not till I beheld for the first time the fortifications of the encampment at Raab, which were then almost finished, that my mistake was plainly apparent. They had been established for an army of 80,000 men at least, while my whole forces amounted to scarcely more than 12,000; and the reciprocal protection between the several isolated works had been calculated for a distance which defied the effect of field-pieces of the largest calibre.

Thus the affairs of Hungary at the end of the autumn of 1848 were in a very tottering condition.

I had been president of the court-martial by which Count Eugene Zichy* was condemned to death; I was called "the soul" of the short and successful campaign against Generals Roth and Philippovich; and it is a fact, that after I had been invested with the command over the troops on the upper Danube, the taking up of arms assumed a far more determined character than it had ever before done; but still its real nature did not at all warrant the expectation of such an energetic resistance as would have been worthy of the inheritors of the name of a noble and heroic nation.

The former of these two prominent periods of my last sphere of action provoked the arrogance of the Committee of Defence; the latter, that of almost the whole nation. As respects the Committee of Defence, —because the *former* of these two incidents having put to flight its political adversaries in Hungary, it enjoyed by this means an absolute and undisturbed power; as respects the nation,—because the *latter* brought into vogue the silly delusion, that the Hungarian by merely taking up his scythe would frighten the enemy out of the land, or that he had but to disarm him, and send him generously home again!

The governors (Kossuth and his party) gave themselves up more blindly to this delusion than those whom they governed; and placing no confidence in the regular

* From Presburg I had directed proceedings to be taken against Captain Vásárhelyi of the Hunyady-Schar (belonging to Perczel's corps) for the plunderings of which he was accused in the castle of Kálozd. Hereupon I received a report from the south of Hungary, that Vásárhelyi had fallen in an insignificant skirmish, soon after the disarming of the Croat corps under General Roth.

troops, they now believed themselves strong enough, and saw no danger whatever in openly shewing to the latter this want of confidence.

Wounded by this suspicion on the one hand, and on the other instinctively scenting revolutionary designs behind it, the regular troops were even in the month of November 1848 almost ripe for revolt.

The declaration which I issued in the name of the army, in answer to a second proclamation by Prince Windisch-Grätz, stating that the Committee of Defence was, in the present condition of Hungary, its sole and lawful government, scarcely sufficed to retain the services of the officers of the regular troops for the national cause. Better was the impression I made by defending most energetically their interests against the Committee of Defence;—still better the influence produced by the constant homage which was paid to the Committee of Defence by the minister of war, Mészáros, who held his charge from the king—(this minister was unquestionably a lawful political compass to the regular troops during their revolutionary wandering in Hungary, though a very uncertain one—a circumstance of which the officers could not be aware at that time);—but the best effect was owing to the manner and form in which the sudden change on the throne took place during the first half of the month of December 1848.

CHAPTER XII.

On the 14th or 15th of December 1848, Field-marshal Simunich attacked our brigade between Nádas and Jablonicz, and forced it back towards Tyrnau.

Before I resolved on quitting Presburg in consequence of this disaster, I wished to endeavour to drive the enemy once more back across the White Mountains, and sent Colonel Count Guyon and Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik with reinforcements to Tyrnau.

On the 16th of December, however, the general advance of the hostile main army took place against the points Parendorf, Neudorf (Ujfalu), Gattendorf (Gáta), Baumern (Körtvelyes), and Kittsee, which were occupied by our troops.

From the great superiority of the enemy's forces, our resistance along the whole line could be only of short duration, without danger of being annihilated.

The commander of the brigade in Parendorf had not reflected upon this, and had engaged himself too far in the combat, while the hostile column directed against Neudorf met there with but an insignificant opposition. By the unobstructed advance of the latter, the former lost his communication with the neighbouring brigade in Gattendorf.

When this had been reported to me from Gattendorf, I ordered the whole line between Parendorf and Presburg to be relinquished, in order to commence the retreat to Altenburg (Magyar Ovár) and Wieselburg (Moson), as had been determined upon beforehand. Presburg,

however, was to be held during the following day, till our outposts from the March had assembled there. The pontoon across the Danube was to be abandoned to the stream. After the arrival of the last outpost the garrison of Presburg was to retreat without delay to Komorn.

I left the execution of this order to Colonel Aulich, commander of the second foot-regiment (Alexander).

My presence was necessary on the right bank of the Danube. I left Presburg, therefore, while yet night, between the 16th and 17th of December; took my way to Altenburg by Sommerein (Somorja) on the Grosse-Schütt (Csallóköz), crossed on the morning of the 17th the great Danube between Csölesztö and Kiliti, and reached Altenburg and Wieselburg with a few attendants in the course of the forenoon, where I found assembled the troops which had been repulsed the preceding day; those from Neudorf, Gattendorf, Baumern, and Kittsee, without loss; but of those who had been distributed in Parendorf, Neusiedel (Nezsider), Weiden (Védeny), and Gols (Gállos), only the cavalry with their guns and the fourteenth Honvéd battalion. The rest of the infantry and artillery, by the speedy advance of the enemy upon Neudorf, had been forced from their line of retreat to Altenburg away towards the marshes of the Neusiedel lake. Across these, however, the so-called Pamhagen dam between Pamhagen (Pomogy) and Eszterháza leads; but this dam also was impassable at that time; and I could not help fearing that the missing divisions were irrecoverably lost.

The spirits of the troops, in consequence of this very sensible loss, were extremely depressed. A single cannon-shot seemed sufficient to dishearten the men, especially the infantry, to the last degree. I had, at least,

to be prepared for the worst; and therefore sent back the whole of the infantry, together with the foot artillery, towards Raab, before a hostile attack on Altenburg or Wieselburg could be possible; but I intended to wait with the cavalry till mid-day of the 18th of December in the camp of the last-named places, to hinder, if necessary, the too speedy advance of the enemy upon the main road.

Mid-day of the 18th came, without an enemy being visible; and I now ordered one half of the cavalry likewise to retreat towards Raab. This half, however, had been on its way scarcely half an hour, when the remaining half was alarmed by a hostile column of cavalry advancing from the west.

It is easily conceivable that the enemy—whatever were his intentions—must be firmly repulsed before I could hope to continue my retreat perfectly free from danger. The half of the cavalry which had already set out was immediately ordered back again, to form the reserve in the impending encounter.

Both Altenburg and Wieselburg are enclosed by a canal on the west and south. Between this canal and these places we encamped; the enemy approached on the other side of it. All the bridges across the canal except one had already been destroyed. This one was situated to the east of our camp, on our line of retreat to Raab.

Notwithstanding this, the enemy marched at first directly towards that part of the canal which was just opposite our front, until some shots obliged him to change the direction of his march. He inclined towards the south; but continued uninterruptedly his advance against our line of retreat, though describing a considerable circuit.

It would certainly now have been easy to have gained upon him such a considerable advance, on the shortest line over the remaining bridge along the road to Raab, as would have made it impossible for him to overtake us and force us to an engagement. But I feared above all the pernicious effects of a repeated retreat, without previous combat, on the future maintenance of my troops, and resolved to engage the enemy at all hazards. For this purpose I crossed the canal by the bridge, and advanced on the other side to meet him.

We encountered each other to the south of Wieselburg; he with his left, we with our right wing leaning on the canal.

At first it seemed as if he intended to fight a very serious conflict. He despatched a part of his forces to turn round our left wing to the south; and from the front of his position promptly and spiritedly answered the fire of our approaching guns. But when our left wing advanced in echelons to the attack of the hostile turning-column, the enemy seemed to have suddenly lost his eager desire for the contest. He abandoned one position after another, without even bringing his forces into action; and before sunset he had escaped from our further attacks by means of such a speedy retreat in the direction of Kaltenstein, that, as I learned by a report from our extreme wing, he had not even found the time necessary for placing in security such of his men as had become disabled. Some of them, who were left to save themselves by means of their still sound legs, had been overtaken by a patrol of hussars, and cut down in the first heat.

It was a striking circumstance in this encounter, that in spite of the cannonade, which lasted several hours,

not one of the enemy's shots had told; whilst the positions which he had abandoned were marked here and there by traces of blood and some carcasses of horses.

Before my arrival at Wieselburg the Committee of Defence had ordered the destruction by fire of all such stores of corn and hay as it would not be possible to transport to Komorn. In fact, I remarked even during the fight the burning of corn-stacks on the south-eastern extremity of Wieselburg. But not far distant from the corn which had been set on fire, a long double row of very large hay-ricks stood still untouched; and a column of hostile cavalry, as we saw, had already entered Altenburg on the north, between the canal and the town, and was just advancing towards Wieselburg. A bold stroke was necessary to destroy likewise these immense supplies of hay, to the detriment of the enemy. Twelve hussars undertook it voluntarily; they crossed to the other side of the canal at the risk of their lives, and notwithstanding the proximity of the enemy, set fire to all the hay-ricks. The like was done in some farms situated towards the Hanság, before our departure from the field of battle.

On the morning of the 18th my troops were still extremely dejected; the evening found them full of courage. They had seen the enemy flee; and they continued their retreat, from the field of battle they had victoriously maintained, towards Raab, in the best possible spirits. This advantage, of the utmost importance to us at that time, we owed solely to the fortunate accident that the hostile commander on this occasion had somewhat too great a desire to fight for a mere reconnoitering, and, on the other hand, somewhat too little for a serious engagement.

Before midnight we reached Hochstrass (Ottevény), and on the following day (the 19th of December) Raab.

The stores of hay and corn which were discovered by our patrols nearest to the main road were likewise burnt during this retreat; that the enemy, obliged to meet his most pressing wants by conveying supplies thither from great distances, might be continually stopped in his advance.

Soon, however, we perceived the disproportion between the very great loss to the rural population, and the small advantage to the defence of the country, which resulted from these hard measures, and desisted from further devastations.

In Raab the joyful news had meanwhile arrived that the divisions of infantry and artillery from Parendorf, missing since the 16th, had nevertheless succeeded in safely reaching the road from Œdenburg to Raab, after restoring as far as necessary the numerous bridges over the Pamhagen dam that had been destroyed. This lucky escape was owing to the circumstance, that the hostile column, which by the 15th had advanced as far as Œdenburg, was in the course of the 16th not forward enough to render impossible the debouching of the fugitives on the above-named road near Eszterháza.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE President Kossuth wrote to me at Raab, not to give up that place for at least ten days. In this matter he had addressed himself to the wrong person. To determine how long Raab should remain in our power depended, considering the numerical superiority of the hostile troops, only and exclusively on the good pleasure of Prince Windisch-Grätz. He was pleased to defer the attack upon Raab until the 27th; and thus it happened that the wish of the President, reckoned from the date of his above-mentioned despatch, was gratified.

On what idea this desire was based has not even subsequently become clear to me.

In the evening of the 26th a report from the northern outposts on the Kleine-Schütt (Szigetköz) reached my head-quarters at Raab, that a strong hostile turning-column coming from Zámoly had already advanced along the great Danube so far, that it menaced the road from Raab to Gönyö (one of our lines of retreat). A similar manœuvre of the enemy was to be expected on the south of Raab. I now perceived the necessity of quitting Raab before daybreak next morning, and beginning the retreat towards the capitals in two columns. Two-thirds of the corps, together with the head-quarters, were directed to Dotis (Tata) along the so-called Fleischhacker road, one-third over Gönyö. The main road along the Danube was to be left open for the train of the army and its escort, moving from Presburg by Komorn to the capitals.

It was indeed high time to evacuate Raab, if my intention of reserving our forces for the last decisive combat before Ofen was to be realised; for the column retreating from Raab by Gönyö was already attacked by the enemy's turning-column at a short distance behind Raab, and could continue its retreat unhindered only after it had repulsed the attack.

I had been induced to form the intention just mentioned by the heroic declaration of the government: *they would be buried under the ruins of Ofen.* I had already successfully combated a similar longing for the ruins of Raab, by shewing that *Raab was not Hungary.* But the tenacity with which Kossuth seemed desirous of clinging to this idea, entitled me to suppose *that the government was really resolved on a last decisive battle before Ofen;* and I believed I was bound to subordinate to this magnanimous determination even my own intention, according to which, as I had already declared in Presburg, *the seat of the government must be transferred to behind the Theiss.*

The first station of the march of our main column was Bábolna and its environs.

Very early on the next day, the 28th of December, the retreat ought to have been continued. But a strict observance of the dispositions enjoined, in an army consisting for the most part of young, little-disciplined troops, is a rare occurrence. And so it happened that the early hour fixed for setting out on the march on the 28th was not kept. The rear-guard was obliged to wait before Bábolna for the moving off of some retarded divisions belonging to the main body, and was there overtaken by a troop of the enemy in pursuit.

The commander of the rear-guard perceiving the

danger which threatened him, if he engaged in a serious contest at the entrance of a defile, as the road through Bábolna was, posted his artillery and infantry at gun-range behind the village; but one half of the cavalry had to oppose the entrance of the enemy into the village until the other half, following the artillery and infantry, should have taken up their position in the rear, at a distance necessary for the attack.

But on this unlucky day even the generally brave hussars had not their heart in the right place. They fled without awaiting the attack, precipitated themselves on the still-marching divisions of infantry and on the artillery, throwing the former into confusion, startling the horses of the latter, and completely discouraging all the divisions of the rear-guard. In vain the commander of the rear-guard opposed the fugitives; in vain he exhorted the divisions of infantry to remain compact and to offer a firm resistance; a panic terror paralysed every energy. Even before the enemy's cavalry debouched from Bábolna, the battalions had lost all firmness: two of them saved themselves, in scattered flight, on some tracts of intersected ground; the third was overtaken by the hostile cavalry, and partly cut down, partly made prisoners.

The hussars fled without stopping till they came to the Czonczó brook near Nagy-Igmánd. Here the partly steep, partly marshy banks first set bounds to their wild flight. Besides the battalion mentioned, we also lost an ammunition-chest.

The main body, together with the head-quarters, reached on this day Felsö-Gállá; the rearguard, Bánhida, on the north-western declivity of that chain of mountains which, being the continuation of the Bakony forest,

extends in manifold windings, in a north-eastern direction mainly, as far as the Danube near Visegrád, and bears the name of Vértesi Hegyek.

"*Here*"—so said every one—"*the enemies of the country shall find their grave! The people is already preparing to dig it broad and deep! The few roads and ways which lead across this ridge shall be destroyed; then it becomes an impregnable gigantic fortress,* AND THE PEOPLE READY TO VANQUISH OR DIE THEREON! *The Fleischhacker road runs between Bánhida and Bicske through a defile, as does also the road from Kis-Bér to Móor at Sárkány. Here, as there, a single resolute division can stop a whole army!*"

And I—to whom the skeleton of the principal mountain-chains, roads, and rivers of Hungary was then scarcely familiar, and who knew of the nature of the Vértesi Hegyek only generally that they existed—allowed myself to be induced by this talk to agree to the following plan of defence.

The head-quarters of the corps of the upper Danube were to be removed back for the winter, in the last extremity, as far as Bicske; the winter-quarters to be established along the Vértesi Hegyek, with their principal stations at Almás, Tata, Bánhida, Kecskéd, and Ondód. Moriz Perczel, meanwhile advanced to the rank of general—who would by no means subordinate himself to the command of the army of the upper Danube, and wished moreover to remain independent—had taken on himself the defence of the Sárkány defile by means of a small regular corps, and of the tracts of ground lying between this defile and the Platten lake (Balaton) by patrolling columns. The so-called guerrilla warfare would in this way be applied on the largest scale,

and protect the organisation of a most imposing army, to be concentrated in the capitals and their environs.

In conformity with this plan, General Perczel was conducted sufficiently early from Pápa to Kis-Bér, that he might immediately commence his part of the duty, by occupying and defending the Sárkány defile.

I believed, it is true, in the possibility of a general rising of the people causing very considerable disturbances in the combined operations of even a larger, well-disciplined, and well-led army; nay I still believe it. But I did not believe that the all-pervading and enduring enthusiasm indispensable for this existed among the Hungarian rural population, whose indolence had long ago become proverbial, and whose warlike spirit, extolled to the stars, I had already learned to appreciate, *by my own experience*, in its utter worthlessness.

The little sympathy for the national contest, which, during my retreat from Raab to the capitals, I met with almost every where in the country, did not consequently take me unawares. But much more surprised was I by the view which I obtained, on the very day of the disaster at Bábolna and directly after it, during a reconnoitering ride in the mountains represented as being *so extremely impracticable*, of their real nature, as well as of the defensive works so highly lauded in the communications of the Committee of Defence. These latter had been eulogised to such a degree, that, during my retreat from Raab, I almost feared *we should hardly be able to find a passage open for our own safety*. We met indeed with ditch-works on the road, which we could march past without the least interruption—not, as it might be supposed, through the space which had been left for us, but far and wide, to the right and to

the left. We found likewise some abatis constructed, to the utility of which our good-natured Honvéds, in their childlike *naïveté*, bore the most conscientious testimony by setting light to them for the purpose of warming themselves at the fire. But we searched in vain for the place which some government commissary had taken for a "defile."

In consequence of my having been undeceived in these respects, I removed the head-quarters on the 29th of December to Bicske; and perceiving that the whole great plan for the defence of the Vértesi mountain-range was *just as great an absurdity*, I began to draw my troops nearer to the mountains, that I might secure the Fleischhauer road as far as possible.

It was more than probable that the enemy's main army would advance on *this* road; while, on the contrary, only his secondary forces would take that from Raab by Kis-Bér, Sárkány, and Móor, which General Perczel with his corps would be so much the more capable of resisting, as I had already detached a strong column of cavalry, with a battery, from Raab to Ondód, to the north of Móor, and during the retreat from Kócs a brigade by Kecskéd and Majk to Csákvár, to prevent his being turned round on the right, and to maintain him in communication with my corps.

The part of my troops which had been ordered for the retreat from Raab by Gönyö to Dotis was consequently drawn back to Zsámbék; while Colonel Guyon retreated, after crossing the Danube, on the main road to Vörösvár, having previously, on his way, hazarded an engagement in Tyrnau, which was *equally unlucky as aimless*, with the far superior forces of Field-marshal Simunich, and had then marched towards Komorn.

The rest of my forces, which on the 16th of the same month were disposed on the left bank of the Danube, had partly remained as garrison in Komorn, and partly had rejoined me while I was still in Raab.

Immediately after my arrival at Bicske on the evening of the 29th of December, I learned that a carriage-road existed from this place to A.-Gálla, sufficiently practicable to turn round upon it, even with artillery, any position *à cheval* of the Fleischhauer road between these places. Certainty on this point appeared to be of great importance with reference to the dispositions next to be made. I employed the 30th of December to obtain in person this certainty; left for that purpose my head-quarters early in the morning, and returned only towards evening, at the moment when whole swarms of dispersed troops from Perczel's corps arrived with the disastrous news, that *General Perczel had been attacked by the Austrians between Móor and Sárkány, and had suffered a total defeat.*

My army, then divided into six brigades, occupied on the 30th of December the following positions: a brigade on the main road of Vörösvár, one in Zsámbék, one in Bicske, one in Csákvár, one in F.-Gálla, and one in Buda-Örs.

Several of these brigades had furnished their contingent for the formation of the column which had been detached to Ondód, as has been mentioned before. But this column had already joined Perczel before the unfortunate engagement near Móor, and was consequently at the moment not disposable.

By those of Perczel's corps who, having been dispersed to Bicske, had reached our camp, almost all his battalions were numerously represented. Hence it might

be concluded that his forces had been so scattered, that he would not be able to prevent with the remainder the victorious advance of the hostile right wing on any point *before* the capitals; while the accounts of the fugitives at the same time all led to the apprehension, that in his flight he had taken the direction of Stuhlweissenburg, and thereby given an opportunity to the hostile right wing *to separate him from me by a resolute advance from Móor over Lovas-Berény.*

To avert this impending danger, during the night between the 30th and the 31st of December the brigade from Bicske was despatched to Baracska, that of Csákvár to Váll, that of Zsámbék to Sóskut, and at the same time that of F.-Gálla to Bia. *After the accession of Perczel's corps, the offensive was to be resumed against the enemy's right wing, for the purpose of giving a more favourable turn to the campaign by its destruction.*

But the defeat of General Perczel had broken at once the *Roman courage of the Committee of Defence.*

Early in the morning of the 31st of December 1848, I received a decree, signed by Kossuth, and drawn up in this instance in *German*, wherein I was ordered to retreat *with my corps d'armée without delay into the first line before Ofen*, that is, on the height of Tétény, Buda-Örs, Budakeszi, and Hidegkut.

I replied by sending a report of the last dispositions, and besides took the liberty of *decidedly blaming the retreat thus ordered;* but was nevertheless obliged to desist from the offensive against the hostile right wing; for without the assistance of Perczel's corps I had no expectation of success, and it was not to be doubted *that Perczel, from personal hostility, would take part against me* FOR *this order of the Committee of Defence.*

Still in the course of the 31st of December, as soon as General Perczel, coming from Stuhlweissenburg, had entered the protecting sphere of my brigades, I drew back that of Váll to the height of Hanzsabég, and that of Baracska to Tárnok. The divisions of the army which had been sent to Bia and Sóskut remained there; those of Vörösvár, however, received an order from the Committee of Defence immediately to approach the capitals. The head-quarters advanced to Promontorium.

CHAPTER XIV.

On the 1st of January 1849 the main body of my army consequently stood in an extensive circuit from Hanzsabég as far as to Bia. I had left my head-quarters very early in the morning to convince myself personally that the dispositions ordered the night before had been strictly observed by all the divisions. I met the ruins of Perczel's corps on the road between Tétény and Hanzsabég, and finally Perczel himself. He rode close to my carriage, and surprised me with the assurance that he had indeed abandoned the field of battle at Móor, but that this circumstance did not in the least justify the supposition that he had been beaten; his loss being far exceeded by that of the enemy, as was made evident by the continual arriving of the dispersed troops.

"Especially," said I, interrupting him, "if you deduct from your loss those runaways also—there are far more than a thousand of them—whom I caused to be

driven together one by one in Bicske, and transported to Ofen, where they are awaiting your orders upon the Generalswiese. You probably establish your head-quarters in Pesth?"

"Yes," replied he, "for my personal presence with the government is absolutely necessary at this time; but to my troops I shall grant some days' rest, and shall therefore quarter them in Ofen. The enemy will not recover for a long time from the severe blow I have given him near Móor, and therefore you have nothing at all to fear. I will for certain be on the spot at the right moment."

At that time I could still compassionately laugh at Perczel's boasting; for I was then ignorant of what a few days later I could no longer doubt, namely, *that the manner of speaking and acting of this man was the element in which the Committee of Defence, nay even a great part of the Diet, most complacently moved;* a manner of speaking and acting, which, void of any steady moral basis, was well calculated to give birth to the serious apprehension, *that the loyal personal sacrifices of the army for the Constitution might be abused as a cloak for the execution of plans of high-treason, and moreover most ruinous to the country.*

When, late in the afternoon, I returned to my head-quarters through Buda-Örs, I was informed that meanwhile a deputation sent by the Diet to the hostile general-in-chief Prince Windisch-Grätz had been there, and had demanded an escort to the hostile outposts, for which they had been directed to the brigade in Hanzsabég.

These deputies had also brought a letter for me from Kossuth.

I felt as if I had fallen from the clouds when I learned from it that the Government and the Diet had the day before decided:

Once more to enter on the way of accommodation; and at the same time

To transfer its seat from Pesth to Debreczin; whilst I

Should give to the enemy a decisive battle in the first line before Ofen; but in doing so,

Keep in view the salvation of the army on the left bank of the Danube, and in every possible way the preservation of the capitals.

Kossuth, to whose memory it could not but be still very vividly present how irritated Prince Windisch-Grätz had been with him even before the battle at Schwechat, now suddenly once more entered upon the way of accommodation!

Could he from this step hope for any thing for his country? No.

Was this an UPRIGHT *step?* No; *it was merely one* VOID OF COUNSEL.

Kossuth, who during the last two months had constantly refused my repeated advice to remove, while it was yet time, the seat of government to behind the Theiss, asseverating that the government would die *first at Raab, then before Ofen;*—Kossuth, I say, thought now was the time *suddenly* to perceive that Ofen and Pesth were all Hungary *just as little as Raab*, and *that the government, in case of necessity, could die even in Debreczin, or* ELSEWHERE.

What could so suddenly have induced Kossuth subsequently to follow my advice?

Could it be a *prophetic glance into the approaching*

glorious future? OH, NO! It was only *la peur pour la peau.*

Probably it was merely *the same* motive which had determined him to order me to give the enemy a decisive battle before Ofen—perhaps to cover his flight to Debreczin.

To this supposition it might at least be objected, that the flight of the government needed no protection, since the speed with which it could be accomplished by railway as far as Szolnok took away all danger of hostile pursuit; and that perhaps Kossuth so urgently demanded a battle to be fought on the right bank only "for the honour of the nation," or for the purpose of gaining time to remove the multifarious stores of provisions.

However, be that as it may, the task which Kossuth had assigned to me could only have been assigned by *such a general as Kossuth.*

The chain-bridge, then the sole communication over the Danube, which was scarcely frozen, was only barely practicable; it could be made use of, but not without precaution. Precaution presupposes leisure; but it is just of this that there is least during a retreat after a decisive and *lost* battle; unless a part of the defeated army should sacrifice itself in an obstinate fight by its rear-guard, to secure for the main body the time necessary for its retreat.

But an obstinate fight by the rear-guard is conceivable only when there is a simultaneous use made of all the advantages accidentally offered for the defence on the line of retreat. Houses and rows of houses, among other things, present such advantages.

To enable me to give a last decisive battle to the

enemy on the right bank of the Danube, I had previously to reunite the parts of my army which had been separately stationed on the Fleischhauer road and on the main road to Stuhlweissenburg. But the protection of both roads had to be kept in view at the same time as this junction. This was possible only where the two roads opened into one and the same level valley, consequently between Buda-Örs and Promontorium on the one side, and the Brocken (Gellérthegy) on the other. Upon every point farther distant from Ofen the concentration of the main army could only have been effected on one of the two hostile lines of attack, while the other must have been abandoned, and with it at the same time our line of retreat to Ofen.

The field presented by local circumstances for the desired last decisive battle on the right bank of the Danube lay, therefore, at a distance from Ofen, and the chain-bridge not far exceeding the bounds even of the most sluggish hostile pursuit after a lost battle.

How could the rear-guard stop this pursuit, when neither the suburbs of Ofen nor the town itself were allowed to be occupied and defended, that they might not be exposed to the dangers of a hostile attack? And how was sufficient time to be got for saving the defeated army with precaution, in spite of the unretarded pursuit of the enemy, on to the left bank of the Danube, over the chain-bridge, which had been made practicable only so far as was absolutely necessary?

I hastened early in the morning of the 2d of January to Pesth, to put these questions to Kossuth, and call upon him to renounce either the battle or the salvation of the army, or at least his regard for the capitals and the sympathies of the proprietors of the houses. In case

he should accede to none of these modifications, I was determined voluntarily to resign my post. This latter determination had been finally come to principally by my deliberation upon the *motives* of his intended flight to Debreczin.

But the President was no longer in Pesth when I arrived there on the morning of the 2d of January 1849.

With the care of the defence of the country he had charged General Vetter as substitute of the minister of war Mészáros, who—as was generally said—had been sent to destroy a hostile corps under the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick, which had already advanced as far as Kaschau.

I addressed myself consequently with my request to General Vetter, and invited him at the same time to take the command in my stead, because the unfortunate results of the campaign had made me doubt my ability for the post confided to me. General Vetter, however, said that he was not inclined to endanger his renown as a general, acquired laboriously in the war against the Raizen, by undertaking the conduct of a relinquished campaign. Nevertheless he promised to call together a council of war, in which my present task should be modified, so as to render it practicable, and a decision be come to upon the measures to be next taken for the defence of the country.

This council of war was assembled in the course of the day, under the presidency of the royal Commissary Csányi, and came to the following resolutions:

"*The principal object in view should be the saving of the army on to the left bank of the Danube.*

"*After accomplishing the retreat, General Perczel with his corps was to draw back towards Szolnok; whilst*

I with mine, by Waizen (Vácz), had to operate against the hostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich on the Waag.

"*The expedition in the south against the Raizen and Serbians was to be abandoned, and the forces employed in it* (under the command of Colonel Count Vécsey) *drawn to the middle Theiss for the protection of the new seat of government.*

"*In case of extremity, the three corps d'armée of Mészáros, Perczel, and Vécsey were to join each other during their concentric retreat to Debreczin; while it was left to me, according to circumstances, to choose for my point of retreat Komorn or the upper Theiss.*"

The object of the council of war in detaching me into the north-western comitates was TO DIVERT THE HOSTILE MAIN ARMY FROM THE SHORTEST LINE OF OPERATION AGAINST DEBRECZIN.

Meanwhile from 4000 to 5000 infantry had been concentrated in Waizen.

"*These I was to receive on my march through Waizen; but for them I was to give up from my corps to General Perczel, without delay, one battalion of infantry, twelve squadrons of hussars, and a battery of twelve-pounders.*

"*That the retreat of my corps d'armée from its position on the right to the left bank of the Danube across the chain-bridge might be possible without danger, the enemy's principal attack was not to be awaited.*

"*For the protection of this retreat General Perczel was to occupy the intrenched principal approaches to Ofen.*"

Perczel, however, declared that he could not do so before the following day, almost his whole corps being dispersed through the capitals.

I saw from this that I could not rely on Perczel, and resolved in the meantime myself to take charge of the protection of my retreat.

On the 2d of January my six brigades stood thus:

In Tétény;

Near Hanzsabég, with the outposts towards Ersci and Mártonvásár;

In Sóskut, with the outposts in Tárnok, Zámor, and Baratháza;

In Buda-Örs, with the outposts in Bia;

Outside Altofen (Ó-Buda), with the outposts towards Kovácsi, Vörösvár, and Sz.-Endre; and

In the suburb of Ofen, "Christinenstadt."

In consequence of these resolutions of the council of war, on the 3d of January I removed the brigades from Hanzsabég and Buda-Örs to Ofen, and that of Sóskut to Buda-Örs; ordered the outposts upon the Feischhauer road back as far as Csik; while the brigade of Hanzsabég was not to draw-in its outposts till they had been relieved by those of Tétény.

The commander in Hanzsabég had not observed this precautionary measure, but withdrew his outposts before those of Tétény, who were to relieve them, had arrived on the spot, and began his march to Ofen, without remarking—in spite of its being sunshiny mid-day—that a hostile corps, coming from Mártonvásár, was upon his heels.

It was only a lucky accident that saved the brigade of Tétény from an unintentional attack of the enemy in broad daylight.

A division of hussars just in the nick of time threw itself upon the cuirassiers, by whom the outposts of the Tétény brigade, while on their march towards Hanzsa-

bég, had been attacked, and were obstinately pursued already nearly as far as Tétény.

A violent conflict ensued, in which the cuirassiers suffered considerable loss.

Their flight delayed the attack of the hostile corps, and afforded to the Tétény brigade the time necessary to prepare for battle.

The brigade which was on its march from Hanzsabég back to Ofen had meanwhile reached Promontorium. On the first news of the enemy's attack, I ordered it immediately to return, and advance again by Tétény to Hanzsabég. It deployed to the left of the road to Stuhlweissenburg, while the Tétény brigade was turned towards its right.

Although there were only about 4000 men on the spot at my disposal, I was determined to advance on the offensive.

The combat, however, had scarcely assumed a somewhat more active character, when suddenly an officer, who had been despatched to me from Pesth, arrived on the field of battle, and reported to me, *that General Vetter desired I would not allow myself to be led into any offensive, the enemy having crossed the Danube below Hanzsabég, for the purpose of threatening the capitals from the left bank likewise.*

On receiving this information I immediately began the retreat, and continued it as far as Promontorium, without being pursued by the enemy.

There I allowed the troops to rest for some hours, after which, together with the head-quarters, they were to continue the retreat before midnight, with one part as far as Ofen, with the other as far as Pesth; while I myself rode to Buda-Örs, to order the brigade of that

placed also to retreat to the left bank. Ofen remained occupied till the following day (4th of January) by my rear-guard, when it was relieved by General Perczel's troops, and followed my main body, which was already on its march for Waizen.

General Vetter was much displeased at this precipitate "salvation of the army on to the left bank of the Danube;" and when, moreover, the news of the enemy's having crossed the river below Hanzsabég—the immediate cause of my retreat—proved to be unfounded, this retreat then appeared in fact to have been over-hurried, at least by one day. What had been done, however, could not be undone.

But General Perczel declared, "*he would rather see the capitals reduced to a mass of ruins, than withdraw without a contest.*"

Fortunately for Ofen and Pesth, Perczel belonged to *that* party whose last proclamations (if there remained no other historical documents of this period) would induce posterity *to dig for the bones of the former Committee of Defence under the walls of Ofen.*

CHAPTER XV.

In the night between the 4th and 5th of January 1849 I quitted Pesth with my head-quarters, and reached Waizen in the course of the next day.

The Hungarian armed rising—although originally stirred up by the *officious* instigation of the nationalities

against each other systematically introduced from Vienna, and diametrically opposed to the realisation of the idea of a collective Austrian unity, subsequently not less *officially* enounced—was nevertheless *purely* MONARCHICAL-*constitutional:* and herein lay its strength; for it was to this circumstance *solely* that it owed the co-operation of the regular troops.

Besides, in the year 1848 Hungary could be insurgent *only in a monarchical* point of view.

A proof of this, experienced innumerable times, is, that the agitations in favour of the arming succeeded *only when* they were attempted "*in the name of the King.*"

A proof of this are the great difficulties that had to be surmounted, when it was necessary—in contradiction to the proclamations dispersed in great numbers by the authorised or unauthorised agents of the reactionary party, and furnished with the *King's signature*—to procure for the Pesth government, *all legitimate as it was,* an active support in the country.

A proof of this is the being obliged to paralyse the effect of those reactionary proclamations by others, drawn up with a contrary intent, and *likewise in the King's name.*

Nay, even ANTI-DYNASTIC *ideas were exotic growths in Hungary.* If these were to be acclimatised, the political soil—although the *Vienna* government measures had right valiantly *dug* it up—must nevertheless previously have a correspondent *manuring.*

The *manure* necessary for this purpose came, so far as I know, from *two* sources—I am not certain if *primary* ones; namely,

From the *free exercise of popular oratory,* and

From the *faits accomplis* of the Committee of Defence.

Of these two kinds of manure, diverse in origin, which has been the most favourable to the acclimatising of those exotic ideas is, I think, not yet decided; but this much is certain, *that the old soldiers* FIRST *scented* THE FILTH OF THE COMMITTEE OF DEFENCE, and were not inclined to allow the *legal soil*, on which they had unfortunately to fight against their former comrades, to be *defiled.*

We should certainly go too far were we to attribute to the *political sagacity* of the old soldiers this scenting —perhaps premature—of anti-dynastic tendencies in the acts of the President Kossuth, dating them from the year 1848.

As soon as religious, political, and national ideas divide mankind, there is a generally prevalent inclination to suppose in those of a different opinion the want of all social as well as private virtues; and inversely, from the recognised deficiency in some just then prized virtue, it is commonly immediately concluded that the person deemed blameworthy holds the opinion, religious, political, or national, which happens to be most detested.

This weakness was not foreign to the old troops, of *monarchic-constitutional*, nay SPECIFICALLY DYNASTIC opinions; and herein, I believe, was the source of their —*alas prophetic*—presentiment.

In the end of October they had confided in Kossuth's asseverations, that the offensive beyond the Lajtha was intended *only for the punishment* of Ban Jellachich and his allies, the Ban being with reason hated on account of his intrigues, which *first disunited the army*, and against whom, besides, they had been mustered by the King's

cousin. In the beginning of December they had received as *true and genuine* Kossuth's declarations that, according to the literal meaning of their military oath, they had to become surety with body and soul, *notwithstanding the proclaimed change in the throne, for King Ferdinand V. and the Constitution sanctioned by him.* They had SUFFERED for *this* belief, and *thereby* became still more inaccessible to doubt what Kossuth said.

When, after this, they had come to the painful conclusion, that, with the superior forces of the enemy, victory was no longer conceivable, then they wished, out of a national and military feeling of honour, for a last and decisive combat—a *glorious fall!*

Kossuth met them half-way, and promised them this combat before the walls of Ofen; *he himself*—thus he vowed—*would there perish with them!*

And the old soldiers calculated upon it.

But Kossuth, having had sufficient time to consider, since the battle of Schwechat (on the 30th of October) till the moment when he declared his resolution to be buried under the walls of Ofen (about the end of December), whether the removal of the seat of government from Pesth to Debreczin would not perhaps be more conducive to the welfare of the country,—and nevertheless discovering for the first time the necessity of this change of residence only when he ought to have redeemed his magnanimous solemn promise;—it seemed as if the so sudden recognition of the possibility of saving the country just as well from Debreczin had its motive less in patriotism than *in perceiving that Debreczin happened to be several days' march farther than Pesth from the head-quarters of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz;* and Kossuth, by his improvised official

"*Sauve qui peut!*" behind the Theiss, seemed only *à posteriori* to have furnished proof *that he was incapable of dying for the fatherland.*

In a word: The *hero* Kossuth debased himself to a *braggart*; and in the eyes of the *monarchically-minded brave* old soldiers, *Kossuth the braggart* could only be a *republican!*

Distrust took the place of confidence in the old troops towards Kossuth. A part of the officers quitted our ranks suddenly; the rest visibly wavered.

Only their *confidence in me* could still secure the latter.

But *this* had already been struck two violent blows.

Immediately after the battle near Wieselburg I had communicated to Kossuth, in rather frivolous phrase, the events of the day, intending to mitigate the painful impression which the report of another retreat must make on him.

The issue of this contest, favourable for us directly on the battle-field; the entirely unimpeded easy retreat from Wieselburg to Hochstrass, in the face of the danger of seeing our whole corps dispersed, to which the most insignificant hostile pursuit would have exposed us,—had given me the right to call the combat near Wieselburg a victorious one for us.

"*Ma gyöztünk!*" ('To-day we have vanquished!') I wrote to Kossuth, and depicted in glowing colours the resolute bearing of the hussars during the engagement; and closed with the encouraging words, "*Csak rajta! majd elbánunk mi a czudarokkal!*" ('Cheer up! we will yet be rid of these fellows!')

Kossuth had considered it judicious to make this private letter public through the daily press.

Furthermore, the Government had printed and partly distributed a proclamation to the army, drawn up in the spirit of its last Pesth resolutions—I know not by whom—and, without my authority, containing my signature. In this I was made to urge the army to a last decisive battle under the walls of Ofen, in contradiction to the retreat to the left bank of the Danube, which directly afterwards had been ordered by me in person.

The *erroneous* supposition, that *those* private communications about the Wieselburg battle had been intended *by myself* for publication, and that *this* proclamation to the army was genuine—from the great resemblance of both of them to the official rodomontades of Messrs. Kossuth, Perczel, and several others—shook so much the confidence even of those officers who had not then deserted me, that I was obliged to make haste to strengthen it anew by an open exposition of the tendency of our combat, *as* I *understood it.* I did this in the following address to my corps d'armée.

"To the royal Hungarian corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

"The advantages which the numerical superiority of the enemy has obtained over the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, but especially the more recent events, seem, through their naturally discouraging influence, to have shaken in some cases even that noble self-reliance which united us all in this, the most just of struggles.

"To re-animate this shaken self-reliance, and thus revive that courage which has perhaps in some measure been depressed, is the first duty of the leader.

"I discharge this duty especially by opening to the corps d'armée of the upper Danube the prospect of more favourable opportunities, through the impending diversion against a portion of the enemy; but I hope to raise the self-reliance of the corps d'armée principally by speaking out openly and honestly my judgment and conviction concerning what has already been done, as well as what we have yet to do.

"I accepted the post which was offered to me, because I believe the cause of Hungary to be a just one.

"And I will maintain my post, so long as it is entrusted to me, should even the best among us become irresolute, and withdraw their arm from the good cause.

"This consciousness enables me, in judging of the events since the 1st of November 1848, undisguisedly to confess my own mistakes; hoping thereby to give to the corps d'armée the surest guarantee that more judicious measures will be taken in future.

"I erred when I ceased to urge the Committee of Defence, by unanswerable arguments, to desist from the defence and blockade of the frontier; since all the other mischances to which the corps d'armée has been undeservedly exposed arose solely from the fact, that in consequence of the harassing fatigues of the outpost service, the organisation as well as the augmentation and consolidation of the army remained only pious wishes.

"I erred when, in the head-quarters at Bicske, I gave effect to the positive order of the Committee of Defence to retreat with the corps d'armée into the first line before Ofen; because through this retreat, for which there was but little reason, the corps d'armée was placed in the ambiguous light of evading a serious conflict, which would have been decisive for the good cause.

"But I had received these orders from that authority, which the responsible Hungarian minister of war, General Mészáros, elected by the country to this post, and confirmed by our King Ferdinand V., himself recognised, and still continues to recognise, as the supreme governing power; for upon *its* mandate he himself took, and under its ægis retains, the command over the army on the Theiss against General Count Schlick, hostilely opposed to us. And I *could* do this with the calm consciousness that I was committing no illegal action, nor misleading the royal Hungarian corps d'armée, intrusted to my command, into any such action, so long as the Committee of Defence did not disavow itself.

"But when, on the 1st of January 1849, whilst the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, prepared for the combat, and notwithstanding the ordered retreat to the first line near Ofen, was still posted at Hanzsabég, Tárnok, Sóskut, Bia, &c.—the Committee of Defence, instead of justifying, by its heroic perseverance when in the proximity of danger, the confidence which we had always reposed in its loyalty, in an unaccountable manner suddenly left the capital; and by doing so, and still more by sending a deputation, without our knowledge and consent, to the commander-in-chief of the hostile troops, placed us in a perplexing and desperate, nay even ambiguous position;—then it was that in many a one among us the suspicion must have arisen that we had been degraded from the eminence due to us as defenders of the constitutional liberty of Hungary, down to that abasement in which the usual methods for the furtherance of personal private interests are accustomed to be successfully pursued.

"Without denying the loyalty of the Committee of

Defence—however deeply it may have shaken by its sudden disappearance from the capital our confidence in it—I believe it to be my duty to invite the corps d'armée, that it may be preserved from the most miserable of all fates, that of utter internal dissolution, either, after mature deliberation, to adopt as its own the following declaration, the purpose of which is to secure us against any suppositions injurious to our honourable position; or to declare openly whatever different views it may entertain on the subject."

(My signature follows.)

This declaration runs thus:

"The royal Hungarian corps d'armée of the upper Danube—the nucleus of which, with the staff, once belonged to the Austrian united forces, until, after the recognition of the royal Hungarian ministry of war, the Hungarian regiments were placed exclusively under its authority—in obedience to the will of the constitutional King of Hungary, took oath to the Hungarian constitution. It was at first opposed, under the chief command of the Archduke Palatine, to the royal imperial troops under Jellachich; and, in spite of the saddest political confusions, always faithful to its oath, has hitherto complied only with the orders of the responsible royal Hungarian ministry of war, or with those of the Committee of Defence, declared by the former authority to be legal.

"Supported by this irrefutable fact, the corps d'armée of the upper Danube accordingly protests most decidedly against the supposition of having ever served the *private interests* of any party in Hungary, and declares that all such rumours are *infamous calumnies*. But the same irrefutable fact of the unshaken fidelity with which the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, in

fighting for the maintenance of the Hungarian constitution, has indefatigably submitted itself to all decrees of the Committee of Defence, and this in spite of the most inexpressible privations and deceptions, fairly entitled the corps d'armée to expect that the Committee of Defence would at least scrupulously avoid one thing, namely, placing the corps d'armée in an ambiguous position.

"" After the corps d'armée of the upper Danube had protected the frontier, according to the orders of the Committee of Defence, during a month and a half with a rare self-denial, by the most fatiguing outpost service; —after it had victoriously repulsed the enemy, though much stronger, in the battle at Wieselburg;—after it had undauntedly held the desperate position at Raab, until the moment when its right flank was already turned by the enemy, and when its own retreat, necessary for the salvation of the capitals, could be rendered possible only by an obstinate conflict with the hostile turning-column;—after it had held itself ready for fight, partly before, partly behind Dotis, Bánhida, Neszmély, Csákvár, Zámoly, Ondód, and Sárkány, until the victorious advance of the enemy's right wing by Móor caused us to resume the offensive by Mártonvásar, though obliged in consequence of the positive order of the Committee of Defence to exchange this offensive for the defensive before Ofen; and all this without having met with those much-dreamt-of sympathies of the inhabitants of the circle on the other side the Danube, and without even the least preparation having been made by the Committee of Defence to hinder the advance of the enemy's superior forces on the main and by-roads to the communications of the above-named places;—there re-

mained but *one* consoling prospect for the much-suffering corps d'armée—that of a decisive combat immediately in front of and *in* the capitals of Hungary.

"The former resolute tone of the decrees of the Committee of Defence, as well as its proclamations to the people, justified the expectation, that at this decisive moment, so long desired and now at last come, it would display an all-inspiring energy.

"And instead of all that *should* and *could* have been done, there arrived at the head-quarters at Promontorium, on the 1st of January 1849:

"1. The information that the Committee of Defence had left the capitals.

"2. A decree of the Committee of Defence, that a decisive battle should be fought upon the first line before Ofen, at the height of Tétény, Bia, &c., but without sacrificing the corps d'armée, or exposing the capitals to a bombardment; that is to say, were the battle lost, the corps d'armée, in spite of only one passage being secured across, and in spite of the pursuing enemy, should be saved upon the left bank of the Danube, without the defence of the town.

"3. The order to escort a deputation to the commander-in-chief of the enemy's army.

"Any one of these three facts, viewed separately, would have been sufficient in itself to shake the confidence of the corps d'armée in the members of the Committee of Defence; but taken together they must excite apprehensions that the corps d'armée had been, up to this moment—to use the mildest expression—a useful but dangerous tool in unpractised hands.

"To be able to maintain its position unshaken and

upon strictly lawful grounds amidst the political intrigues to which our poor country may very shortly be exposed, the corps d'armée of the upper Danube publicly makes the following declaration:

"1. The corps d'armée of the upper Danube remains faithful to its oath, to fight resolutely against every external enemy for the maintenance of the constitution of the kingdom of Hungary sanctioned by King Ferdinand V.

"2. With the same resolution, the corps d'armée of the upper Danube will oppose itself to all those who may attempt to overthrow the constitutional monarchy by untimely republican intrigues in the interior of the country.

"3. It is a natural consequence of the right understanding of constitutional monarchy—a form of government for the maintenance of which the corps d'armée of the upper Danube is determined to contend to the last—that it can obey only and exclusively those orders which are forwarded to it in the form prescribed by law through the responsible royal Hungarian minister of war, or through his representative appointed by himself (at present General Vetter).

"4. The corps d'armée of the upper Danube, mindful of the oath taken to the constitution of Hungary, and mindful of its own honour, having remained perfectly conscious of what it *has* to do and is *determined* to do, declares, finally, that it will adhere to the result of any convention made with the enemy, only if it guarantees on the one hand the integrity of the constitution of Hungary, to which the corps d'armée has sworn, and on the

other, if it is not inimical to the military honour of the corps d'armée itself."

(My signature follows.)

Neither within nor without my corps d'armée, to my knowledge, has any voice publicly been heard against this proclamation.

The old soldiers regained their confidence in me and in the cause which I represented, and ceased to waver.

They could not anticipate that they had come out of the rain to get under the spout—thanks to the dependence of the war-minister Mészáros on the president Kossuth; a fact of which they were not then aware.

I, on the contrary, had already remarked when in Presburg manifold indications that Mészáros was not independent, but had considered these, at that time, only as a natural consequence of his really powerless position, from the good understanding existing between myself and Kossuth, and found no reason for suspecting that symptoms of a moral defect remained in the courageous old soldier — the original existence of which could not be reconciled either with Mészáros remaining at his post, nor with the obstinacy with which he had hitherto opposed every modification in war-business though approved of by experienced military men — after this *powerless* position of the minister of war had been changed into a *powerful* one by my decided espousing of his side.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE corps d'armée of the upper Danube, according to the muster-rolls consisting of from 15,000 to 16,000 men, underwent in Waizen a new classification into four divisions: two wing-divisions, one centre-division, and one reserve.

Colonel Aulich commanded the division of the right wing, Colonel Kmety that of the centre, Colonel Count Guyon that of the reserve. The command of the division of the left wing was likewise confided to a Honvéd colonel.

Each division consisted of two brigades, under distinct brigade-commanders.

These divisions were almost equal in strength, and differed little from each other in their relative proportions of the three kinds of force (infantry, cavalry, and artillery).

The division of the left wing alone was directed from Waizen along the Danube as far as the Eipel (Ipoly), but afterwards in a north-western direction, on the shortest line, towards Tyrnau. The division of the right wing moved at the same time by Rétság, Nagy-Oroszi, Szántó, Lévencz (Léva), Verebély, towards Leopoldstadt, the fort on the Waag to be relieved. The right flank was followed at intervals of a day's march by the centre and the reserve.

By detaching the division of the left wing between the fortress of Komorn and the hostile corps concen-

trated round Leopoldstadt, it was intended to divert the attention of the latter at first from the danger menacing from the south, and to induce it to lay itself open to our principal attack from the east.

On the 10th of January the divisions of both wings reached the little river Zsitva, the right wing near Verebély, the left two (German) miles southward from that place; the division of the centre, together with the head-quarters, Lévencz; that of the reserve, Szántó.

The division of the right wing (Aulich) was the van-guard, and the division of the reserve (Guyon) the rear-guard of the corps d'armée.

On the said day the Aulich division on its entrance into Verebély encountered the van-guard of the hostile corps under Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich; while the Guyon division, just when marching out from Ipolyság, was overtaken and attacked by the hostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich, which had been ordered to pursue us.

The reports of both occurrences reached my head-quarters at Lévencz almost at the same time.

Colonel Count Guyon, too weak to repel the hostile attack, had soon withdrawn, with little loss, and speedily continued his march to Szántó.

The division of the left wing advanced on the 11th of January from the river Zsitva to Komjáthi on the river Neutra; the other three divisions of the corps d'armée had to rest a day in their stations of Verebély, Lévencz, and Szántó.

I left Lévencz on the morning of this day to ride to Szántó, that I might learn the particulars of the conflict which had taken place at Ipolyság. On my route I heard some discharges of artillery from the direction of Szántó.

I could only suppose that the Guyon division had been again attacked, and quickened my pace.

At about half an hour's distance from Szántó I found the Guyon division in a defensive position *à cheval* of the road, expecting the attack of the enemy, though he was nowhere to be seen. The cannon-shots had been fired at a party of our own recruits, which marched across the fields towards the division, for the purpose of joining it.

Colonel Count Guyon was certainly a very brave officer, but his ignorance equalled his bravery. Without having sent out even a single patrol from Szántó towards Ipolyság, which would have brought him long ago the certain news that the enemy was still in Ipolyság; he had given way to the unfounded apprehension that he was most obstinately pursued, had started at daybreak from Szántó towards Lévencz, and believed that he must prepare for a mortal combat on the very spot where I found him vainly expecting the enemy. He had taken the recruits for a hostile turning-column. The few shots which he fired at them completely sufficed to frighten the poor devils hap-hazard into *that* valley which was situated between his position and the declivity on which they had just marched. But Colonel Guyon thought this movement was a desperate attempt to attack his position, until at last he was awoke from his dream by some volunteer hussars who had been ordered to charge the recruits.

While Colonel Guyon expected the enemy in his position between Szántó and Lévencz, the latter could unobserved take the shortest road from Ipolyság, by Németi, to Schemnitz (Selmeczbánya), and occupy the district of the mountain-towns without drawing a blade;

or he could rest himself in Ipolyság for one or even two days, after his recent forced march, and make the brave Colonel Guyon for the present maintain his most injudiciously chosen position—against *ennui.*

After I had emphatically represented this to Colonel Guyon, I ordered his division back into the places lying nearest to the road towards Lévencz, that it might the more speedily be supported by the Kmety division, stationed in Lévencz, in the event of a hostile attack, perhaps even in the course of the day, being made upon their cantonment.

The principal object of our operations, commenced from Waizen, was, as I had already indicated in my proclamation, *to act on the offensive against the hostile corps under Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich, and especially to relieve the fort of Leopoldstadt on the Waag, blockaded by him.*

The first intimation I had of the untenableness of this fort—even against a mere bombardment—was when I was in Raab, and when it was already too late to withdraw its garrison and armament without danger. This had now to be done after all, if possible, by the relief of the fort.

Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich's hostile operations in my rear—although we had expected something of the kind, nay, by our eccentric retreat from the capitals had, as has been mentioned, fully calculated on it—rendered my offensive against Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich an undertaking attended with great risk.

Nevertheless I persisted in its execution, until at length the well-founded representations of the new chief of my general staff—appointed in the stead of Lieut.-colonel (formerly Major) Pusztelnik, who was unfit for

this post—succeeded in deciding me to choose another object for my operations.

He urged me to consider:

That the leading idea of our march towards the north, namely, "*the diversion of the hostile main forces from the Theiss, so as to render possible the organisation of new troops behind that river,*" presupposed, as a fundamental consideration, the *preservation* of the corps d'armée.

That to effect both of these objects, we must restrict ourselves to mere demonstrations, and avoid any actual combat that would endanger the existence of the corps.

That should we, in the end, not succeed in relieving Leopoldstadt; being surrounded on the north, east, and west by hostile corps who were confident of victory, we should be forced to retreat towards the south to the fortress of Komorn, or to fight our way between Gran (Esztergom) and Komorn to the right bank of the Danube. But in the first of these cases we ran the risk of discouraging the garrison of this, the most important bulwark in the country, far more than it would have been by the closest investment; while in the latter case we should, in addition, expose our own corps to the greatest danger.

That, consequently, the injurious results of a failure in the attempt to relieve Leopoldstadt bore a striking disproportion to the advantages which could result to us, even under the most favourable circumstances, from its successful deliverance.

That, from the position just taken up by the hostile forces, the relief of Leopoldstadt was almost without any further influence.

That this relief, according to the intention of the *leading idea* of our march towards the north, was to be

nothing else than the commencement of *those* demonstrations by which we hoped "*to divert the hostile main army from the Theiss.*"

That the deliverance of the garrison of Leopoldstadt, and the reinforcement of our corps d'armée thereby, was only a secondary aim, a welcome addition, as it were, to the advantages which our cause would derive from the realisation of *this idea.*

But this idea—the chief of my general staff argued farther—*was already realised,* the enemy having fallen into the snare *even earlier* than, *without under-estimating him,* we could have expected.

The moment of greatest danger for our cause was fortunately gone by; for a hostile offensive from Pesth against Debreczin was scarcely any longer to be feared now that Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich had been sent on our track.

It was therefore impossible for me not to perceive that our next operations must now be directed solely to the deliverance of the corps d'armée from a position which was already critical enough to endanger its very existence. To effect this, even the garrison of the fort of Leopoldstadt must be sacrificed, if necessary. However great this sacrifice might appear, any attempt to save the garrison was connected with still greater disadvantages. The line of the retreat into the mountain-towns was still open to us for the next twenty-four hours; but not after the expiration of that time. The rigour of the season augmented the hardships of the war —carried on now by us under the most unfavourable circumstances—to such a degree, that they of themselves were sufficient to destroy our troops even without direct co-operation on the part of the enemy. Some days' rest

seemed to him to have now become of the most urgent importance in reference to the existence of the corps d'armée. A great part of it was but very imperfectly clad. The supplies of cloth, leather, and linen, which we had discovered, and taken with us, at the last moment, when marching out from Waizen, might perhaps be sufficient to remedy this deficiency. But of this stock of cloth, leather, and linen, garments had previously to be made. This, however, could not be accomplished while on the march. For this purpose several days' rest was necessary. This would be secured to us by the immediate occupation of the mountain-towns, and moreover an important part also of our line of retreat towards the upper Theiss.

Consequently he could by no means approve of the offensive against Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich, and proposed the RETREAT SIDEWAYS INTO THE DISTRICT OF THE MOUNTAIN-TOWNS.

More brilliant, more alluring—he said finally—might appear to me the deliverance of Leopoldstadt; more favourable perhaps to my renown, if it succeeded; but to avoid any critical conflicts seemed to him at present nevertheless more judicious, even if we thereby repeatedly exposed ourselves to the suspicion of faint-heartedness. If the affairs of Hungary were still *as bad as they were a fortnight ago,* he would not advise a retreat. But they were now—he said—*already incomparably better,* thanks to the blindness of the enemy! *The uninterrupted continuation of the offensive against Debreczin might have destroyed at one blow the sinews of our resistance.* But, as it seemed, Prince Windisch-Grätz preferred to prepare for us a lingering, torturing death. What have we to do now? *Let us continue to*

give him the opportunity of trifling away, in these preparations, more time and strength: THE NATION WILL PROBABLY RECOVER IN THE MEANWHILE FROM ITS FIRST PANIC TERROR.

I could not deny the correctness of these opinions, and gave up the offensive against Field-marshal Simunich, though not without inward reluctance.

This reluctance sprang from the painful thought of abandoning the garrison of Leopoldstadt to certain destruction, among whom also were two men, who having been my intimate friends in early days, remained still dear to me.

CHAPTER XVII.

By the "district of the mountain-towns" is here to be understood, without regard to political divisions, that tract of land in the valley of the river Gran, which includes especially the towns of Schemnitz (Selmeczbánya), Kremnitz (Körmöczbánya), Altsohl (Ó-Zólyom), and Neusohl (Beszterczebánya).

The Gran (Garam) flows through this district from Neusohl to Heiligenkreuz (Szentkereszt) almost at a right angle, turning from the western direction in which it reaches Neusohl suddenly to the south, and at Altsohl bends again just as suddenly to the west, at Heiligenkreuz first resuming the bow-shaped direction of its course from the source to the mouth.

The lofty boundaries of the valley of the Gran,

partly covered with forests, partly rocky, to the south as well as to the north, can, so far as they limit the district just named, be traversed with artillery only at detached points; while an offensive advance with strong columns from the south into the valley itself appears to be hazardous on account of the frequent crossing of the road from one bank of the river to the other, with the dangerous proximity of a hostile cantonment in and around Schemnitz.

Two main roads, leading from the south into the district of the mountain-towns, meet at Schemnitz, one from Ipolyság by Németi, the other from Lévencz by Frauenmarkt (Báth). There exists, besides, another western by-road, which, near Zsarnócz and by Hodrics, joins Schemnitz with the road that likewise leads from the south upwards into the valley of the Gran.

The other approaches from the south into the district of the mountain-towns conduct to Altsohl, having previously united into one road two or three (German) miles before reaching this town.

Across the northern boundaries of the valley of the Gran two roads lead out of the valley of the Túrócz from Mosócz into the territory of the mountain-towns; on the one side by Turcsek to Kremnitz, on the other by Hermanecz to Neusohl; and a third out of the upper valley of the Vág from Rosenberg, across the mountain of Sturecz, likewise to Neusohl.

Further, a fourth line of communication leads out of the valley of the Neutra from Privigye to Kremnitz.

Neusohl and Kremnitz were at that time menaced only from the valley of the Túrócz, and this by the hostile brigade of Major-general Götz and his allies the Sclavonian militia; but the above-mentioned approaches

were easy to defend, and, as well as the valleys of the upper Waag and Gran, were still in our possession.

The southern mountain-towns, Altsohl and Schemnitz, appeared to be more seriously menaced than the two northern ones, especially Schemnitz, it being exposed to attack from three sides at the same time.

But innumerable difficulties awaited the aggressor, by reason of the extremely rigorous winter, and the deep snow on the mountains: and the chief of my general staff could therefore really predict with much probability, that we should be able to maintain ourselves in the mountain-towns easily until our troops should have recovered themselves.

The position of our corps d'armée on the evening of the 11th of January 1849 was, as before mentioned, the following:

The division of the left wing in Komjáthi, on the river Neutra.

The Aulich division in Verebély, on the river Zsitva.

The Kmety division in Lévencz, on the left bank of the river Gran.

The Guyon division in Varsány, on the road from Ipolyság to Lévencz.

Before us, in Neutra (Nyitra), on the river of the same name, stood a part of the hostile corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Simunich; in our rear, in Ipolyság, that of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich.

Schemnitz, the next to our position and at the same time most important point for us of the mountain-towns, was consequently nearer to us than to the two hostile corps; the road from Lévencz to Schemnitz could not be endangered by either of them so long as we were posted as above indicated: nevertheless it was possible,

if we delayed any longer in Lévencz, that Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich might reach this point before us, if he had started early on the 11th from Ipolyság, by Németi, towards Schemnitz, advancing onwards in the valley of the Schemnitz-Bach. In fact, on the evening of the 11th we were informed by a scout, that a hostile column had been seen in the course of the day marching along the road from Ipolyság to Schemnitz; its strength, however, was not indicated more precisely.

For the purpose of again getting the start of this column, the Kmety division had to set out during the night between the 11th and 12th of January from Lévencz, by Frauenmarkt, towards Schemnitz.

The Aulich division left Verebély on the 12th, and took its route by St. Benedict (Szent Benedek) and Heiligenkreuz to Kremnitz.

The division of the left wing, leaving Komjáthi likewise on the 12th, should follow it as far as Heiligenkreuz; but from thence march to Altsohl, occupy this place, and advance its outposts immediately towards the south as far as Dobronyiva (Dobrona).

During the course of the 12th, in order to protect these operations, the Guyon division should oppose to the uttermost the advance beyond Lévencz of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich.

Being forced to suppose that there was an OFFENSIVE *understanding* between the movements of the two hostile corps, which menaced us in front and rear, there remained, notwithstanding all the circumspection of the chief of my general staff, reason enough to apprehend, on the one hand, that we should find Schemnitz already occupied by the enemy, and on the other, see the division of our left wing destroyed.

Fortunately, however, there existed only an "*observing*" understanding between the two hostile corps; and thus it became possible for us to lead the corps d'armée "of the upper Danube" without accident into the district of the mountain-towns.

The Kmety division, together with my head-quarters, reached Frauenmarkt during the night between the 11th and 12th. From hence a small column of infantry with two guns was despatched without delay across the mountains to Prinzdorf (Prencsfalu), on the road to Németi, with directions to turn to the south immediately after reaching that point, to occupy the narrow valley of Teplicska, and to send out patrols as far as Németi. The main body of the Kmety division continued, likewise during the night, its march to Schemnitz, and arrived thither early in the afternoon of the 12th, while almost at the same moment some lancers of the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Csorich were taken prisoners in Németi by the patrols of the Prinzdorf column.

On the 15th of January the divisions stood thus:

The Aulich division in Kremnitz, with the outposts to the north in Perk, to the south and west in Heiligenkreuz.

The Kmety division in Neusohl, with the outposts towards the north-west in Hermanecz.

The division of the left wing in Altsohl, with the outposts towards the south in Dobronyiva, towards the south-east in Szalatna; and

The Guyon division in Schemnitz and Windschacht, with the outposts towards the south, on the road to Lévencz.

For the protection of both flanks of the Guyon division, Prinzdorf and Teplicska, on the road to Németi,

continued to be occupied by a detachment of the Kmety division; and Zsarnócz, westwards from Schemnitz, in the valley of the Gran, on the road to St. Benedict, by a part of the Aulich division.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE troops on their march had found the communications into the mountain-towns partly covered with ice, partly blocked up with snow, and only with great exertion had they been able to advance. The same obstacles could not but make it appear doubtful whether there would be any hostile attack against the mountain-towns for a considerable time. But scarcely had the divisions entered their presumptive winter-quarters when a thaw came on, and smoothed for the enemy the roads which ice and snow had made so very difficult for us.

It is true that Colonel Aulich, soon after his arrival in Kremnitz, had by repeated forced reconnoiterings towards Turcsek on the road from Kremnitz to Mosócz so energetically frustrated the attacks intended by the brigade of Major-general Götz and the Sclavonian free-troops, that we could not in future be molested from this side; but the danger menaced more seriously in the south.

The corresponding news received from scouts announced the approach of considerable hostile forces on the roads from Frauenmarkt and St. Benedict.

The detachment in Zsarnócz, which ought to have

yielded only to a superior hostile attack, abandoned this position; whether through ignorance or cowardice on the part of the commander could not be ascertained.

Zsarnócz had again to be occupied by us, in order to secure Schemnitz, in case of a hostile attack on the road to Frauenmarkt. The Guyon division, however, could not be further weakened by detaching any part of its troops. Consequently the Aulich division received an order to occupy Zsarnócz again with a battalion of infantry. The commander of the battalion despatched for this purpose, while on his march from Heiligenkreuz towards Zsarnócz, heard it rumoured that the enemy was already in possession of the place, and turned immediately to the "right about," because his orders happened to say nothing about "attacking," and also made no mention of the possibility of the enemy's being in Zsarnócz.

On the 20th of January, when in Neusohl, I received intelligence of this unwelcome incident, and hastened the same night to Kremnitz, to lead in person a column from thence to Zsarnócz.

On the evening of the 21st of January I had reached it with a battalion of the foot-regiment Alexander, a squadron of the ninth regiment of hussars, and a three-pounder battery of six pieces. The hostile Colonel Collery, by advancing from the south upwards along the valley of the Gran, had arrived at Zsarnócz the day before with the twelfth battalion of chasseurs, some cavalry, and about half a rocket-battery, but early in the morning of the 21st of January had continued his march by Hodrics towards Schemnitz.

By the attack which it was to be foreseen the hostile turning-column would make on the following day, the

Guyon division could easily be forced to abandon its position near Windschacht, and as a consequence even Schemnitz.

To frustrate this I resolved to march after Colonel Collery, and attack him in his rear.

Colonel Guyon was informed of this project during the night between the 21st and 22d of January, and ordered on his part to anticipate the attack of the enemy's turning-column.

The road from Zsarnócz to Schemnitz leads, as has been said, by Hodrics, in a narrow valley, ascending to the northern thickly-wooded bank, at first gently in the bottom of the valley, but above the last-named place rather steeply. Here the road had been made impracticable in several places by natural abatis, which so far as was absolutely necessary were manned by us, but only with volunteers, and more for observation than for defence.

When I broke up very early on the 22d of January from Zsarnócz towards Hodrics, I hoped to find the enemy still delayed by the abatis, and occupied in removing them. I was, however, soon informed that he had succeeded in overcoming all these hindrances during the course of the preceding night.

From Hodrics I despatched strong patrols in a south-eastern direction, partly to harass likewise the enemy posted before Windschacht, partly to give intelligence to the Guyon division of our approach, which I always presumed to be still in its position before Windschacht.

Higher up than those parts of the road on which the remains of the removed abatis were still to be seen, we encountered the enemy. He had occupied the declivity

of the mountain above the road with sharp-shooters on a point favourable for commanding the road.

I ordered a company on to the height of the wooded mountain-side, to eject the hostile sharp-shooters, or at least divide their fire, and thus facilitate the advance of a storming-column of infantry along the road.

Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik—a short time before, as has been mentioned, the chief of my general staff, but now commander of the brigade to which belonged the battalion of the foot-regiment Alexander engaged in this attack—had voluntarily joined this expedition, and undertook in person the command of the company sent on to the height.

In case the storm on the road should be repulsed, I ordered two guns to advance and be unlimbered; intending by their fire to stop the pursuing enemy, and protect our preparations for a renewed attack. The rest of the battery remained with the rear-guard, as did also the greater part of the cavalry.

Several hussars had voluntarily galloped along that part of the road which the fire of the enemy commanded, but were received with such a brisk volley of musketry, that they were forced to turn back as quickly as possible. This of itself sufficed to discourage the infantry, among whom was a very large number of recruits. Nevertheless our sharp-shooters on the declivity meanwhile opened their fire; and now I believed the moment had arrived for advancing the storming-column on the main road. But after the first hostile shots, it turned back; and there was the less chance of stopping it, as the enemy itself sent forward along the road a small division of chasseurs with crossed bayonets.

A panic terror seized the infantry and the cannoneers

of the two unlimbered guns. They turned in disgraceful flight. The hussars would have barred their passage, but they crawled away under the horses, although the horsemen kept slashing at them with their swords. In the dreadful confusion thereby produced, the artillery-horses took fright; and of the rest of the battery, except one piece, part tumbled down the declivity, part could not at all be got again under way.

The commander of the battery, struck by a ball from the enemy, had fallen near the two unlimbered guns; whilst his men, leaving their pieces behind them, ran away with the implements necessary for loading.

During my fruitless efforts to keep the most courageous of the infantry together for the protection of these guns, I was myself forced back by degrees to the place where they had been planted. Some balls whistling past us in rapid succession caused me soon to be left completely alone. Even my adjutant, an intrepid valorous man, had disappeared. As, however, I had not seen him fall, his absence gave me some ground of hope; for I was convinced he had left me only for the purpose of stopping, if possible, the fugitives farther behind, and rallying them for another attack. Nevertheless I saw that with such troops victory was absolutely impossible, though I hoped at least to be able to save the artillery. I was therefore constrained to remain where I was, although alone.

Close to the guns stood an ammunition-cart placed athwart the road. Behind it I sought meanwhile a partial shelter from the enemy's balls.

The noise of my troops fleeing towards the valley now scarcely reached my ears; but in its stead I distinguished from the opposite direction confused shouts,

and at intervals the sounds of the Austrian popular hymn. Next moment the storming hostile chasseurs broke forth from the last turn of the road. This staggered me too. Undecided whether I should yield to the natural instinct that urged me to save myself, or, in despair at the humiliation I had suffered, await the thrust of the hostile bayonets, I looked at one time in the direction of my fleeing troops, and then towards the advancing enemy. Suddenly it seemed to me as if they wavered at the sight of the guns, as if the "Hurrah!" died on their lips. With prompt decision I searched for the match. But whether it was that I overlooked it, or that the fugitive gunners had taken even this with them, I did not find it—and thereby completely discouraged, I also now took to flight.

I was on foot—my preservation therefore extremely improbable. I had thought of this too late. I now sought to escape the searching looks of the pursuing enemy by leaping onwards to the wooded slopes, for the purpose of gaining ground unobserved among the trees; but stumbling at almost every leap, I was obliged immediately to come down again to the open road.

The hostile chasseurs were already close enough behind me to take sure aim; which they indeed did; but the road being much inclined, I fortunately sank at every step under the line of sight, and thus my shako received a ball, which was probably destined for my skull; all the others whistled harmlessly past me. The brave chasseurs evidently shot rather too eagerly. With somewhat more coolness in their aim, they might have spared both themselves and their commander-in-chief much trouble next spring.

However, I meanwhile did my best to shorten as

much as possible the time during which I had to serve them as a walking target.

A cavalry horse without a rider, coming from the side of the enemy, galloped suddenly past me. About a hundred paces from me a hussar stopped it for his wounded dismounted comrade, whom he would not abandon in spite of the danger to his own life. After he had assisted him to escape, he accidentally caught sight of me, rode speedily towards me, and offered me his own horse, with the remark, that his life was of less value than mine.

This magnanimity had an altogether peculiar effect on me. I suddenly believed that the day need not yet be given up for lost. "You had better gallop after these scamps of infantry, and bring some back to me; but they must be such fellows as you!" I impetuously called to the heroic hussar. "All is in vain!" replied he, with an oath; "they are Sclavonians, not Magyars!"

This observation on their nationality was certainly just, but the conclusion deduced from it not quite correct; for the coward cannoneers were Magyars, not Sclavonians. Moreover, the next moment seemed as if it would give the hussar the lie even in regard to the Sclavonians; for scarcely had he finished his swearing, when round the next projection behind which the road loses itself downwards, a column of infantry, led by my adjutant, arrived swiftly for my deliverance.

I had not been deceived in the adjutant. My newly roused determination not yet to give up the contest now ripened more quickly into action. "Follow me!" I called to them, they appearing very resolute; "your comrades will not remain behind, when they know that we are again advancing. This brave hussar," I confi-

dently added, "will take care of that; will you not, comrade?"—and without stopping for an answer, I again advanced up the mountain. The Sclavonians probably understood very little of what I shouted to them in Hungarian; however, they followed fearlessly.

The enemy's fire now grew more animated: we had no time to return it. I felt continually urged to address my men. He who, himself in danger, inspires others with courage, most strengthens his own.

"Follow me!" I repeatedly called out; "you see they hit nothing!" But unfortunately just then a ball did hit; a man in the first rank fell moaning to the ground; and in a twinkling the rest had again taken to flight.

The *sudden* extinction of a last hope, that has unexpectedly emerged—even though it may be but a foolish one—shakes more vehemently than the *gradual* disappointment of all previous well-founded expectations.

"It is all over for to-day!" cried the adjutant. "For ever!" I added, in despair.

When I retired from the guns, I had already given up the day for lost, just as much as now; but the knowledge of this disgraceful necessity had not there, as here, been forced upon me all at once. *There* I still had regard to my own safety; *here* I renounced it.

This desperate indifference must also in part be attributed to the unusual relaxation of my physical powers. On the summit of moral enthusiasm death is sought—in the depth of physical exhaustion it is no longer avoided. The simultaneous coincidence of both conditions in one and the same individual appears to me impossible. Only in the intermediate phases can either valour or cowardice be spoken of.

"Let us save ourselves, before it be too late!" called out my adjutant, seized me by the arm, and dragged me away with him down hill. The hussar also—(he had been right this time with regard to the Sclavonians) —rode again up to me, and once more invited me to mount his horse. Irritated at this request, and angry at the annoyance of being dragged along, I endeavoured to disengage my arm from the adjutant; but he would not let go, even when a ball from the enemy passing between us had almost lamed the elbow of the arm with which he held me: whereupon perceiving that, by a further opposition on my part, not only my own life, but the lives of my two faithful companions also, would be endangered, I immediately began again voluntarily to take part in the flight, and exert my last physical powers.

In the vicinity of the uppermost houses of Hodrics stood a carriage for the severely wounded; but these had one and all been made prisoners of war. I could therefore avail myself of the carriage without scruple in order to overtake my troops. Not till I reached the lower part of the village did I succeed in coming up with them.

Here I found the hussars still endeavouring to drive together the dispersed infantry. It was a humiliating spectacle; but far more humiliating was the thought that I was the commander of such a troop; and the boldest imagination, after such events, would have been baffled in its attempt to discover within the bounds of probability the elements of the subsequent necessity for a Russian intervention in Hungary in favour of "independent united Austria."

I intended then and there to decimate the infantry

and the servers of the lost guns; but a glance at the thinned ranks told me that they were already more than decimated.

Our loss amounted, besides the five guns and some hussars, to almost two companies of infantry. Lieutenant-colonel Pusztelnik was also missing. He had been wounded and taken prisoner, as we learnt afterwards.

The enemy did not pursue us further; so that our march back from Hodrics to Zsarnócz could at least be performed in order.

Here I gave a short rest to the troops; but I felt myself irresistibly impelled further on, the sooner to obtain full certainty as to the fate of the Guyon division.

That it must have simultaneously suffered a defeat was beyond a doubt.

But these questions urgently demanded an answer: whither and how far it had been forced back?—whether, in its first fright, it had not even perhaps receded as far as Neusohl, and thus made it possible for the enemy, swiftly following in its track, to cut off on the one hand the division in Altsohl, on the other that in Kremnitz, from each other and from the remaining two in Neusohl; and thereby divide my corps d'armée into three parts, and destroy them separately?

This nobody in Zsarnócz could give me. The dispositions for the Aulich division had also to be issued in the course of the next night, nay even partly executed. Accompanied by my adjutant, I accordingly hastened forward in a carriage to Kremnitz.

I had been warned in Zsarnócz not to travel without a strong escort, because a hostile division from Hodrics, across the northern ridge of the mountain,

could long ago have reached the road from Zsarnócz to Heiligenkreuz, and I had to take this route. I paid no attention, however, to the warning.

Not far from the place which had been pointed out as dangerous to my safety, a menacing "Halt! who goes there?" in German, interrupted the course of the horses; and next moment our carriage was surrounded by foot-soldiers with white straps. The challenge in German and the white straps made us suspicious. My adjutant would not immediately produce the colours. "A general," he answered, delaying; and "Of what battalion are you?" he asked in return, harshly, at the same time leaning out over the carriage, that he might discover, in spite of the darkness, some more distinct mark among the soldiers. "Never mind about the battalion!—what general?" was the answer, accompanied by a closer advance of the soldiers to the carriage.

Our situation was not pleasant. We were now obliged to explain. If it should be followed by a hostile declaration, we could be saved, perchance, only by a shot at the importunate questioner, a jump on to the coach-box, and a lusty lash at the horses.

I had soon considered this; and rising by degrees from my seat, seized a pistol, noiselessly cocked it, and thus awaited, ready for the leap, with suppressed breathing, what should happen.

Meanwhile my companion still delayed with the information. Continually endeavouring to recognise before we should be recognised, he leant forward still more over the carriage-door towards the soldiers, who had come quite close. The short pause seemed to me an eternity. I thought I could scarcely wait longer for the moment of decision.

"It is Alexander infantry!" the adjutant at last called out, and gave the desired information without more ado; for he had recognised a sergeant of the troop, to whom he remembered having given in person a certain order on the morning before the disastrous conflict. The Alexander infantry at that time still wore white straps. This circumstance, however, had not occurred to either of us in the first moment of surprise, any more than that the chasseurs who had been opposed to us at Hodrics had black straps.

This sergeant, together with the small number of men now distributed round our carriage, was the remains of the company I had sent from Hodrics, during our advance, as a reconnoitering patrol, towards Windschacht. It had been suddenly attacked on all sides, while marching through the forest, and the greater part of it taken prisoners. Only these few succeeded in cutting their way through rearwards, and passing Hodrics where the footpath leads from the southern declivity across the little place to the northern ridge of the mountain; having previously awaited, in a hiding-place hard by, the marching past of a hostile patrol, which was observing our retreat to Zsarnócz. Unmolested, they then reached, after crossing the above-mentioned ridge of the mountain, the road from Zsarnócz to Heiligenkreuz; and were just on the point of joining their battalion in Zsarnócz when they met us.

I directed them to wait where they were for their battalion, which was on its march back; and then continued my journey to Kremnitz without further interruption.

CHAPTER XIX.

In Kremnitz I found already authentic news of Colonel Guyon, which unfortunately confirmed almost all my apprehensions. He had been defeated on the preceding day, the 21st of January, at Windschacht, and obliged to retreat to Schemnitz. On the following night he received my order to attack the hostile turning-column. This he attempted to do next morning; but his men—like mine at Hodrics—made off as soon as the enemy's first shots had been fired. Meanwhile he was forced by the attack directed against him from Windschacht to evacuate Schemnitz also; nay, the depression of his troops compelled him even to cross the Gran near Breznicska, and fall back as far as Búcsa.

The junction of the Aulich division with the other divisions on the road leading through the valley of the Gran seemed now, as I had feared, to be impossible. For this road formed at several points, quite close to the right bank of the river Gran, narrow defiles, open towards the left bank. But I had little reason to suppose that an enemy, who was not deterred from carrying out his operations by the necessity for such daring marches as Colonel Collery's recent one from the lower valley of the Gran by Zsarnócz and Hodrics towards Schemnitz, would leave unoccupied the left bank of the Gran, opposite the just-mentioned points—very unfavourable for the march of the Aulich division through the valley of the Gran—as he had already obtained, in

consequence of Colonel Guyon's hasty retreat to Búcsa, undisturbed possession of the left bank of the Gran along this road.

To effect a junction of the Aulich division with the main body of the corps d'armée in the north of Neusohl —through the valley of the little river Túrócz, by Perk, Turcsek, Stuben towards Mosócz, and then, turning to the right, by Cseremosne, Bartoska, and the mountain Hermanecz—seemed, if possible, still more dangerous, on account of Major-general Götz's menacing position upon this line, and the unfavourable disposition of the inhabitants of this district towards us.

There was consequently nothing left for us but to make use of the precarious road across the mountain-ridge between Kremnitz and Neusohl, even at the risk of losing a part of the baggage and artillery.

From Kremnitz, as well as from Neusohl, steep forest-paths lead close under the highest point of the mountain chain; and the path here is formed by a rocky ridge, which can be crossed only by a single foot-passenger at a time. The inhabitants of the mountain declivities use these paths, as we were assured, only occasionally during the winter, and then with light sledges, in such a manner that, when arrived below the ridge, they unload them, take them to pieces, drag every thing, one by one, over the ridge to the opposite continuation of the path, there put the sledges together again, and seated upon them slide down with their freight to the place of their destination.

For the purpose of rendering possible the use of this communication, already sufficiently difficult on account of its steepness, independently of that fatal impediment, an opening had once been made through the rocky ridge

at the narrowest part of its base; but this tunnel *en miniature* had since, bit by bit, fallen in again.

We had consequently to clear it out, and considerably enlarge it, so as to be able to pass through it with our artillery.

This was accomplished on the 24th of January; and during the following night the Aulich division also passed through the tunnel, in both cases not without excessive exertions on the part of the troops.

But in the meantime the Guyon division and that of the left wing were threatened with the unforeseen danger of being separated from the main body of the army, and destroyed while isolated.

In the same night on which the Aulich division had effected its difficult march over the Szkalka (the name, I believe, of the short spur which, extending from the spot where the rivers Gran and Waag branch off in a south-eastern direction between the mountain-towns Neusohl and Kremnitz, is terminated by the Laurinberg), so rapid a thaw once more suddenly set in, that the Gran, overflowing its banks by the next morning, inundated the roads between Neusohl, Altsohl, and Búcsa, to the height of several feet. The divisions in Altsohl and Búcsa were thereby not only completely isolated from the main body in Neusohl, but even from each other; and their situation seemed incomparably more dangerous than that of the Aulich division had recently been, principally because, on the one hand, to my knowledge, no obstacle stood in the way of the victorious enemy in Schemnitz, which could have prevented him from attacking the Guyon division at Búcsa with superior forces, and destroying it utterly, or immediately taking it all prisoners, since Guyon's retreat to Altsohl or Neusohl

through the inundated ground was impossible;—on the other hand, because during the last few days repeated reports had arrived from the division in Altsohl, that numerous patrols of cavalry were advancing more and more boldly from Karpfen (Karpona) towards Altsohl, and these must be considered as the precursors of an attack soon to be expected from this direction likewise.

A speedy decrease of the hemmed-in waters was not at all to be expected, in consequence of the heaped-up masses of ice which stopped the course of the Gran; and any attempt to wade through the deluged expanses of the roads, threatened—so the inhabitants of that district asseverated—certain destruction to the troops.

The loss of a part of my corps appeared at this time inevitable; for neither from Búcsa nor from Altsohl did there exist even a barely practicable road to Neusohl, on which a circuit might have been made round the fatal inundation.

We owed our deliverance from this desperate situation, strangely enough, to the effects of a tragi-comical event which happened on the 22d of January—consequently before the inundation—to the Guyon division in Búcsa, immediately after its retreat from Schemnitz.

Colonel Guyon—void alike of fear and of penetration as he always was—had scarcely arrived in Búcsa with his defeated division, exhausted by its march, when he resolved, after a short rest, to set out again towards Schemnitz, that he might take immediate revenge on the victors of the day. Now as his soldiers were utterly destitute of the military ardour necessary for the accomplishment of this project, he thought to impart it by means of brandy; this made them drunk, however, rather than eager for combat. Moreover, dis-

cipline, never the strongest feature in the Guyon division, had soon fallen so very low, that even the daily false alarm, "The enemy is approaching!" was sufficient to create such a confusion in the camp, as could scarcely have been exceeded after a total defeat. The most terrified ran back as far as Neusohl. The dispersed divisions, however, by degrees again assembled in Búcsa: but the dread of an attack had once taken possession of them; it mounted afterwards with the waters of the Gran, and became at last stronger than the fear of being drowned. Only in this way was it possible for Colonel Guyon to attempt the retreat by the deeply-inundated roads: and the success of his hazardous enterprise brought suspicion on the inhabitants of the district of having represented the dangers connected with it as so formidable from treacherous hostility towards us.

The division in Altsohl had far greater difficulties to contend with in a similar attempt. It had to cross the river itself, by means of the overflowed bridge, and where the stream was very rapid; its road also lay considerably deeper under water. But the example of the Guyon division had its effect: and some hours later the whole of the four divisions of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube were assembled at Neusohl.

We afterwards learned, it is true, that we might quite comfortably have awaited the subsiding of the waters; for the hostile brigade of Major-general Wiess, by which we supposed Altsohl to be menaced, had been suddenly drawn back towards Pesth; and the victors at Windschacht, Hodrics, and Schemnitz believed themselves too feeble for further attacks, nay even expected to be attacked by us. But we had no suspicion whatever of all this; although it by no means seldom happens

that mutual fears are entertained on both sides, and often without reason on either part.

We should, however, not have been able to protract our stay in the mountain-towns, even had we been informed of these circumstances early enough. For the really irresistible enemy who drove us out of them was hunger; the thaw having made the roads to the southern comitates, whence we had to obtain our provisions, impassable, and thus the transport from thence of corn for a long time was impossible.

Directly after my arrival in Schemnitz I received an order from the war-minister Mészáros to begin my march back towards the upper Theiss without delay, and to act against Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick, in concert with the then Colonel Klapka, who, in the stead of the war-minister, had just taken the command of the latter's corps, which had been repeatedly miserably defeated by Count Schlick. I was to attack the Schlick corps from the south-west, while Klapka intended to assail it from the south.

The same reasons which had decided me when in Lévencz to adopt the side-march to the mountain-towns had in Schemnitz made me resolve not to obey at present the above order of the minister of war: for I could not hesitate to estimate the disadvantages which might arise to the country from this disobedience, only very low in comparison with those which must have been the inevitable consequence of the anticipated destruction of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

After the unexpected success in concentrating the corps d'armée in Neusohl, circumstances were quite changed, and instead of justifying a continued disobedience to this order, urged me, on the contrary, no

longer to delay the commencement of the retreat to the upper Theiss.

The question now was, not *whether*, but *how* this retreat should be accomplished.

Only *two* ways were at that time open to us from Neusohl: *either* through the valley of the upper Gran as far as Vöröskö, from thence across the southern limits of the district of the Gran valley into the Murány valley and that of the little river Iólsva, then by Tornalja, Putnok, into the supposed circuit of the operations of Klapka's corps; *or* through the Zips (Szepes megye), the Sáros, and Abanjvár comitates.

On the *first* line a hostile conflict was *highly probable*, on the latter it was *certain*, and moreover with the dreaded victorious corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, which just then occupied these comitates.

In spite of this, however, we chose the latter route, because on the former we had to fear, in consequence of the continuance of mild weather, impassable roads, and at Tornalja hostile attacks from two opposite directions even during our march; because, informed in time of our movement, the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, or, at all events, a part of it—from Kaschau (Kassa) along the road from Torna, on the one hand, and the brigade of Major-general Wiess, which we then supposed to be already near Altsohl, by Vámosfalva (Milna), Zelene, and Rimaszombat, on the other—could reach Tornalja long before us, and either await us ready for combat, or fall upon us even during our march.

On the route through the Zips, on the contrary, we could reckon, even with continued thaw, if not upon good yet upon firm roads; were ourselves *the assailants;* and had not to fear any unexpected attack in the flanks

or the rear during our whole march; since, according to what we then believed to be the position of the hostile forces, we could neither be overtaken on that route, nor by the forced march of any hostile corps on another route could we lose the start which we had already gained, and which we just then most urgently wanted to enable us deliberately to prepare our attacks on the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, and to execute them undisturbed in flank and rear.

In consequence, the following plan of retreat was projected:—The Hungarian corps d'armée of the upper Danube to begin its retreat from Neusohl towards the upper Theiss, through the Zips, in two columns of equal strength. One, composed of the Guyon division and that of the left wing, to move through the valley of the Gran, then by Pohorella, Vernár, Sztraczena, and Huta, to Igló; the other, formed by the Aulich and Kmety divisions, to march, after having passed over the ground between the Waag and the Gran, through the valley of the upper Waag into that of the Poprád, and then by Donnersmark (Csötörtökhely) to Leutschau (Löcse).

The successful attainment of the two last-specified objects of the march must absolutely precede any idea of a serious offensive against the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick.

The southern column, which had to proceed through the valley of the Gran, received for rear-guard a train of several hundred wagons, laden with stores of various kinds belonging to the state, among which were supplies of military clothing, a movable musket-manufactory, a stock of sugar and coffee, tin, copper, materials for muskets, and so on. These were mostly things ordered by the Committee of Defence, which we found prepared

in different places on our march from Waizen to Schemnitz, partly already on the way to the capitals, which were now occupied by the enemy, partly only ready to be sent thither; and made them accompany our movements, that they might arrive as safely as possible at the new seat of the government.

To do more for the protection of a train of wagons, which had grown to an unusual length, seemed, however, to be a too exhausting service for the troops, who were besides already excessively harassed by the retreat in forced marches; and as I would not send it in advance, because the most insignificant hostile rumour coming from the point whither we were retreating would have caused it to stop, and thus have interrupted in their march the divisions behind it,—the wagons had to follow the troops as they best could.

These stores would, it is true, fall a certain prey to the enemy, if it occurred to him to pursue our southern column; but then he had also to remove out of his way the whole train before he could overtake the divisions, which would be already two days' march in advance of him; and the commander of the small detachment accompanying the train—not indeed to defend it, but only to maintain order in its transport—had been charged to abandon to the enemy the booty only piecemeal, where practicable, and thereby, as well as by frequently barricading the road with wagons, and finally by carrying with him or destroying the draught-horses, render pursuit as difficult as possible.

The permanent advance which was secured to the southern column in consequence of the execution of these measures was important enough to indemnify us for the loss of the state's stores; for it must not be

overlooked, that our retreat from the mountain-towns to the upper Theiss was at the same time an offensive movement against Count Schlick's corps, and that our principal aim had to be directed towards endeavouring not to be overtaken by the hostile brigades of Generals Götz and Prince Jablonowski, which came behind us before we had forced our march through the district in which Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick was operating at that time.

However, the enemy did not pursue the southern column, and the whole of the stores consequently remained at the disposal of the government.

A quantity of precious metal, partly coined, partly uncoined, which we had found in the mountain-towns, was to be conveyed for greater security under the protection of the *northern* column, and afterwards handed over to the government. (This was accomplished from Kaschau.)

This plan of retreat was promptly put in execution.

On the 27th of January 1849 the last troops of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube left the mountain-town Neusohl. My head-quarters marched with the northern column, and reached Rosenberg (Rózsahegy) on the 28th.

Here there arrived from the Zips a messenger—sent by Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz, as he said—who requested a secret conference with me.

This I granted him.

He assured me it was the desire of Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz that I should lead the corps d'armée of the upper Danube to his serene highness—this I did not for a moment doubt; and if I acceded to this desire, a full amnesty and a life free from care, though out of

Austria, would be guaranteed to me—this also I did not doubt in the least. But when the messenger had finished, I nevertheless called into the room some staff-officers, communicated to them the object of the secret conference which had just taken place, and handed to the messenger a lithographed copy of my proclamation from Waizen, as the answer for HIM *who had sent him*, with the remark, that this was the ultimatum of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube and of its commander.

During our retreat from the Lajtha as far as Buda-Pesth, we had met, as has been mentioned, with but little sympathy on the part of the population; in the mountain-towns, and the comitates bordering on the north, the majority was disposed even *against* us; still the people remained generally passive, except a few tricolor demagogues, whose activity, however, had no other result than causing some individuals, renowned as black-and-yellow zealots, to be arrested by my orders in Schemnitz, transported to Neusohl, and there after some days again set at liberty. But a dozen obscure Sclavonian agitators were carried with us as prisoners from St. Nikolaus (Szent Miklós), and afterwards sent to Debreczin.

CHAPTER XX.

THE necessary orders having previously been given to the rear-guard for securing by a demonstration the march of the northern column against the hostile brigade of Major-general Götz, which was pressing on

after us from the comitate of Túrócz through that of Arva, and it having been likewise charged with the destruction of all the bridges in the valley of the Waag over which we had passed; the main body of the Schlick corps just then operating, though unsuccessfully, against Tokaj, with the intention of forcing the passage over the Theiss at that place; both columns of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube could consequently easily and exactly execute the detailed orders given when in Neusohl for the whole march from the mountain-towns into the Zips, and on the 2d of February 1849 they stood already—the southern column with its head, the Guyon division, in Igló in the valley of the Hernád, the northern at the same height with it in the valley of the Poprád.

Leutschau was on that day still occupied by a feeble division of the Schlick corps. Colonel Guyon took no notice of it, and sent away his officers, who were awaiting his orders, with the soporific injunction that the next day should be a day of rest.

But a critical night had still to precede that following day. In its course the Guyon division in Igló was surprised by the hostile column of Leutschau, and lost a piece of artillery. The enemy himself, however, unwisely induced by the confusion which the surprise had caused in Guyon's camp to continue his attack longer than was advisable with his small forces, lost a part of his rocket-battery, whereupon he retreated hastily by Kirchdrauf (Szepes-Váralja) to the Branyiszkó, that saddle of the mountain-chain separating the comitates of Sáros and Zips, over which the shortest communication between Leutschau and Eperjes leads.

Although this sudden attack could not be called a

successful one, on account of the sensible loss which the enemy had suffered, yet it furnished a proof of the spirit of warlike resolution which distinguished the corps of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, and presaged hindrances to our further attempt at breaking through towards the upper Theiss; the accomplishment of which we had to hasten so much the more, as the united hostile brigades of Generals Götz and Prince Jablonowski, with their allies the Sclavonian militia, were pressing on after us in the valley of the Waag, being now only two days' march in our rear; and as their attack on our rear, if combined with the simultaneous energetic opposition of the Schlick corps in our front, might very easily cause the ruin of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

There was, it is true, another expedient left us, by which it would have been possible to accomplish, without combat, the junction of our corps d'armée with that of Colonel Klapka, and then immediately attack Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick from the south and south-west—the original idea of the war-minister Mészáros. This expedient consisted in removing the corps d'armée into the valley of the little river Bodva, starting from Igló in two columns; to be executed with the one by Rosenau (Rosnyó-bánya), Hárskut, Almás, Görgö, Torna to Moldau (Sepsi), and the other by Svedlér, Einsiedel (Remete), Stósz, Metzenseifen, to Jászó. But then the enemy would also have been more favourably situated for the junction of his forces, now separated by the corps d'armée of the upper Danube; and the fame of the Schlick corps, which had so much influence on our troops, would have been still more dangerously increased.

The reasons which prevented us from adopting this plan were in fact mainly of a moral nature. They were the same which impelled us to force our way through the mountain-road over the Branyiszkó, while only demonstrations were made in the Hernád valley by Krompach and Kluknó; the same reasons which determined me, in forcing this passage, to put in front those troops in which *the least confidence* could be placed.

In consequence of tittle-tattle exaggeration, the mountain-road across the Branyiszkó had gained the renown of being a defile, and moreover impregnable from the west. To force the Branyiszkó was at that time equivalent to taking the bull by the horns. But *this* was just the point to which I wished finally to bring my infantry, which, with the exception of only a few battalions, was not to be trusted.

The Guyon division consisted of infantry of the thirty-third Honvéd battalion, which had been totally routed on the 21st of January at Windschacht; of the thirteenth Honvéd battalion, which had completely failed us on the following day, immediately after the first shot of the hostile chasseurs in the attack undertaken from Schemnitz against the turning-column of Colonel Collery; furthermore, of a battalion of what were called pioneers, a platoon of Hungarian volunteer chasseurs, and two Honvéd battalions raised in Neusohl only a fortnight ago, consisting of quite raw recruits sent in by the rural districts. The thirty-third and thirteenth battalions, ever since the days of Windschacht and Schemnitz, remained, as may be conceived, in the odour of cowardice, and were ripe for decimation; the pioneers and Hungarian chasseurs, about thirty men strong, were for action still unknown quantities, because untried; but what

could be expected from the fourteen-day soldiers of both the last-mentioned bodies of troops? The other three divisions had at least one or two tried battalions.

But the taking by storm of the Branyiszkó by *these last* would have produced only an insignificant sensation among the corps d'armée: for every one was convinced beforehand that these few good battalions always valorously did their duty in presence of the enemy. Nay, it was even to be feared that a victory gained by the *best* troops would support the fixed idea that this favourable result could have been obtained only by these very battalions. The more vivid their recollection of the defeats lately suffered, the more this would have caused the highly dangerous want of self-confidence to be felt by the less trusty divisions. In this way the trusty troops would have lost in numerical strength, and the *un*trusty ones would have gained nothing; while, on the contrary, an insignificant victory gained by the *latter* must become to the whole corps d'armée a source of higher self-confidence, in comparison with which the perhaps greater numerical loss would appear hardly worthy of notice.

Therefore the Guyon division *alone* was sent on before to attack the hostile position on the Branyiszkó, while the division of the left wing, designed for the support of the former, had to remain in Kirchdrauf (Szepes-Váralja), and the Kmety division to make a demonstration on the road along the Hernád. The Aulich division remained in the valley of the Poprád to support the rear-guard, the head-quarters in Leutschau.

On the 5th of February 1849 the Guyon division attacked the enemy in his position on the Branyiszkó; while the officers of the head-quarters and their column

innocently arranged a *soirée dansante* in Leutschau for the night from the 5th to the 6th. Since our side-march from Lévencz and Verebély into the district of the mountain-towns, where our situation began to be a critical one, I recommended to the divisions the employment of similar preservatives against that poor-sinner state of mind which only too easily gets hold of the officers of an isolated army seriously and continually menaced from all sides—as the corps d'armée of the upper Danube was at that time—and immediately seizing also on the men, guarantees victory to the enemy even before the battle has commenced.

I was myself, however, on that day too much racked by incertitude about the issue of the combat on the Branyiszkó, to take part this time, as on former occasions, in the quickly organised ball. Alone in my lodgings I awaited with painful impatience a report from the field of battle.

Of Colonel Klapka we knew on the 5th of February only thus much, that he had still, on the 24th of January, the defensive task of frustrating the advance of the Schlick corps d'armée across the Theiss, near Tokaj; so we were informed by a letter written in French by Colonel Stein, adjutant-general of the war-minister, and containing the autograph signature of the minister of war, Mészáros, dated from Debreczin, the 24th of January 1849, which reached me only on the 5th of February, that is, on the twelfth day after it had been despatched. Meanwhile, it is true, rumours had reached my head-quarters about two encounters, favourable for the Hungarian arms, which Colonel Klapka was said to have had with Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick on the 22d of January at Tarczal, and on the following

day, the 23d, at Bodrog-Keresztur; the said private letter of the 24th of January, however, did not mention the matter; and as the distance of these places from Debreczin was only about twelve (German) miles, the news of both victories would have reached the latter place before the sending away of this letter. We had, therefore, so much the greater reason to doubt the authenticity of the rumours about the victories of Colonel Klapka at Tarczal and Bodrog-Keresztur, because these appeared under the *same pompous form* as that under which many a defeat suffered by us had been obliged to do duty as victory, to raise—as they said—the spirits of the people.

According to the tenor of this official communication, and that we might act with certainty, we could by no means calculate upon a simultaneous energetic offensive of Colonel Klapka against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick. All we could expect was, that Colonel Klapka, on the news of our approach, would closely follow Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, who very probably was hastening against us from the Theiss. A resolute rear-guard, however, could nevertheless easily detain him until the Field-marshal should have succeeded in getting rid of our corps d'armée.

In more precise terms:

Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Schlick stood with his main army on the 24th of January at Tokaj, on the Theiss, on the offensive against Debreczin; Colonel Klapka with his corps, opposite to him, on the defensive.

The supposition that the enemy had been successful in his offensive would have been an especially favourable one for the corps d'armée of the upper Danube in its

position on the 5th of February 1849. In order to preserve ourselves against optimist illusions, we had to assume that the certain news of our approach had found the Schlick corps still on this side the Theiss.

Moreover, Colonel Guyon, four days before his arrival at Igló, early in the morning of the 30th of January, had pryingly fallen upon a post of intelligence despatched in our direction from the hostile column in Leutschau, and so unskilfully that some of these men escaped. They could on the same day have carried to Leutschau the certain report of our approach; and on the next day, 31st of January, Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick in Tokaj — if nearer to Kaschau, the worse for us—could know what he had to do, in case he did not under-estimate the corps d'armée of the upper Danube —a circumstance which could not be supposed in a general like him.

The distance from Tokaj to Korotnok on the western foot of the Branyiszkó is nineteen (German) miles, consequently five successive marches of four miles per day. To accomplish this task presupposes a brave, hardy infantry; it does not, however, exceed—especially in winter—the maximum of what they can accomplish.

The troops of Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick were inured to fatigue, and brave.

It was impossible for the Klapka corps to persevere in these forced marches *toujours à la piste* of the main body of the Schlick corps. Why?

Because the pursuer while following can never neglect certain precautionary measures—and these cost time; because the pursued again and again stops the pursuer by opposing to him part of his forces as rear-guard; because this rear-guard, besides its direct re-

sistance, has moreover considerable means at its disposal for interrupting repeatedly the progress of the pursuer on a road intersected by many important local impediments, as is that from Tokaj to the Branyiszkó.

The strength of the Schlick corps was generally estimated at about 15,000 men. It is clear that the forced march of five days must produce a considerable number of stragglers. But even these taken into account, together with the rear-guard, Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick on the 5th of February could oppose to us 10,000 men, in two columns at the same height, one on the Branyiszkó, the other at Kluknó on the Hernád; while Colonel Klapka on the same day could have advanced scarcely further than Kaschau.

Moreover, the road into Gallicia was open to the baggage of the Schlick corps.

The attack upon the hostile position on the Branyiszkó on the 5th of February, if repulsed, would only excite the enemy to assume the offensive, and this, probably with the intention of again defeating us before Colonel Klapka had overtaken him; while I should be obliged—on the one hand by the pursuit of the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, together with their allies the Sclavonian militia, on the other by my determination no longer to avoid the combat—to act likewise on the offensive, namely, to a compulsory renewal of the attack of the 5th; and thus the conflict between the Schlick corps and the corps d'armée of the upper Danube on the 6th of February must become a decisive one.

By these combinations the issue of the attack of the 5th already obtained for us almost the importance of an answer to the question, "*To be, or not to be?*" and the painful impatience with which I was awaiting Guyon's

report becomes explicable—the more so, as the news, received from Kirchdrauf in the course of the afternoon, that there had arrived thither already several wagons full of wounded from the Guyon division, had placed beyond doubt the actual beginning of a serious battle on the Branyiszkó.

This news certainly did not sound unfavourable, considering that *running away and even leaving the wounded behind*, after each serious engagement, had hitherto been exclusively the course followed by the most of the infantry of the corps d'armée, especially that belonging to the Guyon division. But the higher these hopes of mine had been raised hereby, the deeper they sunk on account of the inconceivably long delay of all further news.

Despairing, I stood on the threshold of a reckoning with the past.

The perception of unavoidable great dangers at hand, if consciousness does not refuse its assistance, urges us irresistibly to that height of intellectual activity, whence the *still-hoping* glance more boldly than at other times endeavours to pierce the veil of futurity, so as to discover beyond it more favourable conjunctures; but whence the *already-despairing* searches in the opposite direction for that crossing of the roads where we perhaps took the *wrong* direction.

The dangers which menaced the existence of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, and next, through it, that of the fatherland, were unavoidably near and great.

The perception of this had not indeed shaken my self-reliance, but it had put *hope* to flight, and in its room came the question, imperiously demanding an answer:

Whether it would not have been better to have forborne *that step*, which had led me *so far* as to prevent me now from returning, although thousands looked up to me with the firm confidence, *that I would not let them be destroyed in the desperation of fruitless efforts!*

Whether it would not have been better to have issued to the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, instead of the defying proclamations at Waizen, *a pacific summons to a voluntary laying-down of arms.*

Although I had perceived when in Presburg:

That the repeated attempts of the Vienna ministers to overthrow the constitution of Hungary by force of arms were *not less revolutionary*, because our attempt, on German-hereditary ground, to attack the Croat Ban Baron Jellachich in revolt against the lawful government of the country, *even when*, or rather *only when*, he had crept under the ægis of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz and his army—had been apparently an *aggressive act against Austria.*

That the *constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest.*

That such a contest was sufficiently justified by the single result of *rendering* IMPOSSIBLE *for the present the re-establishment of its former dependent condition.*

That *the nation now more assuredly owed it to its honour* to seize the sword for the existence of Hungary as a state, because hitherto it had unfortunately *indolently looked on* while the rude arrogance of several from its midst drove the greatest part of the Sclavonians and Romanians into open revolt, and thus foolishly promoted only the views of those who desired nothing more earnestly than *the ruin of the* STATE *of Hungary.*

All this I had perceived while yet in Presburg.

Nevertheless I was forced to admit when in Waizen:

That the nation cared desperately *little* for its honour, and that I had not the power to force it to act otherwise.

That the enemy had an armed force at its command *far superior* to ours.

That consequently the contest—though demanded thrice over—must remain a *fruitless* one.

In addition to this came the apprehension—excited by *his unworthy public conduct*—of intrigues on the part of Kossuth, which might be sufficient to justify, though only *anachronistically*, the acts of violence of the Vienna government.

What then was it that, considering the visible degeneracy of the nation, the gigantic superiority of the enemy, and my shaken confidence in the purity of Kossuth's politics—could still prevent me from recognising as my first duty to my companions in arms the speediest renunciation of all further resistance?

It was the *conviction* that, if the overthrowing of the reformed constitution of Hungary succeeded at the *first* assault, millions of families, for the sake of a few thousands, would *immediately* be brought *again* under the old yoke of subjection.

And those who looked up to me with firm confidence that I would not allow them to perish in the desperation of fruitless efforts DID WELL IN TRUSTING ME; for *no* effort is fruitless when it is made in *defence of the most essential personal rights of millions;* and *every day* that the corps d'armée of the upper Danube passed under my command *was gained for the securing of these rights* —gained moreover for the *very salutary chastisement* (unfortunately not the directly personal one) *of those men* who (I mention as an instance only *one* fact) had

been sufficiently unprincipled to advise the monarch to bind to-day a part of the army by an oath to the Hungarian constitution, and expect to-morrow *this very* part of the army—perhaps out of loyal *instinct?*—to make common cause with the enemies of the constitution they had sworn to.

Thus I became quits with the past; thus I remained from this time protected against all weapons which the future might turn against me with the intent of mortally injuring the sinews of my firm resolve TO SAVE OR TO AVENGE THE CONSTITUTION—namely, the conviction that I had to regret nothing of all I had already done for this purpose, nor the consequences of it.

With the equanimity of resignation I now awaited the still-delayed news of the issue of the battle on the Branyiszkó.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE night between the 5th and 6th of February was half passed, when an officer delivered to me Colonel Guyon's written report, that the enemy had abandoned his position, begun his retreat towards Eperjes, and was being vigorously pursued.

Colonel Guyon sent me at the same time one of the enemy's despatches that had been seized. It contained an urgent request from the commander of the hostile column opposed on the Hernád to our Kmety division—which was making demonstrations along the same road towards Kaschau—to the hostile commander on the

Branyiszkó, Major-general Count Deym, for assistance, especially artillery.

The situation of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube appeared now to be suddenly essentially changed.

From this hostile despatch we could conclude with certainty:

That the hostile column on the Hernád must be much weaker than that which had been dislodged from the Branyiszkó; and that consequently

Before Eperjes we could scarcely any longer meet with resistance.

For if Major-general Deym could have thought it possible at all to prevent our advance with his comparatively feeble brigade—if I remember right, scarcely 2,000 men strong—even by the total loss of all his troops, he would assuredly not have abandoned the position on the Branyiszkó; just as he would hardly have left it, if he had entertained the slightest hope of receiving any considerable reinforcement in the course of the day, or even of the following night, by arresting some division of the Schlick corps on its advance against us and already sufficiently near for the purpose.

The surprisingly small strength of the enemy dislodged from the Branyiszkó—according to the supposition that we had before us on the evening of the 5th the Schlick main army in two columns, on the Branyiszkó and on the Hernád—shewed, first of all, that

Either the passage of the enemy across the Theiss near Tokaj had succeeded, and consequently Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick already menaced Debreczin, and resolutely marching against this object, doubtless the most important, deliberately abandoned the base of his operations;

Or that he had undervalued the importance of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube *previous* to the successful and yet miscarried surprise of Igló (in the night from the 2d to the 3d of February), but that *after* this surprise there was no longer sufficient time to oppose to us a greater force on these barriers.

Both indications urged us to a speedy continuation of the offensive thus favourably commenced.

On the 6th the Aulich division was removed from the Poprád valley into the line of Kirchdrauf, Krompach; the head-quarters to Kirchdrauf. I hastened in a carriage after Colonel Guyon towards Eperjes, to convince myself of the real position of affairs. I did not succeed, however, in overtaking him; for I had to be back again in Kirchdrauf before evening, to resolve upon the dispositions for the following day, and to issue them. But I came up with the division of the left wing, which followed close on the Guyon division, and learnt from its commander that Colonel Guyon had already reached Eperjes, and found it evacuated by the enemy.

This unexpected hasty abandonment of the base of operations led us to suppose that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick, after the loss of the Branyiszkó, had suddenly resolved to effect especially the junction of his corps with the brigades of the Major-generals Götz and Jablonowski; that he intended to accomplish this on the shortest communication between Kaschau and Leutschau, by Bela, Hámor, and Kluknó; and for this reason drew back with such uncommon celerity, on the road to Eperjes towards Kaschau, the part of his corps which had been repulsed from the Branyiszkó. By doing so he could meanwhile have his baggage escorted safely

from Kaschau by Jászó, Schmölnitz (Szomolnok), into the Zips.

This supposition was by no means improbable in itself, because we knew nothing whatever of Klapka's operations, except what we learnt from the official communication of the 24th of January, and the still earlier rumours about the encounters at Tarczal and Keresztur; and this decided us (on the 7th of February) to leave the whole Kmety division on its former line of demonstration on the Hernád, but to dispose the Aulich division from Kirchdrauf only as far as half-way towards Eperjes, while the head-quarters, together with the division of the left wing, were transferred to Eperjes.

According, however, to information obtained by scouts in the evening of the 7th, the enemy seemed again to have evacuated Eperjes for the purpose of concentrating himself behind the river Tarcza, and once more advancing against us; since the scouts reported that they had seen large masses of troops moving from Kaschau towards Eperjes.

It was then to be expected that the enemy would attack on the following day; and as a precaution the Aulich division was now ordered all the way to Eperjes; while the Kmety division received instructions to advance on the direct road towards Kaschau by Hámor and Bela, from the 8th onwards no longer merely making demonstrations, but attacking in earnest where it met with resistance; and as soon as it should hear a continued cannonade in the direction of its left flank, immediately to march against Kaschau, and even if its attacks should be repeatedly repulsed, incessantly to begin them anew.

Intending to let the enemy come over the Tarcza

before we resumed the projected offensive against him, we remained during the night from the 7th to the 8th on the defensive; and were surprised on the morning of the 8th by the news, *that the enemy had demolished the bridge over the river Tarcza at Lemesán.*

I say "*surprised,*" because—after the enemy had sufficiently convinced us by the advance of his main body towards the Tarcza, which had begun on the previous evening, that he did not intend the execution of the above-mentioned junction with the Götz and Jablonowski brigades—we had no reason to take this advance for a defensive measure, unless we had presupposed as certain the closest proximity of Klapka's corps in the rear of the enemy. But this we could not do, since all our scouts sent to look out for Klapka, either did not come back at all, or if they did, it was without bringing us any intelligence. *Not till after the retreat of the enemy from Lemesán* did an emissary, whom Colonel Klapka had sent to me several days previously, succeed in reaching my head-quarters.

Now the communication over the Tarcza had first to be restored. Considering the little experience and imperfect equipment of my corps of pioneers, this required much time. We hoped to find near Felsö-Olcsár a communication still remaining across the river. Information collected beforehand confirmed this, and made us resolve to advance in two columns from Eperjes towards Kaschau, with the Aulich division on the left bank of the Tarcza to the passage just named; but with the Guyon division and that of the left wing on the main road over the bridge near Lemesán, which should be previously repaired.

Before the arrival in our camp of Klapka's emissary,

we believed that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick intended to fall back only as far as the mountain of Kaschau, for the purpose of giving us there a decisive battle, when we should have been nearer to the town Kaschau —the point of junction of the line of retreat of his main body—as well as to the column detached on the direct road from Kaschau to Leutschau against our Kmety division.

We intended in that case, by advancing on the main road of Eperjes with the Guyon division and that of the left wing, to occupy him in front until the Aulich division should have accomplished its passage across the Tarcza at Felsö-Olcsár, but then immediately to pass over to the real decisive attack upon the front and right flank of his position; whilst the Kmety division, advised by the thunder of the guns, had to do the same upon the isolated line of attack which had been assigned to it.

But since we had been apprised—as has been said, only late in the course of the 8th of February—by our emissary, that Colonel Klapka had been some days already acting on the offensive against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick,—the chief of my general staff called my attention to the circumstance, that Count Schlick very probably intended to evacuate Kaschau and fall back by Torna into the district of the operations of the Austrian chief army; and I therefore abandoned the intention of awaiting the Aulich division, which might possibly be delayed by its passage over the river at Felsö-Olcsár. The Guyon division and that of the left wing had to attack the enemy immediately and without hesitation, wherever they might find him.

But the restoration of the bridge at Lemesán went on so slowly, that our advanced troops did not reach

Kaschau till the morning of the 10th of February, while the enemy had left the town on the evening of the 9th. At the same time Klapka's corps also arrived at Kaschau, and the corps d'armée of the upper Danube was now again united on the Theiss with the Hungarian forces, which had meanwhile been greatly strengthened.

In the course of the same day Colonel Klapka appeared in Kaschau; and late in the evening I repaired thither myself, to deliberate with him and arrange our further operations.

Klapka—after he had succeeded by the battles at Tarczal, Bodrog-Keresztur, and Tokaj (on the 22d, 23d, and 31st of January), in frustrating the attempt of the Schlick corps to cross the Theiss—in the beginning of February had assumed the offensive against it on his own behalf, without knowing any thing more of me than that I still continued the struggle in the mountain-towns, in spite of the instructions of the war-minister to hasten back to the upper Theiss.

Only the unexpected hasty falling back of the Schlick corps on all lines towards Kaschau, after the hot days of Tarczal, Keresztur, and Tokaj, led Klapka to the conclusion that I must already have left the mountain-towns and appeared in the rear of his adversary. He then accelerated his own advance towards Kaschau, summoning all his strength, and thus rendered it absolutely impossible for Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick to execute his purpose, resolved upon too late, of falling with all his forces first upon me, and then turning himself anew against Klapka only after he had vanquished me.

Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick must now have seen that he would be attacked in Kaschau at latest on the 10th of February by both Hungarian corps in the

north and south simultaneously, and evacuated, as has been mentioned, the town on the 9th, in order to save his corps by a bold though dangerous retreat through Torna towards Waizen.

Although this retreat was, so to say, executed before Klapka's eyes, he was nevertheless unable to prevent it, because on the 9th the main body of his corps was, in spite of accelerating his advance to the utmost of his power, still in part one, in part two days' march in the rear behind the Hernád, and as the advanced troops alone were then and there at his disposal. But this only made him resolve to pursue the fleeing enemy more energetically; and for this purpose, on the 10th of February he disposed one half of his main body as far as Enyiczke and Nagy-Ida, while the other half arrived at Hidas-Németi, and two divisions of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube at Kaschau.

Thus stood matters when Colonel Klapka and myself saw each other again, on the evening of the said day, for the first time since the evacuation of the capitals.

On the 11th of February Klapka expected, by means of a forced march, to approach the enemy sufficiently near to be able to overtake him by the following or at latest the second day thereafter, and at least to disperse him in detail. I was, however, during the same time, to prevent at any cost the junction of the Schlick corps d'armée with the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, which had followed me as far as the Zips; and when successful in this, was to attack them.

Thus we aimed at weakening in every possible way, if not at the entire destruction of the hostile forces in upper Hungary, so as thereby to render the chief army of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz less able to with-

stand the attacks which were to be directed against it from the middle Theiss.

We agreed in an instant on the earlier details of our separate operations. The results of these operations to become the basis of later ones.

My wish to examine the corps d'armée of Colonel Klapka, or at all events a part of it, decided me to start in a carriage during the night from the 10th to the 11th for Hidas-Németi, where, as has been mentioned, a part of the corps was just then stationed. I intended to accompany these troops on the 11th of February on their march, in order to observe them more closely during it, and that I might be enabled to institute a comparison between them and those of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

This part of Klapka's corps was to leave Hidas-Németi on the 11th, and follow that part which had already advanced as far as Nagy-Ida and Enyiczke.

But on its way it was overtaken by a new order of Klapka, in obedience to which it had immediately to return and march back towards Miskolcz.

Greatly surprised at this unexpected disposition, in direct contradiction to our agreement of the preceding evening, I left the column, which was now returning again towards Hidas-Németi, and hastened to Klapka's head-quarters at Enyiczke, for the purpose of learning the reason of this counter-march; which I found to be, that an order had suddenly arrived from Lieutenant-general Dembinski, for Colonel Klapka instantly to set out back again towards Miskolcz, by forced marches, with the whole of his corps.

Klapka was at that time under Dembinski's chief command. He consequently believed himself bound to

obey, and I could not prevent him; but I resolved to undertake immediately—though late—the pursuit of the Schlick corps abandoned by him, with a part of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube; without, however, giving up the offensive against the Götz and Jablonowski brigades.

The division of the left wing of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube had therefore in the course of the day (the 11th) to start from Kaschau, and hasten after the Schlick corps.

The latter had by this time, it is true, gained an advance of two days' march—thanks to Dembinski's order; during the next two days, however, its rear-guard was overtaken, and on the 13th at daybreak surprised near Szén. The enemy lost in all perhaps from 60 to 70 cavalry and about 100 infantry; but this was the sole result of the pursuit—and the last of my acts as the independent commander of the royal Hungarian corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

CHAPTER XXII.

At the same time as the account of the successful surprise at Szén, a despatch from the minister of war once more, after a long pause, arrived at my head-quarters.

It contained two most important documents:

1. An *ordre de bataille* for the whole Hungarian forces.
2. The nomination of the Polish Lieutenant-general

Dembinski as commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian troops, except those which were under Bem's chief command in Transylvania, the garrisons of the fortresses that were in our hands, and the troops surrounding those occupied by the enemy.

According to this I also was placed under Dembinski's orders.

The first-named document divided the whole of the Hungarian forces into isolated divisions of from 4,000 to 6,000 men each, which received the appellation "division of the army," and a number as a distinctive mark. These divisions were to serve the commander-in-chief in his strategic combinations as a war-operative unity. The former corps d'armée were consequently divided, according to their strength, into from two to three such divisions of the army.

The strength of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube—amounting still to from 15,000 to 16,000 men, in consequence of our losses in the mountain-towns having been from time to time compensated for by continual recruitings—was not known in Debreczin at the time when this *ordre de bataille* was drawn up. The corps d'armée of the upper Danube accordingly figured as a single army-division, the XVIth, in the said document. (Afterwards, however, I was charged to divide it into three army-divisions, while it received as corps d'armée, instead of the designation "of the upper Danube," the number VII. By the appellation the "seventh corps d'armée" will therefore in future always be meant the former corps d'armée of the upper Danube.)

The rumour had preceded these despatches by some

days, and had encountered considerable antipathies in the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. The greater number of the officers had, like myself, not even the slightest knowledge of the glorious warlike past of Lieutenant-general Dembinski; while the sudden recall of the Klapka corps to Miskolcz, and the immediate favourable consequences of this measure to the fleeing enemy, were not exactly calculated to create all at once confidence in the talents of the unknown foreigner as a general. These officers, not dissatisfied with my command hitherto, did not consider my being subordinated to the authority of this foreigner, whose *début* was so unlucky, as in any way justifiable, and believed that the motives for Dembinski's appointment as commander-in-chief must be sought

Partly in the *animosity of the Committee of Defence against me*, caused by the *proclamation of Waizen;*

Partly in the intention to give them a leader *who did not recognise that proclamation.*

The first supposition raised the sympathies of the officers for me, and at the same time their jealousy of the relatively-increasing importance of the other Hungarian corps in consequence of the degradation of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube to a simple army-division; while the second quite sufficed to awaken again the apprehensions of "republican intrigues," declared first after the evacuation of the mountain-towns, and for a while appeased by the proclamation of Waizen, which was *silently acknowledged* by the government.

The consequence of this was, that consultations took place in almost all the divisions about measures of resistance, more or less energetic, against the recent decree of the war-minister Mészáros, who through it fell

under the suspicion of allowing himself to be made a tool of by the Committee of Defence.

I was informed of these agitations, however, only when, in consequence of them, three divisions had already declared themselves positively *against* my subordination to Dembinski's orders, and *for* the independency of my position as commander of the corps d'armée of the upper Danube. Nay, the Kmety division especially assured me of its absolute obedience, even in case I should judge it to be necessary to lead it *against Debreczin*. The Guyon division only, in opposition to the other three divisions of the corps, gave an evasive declaration; but with it, and as commentary on it, the information arrived at the same time from this very division that Colonel Guyon had made this declaration *without having consulted the body of his officers*.

From these expressions of such a lively antipathy against Dembinski's being commander-in-chief, though they had been evinced only after previous agitations, I could nevertheless not avoid coming to the conclusion, that the older officers in particular, with whom the agitations originated, felt just as strongly as myself an apprehension that Hungary's combat in self-defence would acquire, sooner or later, through the participation of foreign elements in it, an aggressive signification against Austria, by which the invasion of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz would be afterwards justified. But this conclusion led me next to the thought, either to retire from my post, or straightway to oppose myself with the corps d'armée to the recent decree of the war-minister.

However, I could not long fail to see that the former step would immediately have brought with it the dissolution of the whole corps d'armée of the upper Danube.

For had not its bravest, its most useful officers repeatedly declared, that they would take part in the combat only so long as *my* participation in it guaranteed to them the maintenance, on the part of the Committee of Defence also, of the principles expressed in the proclamation of Waizen? Now the dissolution of my corps d'armée would very considerably have weakened Hungary's means of resistance; and consequently by retiring I should have injured the cause of my country more than, for instance, his serene highness Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz, whose especial charge it was. I therefore could not leave my post.

But if I remained at my post and would not obey, then I must be prepared for its resulting in my dismissal, the consequences of which would have been tantamount to those of my voluntary retirement.

After calm reflection, there was nothing left for me but to obey, and console myself meanwhile with the vain hope, that the recent measures of the government, though they had not their origin in a correct perception of the true interests of our distressed country, yet still were not to be exclusively ascribed to *impure* motives.

Once resolved on obedience, I had next to think on the means of paralysing the spirit of resistance against the decree of the war-minister, which, by these agitations, had been stirred up in the whole corps d'armée; and to do this without—by an unwise decreeing of punishments against the continuance of the agitations, which apparently had been introduced under my ægis, because by officers high in rank—giving rise to a suspicion that I approved of Dembinski's being appointed commander-in-chief, and thereby weakening, to the disadvantage of the country, the confidence of the corps in

me, and thus obtaining instead of a prompt obedience, because voluntary, at most a passive, because forced one.

That, on the other hand, I must not approve of the agitations was plain; but neither could I ignore them entirely, for it was already generally known that I had been informed of their result. I thought I should solve this difficult problem best by issuing the following pacifying address to the corps d'armée, avoiding therein all political matters, and assuming that the corps d'armée was, as it were, wounded only in its *esprit de corps*.

"ORDER OF THE DAY.

"The decree of the Minister of war of the 12th of February 1849 places the corps d'armée of the upper Danube, with the changed appellation of the 'Royal Hungarian sixteenth division of the army' under the chief command of Lieutenant-general Dembinski.

"In officially communicating this to the whole sixteenth division of the army, I most solemnly call upon all the staff and superior officers under my command to treat this apparent humiliation with the same indifference with which I—resigning my independence as commander of a corps d'armée, in obedience to the decree of the united Diet—submit myself freely to the orders of the Lieutenant-general Dembinski, who is said to be a worthy general, and one grown grey in war.

"*Kaschau, 14th of February* 1849."

(My signature follows.)

This address had the desired effect. The agitations in my favour against Dembinski—though, as I heard afterwards, secretly continued—were in future without any disturbing influence on the free submission of the corps to the orders of the general-in-chief.

The minister of war Mészáros, however, regarded this order of the day as the *corpus delicti* of a daring attempt on my part to stir up mutiny against himself and Dembinski, and resolved to reprimand me—as it seemed very seriously.

This reprimand was nevertheless a well-deserved one, because I had omitted to inform the war-minister of the circumstances which had called this order of the day into existence; although I had omitted to do so only for *this* reason, because therein I must inevitably have thrown a very clear light on *his* nullity as war-minister in regard to Kossuth and the Committee of Defence.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Almost simultaneously with the above-mentioned despatches from the minister of war, I also received an order from Dembinski immediately to communicate to him circumstantially what was the strength of my corps, how and where it was distributed, and what plan of operations I had at that time in execution.

Dembinski received all this information without delay.

My plan of operations was that concerted with Klapka a few days previously. In my communication I pointed out the importance of the continued occupation of Kaschau, the advantageous position of my corps d'armée just then, and the extremely unfavourable situation of the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, and their allies the Sclavonian militia. I did not fail also to call

Dembinski's attention to what a favourable opportunity was offered to us at this moment of defeating separately, on the one hand the last-named hostile forces, on the other the Schlick corps; and perhaps, by my rapid advance to the relief of Komorn, of compelling Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz again to relinquish his offensive operations against the Theiss; and by these means secure to ourselves time, of which we had still no superfluity, to prepare for a decisive stroke.

Dembinski's answer was to this effect, that he did not by any means overlook the value of my suggestions relative to the nearest operations; but that he perceived the moment for the intended decisive blow had already arrived, and could not be deferred: he therefore urgently summoned me for the present to leave to their fate the brigades of Götz and Jablonowski, together with their allies the Sclavonian militia, and lead my corps d'armée as soon as possible from their position around Kaschau to Miskolcz.

In consequence of this order I left Kaschau; and dividing my corps into two columns, marched one by Enyiczke, Forró, Szikszó, the other by Moldau and along the valley of the Bodva, to Miskolcz.

Dembinski received, with a report hereupon, at the same time a detailed account of the daily stations on the route. By this means he could send his dispositions direct to any single division during the march, instead of forwarding them through me.

The two columns of the seventh army corps were of the same strength. Each of them consisted of two divisions (I still retained meanwhile the original plan of having the corps d'armée in four divisions): *the column in the valley of the Bodva*, of the division of the left

wing (the command of which, after the voluntary retirement of its former commander, was confided to Colonel, afterwards General Pöltenberg), and the Guyon division; *the second column* — that on the high road from Kaschau to Miskolcz — consisted of the Aulich and Kmety divisions. At the head of both columns were, in the valley of the Bodva, the Pöltenberg division, on the main road the Aulich division. On the 20th of February, according to the plan for the march, the former should have arrived at the height of Edelény, the latter at Szikszó.

On the same day, while on the way from Forró to Szikszó, the latter received Dembinski's order, by turning westward into Szikszó from the main road, to continue its march with the least possible interruption as far as Sajó-Szent-Pêter.

That I might obtain some certain information respecting the movements of the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, I had remained later in Kaschau, and left this town only with the last sections of my corps. I did not, therefore, learn the altered route of the Aulich division till afterwards, from a report of its commander.

Whether this deviation from the line of march towards Miskolcz was for a part of the distance only—a temporary one—or rather was the starting-point of a new line of operations, perhaps removed to the road to Lossoncz, was for me now a most important question, because on it depended the arrangements to be made, by way of precaution, relative to providing for the corps. I thought I should receive an explanation soonest by proceeding to Dembinski's head-quarters at Miskolcz, and accordingly hastened thither in the first instance, on the 21st of February.

Both Dembinski and his adjutant were absent; and nobody at his head-quarters could give me the desired explanation.

This uncertainty as to the position of the seventh army corps, of which the Aulich and Pöltenberg divisions should, according to the original plan of march, have already reached Miskolcz on the 21st; the conviction that Dembinski had taken no care whatever to provide for them in the new district of location, and that consequently these divisions for that day at least must either suffer from hunger, or resort to the forcible seizure of the most essential supplies; and, in the next place, the apprehension of seeing undermined the hitherto good discipline of the seventh corps through the repeated occurrence of such demoralising circumstances, which though certainly not always unavoidable, yet generally, and in this case especially, could very easily have been guarded against;—all this induced me to represent, in a letter to General Dembinski, the injury which must result to the success of our arms, if he directed the movements of isolated parts of an army corps without at the same time giving due information on the subject to its commander, who was responsible for the maintenance of his troops in a warlike condition.

The letter which contained these representations was delivered at Dembinski's head-quarters, with a request that I might be immediately informed of his return.

He did not return, if I recollect rightly, till the morning of the 22d of February; and I at once waited upon him, in company with the chief of the general staff, as well as the then adjutant of the seventh army corps, and another officer of my suite.

As I entered with my companions, Dembinski had

just finished reading my last letter to him; he had perhaps also already seen the "Order of the Day," of the 14th of February, from Kaschau, given above; and probably both had violently excited him against me; for scarcely had I introduced myself and my companions, when he attacked me with uproarious vehemence. He expatiated on his services to Hungary, and the great sacrifices *he* had *already* made for the salvation of my country.

"I have laid down the supreme command in my fatherland* to save this poor country," cried he; "yes, I have just now saved your corps, while you do not trouble yourself at all about it. Do you know where your divisions are? No! you do not know! Yet you reproach me. I came to Hungary only on the condition that I should be entrusted with the supreme command over all the Hungarian troops; and the government has empowered me to have you shot, if you do not obey. I have met you with kindness, because I know that it must mortify a Hungarian to serve under a non-Hungarian. But you reproach me for my orders, instead of obeying them!"

Dembinski was somewhat exhausted by the excessive straining of his voice, and gasped a moment for breath. I wished to take advantage of this involuntary pause to shew him that his orders, so far as they concerned me, had been punctually followed. But he probably attributed to me an aggressive intention, and interrupted me with the question, several times repeated in the greatest passion: whether I thought he had not courage enough to fight a duel with me. Without, however,

* Dembinski probably meant that which was intended for him *in spe* of a new insurrection in Poland.

waiting for my answer, he suddenly digressed to recent events.

"I advised you to be very cautious on your march towards Putnok," continued he; "why have you not followed my advice?" and so on.

It was to Dembinski's adjutant, who was present, and made meanwhile unceasing efforts to calm his chief, that I owed at last the opportunity of speaking. I now enumerated all the orders which had come to me from him, shewed that they had been punctually followed, and wished to know what order I had disobeyed.

As he could make no reply to this, he again began talking of the above advice, which I had not followed.

But I reminded him, that disregard of well-meant advice was not disobedience; that, besides, his advice had been quite superfluous, as the march of the seventh army corps from Kaschau to Miskolcz had been already arranged with an eye to the danger which threatened from Putnok; and I finally requested him to send me only *orders*, and to communicate to me also such as he should think it necessary to give in a direct manner to separate divisions of my corps; but that, once for all, I thanked him most courteously for his *advice*.

Hereupon I and my companions took our leave.

I could not on this occasion resist the impression, that I had just made the acquaintance of a man who would be much more in his proper place as the inmate of a lunatic asylum than as the leader of an army.

Dembinski's adjutant, a circumspect man, followed us directly, and sought to excuse the unwonted violence of his chief, by representing it as the consequence of my letter, which had been taken as conveying censure. He assured me besides, that Dembinski already saw that in

his passion he had given way to unjust expressions; adding that, for these reasons, he hoped no obstacle would be made on my part to smoothing the way for a future *entente cordiale* between us.

I declared to Dembinski's adjutant, that, on the contrary, I intended to take care to preserve a good understanding between myself and his chief; but would therefore raise my demands on his exertions in the service of my country so much the higher.

Dembinski's performances up to that time, however, so far as I was acquainted with them, justified but very slender expectations.

On the 5th of February he had crossed the firmly frozen Theiss near Lök, below Tokaj, with the then Kazinczy army-division, and had marched at first to Miskolcz. There he learned on the 9th, or at latest in the night between the 9th and the 10th, that Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick had left the town of Kaschau, taking the road to Torna. On the 11th he ordered back to Miskolcz the Klapka corps (from this time called the first army corps), which was pursuing the enemy; but while on its march made it turn towards Sajó-Szent-Péter and Putnok. On the 14th of February Dembinski attacked with only the Kazinczy division the main body of the retreating Schlick corps at Tornalja. The attack was repulsed at its very beginning; whereupon Dembinski drew the Klapka corps, together with the Kazinczy division, which had at the same time been broken up and incorporated with it, back to Miskolcz, and from thence made them advance on the road of Mezö-Kövesd towards the capitals. The seventh army corps he likewise called back from Kaschau to Miskolcz, to make it follow the first corps.

Now the question was, why Dembinski, who certainly intended to attack Schlick's retreating corps in earnest and not in mere fun, had not done this two days sooner (on the 12th)? Tornalja is only seven (German) miles from Miskolcz; Dembinski could consequently quite easily have stood before Tornalja on the 12th.

The answer to this might perhaps be found in the recalling of the first army corps from Nagy-Ida and Enyiczke to Miskolcz, and would be, *that Dembinski did not dare to go against the Schlick corps with the feeble Kazinczy division alone.*

But this explanation is contradicted by the fact, *that on the 14th he had nevertheless actually dared the attack with* ONLY *the Kazinczy division;* while the first army corps remained inactive at Putnok.

Then again, in excuse of Dembinski, it might be assumed that he had moved the first army corps nearer to the point of attack only *that, being protected by it in his rear, he might be able to execute his attacks with the Kazinczy division the more boldly and obstinately.* Irrespective of the strategic disproportion which existed in the present case between the modest offensive operations of a single weak division and the imposing protective measures which had required a whole corps d'armée, this supposition is contradicted by the *notorious haste* with which Dembinski at once utterly abandoned the attack on the marching column of the Schlick corps, as soon as the enemy had seemed disposed seriously to accept the combat.

Irresolution stamped this mismanaged offensive of Dembinski against Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick.

A further performance of Dembinski was the following:

While the seventh army corps, as has been mentioned, was marching in two columns of equal strength and on the same height, the one in the Bodva valley, the other on the high road from Kaschau to Miskolcz, Field-marshal Lieutenant Schlick made an offensive movement from Rimaszombat by Putnok towards Miskolcz. Dembinski, informed of this sufficiently early, was quite right in concentrating both the Guyon and Pöltenberg divisions when advancing towards Sajó-Szent-Péter, the point menaced next by the enemy, and moreover drew towards him also the Aulich division from Szikszó, in order energetically to repulse the enemy. *To this measure nothing can be objected.*

But now the enemy—apprised of this—suddenly gives up the offensive, and withdraws, by a forced retreat, from the danger of a disadvantageous conflict. And what does Dembinski then?

He allows the three divisions from early in the morning till late at night, in battle-array, to await—evidently in vain—the attack of the enemy, WHILST MAN AND HORSE ARE PERISHING WITH HUNGER AND THIRST.

This mistake made me apprehend a great *want of penetration* on the part of Dembinski.

But *irresolution* and *want of penetration* are not among the *qualities desired in a general.*

CHAPTER XXIV.

It seemed as if Dembinski seriously intended to assume the offensive against the Austrian army.

In the evening of the same day on which I had spoken for the first time with him (22d of February), I received an order to follow the first army corps on the main road towards Mezö-Kövesd.

All the dispositions during this advance were forwarded to us, already elaborated in their details, from Dembinski's war-office.

On the 24th of February the head-quarters of Lieutenant-general Dembinski were in Mezö-Kövesd, mine in Mezö-Keresztes.

I availed myself of the afternoon of that day to pay a visit to Dembinski; for I really wished to bring about a good understanding between him and me.

He received me in such a manner as plainly shewed that he intended to make me forget his absurd behaviour during our first meeting in Miskolcz.

He had just got Klapka's report of a sudden attack made during the preceding night on those troops of the Schlick corps which had entered Pétervására the day before, but which had been only partially successful.

Some days earlier a hostile division of cavalry had been surprised in Kompolt by Aristid Dessewffy, first lieutenant in the first army corps, and had suffered severe loss.

These attacks greatly incensed Dembinski against

Klapka. He asserted that by such surprises our offensive was only revealed to the enemy before the time; while, on the other hand, they prevented the enemy from discovering his own intentions.

It cannot be denied that there was a certain *originality* in this opinion. Its originality was especially evident in the natural consequence resulting from it, which in the present instance plainly amounted to this, that Dembinski would have been better pleased if Colonel Klapka had allowed himself to be suddenly attacked by the Austrians; because then, on the contrary, *they would have revealed their offensive prematurely*, and Klapka would have been prevented *from discovering Dembinski's intentions.*

Besides Klapka, the government also was on this day the object of Dembinski's dissatisfaction. He complained, that the seat of the government being fixed in Debreczin, and the necessity of continually protecting that town, greatly increased the difficulty of his task against the enemy. Further, that the government could not be depended on for the fulfilment of its promises: thus, for instance, it had been promised to him, that from the 16th of February onwards there should constantly be a fortnight's provisions for 60,000 men at his disposal in Tiszafüred; while according to the reports which had just been received from thence, the wants of the next five days were scarcely provided for.

The *entente cordiale* between Dembinski and myself seemed now to be in a fair way. Dembinski had already made me the confidant of his vexation at Klapka's sudden attacks, and at the unfulfilled promises of the government.

Satisfied with these results of my initiative at ac-

commodation, I returned towards evening to my head-quarters at Mezö-Keresztes.

In Dembinski's war-office the detailed dispositions for the next days had been delivered to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps, who had accompanied me on this visit, in case Dembinski should think proper to admit him to a consultation in common,—while Dembinski himself had not said a word about them to me, and had evidently been endeavouring to avoid any conference upon our operations. Thus I learned only after I had already left Dembinski what was to be done on the ensuing days.

The dispositions made known the intention of first occupying the little river Tarna from Sirok as far as Bod; but at the same time in the details the *tendency to isolate from each other the divisions of one and the same army corps* was striking.

While the one half of the first army corps was ordered to Sirok, and the other to Kápolna, the Pöltenberg division of the seventh army corps, advancing from Mezö-Kösved through Kerecsend, had to place itself between the former two, and occupy Verpelét and Fel-Döbrö, whilst the Aulich division should take its direction to Kál.

To perceive the disadvantages of thus intermingling two army corps accustomed to the peculiarities of their own commanders, no very rare perspicacity—one would think—is wanted.

Dembinski consequently was either destitute of even *this* perspicacity, or the motive of this measure, uncalled for by the circumstances, and materially restricting the capacity of the separated divisions as well as of the whole army corps for rendering service, was no other than a

definite endeavour on his part to accustom the separated divisions to being isolated from their commanders of army corps, thereby weakening the *dreaded* influence of these commanders on the minds of their troops, and thus to render possible *the predominance of his* OWN *influence.*

Dembinski had given me to understand on the 24th of February in Mezö-Kövesd, that he was desirous of speaking with me again on an early day, but that on the following day he would remove his head-quarters to Erlau (Eger). This intimation induced me to pay him a second visit in the forenoon of next day, the 25th, while he was still in Mezö-Kövesd, and before his departure for Erlau. But I no longer found him in his old head-quarters; and supposing that he had probably some important affair to discuss with me, I immediately continued my ride as far as Erlau.

I overtook him on the road thither, entered with him into Erlau, and there awaited his orders.

Towards evening he excused himself, that he had found neither time nor opportunity for a conference with me, and appointed the next day at his head-quarters.

I had to ride back during the night to Mezö-Kövesd, to make some important arrangements in my own head-quarters, which on the 26th of February were to be at that place.

In the forenoon of the 26th, however, I was back again in Erlau, expecting Dembinski's orders.

This time he spoke with me only upon some measures relating to the subsistence of the troops. But in the further course of the conversation he put some questions to me about the ground and the manner of fighting which were best suited to the troops of the seventh army

corps. I told him that hitherto they had learnt only *the little war in the mountains.*

He then inquired what kind of troops in the corps were most to be depended upon. Before, however, I could answer, he said that he believed our infantry, as a whole, could not be relied on, but that from the cavalry he expected extraordinary services. I confirmed his supposition in so far as related to the seventh army corps—the other corps I hardly knew by name; at the same time calling his attention to the fact that our cavalry, though superior to that of the enemy in agility and perseverance, was by no means its equal in numerical strength.

Dembinski hereupon assured me, with much earnestness, *that he uncommonly wished for a few thousand more men* THAN WERE JUST THEN AT HIS DISPOSAL.

It cannot in fact be denied that THEREIN Dembinski had SOMETHING *in common with the most celebrated generals.*

Meantime midday had arrived. Dembinski was entertained by a prebendary in Erlau, and invited me, together with the chief of the general staff of my army corps, who had again accompanied me on this visit, to dine with him.

The meal was nearly over; we were just adding the best to the good—the world-renowned Erlau wine—when suddenly it was reported that a brisk thundering of cannon was heard in the direction of Verpelét.

Dembinski denied it *à priori*, and did so even very angrily when the report was confidently repeated.

Having opened a window of the saloon, I had meanwhile convinced myself with my own ears of the correctness of the report, and now invited Dembinski to do the same.

Unwillingly he quitted the table, came near the window, and listened; his countenance expressing the conviction that we were all deceived.

The repeated hollow sound of the ground, however, was too distinctly perceptible, and too similar to the distant thunder of cannon, to be mistaken for any other sound. From the moment when Dembinski *was forced* to acknowledge this, his demeanour degenerated into the fury of a demoniac; above all, he bawled for a carriage and horses. But the only available means of conveyance in all his head-quarters was a farmer's cart, which had brought me and my companion—the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps—from Mezö-Kösved to Erlau, and stood ready for our return. We invited Dembinski to allow himself to be conveyed in our company to the proximity of the field of battle. He had no choice, and was obliged to comply. I urged haste.

The poor vehicle might have taken us forward about 100 paces, and we were still within the town, when suddenly a few of the more curious from among the masses of the inhabitants of Erlau sprang forward, and laying hold of the reins of the horses, asseverated in good Hungarian, that it was impossible for them to suffer the general-in-chief to be taken a single step further in such a miserable cart. This would be—they thought—a disgrace to the town of Erlau, nay, to the whole nation.

Irritated at this foolishness, I authoritatively ordered the unwelcome champions of the honour of the town and nation to get out of the way. Dembinski, who understood not a syllable of Hungarian, fell into a still greater passion than myself, and assisted me with his menacing gestures; the chief of the general staff helped

us in our shouting and swearing, and the guardians of Erlau's honour yielded; we got again under way.

Dembinski now wished to know what these people had wanted. I interpreted to him their practical views in reference to the honour of their town and nation; when, lo, he made the cart stop, and declared he would wait till better horses and a more respectable carriage could be procured.

I had been very wrong to behave so brutally to the champions of their civic and national honour!—

Dembinski, however, very soon repented of his hasty determination; for in spite of the evident speed with which one of the patriots had set off, with the intention of placing his equipage at our service, a considerable time elapsed without our getting sight of the respectable carriage promised us, and the thunder of the artillery rather increased than diminished.

From a conceivable precaution we had meanwhile kept our seats in the much-despised hay-cart. The patriot with the equipage might possibly delay too long, or in the end altogether fail us. Dembinski and I were seated on a bundle of straw, which had been laid across the racks, and had partly been forced by our weight into the body of the wagon, which became narrower towards the bottom.

The thunder of the battle—as has been said—rather increased than diminished. At each new hollow sound along the ground Dembinski started up, but just as often fell back again on his seat with all his weight. These shocks operating upon one side of the bundle of straw under us, it was by jerks more and more pushed to my side, and at last, together with me, over the low rack of of the wagon; while Dembinski on his side sank in ever

deeper and deeper, and finally so deep that he could no longer sit upright.

This situation seemed to me not befitting the dignity of the general-in-chief. I feared that to the honourable public it might even appear ridiculous. The incidental remark of a patriot very close to us, that that gentleman (pointing to Dembinski) must be a very brave man, because he was growing so extremely angry at each explosion of cannon, while he (the speaker) was filled with alarm—certainly convinced me that my apprehensions as to the ridicule were unfounded; nevertheless I advised the general to alight meanwhile until the new means of conveyance should arrive. Already out of all patience, however, Dembinski would now hear neither of alighting nor of waiting any longer, but wished to continue again without delay our journey in the wagon. Against this the honourable public protested anew, crowded together in front of our horses, and said that the caleche would be there immediately. This indeed made its appearance next moment, and thus prevented the unequal contest which threatened to take place between the impatient general and the patient patriots of Erlau.

In this new and really more respectable carriage we proceeded uninterruptedly towards Verpelét. But the nearer we approached the field of battle, and the louder the thunder of the great guns became, the more Dembinski's expressions, both in words and gestures, were unlike those of a being endowed with reason. One absurdity followed another from the trembling lips of the commander-in-chief, whilst at one time rowing alternately with his arms and legs, as if he would accelerate the motion of the carriage, at another repeatedly starting

up from his seat, next threatening with his fists in the direction of the battle-field, he revealed to us the state of his mind in all its pitifulness. This state was the *moral agony* of a braggart, who having pretended to be a strong swimmer, was now seized with mortal fear lest he should be drowned, because the water into which he had ventured happened to reach up to his neck!

As far as I could make out from the mass of nonsense with which we were regaled by Dembinski during this journey, it must on this day have been still very far from the intention of the Hungarian general-in-chief to give battle to the enemy. At least his oft-repeated exclamations, "This I did not wish yet! It is too soon yet!" mainly indicated this.

But if this was the case, then was it in fact by no means handsome on the part of Messieurs the Austrian generals to attack us without saying a single word about it to any one, or even previously asking Mr. Dembinski whether it would be agreeable to him just then!

CHAPTER XXV.

DEMBINSKI's last dispositions in detail, dated from the head-quarters at Mezö-Kövesd, the 24th of February, for the first and seventh army corps, and a division of the second corps, which was then cantoned in Tiszafüred and Poroszló, extended to the 26th of February inclusive. In consequence of these dispositions, on this day—dur-

ing which we were attacked so completely contrary to Dembinski's wish—his forces stood:

A division of the first army corps in Sirok;

The Pöltenberg division of the seventh corps in Verpelét and Fel-Döbrö;

The other division of the first corps in Al-Döbrö, Tótfalva, Kápolna, and Kompolt;

A division of the second corps in Kál.

The first and second army corps consisted each of two divisions; while the seventh corps contained four, as has been already often mentioned.

One division of the second army corps Dembinski had left behind in Poroszló and Tiszafüred, to defend the passage across the Theiss.

But three divisions of the seventh corps stood on the 26th of February in Maklár (Aulich), in Mezö-Kövesd (Guyon), and in Abrány (Kmety).

During our journey from Erlau to Verpelét we had discovered that Kápolna was the centre of the engagement, and turned therefore from Szalók by Döménd and Kerecsend on to the high road of Gyöngyös, which leads to Kápolna. The day was coming to a close, the fire of the guns began already to be seen, when we reached the last-mentioned place.

While still outside the town we met the standards of a regiment of hussars which had been ordered to attack.

In the Austrian army there exists the custom—I know not from what period—of the cavalry leaving its standards completely out of action, so as not to run the risk of losing them *mal à propos* in an attack. This custom certainly says less for the self-reliance of the troops than for their wise precaution. It had, however, been introduced, and our hussar regiments had

retained it, in order to make *partie égale* with their adversaries.

We ordered three men from the escort of the standards to alight, and mounted their horses. Dembinski and the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps rode to Kápolna; I, by Dembinski's direction, to Kál. I was to take measures to keep the Tarna, near the latter place, in our possession; he would do the same near Kápolna.

While I was still on my way, the combat near Kál suddenly ceased. I had indeed no particular desire—in the probably precipitate and disorderly retreat of our troops, which might perhaps be the cause of the sudden interruption of the engagement—to encounter, alone as I was, the advancing enemy, and preferred going round the place eastwards. After thus having crossed the road to Szikszó, and reached that from Füzes to Abrány, I learned from some peasants that the division of the second army corps, for which I was seeking, had at the very commencement of the battle advanced across the Tarna, and was still on the other side. The night was very dark; I wandered about for a long time, until I succeeded in finding the division. It had effected its passage across the Tarna by making use of a ford that was practicable with difficulty. I called the attention of the commander to the danger to which his troops were exposed by their position, close to the ford that might easily be missed, by the mere essay of a night attack on the part of the enemy; and ordered him immediately to make the division fall back to the left bank, and leave only the outposts on the right.

Meantime the hostile rocket-battery before Kápolna also finally ceased its efforts to set fire to that place,

after having vainly continued them till the night became very dark; and the combat was extinct along the whole line, without Dembinski or myself having exercised any influence on its course. In my then subordinate position, there reached me mostly merely private rumours about Klapka's doings, as well as about the details of this *first* day's battle of Kápolna in general. Only this much I know for certain, that our troops maintained on that day (26th of February) the whole line of the Tarna from Verpelét as far as Kál, and did not abandon it till the second day of the battle (the 27th).

The main body of the division of the second army corps having been quartered in Kál as well as was practicable and provided with victuals, I hastened back to Kápolna, to learn what Dembinski intended to do on the following day.

I found the commander-in-chief at a farm-house situated on the main road eastward from Kápolna; but could not speak with him, he being already asleep when I reached his night-quarters. He had, however, given the following dispositions for the next day (the 27th of February):

"The Aulich division advances for the reinforcement of the extreme left wing of the army from Maklár to Kál, joins there the division of the second army corps, and hinders the enemy from crossing the Tarna.

"The Guyon division has to advance from Mezö-Kövesd as far as Kápolna, to strengthen the centre;

"And the Kmety division from Abrány as far as Kerecsend, and there remain *en reserve*.

"The remaining divisions have to maintain their positions on the Tarna."

Colonel Klapka continued to be entrusted with the

right wing, and myself with the left near Kál, during the next day also; while Dembinski reserved to himself again the command of the centre.

The drawing up of the special orders necessary in consequence of these dispositions, as well as despatching them with the greatest speed to the divisions, had been committed by Dembinski to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps. He was destitute, however, of almost all means for discharging this important commission. Dembinski's orderly officers had remained behind in Erlau, mine in Mezö-Kövesd. Our being in Kápolna was known in neither of those places. A single officer—of the division of the first army corps, which was in action near the latter place, whom Dembinski had taken for the purpose of sending him as courier to Erlau—was at our disposal, but only in so far as the despatches could go through Erlau. The chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps happened fortunately, on the morning of the 26th of February, to have ordered two of my orderly officers from Mezö-Kövesd to Erlau, that they might be there in readiness on any unforeseen emergency during our presence in Dembinski's head-quarters. To this precaution he now owed the possibility of sending the orders to the Aulich division (in Maklár) and to the Kmety (in Abrány), by Dembinski's courier to Erlau, and from thence by these two orderly officers on to Maklár and Abrány.

When, on returning from Kál, I arrived, as has been mentioned, at Dembinski's night-quarters near Kápolna, the courier of the commander-in-chief had been gone a long time with the despatches for Aulich and Kmety. I expressed a serious apprehension that the despatch for the Kmety division in Abrány, especially, would reach

its destination too late, on account of the great circuit through Erlau; but I soon perceived that, under existing circumstances, it had not been possible to adopt any *better* plan.

Dembinski had given the dispositions only late at night. Then the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps—if he wished to send the orders direct to one or other division—would first have had himself to seek in the camp for the requisite officer; but the night was pitch dark, and the troops were camping without watch-fires, on account of the proximity of the enemy; the places where they were encamped, as well as the localities around Kápolna, were unknown to him. Thus he had to fear he might wander about uselessly half the night, without finding a camp; and even if he should be successful, it still remained doubtful whether any one of the officers would immediately have condescended to the nocturnal ride as courier. An order of the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps had no weight with the officers of the first army corps, to whom he was scarcely known by name.

It was consequently to be feared, that in this way, even under the most favourable circumstances, more precious time might be lost than the circuitous route by Erlau would take; besides, the forwarding of an important despatch by the first best officer who happens to be at hand, is always running a risk, and was especially so in our army, which swarmed with uncertain officers.

The chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps intended to deliver in person the despatch to the Guyon division in Mezö-Kövesd; it seemed to me, however, more advisable to let him remain near the commander-in-chief, and to go myself with the despatch

to Mezö-Kösved. I could the rather venture to do this, even at the risk, if stopped by any unforeseen obstacle, of arriving too late at my post in Kál, as in that case the command of the left wing of the army would have devolved upon Colonel Aulich; and as he had far more experience and tact on the battle-field than myself, my accidental delay would by no means have had a really unfavourable influence on the issue of the contest.

The arrival of the Guyon division on the field of battle at the earliest possible moment was of great importance—of incomparably more than my presence in Kál at the beginning of the action. Time pressed, and I hastened to discharge the duty of courier.

The route which I took from Kápolna to Mezö-Kövesd lay through Kerecsend. Here I quite unexpectedly met with Colonel Pöltenberg. By his patrols, who had been sent towards Kápolna after the termination of the combat, and who in the darkness probably had taken a wrong direction, he had been informed in Fel-Döbrö that Kápolna was already occupied by the enemy; whereupon he led his division from Fel-Döbrö back to Kerecsend, fearing he might be isolated. I corrected Pöltenberg's erroneous suppositions about the result of the conflict of the past day, communicated to him his task for the next morning, adding that he must of necessity advance again to the Tarna before daybreak; and then continued my way to Mezö-Kövesd.

I arrived about four o'clock in the morning (on the 27th of February), ordered the troops quartered there to be roused, and gave to Colonel Guyon the order to advance with the greatest speed to Kápolna—but myself awaited its execution; for however much Guyon

could be relied upon on the field of battle itself—that is, when the performance of his task did not require any particular discernment, but only purely personal valour —he little answered all other demands that war makes on the leader of large independent bodies of troops. His arrangements commonly reminded one of the motto, "Every thing imprudently — Every thing inopportunely!" they had consequently corresponding results.

Thus it happened this time, that in spite of my reiterated urging him to haste, he delayed the departure of his division until it was broad daylight.

Only after it had arrived at Kerecsend, and the distribution of spirits, as usually officially ordered by Guyon before every engagement, was well over, could I at last with confidence report to the commander-in-chief the approach of the Guyon division.

CHAPTER XXVI.

DEMBINSKI had just been forced to evacuate Kápolna when I came up with him, some hundred paces eastward of his last night-quarters, with the announcement of the approach of the Guyon division. While yet at some distance, he called to me, why was I not at my post!—and continually pointing in the direction of Verpelét, he exclaimed repeatedly, "The right wing already retreats, because you are not at your post."

"The right wing does not concern me; I command the left," was my answer.

"But I have sent you an order to command the right wing," he exclaimed.

"I know of no such order," I replied, vexed at this new occasion of a conflict with the commander-in-chief.

"Then ride instantly to Verpelét," he imperiously ordered me, "and there take the command; for the two colonels are rivals."

I now knew what I had to do; briefly made my report of the approach of the Guyon division; and without wasting another word, hastened across the fields towards Verpelét.

While on my way thither, I began to reflect on what Dembinski could have meant by the two rival colonels. From the position of the army he could evidently have referred only to Klapka and Pöltenberg: but the former commanded an army corps, while the latter was merely the commander of a division, was far younger in rank, and was besides altogether free from any pretension which could have justified the supposition that he disputed with Klapka the chief command of the right wing.

The right wing was in fact retreating, though probably not because Pöltenberg had resisted Klapka's orders, but because the united forces of Klapka and Pöltenberg were not strong enough to cope with the Schlick corps.

In order to join the Austrian chief army on the shortest line—in sight of Dembinski's army—the Schlick corps had during the preceding night successfully forced the defile at Sirok, which was occupied by a division of the first army corps under Klapka's personal command; the other corps being stationed, as has been mentioned, near Kápolna.

Klapka had retreated with his division, after the loss

of the defile, as far as Verpelét, where he joined himself to the Pöltenberg division, sent thither in the meanwhile by Dembinski for the purpose of defending the passage across the Tarna against the Schlick corps, which, advancing from Sirok by Szent-Mária, appeared on the morning of the second day of the battle at Kápolna (27th of February) on the right bank of the Tarna, opposite Verpelét. Field-marshal Schlick, however, *forced* the passage, and both Hungarian divisions were driven back.

To bring these to a stand, and to lead them forward again, was therefore the task which Dembinski had just assigned me.

On the south-eastern heights near Verpelét I already encountered some of Pöltenberg's pieces of horse-artillery, the servers of which had been cut down by the hostile cavalry. The resolute attack of a squadron of Alexander hussars, vigorously supported by the fire of the fourteenth Honvéd battalion, had, it is true, regained from the cuirassiers the cannons that had been lost; but as they for the moment were without servers, they had to be withdrawn from the combat.

Soon after the guns, I came upon a part of the infantry—*more consueto*, in most admired disorder—and at last upon the cavalry, well-serried, but not retiring *en échiquier;* the retreat was, instead, a general one, and altogether without plan or regularity; the batteries went on heedlessly among the divisions. The general impression produced on me by the whole scene was, that nothing more could be done that day.

Pöltenberg's confident personal bearing contradicted this comfortless conclusion; though, on the other hand, the unmistakable expression of despondency in Klapka's features seemed to justify it.

The reason of this very different state of mind in the two leaders on one and the same point was probably to be found in recent events. The Klapka division during the last night had accomplished nothing at Sirok, and just now at Verpelét but very little; while Colonel Pöltenberg was satisfied with the behaviour of his troops during the preceding evening at Fel-Döbrö, as well as in the late conflict at Verpelét.

I found both colonels in consultation as to what was to be immediately done then and there. Klapka declared that he, for his part, would ride towards Erlau in pursuit of the half of his division which had retreated in that direction, and again lead it against the enemy. Should this, he said, be no longer possible, he would confine himself during the day to protecting Erlau.

I had nothing to say against the execution of this idea; the less so, as the other half of the division of the first army corps, under the direction of the commander of division Bulharin (a Pole), remained there at my disposal.

Colonel Klapka accordingly did as he had said; and I took the further command of the right wing of the army, now weakened by a fourth.

The said half of the Bulharin division, thus placed at my disposal, consisted of three battalions and an incomplete battery of three-pounders. The three battalions strolled on without compactness, in picturesque groups, like peasants to the festival of their church's dedication, only somewhat quicker, towards the heights before Döménd and Kerecsend. The train was consequently so expanded on all sides, that at present it was useless to think of compacting the *whole* of the brigade which had been committed to me. I must be content if I should accomplish this with a part of it.

Indicating as the place of my next position the nearest eminences towards Kerecsend, which commanded the widest extent of ground, I despatched the officers of my suite to combine on this point as many as possible of the three scattered battalions.

Pöltenberg's division had remained together. It had to re-establish a junction, between the Bulharin half division—the extreme right wing of the army—and the centre near Kápolna.

To the east of Verpelét an insignificant, narrow, undulating ridge of eminences stretches from north to south towards the high road between Kápolna and Kerecsend, and terminates, north of the road, in a *summit* well wooded on its eastern declivity. It is situated about half an hour's distance north-west of Kerecsend, and commands the whole ridge. From it sinks an elongated hill, being the last lateral spur, towards Fel-Döbrö, and forming with the ridge a re-entering angle, the sides of which diverge towards the north-west, that is, towards Verpelét.

The northern declivity of this hill is pretty steep, the western, on the contrary, slopes more gently; while towards the south-west and south—consequently in the direction of Kápolna and the high road—the undulating ground, converging with the not less gently sloping southern declivity of the said summit, becomes level.

Colonel Pöltenberg established himself with his division on this hill, while the Bulharin half division was employed for the occupation of the ridge north of the summit.

But the summit itself was to serve as a last hold for the said half division, in case it should be repulsed from the ridge by the enemy.

From this summit not only the ridge towards the north, far beyond gun-range, could be surveyed, but also the whole battle-field of Kápolna.

When the Pöltenberg division and the Bulharin half division were established on the two points above mentioned, the position of our army was in echelons from the centre to the right. The centre facing Kápolna and the left wing facing Kál stood nearly at the same height. By the rapid advance of Field-marshal Schlick, however, the hostile army soon arrived in a line parallel with our own.

Field-marshal Schlick, after having successfully forced the passage of the Tarna at Verpelét, had immediately prepared himself for pursuing us, and disposed his left wing on the northern continuation of the ridge occupied by the Bulharin half division, his right against Kápolna, while his centre advanced straight to the interval between Pöltenberg's position and that of the Bulharin half division, or—what is equivalent—to the re-entering angle formed, as has been mentioned, by the occupied heights.

By this manœuvre Field-marshal Schlick re-established his junction with the left wing of the hostile chief army, which advanced simultaneously against us by Al-Döbrö, and arrived at the same time with it in an oblique direction against the front of the centre and of the right wing of the main army.

The hostile position formed consequently, during the ensuing action, a line broken forward, while our position, parallel with it, described one broken backward.

Field-marshal Schlick had—judging from his ensuing dispositions for attack—very correctly perceived that, by forcing both the positions of our right wing, he

should most contribute towards disengaging the centre of the Austrian main army, the further advance of which, after the successful dislodging of Dembinski from Kápolna, was very considerably impeded by our centre, which had been re-inforced by the Guyon division.

He accordingly, while yet out of the reach of our guns, divided the centre likewise of his corps, employing one half in an attack on Pöltenberg's position, the other in forcing the *Kerecsend height.*

By the designation "Kerecsend height" is here to be understood particularly only the ridge of heights occupied by the Bulharin half division; but in the latter period of the action, its southern extremity, the summit covered with wood towards the east—therefore the extreme right wing of the battle-array of our army.

Not till after our centre should have effected its retreat over the bridge at Kerecsend—a retreat to which we were in fact compelled in consequence of the violent and dangerous attacks of the Schlick corps on our right wing—was Pöltenberg to be allowed to retire from his hill, while the Kerecsend height had to be held to the last, to cover his own retreat.

Pöltenberg successfully accomplished his task, in spite of the repeated violent attacks of the Schlick corps. The details of its execution, however, escaped me; my attention up to the last moment of the action being chiefly engaged by the defence of the Kerecsend height.

When I—in riding back to the Kerecsend height from that point near Verpelét where I had encountered Colonels Klapka and Pöltenberg for the first time this morning, and had arranged with them what was further to be done—arrived there, the three straggling Klapka battalions which had been appointed for its defence were

for the most part again assembled, and the guns of the battery of three-pounders were likewise already planted.

The Kerecsend height served the Hungarian army during the further course of the engagement as a point of support on the extreme right: it can readily be defended against an attack from the north. A hostile turning of our right could so easily be frustrated by the other half of the Bulharin division—which after the loss at Verpelét had fled towards Erlau, and which Colonel Klapka had promised again to lead against the extreme left flank of the Schlick corps—that a serious intention of attempting to turn our right could never with probability be supposed in the enemy.

In spite of this considerable advantage, the Bulharin half division seemed to me nevertheless to be insufficient for the energetic defence of the Kerecsend height; as I could not expect, judging from the former conduct of the battalions, that they would repulse the attacks of the enemy with remarkable valour, and as the incomplete battery of three-pounders would neither awe the assailant by its calibre nor by the number of its guns.

In the seventh army corps there existed, besides the often-mentioned four divisions, also a reserve, called "the column of the head-quarters." This column—originally composed in Waizen after the evacuation of the capitals, and chiefly intended for service in the head-quarters only—consisted of two companies of grenadiers, from thirty to forty men of the German legion, and half a squadron of hussars of different regiments not belonging to the army corps: it had subsequently received important accessions in the mountain-towns, consisting of the small remains of a battalion of Ernest infantry,

which Colonel Guyon had imperilled in the street-fight with the corps of Field-marshal Simunich in the town of Tyrnau, and of two seven-pound howitzer batteries each of five pieces—which had been formed of the howitzers of the batteries of the corps, for the especial purpose of making eventual attacks on places, or in general on pieces of ground not accessible to direct shot —and finally by that part of a rocket-battery which had been taken from the enemy in the sudden attack at Igló.

This column of the head-quarters, together with the Guyon division, had advanced in the morning from Mezö-Kövesd to Kerecsend, and had been since then kept *en reserve* on the bridge westward of that place.

I now ordered the two batteries of howitzers to the Kerecsend height, and had them planted on the northern declivity of the summit.

At half gun-range before these stood the three-pounders; at a further distance of about a thousand paces, a gentle descent of the ground allowed the left wing of the enemy a covered and easy access to our ridge of heights. From this slope emerged at first a division of hostile cavalry; at sight of which the Bulharin battalions were immediately disposed to flee into the wood, which covered the whole eastern declivity of the ridge. We succeeded, however, in delaying their flight at least till the beginning of the real attack.

This division of hostile cavalry—which had evidently been advanced only for the purpose of a provisional reconnoitering of our position—was immediately driven back by the fire of our three-pounders; and this again encouraged our intimidated infantry.

Lieutenant-colonel Aristid Dessewffy, properly com-

mander of the cavalry of the first army corps, but at that moment—I know not by what accident—remaining separated from his troops and without employment, voluntarily undertook, during the defence of the Kerecsend height, the duty of Bulharin, the helpless and inactive commander. Immediately after the division of hostile cavalry had disappeared, he proceeded with a part of the infantry against the real column of attack, and arrested its advance over the slope to the part of the ridge where we were posted.

The enemy now directed one of his battalions from the centre to storm the Kerecsend height on its western declivity, in order to make way for the attacking-column. If the storming had succeeded, this battalion would have appeared on the height in Dessewffy's rear, in the straight line between him and our three-pounders, and, on the one hand, would have dislodged the three-pounders, whose fire could produce no effect so long as Dessewffy was posted in their front, without annoying him also; on the other hand, would have obliged Dessewffy to withdraw in a lateral direction over the eastern declivity, and thus have pushed him afterwards entirely out of the combat. The storming battalion, however, did not stand the fire of our howitzers, but when at the foot of the western declivity turned towards the north; and later probably joined the column which attacked Dessewffy in front, and by which he was gradually pressed back.

Meanwhile I gained time to occupy with infantry, by way of precaution, the wooded declivity of the summit—our last point of support, as has been mentioned—in case the whole ridge should be taken by the enemy. Unfortunately I had at my disposal for this

purpose at that moment only those troops of the seventh army corps that could least be depended upon, namely, the Tyrol chasseurs. These, together with the Pöltenberg division, had been ordered early in the morning to Verpelét, but had taken to flight from thence by themselves, and had assembled only upon the Kerecsend height. They pleaded as their excuse, that not having bayonet-muskets, they could not stand against the attack of the hostile cavalry. I hoped they would now render so much the better service in the defence of the wooded declivity, as an attack of cavalry was not to be feared there.

Lieutenant-colonel Dessewffy with his sharpshooters was meanwhile again so far pressed back, that the enemy from the slope could gain the top of the ridge with masses of infantry and a rocket and field-piece battery; and now the Bulharin battalions could no longer be made to keep their ground; they evacuated the whole of the ridge, running over the eastern wooded declivity down into the valley of the rivulet which, coming from Szóllát, flows by the west end of Kerecsend, where the bridge of Kerecsend joins its there elevated banks on a level with the main road leading over it. Lieutenant-colonel Dessewffy accordingly returned *alone* to the summit, abandoned by his troops.

The forces of infantry at my disposal were thereby diminished to the few hundred Tyrol chasseurs, who, as has been mentioned, occupied the eastern wooded part of the summit. I accordingly for my reinforcement drew near me the battalion of Ernest infantry from the column of the head-quarters.

In the meantime that part of the Bulharin division in pursuit of which, after the loss of Verpelét, Colonel

Klapka had hastened towards Erlau, in order to lead it once more against the enemy, unexpectedly attacked in its flank the column advancing along the ridge.

This attack in the flank, however, was speedily repulsed, and the hostile rocket and field-piece batteries were brought into action against our howitzers and three-pounders. The latter I immediately took entirely out of action, because, with their small calibre, they must have been uselessly destroyed in the unequal contest. Soon after I also withdrew the six howitzers, which had already become unfit for service, partly from want of ammunition, partly in consequence of damages they had sustained. The rest of the howitzer batteries, consisting of four pieces, had therefore to persevere alone to the end of the conflict.

The enemy now advanced to within half gun-range of our position on the summit; posted, from want of breadth in the ridge, his rocket-stands to the right (from the enemy), his battery of field-pieces to the left backward; and immediately opened a murderous fire. The rockets, little as they used formerly to injure us on the plain, produced now a literally levelling effect in sweeping over the rising arched ground.

This rendered our position—the last we had to lose—almost untenable. The Ernest battalion was just arriving on the summit; from its valour I expected considerable relief in our desperate situation. It was of the first importance to take the rocket-battery by storm, or at least to dislodge it. I despatched the battalion by the western declivity of the summit, covered with only a few trees, that along it, protected as far as possible, it might get near the rocket-battery. But this battalion, which had recently been completed with recruits, could

scarcely be brought forward above a hundred paces. It then ran away towards the valley, and withdrew between Pöltenberg's position and the summit, out of the action. Two attempts to dislodge the rocket-battery by means of an attack with a squadron of Alexander hussars failed likewise; while the Tyrol chasseurs at the same time evacuated the wood on the eastern declivity of the summit.

The four howitzers could maintain their position only so long as this parcel of forest remained in our possession. I consequently sent for the *last* sections of the reserve which were still at my disposal—the grenadiers and the two mixed platoons of hussars—in order to charge the former with the further maintenance of the parcel of forest, and to attempt once more with the latter to dislodge the rocket-battery.

The hussars arrived first at the howitzers. Captain Szeymond, who led them, had, however, scarcely given the word of command to attack, when a rocket-case struck him from his horse. His men refused to proceed.

The grenadiers also in the meantime had reached the height, and, ranged on the edge of the forest, awaited my orders. Some bullets from the hostile field-battery happened to pass over their heads; and these fellows, as tall as trees, became all at once very diminutive—scarcely higher than their bear-skin caps.

This was an unfortunate *début*. But I already knew from experience, that the least obstacle thrown in the way of an enemy gains actually, as its consequence, a certain, though not always important amount of time. I therefore ordered the grenadiers, in spite of their spiritless conduct, and after some energetic reprimands for

such an exaggerated reverence of the hostile bullets, to advance at a storming-pace into the wood as far as its northern edge, and hold it.

A new difficulty arose in the wood. By the first bullets, at which the grenadiers were so much frightened while still on the wooded height, they saw perfectly well the real focus of the danger, and shewed no mean desire to avoid it, and go off in an eastern direction down the declivity. I remarked this just in the nick of time, quickly sprang from my horse, and, assisted by the brave officers of these troops, succeeded in bringing them at last into the right direction, the northern. Not till then did I return to the undefended part of the summit, where the howitzers stood.

Here, however, a notable mishap befell. The commander of these howitzers, while I was occupied in the wood, had perceived the impossibility of holding out any longer, and begun the retreat over the top of the summit the more speedily, as the protection of the battery (Alexander hussars) had been forced to yield by the fire of the hostile rockets and guns. While one of the howitzers was being limbered, a projectile from the enemy struck the team, and killed one of the horses. The terrified men cut the traces of the other horses, and galloped after the pieces which had already been started.

I found the commander of the battery and the cannoneers engaged in unsuccessful efforts to push the abandoned piece up-hill. In order to get it under way, the assistance of far more men was necessary. I hastened towards the western declivity of the summit, in the hope of still finding there a part of the Ernest battalion. In their stead I found some skirmishing hussars of the Alexander regiment. A captain of this

regiment was just about assembling them. I called him with his men to give assistance. Chance had made me hit on the right man; in spite of the sharp fire he was on the spot in a twinkling with some hussars.

The enemy, however, must have remarked how matters were going on here; for his projectiles fell ever thicker about the stuck-fast howitzer. The more urgently necessary appeared to me my own presence there. The brave captain of hussars, on the contrary, was in fear for my life, and pressed me to quit the dangerous place, engaging his honour for the safety of the howitzer. This circumstance, and the simultaneous arrival of my younger brother, on whose resolute perseverance I could also rely, induced me to comply. I rode speedily across the highest point of the summit towards the southern declivity, which was secured against the enemy's fire.

During the hot conflict I had not observed what was taking place in our centre. I now saw with satisfaction that the mission of the extreme right wing was accomplished; for the centre was already wholly, and Pöltenberg partly over the bridge at Kerecsend. I was anew more anxious about the greatly endangered howitzer, and determined partly to stop Pöltenberg's retreat, and despatch one of his battalions across the summit to its hard-pressed position. But this advance was scarcely half executed when the brave captain of hussars appeared with the piece on the summit, and thus nobly redeemed his word of honour. He conducted the train; my younger brother—whose horse a bullet had killed under him—closed it; the cannoneers, some hussars, and the ever-fearless Aristid Dessewffy drew the howitzer. The latter had suddenly arrived on the spot during my absence, and readily interested himself in its rescue.

Now that this had been effected, I immediately ordered the just-advanced battalion of the Pöltenberg division to return, and again continue its retreat over the bridge at Kerecsend; while the grenadiers, whom the enemy had pressed down over the wooded declivity into the valley of Kerecsend, passed the rivulet above the bridge, and marched back across the fields to the northern entrance of the village.

During the combat on the Kerecsend height I had received two orders from Dembinski. One was the retarded one, intended to call me early in the morning to Verpelét to take the command of the right wing of the army; the other contained instructions to maintain the Kerecsend height until he (Dembinski) with the centre should have effected his retreat over the Kerecsend bridge, and then to draw back to the eminence *behind* Kerecsend (east of the place).

When I reached this eminence with the Pöltenberg division and the column of the head-quarters, I found there the Kmety division, which had only shortly before arrived from Abrány. The orderly officer, charged with the marching order from Erlau to this division, had lost the road in the dark night, and reached Abrány only late in the morning; hence the delay in the arrival of the Kmety division at Kerecsend.

Dembinski, it was said, was wounded, and had ridden to Maklár. According to the dispositions which he had issued in Kerecsend after the retreat, that division of the first army corps which had stood in the centre, and the division of the second army corps of the left wing, had already started for Mezö-Kövesd, the Guyon division to Maklár. This latter place was also designated as the station of retreat for the Pöltenberg division and the

columns of the head-quarters of the seventh army corps. The Aulich division had to bivouack near Szikszó to protect the road to Mezö-Kövesd; and the Kmety division on the eminences of Kerecsend to protect Maklár and provide for the out-post service.

Thus ended Dembinski's offensive, which he had assumed against the Austrian main army for the re-conquest of the capitals.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Dembinski had given up the second day's battle at Kápolna as lost. The reasons for this were palpable—*we had been defeated;* and the troops urgently needed a short respite, to render them again quite fit for the field, after the harassing fatigues of the day.

But to judge from their location after the battle, as stated at the end of the preceding chapter, Dembinski, with the battle, gave up at the same time all further resistance: and the more I considered the circumstances which, conspiring together, had caused the loss of the recently fought action, the less I found that *this* step was imperative.

These circumstances were:

1. The loss of Sirok on the night preceding the second day's battle, and as a consequence of it the junction of the Schlick corps with the hostile main army on the very field of battle, whereby a hostile force numerically and morally superior

was brought into action with our right wing, isolated by the distance of more than a (German) mile from its centre.

2. The too late arrival on the field of almost a third of our army.

3. The separation of the divisions of one and the same army corps from each other.

1. To relieve the right wing in time was impossible, its distance from the centre and the reserve being at the first too great (even supposing that the Kmety division had reached Kerecsend early enough).

Dembinski could avoid this defect in the next position—perhaps behind Kerecsend, as I supposed—in which he might intend to withstand the enemy.

2. The too late arrival of the Kmety division left the army without a strong, sufficient reserve.

The army being now concentrated, Dembinski had no longer to fear this disadvantage in the next engagement.

3. By the dismemberment of the different army corps bodies of troops quite strange to each other were brought into close contact during the conflict, none of the divisions knowing in what degree they could rely on the steadfastness of the divisions near them on their right and left; a circumstance which cannot be overlooked with impunity. By this dismemberment of the different army corps half of the first corps was also deprived of the skilful guidance of Klakpa, and I was obliged to command a portion of his troops, which were stranger to me than those of the enemy, and that at a time when they had to perform extraordinary duty; whereas such services can be secured only by the personal influence of a commander familiar with the peculiarities of the troop.

Dembinski, taught by the disastrous consequences of his unskilful experiment of separating, could easily reunite the different army corps before the next combat, and then confidently expect far more from their conduct on the field of battle.

I found accordingly—as has been said—the entire abandonment of all resistance nothing less than commanded.

On the contrary, there existed circumstances which most decidedly encouraged to the resolute continuance of the combat on the next day. These circumstances were:

The behaviour of *our* troops *during* the battle, and that of the *enemy after* it.

This behaviour had been throughout surprisingly good. Disorders had occurred—but only as the exceptions—under my personal command, in the extreme right wing of the army, namely, on the Kerecsend height: these, however, were sufficiently excused, partly by the fact that the commander and troops were strangers to each other; partly because some bodies of the troops —as, for instance, the battalion of Ernest infantry (which had been filled up only a fortnight ago with quite raw recruits), the grenadiers, and the two platoons of mixed hussars—stood fire for the first time on that day; and partly by the greatness of the task which I had assigned to the troops. Even these disorders were only of short duration, and the shaken ranks for the most part could easily be restored to order, even within reach of the hostile fire. It seemed as if the days of Schwechat, Parendorf, Bábolna, and Hodrics would never again return!

The behaviour of *the enemy after* the battle, on the

contrary, evinced no trace of that consciousness of victory, which subsequently found such highly poetical expression in the famous bulletin of Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz.

The sun of the 27th of February 1849 stood yet pretty high in the heavens when the last thunder of cannon at Kápolna had long died away, and the victor nevertheless declined any pursuit; in spite of the strong inducement thereto furnished by Dembinski's dispositions.

Was not this a silent *Te Deum* for the permission at last quietly to take breath over the dear-bought laurels of victory?

The heroically bold Schlick, to whom alone, without reservation, belongs the honour of the day, had advanced the foremost against us; but even *he*, after he had occupied the Kerecsend height, evacuated by our right wing, uttered a distinct "Enough for to-day," and made his troops immediately prepare their bivouac-fires before our eyes.

(And no wonder! He had, during the last twenty-four hours, been obliged to travel with his brave corps a distance of fully six (German) miles; on his way to force three positions; and besides to take in tow the Field-marshal together with the chief army. A handsome stroke of work this! In the end, the Schlick corps would perhaps also have to pursue; while the chief army, which during the same time had scarcely gained half a mile of ground, allowed itself quietly to dream something about the "total destruction" of the rebels?)

But a conqueror, *who, after victory,* even when invited by circumstances, *does not pursue,* places himself involuntarily on an almost equal moral level with the

vanquished. Such a one *after* the victory is absolutely *not* more formidable than *before* it.

Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz after the battle of Kápolna was such a conqueror: and on this very account it seemed to me that Dembinski's dispositions, for retrograding after the battle in such headlong haste, were, considering the surprisingly good behaviour of our troops, not only uncalled for, but decidedly blamable.

They were, however, already for the most part executed when I was informed of them; and although the Kmety division urged me again and again, Dembinski being wounded, to take the chief command and annul his insulting dispositions, it could not very well be done. I should by such a step have been guilty of unjustifiable precipitancy. Colonel Kmety could not help soon perceiving this himself, and promised to yield to what for the present was unavoidable. I then rode to Maklár to seek for Dembinski, and learn the nature of his wound.

I inquired a long time in vain for his lodging. Several were pointed out to me, which had been destined for Dembinski and his suite; but in none of them could the commander-in-chief at that moment be found; every where it was said he had just been there.

That I might the sooner discover his abode, I left officers of my suite in each of the quarters indicated, charging them as soon as Dembinski should arrive in one of them to forward information of it to me without delay to a certain specified point in the place.

This measure caused a misunderstanding. Dembinski thought, when, on returning to the place which he had selected for himself, he found one of my orderly officers there, that I had left meanwhile somebody to

retain it for myself, and received me with bitter reproaches about this presumed arrogance on my part, since to him, the commander-in-chief, were due the most commodious quarters, and so on.

But I intended just then to establish my head-quarters in the bivouac of the Kmety division, and therefore naturally could not for a long time understand Dembinski's fracas.

Dembinski's wound did not seem to be mortal.

His further dispositions were: the troops should proceed with their cooking, and the whole army return on the following morning to Mezö-Kövesd.—The troops would very willingly have cooked, if they had but had something to cook.

Notwithstanding my subordination to Dembinski's chief command, I had taken care from the first that the regular supplies of the seventh army corps should be through its own intendancy; while the support of Dembinski's whole army had been transferred to the government commissary-in-chief, Bartholomäus von Szemere, who was invested with unlimited powers.

This non-central system of support brought the military organised supply-branch of the seventh army corps into frequent conflict with Szemere's officials, and occasioned the peremptory decree of the commander-in-chief, that in future the separate divisions of the army should receive their provisions directly from Szemere.

Now Szemere was deemed, and not undeservedly, an administrative genius; for he managed the supplies of Dembinski's army at least so ingeniously that the troops almost perished of hunger.

Accordingly their discontent with Dembinski's mode of warfare naturally soon rose to the highest pitch; for

the vote of distrust, which he had by his premature retreat called forth against himself, was subscribed by many thousand empty stomachs so much the more willingly, and with a severe clause, because the conviction was general among the army, that he never, never forgot the filling of his own belly.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE night between the 27th and 28th of February, which followed the second day of the battle of Kápolna, passed without disturbance.

Early in the morning of the 28th all the divisions of the army marched back to Mezö-Kövesd. The Kmety division formed the rear-guard. A considerable hostile column of cavalry followed close at its heels.

Dembinski ordered the camp to be pitched at the west end of Mezö-Kövesd *à cheval* of the road to Kerecsend. To the south of it the Pöltenberg division stood next, then the first army corps, and on the extreme left wing one division of the second army corps. To the north of the road the Guyon division was established next, and on the extreme right wing the Aulich division.

Between Mezö-Kövesd and Maklár a broad plateau, slightly elevated above the southern plains, extends from north-west to south-east. The village of Szihalom stands partly on it, partly on its south-western gradual

declivity. From this plateau the ground flattens undulatingly towards Mezö-Kövesd, and is intersected by separate, deeply sunk veins of water in an almost perpendicular direction with the road from Szihalom to Kövesd. The ground slopes in the same manner along the Erlau road towards Mezö-Kövesd.

Our camp in front of this place was consequently commanded direct by those two sides, from which a hostile attack mainly threatened us, and, notwithstanding the veins of water winding to and fro in our front, it was destitute of the most essential advantages of a *defensive* position; while, on the other hand, our capability for the offensive was not a little embarrassed by those very veins of water.

Dembinski in the choice of this camp was probably labouring under the fixed idea, *that the enemy, satisfied for the time being with our retreat as far as Mezö-Kövesd, on this day would undertake nothing more against us.* The circumstance, that neither the further line of retreat had been specified, nor any instructions issued how to proceed in case of being attacked, betrayed with still greater certainty the present prevalence of that fixed idea in Dembinski.

And thus all the conditions necessary for the success of a hostile surprise in broad daylight were fulfilled on our part as sufficiently as possible.

This attack we had not long to wait for.

The Kmety division, shortly before its arrival within gun-range of the camp, was all at once very vehemently assailed by the hostile column which had only observed it close at hand for a long time, and was in parts thrown back upon the surprised camp itself.

I was on my way to Dembinski's head-quarters, to

disabuse him, if possible, of the above-mentioned fixed idea, when the first firing of artillery, by which the onset announced itself, anticipated my intention.

Dembinski, however, was just at dinner, and, through the welcome clattering of plates and glasses in his immediate vicinity, failed to hear the less agreeable thunder of cannon from afar. My oral announcement of the hostile attack consequently found him wholly unprepared; nevertheless he hastened immediately to the point of danger; myself—delayed by the awkwardness of a hussar to whom I had entrusted my horse—a few minutes after him.

On the western outlet of Mezö-Kövesd a bridge has to be crossed. On it I encountered a half battery of the Kmety division in hasty flight. The commander of this battery solemnly protested that the whole camp had been scattered, and that he had only very narrowly succeeded in saving his guns. The poor man was so terrified, he could no longer trust his own eyes; otherwise he, as well as myself, might have been convinced by one glance from the bridge in the direction of the camp that the danger was by no means so great as he represented it. I ordered his battery to halt and return.

About a thousand paces from Mezö-Kövesd, on the other side of a second bridge, over which the road from Mezö-Kövesd to Szihalom and Kerecsend leads, I found the Kmety, Guyon, and Aulich divisions drawn up in battle-array, and the cavalry of the last division (the ninth regiment of hussars) just returning from a successful attack; while the Pöltenberg division, the first army corps, and the isolated division of the second, joined speedily the advancing right wing.

The enemy had already hastened as far back as the

elevation of Szihalom, and watched from thence, with great self-denial, the successful efforts of some hussars to get under way the half battery which had been taken from him by the ninth regiment of hussars, and bring it to our front, a gun-range and a half further back.

But Dembinski, in very bad humour, probably in consequence of his interrupted dinner, inveighed continually—not perhaps against the enemy, but against our advancing, called the successful attack a piece of stupidity, and finally ordered—when the repetition of similar outpourings had been rendered disagreeable to him by the pithy answers of some hussar officers—for the whole front of the army a thoughtful "Halt!"

He then made us await nightfall where we were. The enemy, in his turn, might now indulge in the same reflections on us as we had lately done on him, when he had suffered a few hussars to carry off his guns under his very nose.

It is already known, from what has preceded, that Colonel Guyon was suddenly attacked in the night between the 2d and 3d of February at Igló by a column of the Schlick corps, on which occasion a piece of artillery was taken from him. This gun, the capture of which by the enemy Colonel Guyon had constantly denied, it so chanced was now one of the three pieces just taken by us. The former assertion of Guyon, *that the missing cannon must have* LOST ITS WAY *in the woods of Igló, amid the general confusion which occurred during the surprise,* could—in spite of the contradictory circumstance, that this cannon had really been in the enemy's possession—out of respect for Guyon's well-known love of truth, of course not be doubted; and there consequently arose about the cannon, missing

since the day at Igló, the dark suspicion *that it had there been withdrawn from the Guyon division with a treacherous intent, and delivered to the Schlick corps, which a week later was retreating from Kaschau by Torna and Tonalja!*—This supposition may be thought absurd; however, every country has its own customs! In my country the *supposition of some treachery* is the common favourite formula according to which the most natural *unpleasant* occurrences are analysed in a piquantly-mystical manner, which also incidentally *tickles the national vanity.*

One fine day the *Közlöny*—evidently with the intention of rendering one of my personal opponents popular in the country—had dithyrambically reported, that Guyon at Igló (just during that fatal night between the 2d and 3d of February) had utterly annihilated the enemies of the fatherland. *How then could it have been possible for the* DESTROYED *to take a cannon from their* DESTROYER?

I have mentioned above an officer of artillery, whom I had encountered with his battery in wild flight on the bridge of Mezö-Kövesd, immediately after the commencement of the hostile attack on our camp. I ordered him to be shot for the crime of cowardice, of which he had been guilty by his flight, and intended to have the sentence executed *in flagranti,* as a warning example, in front of the division to which he belonged. Dembinski, however, from whom, as he was present, I had previously to obtain permission for the execution of the sentence, pardoned the delinquent.

Another otherwise brave officer, of the first army corps, happened shortly before the hostile attack to have got drunk, and in this state had made unlawful booty.

When attempted to be arrested, he resisted arms in hand, and thereby lost his life, being pierced by the balls of the escort.

Darkness had meanwhile set in; Dembinski retired to rest. Soon afterwards the troops also were allowed to re-occupy their former encampments, and those divisions could now cook, to which fate, under the guise of Szemere and his commissaries of supply, had, by way of exception, been favourable during the day. The rest were obliged previously to solicit contributions, but with indifferent success; for the patriots of Mezö-Kövesd were wise, prudent people.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE morning of the 1st of March found us still in the camp at Mezö-Kövesd, full of fasting, resignation to Dembinski's will, which had not yet been pronounced. Towards midday it was at last made known.

"*In order to secure to the troops*"—so it was said in the introduction to the dispositions for this day—"*the time necessary for their refreshment, cantonments are assigned to them.*" These cantonments were:

For the whole first army-corps, and the isolated division of the second corps, Eger-Farmos;

For the Aulich division, Lövö;

For the Kmety and Pöltenberg divisions, Szent-István;

For the Guyon division, Négyes.

As these cantonment-stations—only two, three, the furthest four hours' march, Eger-Farmos scarcely half an hour more from the hostile camp than Mezö-Kövesd —were situated in a plain as easily accessible to the enemy as to us; and as by transferring our army into them a hostile attack seemed at most to be delayed only for *the time* which the enemy needed *to find out one or the other cantonment-station and to reach it;* and as we could not suppose that Dembinski by the rest and refreshment which were promised to the troops in the new cantonments meant merely that which would *last for a few hours,*—we could not at once comprehend *how* these dispositions would answer the object for which they had been intended, according to the introduction. On the contrary, the apprehension that our position in these cantonments might become *incomparably more perilous than in Mezö-Kövesd* was awakened by the most superficial comparison of both situations.

However few the advantages offered for defence by the camp at Mezö-Kövesd, the army was at least *united* there, not so dismembered, and moreover stronger by the Kmety division, than on the last day of the battle of Kápolna.

An attack on the part of the enemy, even if executed with his whole force, had here—the relation of mutual strength mainly considered—less chance than at Kápolna. And even if victory should again be on the side of the enemy, there still remained to our general-in-chief the possibility of obviating a greater misfortune by timely dispositions.

The cantonments which we were to occupy, on the contrary, *dismembered* the army.

If the enemy intended to attack us in Mezö-Kövesd, as Dembinski's introduction to this disposition tacitly presupposed, then the already-mentioned *distances* of the cantonment-stations at Szent-István, Lövö, and Eger-Farmos, *from Mezö-Kövesd* were not great enough to prevent him from a further advance against one of them. No matter which he attacked, he could secure to himself but too easy a victory; while our commander-in-chief, through the great distance of the separate divisions of the army from each other, as well as from his head-quarters in Poroszló, was utterly unable, after a hostile attack *had once commenced,* to make dispositions *time enough* to avert a serious disaster. The dispositions for the cantonments, however, did not contain a syllable of any *precautionary* measure in case of such an attack, not even a point of junction or of retreat was indicated in them.

This defect in the dispositions was the more striking as, with the simultaneous removal of the first army corps and the isolated division of the second corps to Eger-Farmos, it could no longer be the result of the fixed idea, *that the enemy certainly would not attack the cantonments.* The circumstance, that Eger-Farmos, the cantonment-station which was situated *nearest* to the enemy, had, in comparison with the others, been occupied in such *remarkable strength,* pointed directly to the fact that the thought of forming a *strong rear-guard* had been influential in bringing about these dispositions. *This* thought, however, could have originated only in the *supposition of a hostile attack;* while, on the contrary, this supposition was flatly contradicted by the *carelessness* with which the beginning of the excentric retreat from Mezö-Kövesd into the cantonments had been delayed till full midday,

and thus this manœuvre, which could so easily have been accomplished unobserved under the veil of the past night or the fog of the morning, had been exposed to the spying looks of the enemy's advanced troops in Szihalom.

To these enigmatical contradictions we found *no* solution; and as our confidence in Dembinski had moreover been already shaken, we could not greatly enjoy the thought of the "promised rest and refreshment," when we broke up about midday of the 1st of March from the camp of Mezö-Kövesd for the cantonments.

My head-quarters closely adjoined the Pöltenberg and Kmety divisions, which were ordered to Szent-István.

About two hours before nightfall the promised rest and refreshment was disturbed by a vehement and continuous thundering of artillery, which penetrated to us from the direction of Eger-Farmos.

Colonel Klapka—who was located in this place with the whole first army corps and the isolated division of the second corps—had been attacked; and, considering the proximity of the united hostile army, there was no reason for supposing but that this attack had been made with far superior forces. Under these circumstances it was to be feared that Colonel Klapka would be defeated, and pressed back towards Poroszló, and that consequently the Aulich division in Lövö would be endangered; and it was my duty to prevent, if possible, these calamities, by ordering the Pöltenberg and Kmety divisions to advance without a moment's delay to Eger-Farmos. I could execute this duty the easier as Szent-István was of no strategic importance at all to us.

The shortest and, as we were assured, best way from this place to Eger-Farmos is through Lövö; but this *best* way was impracticable.

We had scarcely advanced half way when the thunder of cannon from Eger-Farmos suddenly ceased. Klapka's defeat, as well as the advanced darkness, might be the cause of this; the greater was the necessity for hastening our march. But all our efforts were rendered abortive by the accumulation of obstacles which impeded our progress on this road, almost impassable during this season.

In front of Lövö we had to cross the Kánya brook, which had overflowed its banks. The darkness of the night and the depth of the water rendered unavoidable the use of a good many precautionary measures, which took up time. Not till after midnight was our passage completely effected, and the Aulich, Pöltenberg, and Kmety divisions again reunited.

Some of our troops stationed at Eger-Farmos had reached Lövö several hours earlier. From these we now learned, that on the road from Szihalom through Szemere the enemy had continually flanked Colonel Klapka's march from Mezö-Kövesd to Eger-Farmos, and had attacked him most violently with artillery immediately after his arrival at Eger-Farmos; but that, after an obstinate resistance, he had retreated towards Poroszló, whereby these sections of troops, being separated from their main body, had been obliged to fall back on Lövö.

This information decided me to break up the camp at Lövö after a short rest, and to march back with the Aulich, Pöltenberg, and Kmety divisions by Iványka towards Poroszló, sending at the same time an order to the Guyon division in Négyes to do the same.

How fatigued and weary soever the troops might have been when Dembinski sent them at midday of the

1st of March 1849 from the camp of Mezö-Kövesd for their refreshment into the cantonments of Négyes, Szent-István, Lövö, and Eger-Farmos, the rest they found there was *so quickly* refreshing, that they were already enabled early on the morning of the 2d of March 1849 —invigorated in the highest degree! ?—to reunite themselves in Poroszló.

Eighteen short hours had sufficed to place in the clearest light the geniality of the theory, according to which Dembinski had projected, in the golden-mouthed* morning-hour of the 1st of March 1849, the *refreshment* dispositions for his—by the way be it said—more HUNGRY than *fatigued* army. This theory is naturally developed from these dispositions, as follows:

"*The rest necessary for re-invigorating a defeated army is secured by occupying dispersed cantonments in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's operations,* IN A PLAIN, OF WHICH THE INTERSECTIONS OF THE GROUND DO NOT PERHAPS OBSTRUCT A VICTORIOUS ENEMY IN HIS ADVANCE, BUT CERTAINLY EMBARRASS THE JUNCTION OF THE PARTS OF AN ARMY WHICH ARE SEPARATELY CANTONING."

Or, in other terms, and at the same time applicable to the present case:

"*If an already defeated army, which continues still exposed to the attacks of the enemy, is to be secured against them, separate it*—IF POSSIBLE, UNDER THE ENEMY'S EYES—*into from four to five parts, more or less equal to each other, and* CONFIDENTLY *distribute these separate parts into the near surrounding places, several hours dis-*

* "The hours of the morning have their mouth full of gold," a German proverb, which has its equivalent in the English, "Early to bed, and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise."—*Transl.*

tant from each other, between which places there exist in part no communications at all, in part such as are practicable only with uncommon difficulty; FOR IN A CIVILISED ENEMY THERE CAN ALWAYS WITH CERTAINTY BE ASSUMED TO BE SO MUCH OF GOOD-BREEDING AS THAT, AT ONCE RECOGNISING AND HONOURING THE EMINENTLY PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARY, HE WILL INSTANTLY CEASE FROM THE OFFENSIVE."

Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz had in fact justified such a flattering supposition by the remarkable *moderation* with which he pursued us *only* on the day *after* the battle of Kápolna, and even then with forces *so small* that it was *not at all difficult* for us to repulse their attack without inconvenience—as has been already mentioned—and at the same time take from them three guns. Prince Windisch-Grätz afterwards also proved himself not quite unworthy of such a flattering supposition, since he again attacked *with forces not superior* our three divisions, which were moving before his eyes to Eger-Farmos; whereby of course was caused Klapka's retreat by night to Poroszló, which, though somewhat inconvenient it is true, was otherwise almost without loss.

Or could what Dembinski took for the *courteous good-breeding* of Prince Windisch-Grätz have been only the expression—in spite of the days of Kápolna—of continued *contempt for his adversary?* Could neither the days of Kápolna nor that of Mezö-Kövesd have sufficed to correct that disdainful opinion of the importance of our resistance, for which indeed sufficient grounds had been furnished at first by the great retreat from the Lajtha to beyond the Danube, and the simultaneous reports of victory circulated by the Committee of Defence?

Whatever may be the answers to these questions, the short campaign between Windisch-Grätz and Dembinski, since the second day of the battle of Kápolna, had now assumed on both sides the character of what is called at drafts a "losing-game." It is well known that this game is won by *the player who* FIRST *gets rid of all his men.* To this end, his endeavour is, to move his men *always unprotected* in front of those of his adversary, *that they may be taken.* Both commanders proved themselves *very adroit* at this. Thus did Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz, on the 28th of February, at Mezö-Kövesd; thus did General Dembinski on the day after, the 1st of March, at Eger-Farmos. But the *latter* was unmistakably *master,* and would most certainly have won—that is, would have *first lost* all his draftsmen—unless the fit had suddenly come upon them, at first by *arbitrary* moves to spoil the losing-game, which in the cantonments stood so extremely favourable for Dembinski, and finally even to turn out their lord and master; and all this simply because they (Dembinski's draftsmen) had taken into their heads the notion that with them only a WINNING *game* should be played.

CHAPTER XXX.

When I arrived, early in the morning of the 2d of March, with the Aulich, Pöltenberg, and Kmety divisions, at Poroszló, Colonel Klapka informed me, that in consequence of Dembinski's dispositions of the preceding evening for cantonment, the commanders of the three divisions under his (Klapka's) command in Eger-Farnos, had declared, in the name of their officers, that they would no longer receive any order from Dembinski, unless it was counter-signed either by himself (Klapka) or by me. The commanders of these divisions (Dessewffy in the stead of Bulharin) immediately afterwards repeated the same declaration to me in person, Klapka being present.

Dembinski had, before my arrival at Poroszló, ordered the three divisions united under Klapka to retreat without delay behind the Theiss. Conformably to this order they were just about to march, when their commanders informed me of this desire to metamorphose the *absolute* commander-in-chief Dembinski into a *constitutional* one.

But I could not suppose it possible that such experienced soldiers as Colonel Klapka and his three commanders of division were in earnest in proposing the *application of the constitutional principle to the command of an army during war;* and took this request simply for a *consilium abeundi,* which was to be laid before the commander-in-chief Dembinski. But as such an extraordinary measure required at least the concurrence of an

overwhelming majority of the army; and as the four divisions of the seventh army corps—consequently more than one half of the army—had not yet refused obedience to the commander-in-chief; and as I was moreever of opinion that such an important step ought *not to be taken in too much haste,*—with Klapka's consent, I called upon these three commanders of division to comply for the present *unconditionally* with Dembinski's arrangements, until the retreat of the whole army behind the Theiss, which seemed just then to be his intention, should have been accomplished, when they would have an opportunity of deliberately consulting upon the subject.

The commanders of division declared themselves willing to do so, and returned to their troops, as did also Colonel Klapka; while I hastened to Dembinski's headquarters, to announce to him the arrival of the Aulich, Pöltenberg, and Kmety divisions in Poroszló, and obtain his further orders for them.

Dembinski received me very ungraciously; talked of not knowing how to obey, of running away from every hostile cannon-ball; declared that it had not been *his* plan to return again behind the Theiss, but that *we forced* him to do so, and that for this reason he had already ordered the retreat. The seventh army corps had immediately to follow Klapka's divisions.

Having been dismissed with this injunction, I hastened to appoint places where the seventh army corps should encamp (the Guyon division also had meanwhile arrived from Négyes), until Klapka's divisions, on their retreat from Poroszló over the Theiss, should be far enough in advance not to embarrass the marching of the seventh army corps in their rear.

Dembinski at the same time removed his head-quarters to Tiszafüred. I did not see him again on the right bank of the Theiss.

Besides the seventh army corps, six squadrons of cavalry belonging to the second corps were also at the same time in Poroszló. They belonged to that army division which the commander-in-chief, during his just-terminated offensive operation, had left behind in Poroszló and Tiszafüred, to secure the passage across the Theiss between these two places; and, according to Dembinski's last dispositions, were to remain in Poroszló to observe the enemy, even after the retreat of the seventh army corps behind the Theiss had been effected.

I was just ready to commence the retreat, when the enemy, advancing towards Poroszló on the road from Besenyö, suddenly began to deploy before us in scarcely stronger force than our own.

At first he seemed as if he intended to attempt an attack on our camp.

Considering the fatal characteristics of our line of retreat, retreat for the moment could not be thought of.

This line consisted of a causeway, just wide enough to allow two vehicles to pass each other. The Theiss had already overflowed; this causeway was the sole communication between Poroszló and the bridge over the Theiss.

Poroszló is a locality stretching from north to south, and lying on an elevation, which limits westward the extent of inundation on the right bank of the Theiss, here above a league in breadth. This elevation slopes steeply towards the east, and forms at the same time the right bank of the brook Cserö, the left bank of which is situated in the inundated ground itself, across which the

causeway leads to the bridge over the Theiss, which is about a league further off. The connexion of the causeway with the elevation commanding it, and on which Poroszló stands, is effected by means of a wooden bridge, resting on piles, over the brook Cserö.

The clear space between the eastern row of houses of Poroszló and the slope of the bank of the brook Cserö admits of batteries being planted, which, the causeway lying in a vertical direction with this row of houses, would command it (the causeway) lengthways, and expose it to a cross-fire; consequently the troops retreating on it could be literally *swept down*, without any possibility being presented to them of planting more than one gun—namely, on the causeway itself—against the hostile batteries, which gun would then evidently have to form the extreme rear-guard.

Poroszló, in its breadth—in the direction from west to east—is intersected by several streets. One of them opens on to the clear space, between the right bank of the Cserö and the eastern front of the houses, exactly opposite the bridge; the other streets open, part of them above, part below the bridge.

The seventh army corps remained, as has been said, still in the camp before the long western boundary of the place, when the enemy deployed in our front at about gun-range and a half distance. The view was unobstructed; *our retreat could not be masked.*

To begin such a retreat under the eyes of the enemy must invite him to attack, and to immediate pursuit.

While of all the streets which intersect the place in its breadth, we could make use of only *that one* which opens opposite the causeway, if we would avoid obstacles incalculable in their consequences, occasioned by the

concourse of several retreating columns immediately before the bridge; the enemy, by advancing through the other streets, could reach the clear space before the eastern front of the houses simultaneously with our last section, plant his guns in the direction of the causeway, and *sans gêne* begin the work of destruction. In doing so, the *direct* injury which his fire would have caused to us would have been not at all comparable to what would have ensued in consequence of the *thronging* on the narrow causeway. I feared that in the chaotic confusion I should be forced to see several guns and ammunition-chests tumbling down over the slopes of the road; and I preferred to accept where I was even an unequal contest, and defend myself to the last, than to begin the retreat under such untoward circumstances.

The first offensive advance of the enemy was followed by a similar movement on our part; the suspension of our advance by the falling back of the hostile vanguard. After which both parties contented themselves with observing each other during the day.

Late in the afternoon, a patrol of hussars, which had been sent out in the direction of Heves, returned with some prisoners, lancers, whom the commander of the hostile column in Heves had charged with a despatch "to the royal imperial Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Wrbna in Poroszló." The contents of this despatch informed us that we had no hostile attack to fear from Heves.

In my suite there served as courier, among others, a harmless Lo-Preszti hussar. This remarkable troop was distinguished principally by its *red cloaks*. The harmless fellow felt cold, and was enveloped in his cloak, when the lancers were brought in. Whereupon

one of them took the red-cloaked Lo-Preszti hussar for the executioner, who—so the tale ran in the hostile camp—used first to cut off the ears of the prisoners, and after a while their heads also. The brave lancer, at the mere sight of the red Lo-Preszti hussar, was now naturally seized with the gallows-fever, and recovered only after being well recruited by means of bacon, bread, and wine.

There was no longer any prospect of our being attacked in the course of the day. The enemy before us seemed to feel himself too weak, and intended to await re-inforcements, which might arrive during the night.

We were consequently obliged to effect the delayed retreat under cover of night, in order to avoid the danger of an *overpowering* attack, which was to be expected next day.

I issued the orders necessary for this purpose, and reported to Dembinski the cause of the delay.

The second hour after midnight was fixed for leaving the camp. *Before* midnight, however, I received, in answer to my report, Dembinski's order to remain in Poroszló with the seventh army corps during the next day also, and accept a combat, in case the enemy should attack.

Dembinski evidently wished to try his luck once more at the "losing-game," and that with the seventh army corps alone. But I had no desire for such a game; and declared to Dembinski, in a special letter—after a concise review of the principal points in his career till now as commander-in-chief—

That this order appeared to me to have for its object to expose to useless slaughter the best Hungarian corps; a corps for the preservation of which I, as its commander,

was responsible to the country;—that the favourable opportunities for striking decisive blows had been neglected by him (Dembinski) at Tornalja, Kerecsend (immediately after the battle of Kápolna), and Mezö-Kövesd;—that the present position of the seventh corps, with a long, open, indefensible defile in its rear, was badly adapted for accepting a serious combat, by which he seemed now suddenly to be anxious to make up for lost time;—that the corps must, on the contrary, be saved as quickly as possible from this dangerous position;—but that this was only possible by the retreat *during the night*, which I had already ordered; and that I was ready to answer before a council of war for this act of disobedience.

Before daybreak of the 3d of March I had already quitted Poroszló with the seventh army corps, and left behind me there, in order to observe the enemy, only the six squadrons of cavalry of the second army corps.

I reached without interruption the left bank of the Theiss. The hostile corps, however, the attacks of which I thought to avoid by this retreat during the night, had at the same time marched back from Poroszló to Besenyö; and thus once more the one had been in fear of the other, and both again without reason.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE decided vote of want of confidence in Dembinski on the part of the commanders of division under Klapka had in the meantime found the most lively echo in the divisions of the seventh army corps. The army was thus already in fact *without a leader.*

General Répásy, commander of the second army corps, and Colonel Klapka, perceived, as well as myself, that this state of the army could not continue long without endangering the country.

We therefore, without constraint, agreed to lose no time in assembling the staff-officers of the divisions of our corps that were not then on service, to deliberate *how this condition might most judiciously be remedied;* but to invite the government commissary-in-chief, Bartholomäus von Szemere, to take part in the consultation, *that even the* APPEARANCE of the army *conspiring* against the government *might be avoided.*

The conclusion to which this assembly of staff-officers came, as well as the reasons for the resolution, may be briefly summed up as follows:

That to beat the enemy, and yet endure hunger, might be put up with. To be beaten by the enemy, but at least to have afterwards enough to eat and drink, might perhaps also be tolerable. But to be repeatedly beaten, and moreover endure hunger as well as all imaginable fatigues,—was too bad, and could no longer be borne.

That Lieutenant-general Dembinski—especially by

the manner in which he, as commander-in-chief, had conducted his offensive intended for the reconquest of the capitals—had brought all these calamities on the army, and in consequence had forfeited *for ever* its confidence.

The representative of the government, Bartholomäus von Szemere, who was present, was consequently requested to take suitable measures for *removing Lieutenant-general Dembinski from the chief command of the army;* and for transferring it—until the definite appointment of Dembinski's successor—to one of the commanders of army corps present.

In order to let Szemere be completely free in the choice of a commander-in-chief *ad interim,* I declared beforehand that I had no objection whatever to his appointing to the temporary chief command either of my younger comrades, Répásy or Klapka. But both of them, on their part, judging it fitting that the provisional command of the army should be entrusted to *me,* as being in rank the eldest commander of a corps,—there was no longer any choice left to Szemere; and he consulted with me as to the way in which, with the least offence, Dembinski could be removed from the chief command.

We thought to proceed in the most delicate way by Szemere's immediately inviting the commander-in-chief by letter to avoid the bitter pill intended for him, by a voluntary retiring from his post, and to transmit to him (Szemere), in a confidential way, his journal of operations, together with the rest of the protocols.

Dembinski, however, either did not believe in the possibility of being removed in consequence of a simple vote of want of confidence on the part of the army, or he hoped to gain the crown of martyrdom; for he po-

sitively would not hear of a voluntary retirement. It seemed likewise possible that he doubted the genuineness of the vote of want of confidence on the part of the army, and considered it to be merely forged, perhaps by me. He had consequently in the first place to be entirely freed from *this illusion.*

To this end, Szemere, accompanied by Répásy, Klapka, and myself, and, unless I am mistaken, also by Aulich and the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps, went next day to Dembinski's head-quarters.

But that no conciliatory means might be left untried, Szemere saw Dembinski at first *alone,* and announced to him beforehand *what* awaited him next moment, if he should continue to refuse voluntarily to lay down the staff of command.

This measure also having been unsuccessful, Szemere summoned us—who had meantime been waiting in the ante-chamber—to enter likewise, and then declared to Dembinski in our presence, that the army had no longer any confidence in his command, and that he could not fail to perceive how the want of this confidence paralysed his further efficiency as commander-in-chief.

Dembinski seemed to be labouring under the supposition that all this had for its object less the removing him from the chief command than the satisfying our eager desire for the disclosure of his plan of operations, which had formed the basis of his unsuccessful offensive, and which was carefully kept secret by him: for the substance of his answer to Szemere's declaration was the following reminiscence of that campaign to which he owes his ante-March, Conversationslexicon celebrity:

"One day during my retreat in Lithuania," thus Dembinski began his tale, "my officers came to me, and

desired to know whither I was leading them. Gentlemen, I replied, do you see my cap here?"

Hereupon Dembinski actually seized his indoor-cap, and put it on his head.

"If I could suppose," he continued, proceeding with his answer to the said officers, "that this cap had any perception of what I think, and whither I am leading you" (the officers in Lithuania, not us), "I would throw it on the ground and trample it under my feet, and in future go about without a cap."

With this Dembinski tore the poor cap off his head again, crumpled it up for awhile in evident indignation, and threw it mercilessly on the ground.

He must give us the same answer—he hereupon intimated—so often as we should ask him about his plan of operations.

Dembinski here plainly overlooked how essentially different his position was *with respect to us* from what it had been *with respect to the officers in Lithuania.*

These officers wished only to know whither he was leading them; we knew already WHITHER *he had led us* —namely, into the sauce.*

These only doubted of his capacity as a general; we *no longer doubted of the* CONTRARY.

These were still willing to follow him on certain conditions; we *no longer on* ANY WHATEVER.

I strongly suspect that in Dembinski it was only "the vanity of authorship" which led him to cite to us, so *mal à propos*, his smart answer to these officers.

After a long discussion, without result, between Dembinski and Szemere, during which the honour of spokesman on our part was left to the latter exclusively,

* *i.e.* into the very jaws of destruction.—*Transl.*

this scene terminated with Dembinski's repeated declaration, that he would *not* voluntarily retire—whereupon we took our leave.

Szemere, however, had now to bite the sour apple, and, by virtue of his unlimited power, officially to inform Lieutenant-general Dembinski that he must without delay give up the chief command of the army to me.

As soon as I was convinced that Dembinski had received this order from Szemere, I charged the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps to take possession of the registers of the service, which were kept at the quarters of the chief command. Dembinski, however, had taken them meanwhile under his own charge, and obstinately refused to give them up. The chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps took up the matter in good earnest, and placed a guard at Dembinski's door.

I quite approved of this measure, and immediately informed the government commissary-in-chief, Szemere, of Dembinski's arrest. Szemere had not been prepared for this turn of affairs, declared that he did not at all agree to Dembinski's being arrested, and immediately set him at liberty.

Next day the President Kossuth, with the war-minister Mészáros and Field-marshal Lieutenant Vetter, arrived at Tiszafüred.

For Szemere had reported to Debreczin—undoubtedly immediately after the arrival of my last letter from Poroszló to Dembinski—that mutiny had broken out in the army.

Even before Szemere's letter, two staff-officers, despatched by Klapka and myself, had arrived at Debreczin,

in order to open the eyes of the government as to the chief causes of the doubtful progress of our war-operations.

The government took this step for an omen confirming Szemere's report.

Hence Kossuth's speedy journey from Debreczin to Tiszafüred.

Now commenced a lengthened examination of the staff-officers of the army. The point of it was directed against me.

Mészáros and Vetter discharged the functions of judicial examiners.

My letter from Poroszló to Dembinski did *not* appear in itself *sufficient* reason for instituting proceedings against me; while nevertheless a notable satisfaction was desired to be given to Dembinski.

He had probably—just as he did before me on the morning of the 2d of March in Poroszló, so now in Tiszafüred before Kossuth and his colleagues—thrown the blame of his (Dembinski's) retreat behind the Theiss on the army itself, and especially on Klapka and myself, and might thus have excited the suspicion, that both of us had frustrated the execution of his plan of operations, which was unknown to us, by our intentionally bringing on battles unfavourable in their results—for instance, on the days of Kápolna and Eger-Farmos—and this to render it impossible for him to remain Hungarian commander-in-chief.

The discovery of facts confirmatory of this suspicion appeared consequently to be the chief aim of these examinations. Had this been attained, two birds would have been killed with one stone—"Dembinski" and "victory" would have ceased to be *contradictions;* and

myself and my proclamation of Waizen would have *ended our struggles!*

The latter especially caused Kossuth much vexation. Chiefly to render harmless its and its author's influence had Dembinski been written for to Paris—were the independent army divisions invented. The ROYAL HUNGARIAN-CONSTITUTIONAL *corps d'armée of the upper Danube should* DISAPPEAR *in the army of the* POLISH-HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, that "Octavianus" Kossuth might be enabled at last, *unrestrained,* to enact with "Antonius" Bem and "Lepidus" Dembinski, "a triumvirate *en miniature.*"

It is easily conceivable that the more Dembinski's unexpected failure again enveloped in mist the already bright prospect hereof, the more earnestly must Kossuth have desired that "*the blame of this failure*" should be brought home to Klapka and me. Mészáros and Vetter accordingly examined with might and main—I forget now during how many days.

They did not find, however, what they sought.

"Dembinski" and "victory" constantly remained *contradictions;* myself and the proclamation of Waizen were *not* yet to end our struggles!

My punishment for disobedience to Dembinski was confined to a long-winded, humorous lecture, which Mészáros read me one day just after dinner, in Vetter's presence, after the examination of all the staff-officers was concluded.

"*In vino veritas*"—he began—"says a Latin proverb; I have therefore to-day intentionally taken some glasses of wine more than I needed, to enable me to tell you the truth frankly. Soon after you was appointed general and commander of the corps d'armée of the

upper Danube, I must remark that you failed in that respect for the war-minister which I should have thought you owed him. Times innumerable you have slighted me by sending your proposals direct to the Committee of Defence. 'The old Mészáros is an old pigtail; why lose time?' you may have thought. I accommodated myself to it; for I am no friend to sycophancy. Then I heard one fine morning, you had suddenly proclaimed that old Mészáros was the sole authority you acknowledged in the country. You can conceive my righteous astonishment at this? you can conceive how difficult it was for me to comprehend the reason of this distinction of my insignificant self—expected least of all from you? you can conceive what trouble it cost me merely to identify myself rightly with my new dignity as the sole authority recognised by you in the state? At last I succeeded, however; and I now believed I could the more certainly reckon on your obedience, *the more* you had to make good in this respect for former times. But what a deception! You were pleased merely to jest, and have been no more obedient to me *since* than *before;* and just as little have you obeyed more recently the man whom I appointed your commander-in-chief. It seems therefore as if you had been chosen by providence to give the lie to the proverb which says that 'He who would command, must first learn to obey.'" . . . .

This introduction was then followed by some rhapsodical recitals from the military regulations of the royal imperial Austrian army; and a kind "take it not amiss" sweetened at the end even the few bitternesses which during the harmless lecture had escaped from the kind-hearted old gentleman, probably against his will.

I thought I could not shew my gratitude for so much

gentle forbearance better than—while passing over in considerate silence an investigation into the alleged *inconsistencies in my conduct towards Mészáros*—by confining myself to the justification of my disobedience to Dembinski, which I did by some counter-citations from the same military regulations whence the war-minister had taken the really reprimanding part of his discourse.

Mészáros availed himself of my answer to resume the discourse, and informed me that Dembinski had already been removed from the chief command, and that Vetter would take it.

CHAPTER XXXII.

KOSSUTH either had not the courage to oppose the judgment pronounced against Dembinski by the assembly of staff-officers, or he perceived that it was *just;* suffice it —Dembinski did not immediately obtain, so far as I know, any satisfaction whatever for the affront he had suffered. It was left to him to see how he should console or avenge himself.

Some days after the retreat of the army to Tiszafüred, Colonel John Damjanics—having crossed the Theiss at Czibakháza with his army division (one half of the third army corps)—appeared suddenly on the railway from Pesth to Szolnok, between the hostile brigades under Ottinger in Abany and Kargern in Szolnok, attacked the latter, and defeated it.

Dembinski now claimed the honour of this victory

exclusively to himself; because, about a week or a fortnight before, he had sent to the third army corps, which stood on the left bank of the Theiss, opposite Szolnok and at Czibakháza, an order to attack the enemy in the beginning of March. Neither Damjanics nor his brave troops, nor the inddlence of the hostile brigade under Ottinger in Abany, nor the comfortable feeling of security of that under Kargern in Szolnok, which allowed itself to be literally surprised in the midst of a boundless plain in broad daylight,—nothing of all this, according to Dembinski's view, had any merit in the victory—only *he* alone; whilst, *on the other hand,* it was *solely* owing to *me*—said Dembinski further—that this victory could not now exert any favourable influence on the operations of our chief army: for through my treason the battle of Kápolna had been lost; I had been the cause why the cantonment-stations Eger-Farmos, Lövö, Szent-István, and Négyes—in which he intended to await the victory of Szolnok, in order to advance again immediately towards the capitals—had to be evacuated by our army; nay, even the last possibility of suddenly resuming the offensive had been destroyed by *me alone,* in retreating from Poroszló *across* the Theiss, *contrary* to his express command.

Thus Dembinski consoled—thus avenged himself; and Count Guyon seconded him therein.

But the declarations which escaped from Dembinski on this occasion about his most secret war-operative thoughts, when combined with the events already communicated during the campaign, enable us to perceive, almost in its details, the plan of operations according to which Dembinski thought to reconquer the capitals.

During the second half of February Dembinski had

at his disposal *ten* army divisions, the strength of each of which varied on an average from 4000 to 4500 men, baggage-train included.

Seven of these army divisions he destined for attack along the high road of Gyöngyös.

One he left at Tiszafüred and Poroszló for the protection of the passage across the Theiss between these places.

Two army divisions (the third army corps) had to take Szolnok in the beginning of March, and then to make a demonstration on the railway-line against the capitals.

Dembinski's plan of operations was consequently this:

Demonstration along the railroad; *principal attack* along the high road of Gyöngyös.

A demonstration—to answer its object, namely, to make the enemy believe *that the demonstrating column is the principal column for attack*—must be undertaken with reference to such circumstances of time and place as do *not beforehand* prevent the enemy being deceived.

Bearing this rule in mind, Dembinski had quite correctly deferred the commencement of the demonstration on the railroad till the beginning of March; for, having been opposed as late as the 21st of February, with the seventh army corps, to Field-marshal Schlick at Sajó-Szent-Péter, and as this place was at least nine good marching-stations distant from the point where the demonstration on the railroad was to be commenced,—the enemy would have perceived immediately, from the attack on Szolnok, made, for instance, before the 3d of March, *that our* MAIN FORCE *was by no means to be sought for behind this column.*

We ought not, in justice, to suppose that Dembinski *intended* to bring his principal column of attack on the main road of Gyöngyös into conflict with the enemy seven or eight days *before* the beginning of this demonstration along the railroad; for this would have been sheer nonsense, and Dembinski's plans of operation were always based on a distinct, definite idea—only in their *execution* he *always* got into difficulties. Moreover we must remember that Dembinski had as early as the 26th of February repeatedly asserted *that he had by no means wished for the conflict on the Tarna.*

We may therefore be completely at rest on this point, namely, that Dembinski was *from the first* determined to await the beginning of the demonstration, nay even its consequences, favourable for our principal attack; and his advance from Miskolcz as far as the Tarna must appear to us consequently *only* as an arrangement for the intended principal attack.

Dembinski undoubtedly intended to steal away *unobserved* with his seven army divisions to the Tarna, in order to remain there *hidden* until this demonstration should have been begun. For this reason it was that, on the 24th of February at Mezö-Kövesd, he complained so bitterly to me about Klapka's sudden attacks on Kompolt and Pétervásárá, and was quite right in maintaining that Klapka was disclosing to the enemy his (Dembinski's) intentions; for these surprises plainly directed the enemy's attention to our principal column of attack.

It is true that Klapka might oppose to this, that the principal column of attack could not have reached the Tarna *unobserved*, unless Dembinski had had ready *at least* thirty thousand *invisible-caps*, so that each of our

soldiers might have drawn one of them over his ears, and thus become invisible. This, however, will not at all prevent Dembinski—as we already know him—from afterwards maintaining that the execution of his plan of operations was wrecked entirely *in consequence of Klapka's surprises;* for its execution we must consider as wrecked *with the first discharge of cannon on the 26th of February.*

The two-days' battle of Kápolna, which this discharge of cannon opened, seems to have been given by the commander-in-chief only *par dépit.* As soon as it was lost, however, he had again ready a *new* definite plan of operations. We deduce this directly from *his own* declarations made in consequence of the victory at Szolnok. The lines of operation remained *the same* as those in the first plan, only Dembinski had this time to abandon the *deception by means of demonstration,* just because this deception was *no longer* possible after the battle of Kápolna. He consequently intended only to await the taking of Szolnok, and then immediately to resume the offensive on the main road of Gyöngyös. He calculated naturally *on this,* that the resolution with which the third army corps would advance on the railroad must oblige Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz either to weaken his main forces by detachments to the railway-line, or even completely retreat towards the capitals.

To *this* plan of operations also, and the combinations on which its execution depended, considered in itself, not much can be objected: only in the *preliminary arrangements for it,* Dembinski had again overlooked a *trifling matter.*

As is known, he intended to *conceal* his defeated and pursued seven army divisions for the time being in the

oft-mentioned cantonments, and to let them rest until—as has been said—Szolnok should be taken. In order to be *quite sure* that these seven army divisions should *not be discovered* in their hiding-places, Dembinski—since we had no invisible-caps in our possession—by way of wise precaution, *immediately after the battle of Kápolna*, should—beginning with Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz, and ending with the last hostile private soldier—have SO PASTED UP *the eyes of each man, that the whole Austrian army had remained at least* DURING EIGHT DAYS IN TOTAL BLINDNESS. Dembinski having neglected to do this, had to see his *second* plan of operations also wrecked in the combat at Eger-Farmos, and retreated in despair behind the Theiss.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

AFTER Dembinski's dismissal in the camp at Tiszafüred, it was felt to be urgently necessary that the troops should immediately march. Tiszafüred, whose stores were exhausted, proved to be very unfavourably situated for the speedy importation of large supplies—especially at that time, when the inundation had just set in. The conjoint chief command, which—as we shall presently see—had succeeded to Dembinski, was destitute of the firmness requisite for energetically repressing disorders arising in the camp.

In place of the just-wrecked plan of operations Vetter and Dembinski projected a *new* one, namely:

Demonstration on the high road of Gyöngyös with the seventh army corps.

Principal attack on the railway-line with the first, second, and third corps.

This plan of operations was submitted to the *President* for his *approval.* Undoubtedly Kossuth had good manners enough to find it incomparable; nevertheless—he might perhaps have thought—it would at the same time be desirable to be at once quite certain that no accessory circumstance had been neglected therein, in itself insignificant, and yet perhaps important enough to be espied by envious eyes, and immediately sharply criticised. Görgei or Klapka—Kossuth might have thought further—will certainly discover directly any weak point in this plan of operations, and if we omit previously to ask their judgment upon it, though only *pro forma,* they will do all they can to damage it with the troops; nay principally *on account of the troops,* with which both these commanders of army corps seem unfortunately to be very popular, this precaution is indispensable. Finally, Kossuth might have offered to take upon himself personally to confer *with me* about the plan of operations, leaving to General Vetter to speak with Klapka on the subject.

Thus I explain to myself the occasion of a *tête-à-tête* between me and Kossuth, during which he, after some hints about a certain amount of consideration which must still be shewn towards Dembinski, suddenly began upon the plan of operations, expressly assuring me that Dembinski and Vetter had, indeed, projected it, but that he (Kossuth) nevertheless wished, before he had it put into execution, to hear *my* judgment upon it. I answered, that a plan of operations was soon made, and

that, *as far as regarded theory*, there was just as little to object against *this* as against the one recently abandoned; the main point was the *execution*, the details of which depended upon the effect, not always to be foreseen, of the hostile counter-movements, as well as upon a great number of other casualties.

Hereupon I was dismissed, with the assurance of deeply-felt thanks, and so forth; but was shortly after again sent for by the President.

This time Kossuth—naturally again under four eyes—began in an especially confidential manner: that the definitive nomination of Vetter as commander-in-chief was *still undecided upon*, nay, all things considered, was *not even very probable;* that I had consequently *still further* to act as provisional commander-in-chief, and immediately to prepare for the execution of the new plan of operations.

Without hesitation I declared myself ready—taking Kossuth's hints about the still undecided definitive promotion of Vetter, in the first instance for nothing else than the natural consequence of a rising scruple on the part of the latter in the meanwhile—and hastened to consult with Klapka and the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps about the dispositions to be first made for the troops, according to the new plan of operations.

Soon after I had left Kossuth, Vetter came in quest of me, and likewise charged me with the *same* commission as I had already received from the former; but he—in contradiction to Kossuth—assigned as the sole and exclusive reason for it, the circumstance that the *personnel* of his war-office had been left behind in Debreczin, and that he was therefore not able immediately to take

the chief command in due form. He alleged this with such ingenuousness as in him—a man who seemed to be void of every kind of dissimulation—must be considered a proof that he had no presentiment of *the doubtfulness of his promotion*, which Kossuth had expressly specified as *the reason of my further acting as provisional commander-in-chief of the army.*

I sought *in vain* for a valid reason for this ambiguous behaviour on the part of the President. The sole supposition which occurred to me was, that Kossuth wished thereby merely to allay my presumed discontent at Vetter's appointment to the chief command, already definitively indicated, that I might not, so long as the army remained in Tiszafüred, and consequently in close contact with me, perchance entertain the idea of instigating the troops against Vetter. This supposition, however, seemed to me not sufficiently tenable. It would have been so perhaps, if, *with Vetter's previous knowledge*, Kossuth had given these hints about the improbability of his promotion. That the President, however, had dared to give these intimations *behind Vetter's back*, and had thereby seriously compromised him—who conducted himself towards me already as actual commander-in-chief of the army—but had at the same time exposed himself to the danger of being compromised by me with Vetter;—all this found in *that* supposition *no* foundation *whatever.*

Only *later* experience led me subsequently to suppose, that Kossuth, probably while in Tiszafüred, had felt that "*longing for the staff of command,*" which afterwards tormented him so often; that he therefore had taken advantage of Dembinski's removal to introduce a kind of interregnum in the chief command of the army,

during which he could satisfy this "longing" at least for a time; and that his ambiguous behaviour towards Vetter and myself, as well as *the whole comedy with the plan of operations*, had its origin only in his intention *to prolong the interregnum as much as possible*, whereby Kossuth might not have failed to make way for his direct influence with the army in future.

My proceedings during the interregnum were confined to signing the order of march for the first and second corps — which were sent from Tiszafüred down towards Czibakháza — and to reducing the *four* army divisions to *three*, this having been ordered long ago, as has been mentioned, by the war-minister, and the possibility of executing the order having at last presented itself in Tiszafüred.

Kossuth in the meantime had received critical news from Komorn. The commander of the fortress, General Török — it was said — was *not equal* to the post which he held; he was altogether deficient in firmness; a more energetic man must speedily be put in his place, if we would not run the risk of losing the fortress.

The President now consulted with me about the choice of a new commander of the fortress. I proposed Colonel Guyon for this post, as what was wanting here was *merely* an *energetic* man, and as the military council of the fortress consisted of men who were able to supply Colonel Guyon's deficiency in the knowledge necessary to every commander of a fortress.

Kossuth adopted this suggestion; nevertheless, to be quite secure, he thought it necessary to appoint *another* commander besides Guyon for the fortress of Komorn. His choice fell on the then Colonel Lenkey. Both had now to look out, *how* they should get into the fortress:

he who first succeeded in doing so, was to remove Török from his post, and take the command of the fortress upon himself.

The President previously made both of them generals, and at the same time also Colonels Damjanics, Klapka, and Aulich.

Count Guyon consequently left the seventh army corps; his division was broken up, and its troops incorporated into the other three divisions; whilst the command of the division of the right wing, which had become vacant by Aulich's nomination to general and commander of the second army corps, was given to the senior colonel of the latter.

The enemy having forced back our out-posts from Poroszló, and having burnt—after an attempt at a hasty reconnoitering towards the wretchedly constructed *tête-de-pont* of the Theiss — the Poroszló bridge over the brook Cserö; and the crossing of the river being impracticable on any other point between Tiszafüred and Tokaj, partly on account of the inundation, partly of the present want of materials for a bridge—the seventh army corps had now, with this changed aspect, to march up the river as far as Rakamaz, opposite Tokaj, in order here to gain at last the right bank of the Theiss.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

In the preceding chapter I gave expression to the conjecture, that Kossuth in Tiszafüred had striven primarily only for the establishment of his direct influence with the army. Apart from the evident pains he took to leave the post of commander-in-chief unoccupied as long as possible, whereby—easily circumventing the indolent war-minister—he brought himself into immediate contact with the several commanders of the troops,—I find this conjecture confirmed especially by his successful attempts to secure to himself for the future also this *quasi*-goodnaturedly-patriarchal official relation between him and myself.

How these attempts could be successful with me will become evident from what follows:

I had not seen Kossuth from the beginning of November 1848 till the early part of March 1849, and had kept up no direct intercourse whatever with him since his flight from Pesth to Debreczin. The correspondence between us, active as it had been during my sojourn in Presburg, was entirely interrupted some time before the evacuation of the capitals. Kossuth had in fact tried, whilst I was with the then corps d'armée of the upper Danube in the mountain-towns, to renew our correspondence; but without success, for I did not answer his letters. This I believed I owed to those officers of the corps d'armée, who continued to take part in the defence of the country *only in consequence of my proclamation of Waizen.*

Being obliged, however, only too soon to discover that Mészáros was, on the one hand, unfortunately altogether unworthy of the confidence which the officers had placed in the firmness of his political opinions, and, on the other, was in general calculated rather to bring the regular defence of the country by degrees completely into decay than to promote it;—it seemed to me much more advantageous for the security of the political basis on which I wished to maintain the war against Austria, as well as for the continuance of the contest itself, that I should no longer throw any obstacles in the way of a direct understanding between Kossuth and myself.

For this reason I had put the steps which became necessary for removing Dembinski from the chief command directly under the ægis of the government, by causing Szemere to take part in the assembly of staff-officers; for this reason also, on the arrival of Kossuth in Tiszafüred, I determined to press on him as much as possible a thorough consideration of the dangers which would ensue to Hungary from the intermixture of revolutionary tendencies with the legal cause of our combat in self-defence. I thought I should obtain this object most surely by surprising, as it were, Kossuth with the following question: *whether he did not think that Hungary might be* STILL *quite satisfied with the constitution of* 1848, IF THE PORTFOLIOS OF WAR AND FINANCE WERE AGAIN TRANSFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF VIENNA. Kossuth's answer was an evasive one; he thought only, he said, *that the liberty of* HUNGARY *would be* CONSTANTLY *in danger,* SO LONG AS POLAND ALSO WAS NOT FREE, *and that with the freedom of* HUNGARY *the freedom of* EUROPE *likewise would certainly be lost.*

The most natural question on my part would now have been, what Kossuth meant by the freedom of Hungary, Poland, and Europe; but he prevented me from any further scrutiny of his political creed by the declaration, which under existing circumstances was a very important one, *that he held it to be the* MOST SACRED *duty of all who meant* HONOURABLY *by the country, to agitate* NO QUESTION, *and to venture on* NO STEP, THE INVESTIGATION OR CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH *might divide the nation into parties, and so only* INCREASE THE POWER OF THE COMMON ENEMY OF ALL.

There was a severe reproof *for me* in this declaration; for it was I who had already, by the proclamation of Waizen, agitated *such a question* and ventured on *such a step.* But the more keenly I felt the censure contained in the declaration just *made by* KOSSUTH, the more strongly did I believe it contained a guarantee *that he would himself undertake* NOTHING BY WHICH THE POWER OF THE COMMON ENEMY OF US ALL SHOULD BE INCREASED.

On the strength of this belief I completely gave up *all further opposition to Kossuth,* and endeavoured to combat—unfortunately in vain—merely from the point of *Hungarian national* HONOUR, even his *Poland mania,* with which, *from* POLITICAL *aversion,* I could by no means connect myself. *This belief strengthened anew my confidence in Kossuth;* whilst his conduct, *simulating reciprocal confidence,* rendered me completely *inaccessible to any suspicion against him.*

After these premises it was no longer difficult for Kossuth to regulate the relation between us *quite as he thought proper;* not difficult for him to persuade me that in Debreczin there existed *a party* which was striving

to call forth a decision of the Diet, in accordance with which the nation would have to surrender to Prince Windisch-Grätz *at discretion;* that he could hardly any longer oppose with sufficient energy the agitations for *this* purpose, as he could not absent himself even for one day, without having to fear that a motion made with *this* intent might obtain the majority of the Lower-chamber; that he could venture on this jonrney to Tiszafüred only because the representatives had pledged to him their *word of honour that they would come to* NO *conclusion whatever during his absence, which had been limited to a certain number of days,* and that he had to be back at Debreczin without fail before the expiration of the fixed term, in order to preserve the nation from the most disgraceful of all fates, from *self-degradation,* SELF-ABANDONMENT; that there was but *one* thing which could save him for some time, and with him the whole country, from this painful situation, and this one thing was — *a victory!* — even if not a decisive one, at least one *upon which a retreat of our troops did not again immediately follow;* for that in Debreczin the watch-word ran, it is true, literally, "*Victory or death!*" but in reality signified, "*A victory! or we* DIE FROM ANGUISH."

Taking all this for *genuine truth, how could I suspect in the members of* THIS *party* (later the peace-party) *the* ADVOCATES OF MY POLITICAL CREED?

After I had already received, as has been mentioned, a lecture from the war-minister for my disobedience to Dembinski, Kossuth asked me: if I had been in Dembinski's place, what I would have done with Görgei? "I would have had him shot," I replied; "*for if I had been in Dembinski's place, I would not have issued* ORDERS

à la DEMBINSKI, *consequently would have given no* OCCASION *whatever for a* SIMILAR DISOBEDIENCE."

Of this answer Kossuth reported to the Diet *only the first clause:* the second clause, containing my reason, *he passed over in silence;* and thus represented me as the *poor repentant sinner pardoned* BY HIM.

The members of the later peace-party taking this also for *genuine truth,* how could they suspect in ME, the *poor sinner pardoned* BY KOSSUTH, *an* ADVOCATE OF THEIR POLITICAL CREED?

Kossuth *by lying* had interposed a thick veil *between* his political opponents, and thus retained free scope for the prosecution of his own "PERSONAL" *policy.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

KOSSUTH, Mészáros, and Vetter had left Tiszafüred again, and had returned to Debreczin; the first and second army corps were on their route to Szolnok; the seventh corps had now to cross the Theiss at Tiszafüred, in order to begin the demonstration on the main road of Gyöngyös; and as yet nobody knew who commanded the army!

The troops might suppose it was *myself;* whilst I was convinced of the contrary, but without knowing any thing more precisely about the future nomination of the commander-in-chief, than that, as has been already mentioned, on the one hand, Kossuth had contradicted the probability of Vetter's being appointed to this post;

on the other, only that Vetter had *acted as if he were already invested with the office*. Neither the latter circumstance nor Dembinski's removal were officially known; Mészáros had sunk within these few days in Tiszafüred completely to nought; Kossuth was still irresolute; and thus the army strolled, in a goodnatured spontaneity as it were, towards an uncertain destination.

So long as the impossibility of passing the Theiss with the seventh army corps at Tiszafüred, or between this point and Tokaj, had not been proved by attempts, I had, as commander of this corps—which moreover, according to the new plan of operations, had to operate *independently*—no particular reason to trouble myself much whether Peter or Paul should become commander-in-chief. But when the inevitable necessity suddenly forced itself on me, of gaining the right bank of the Theiss by means of the considerable circuit by Tokaj, then I had to fear that the delay—impossible to be foreseen at Kossuth and Vetter's departure from Tiszafüred—resulting therefrom to the demonstration on the main road of Gyöngyös, might essentially embarrass the future commander-in-chief of the army in the immediate execution of the new plan of operations. I hastened therefore to Debreczin, to learn *to whom* the command of the army had at last really been confided, and in order immediately by word of mouth to inform the new commander of this delay in the demonstration, and to urge him at once to decide that the previous plan of operations should remain in full force in spite of this delay, or if not—*what* task was next to be assigned to the seventh army corps.

On my arrival at Debreczin, I found Kossuth just

on the point of writing to me. He could now orally discuss with me the subject of his intended written communication. At first he asked me what qualifications I required in the future commander-in-chief of the army.

"*That he be a* SOLDIER *and a* HUNGARIAN; in other respects, whether older or younger in rank than myself is to me indifferent," was my answer.

Hereupon Kossuth informed me without any further circumlocution, that he had already signed Vetter's nomination as commander-in-chief. At the same time he asked me my judgment of him. I replied, that I could not yet give any opinion on Vetter, having been only twice in contact with him, and then but very transiently; that those, however, who professed to know him, represented him as an experienced, brave soldier.

Now it was not *this* which Kossuth wished to know about Vetter, but whether I did not think him capable of treason to the country.

In answer to this question I assured the President that Vetter had made on me the impression that he was a *man of honour*.

I intended now to take my leave, in order to find the new commander-in-chief, transact with him my business relating to the service, and then very speedily rejoin my corps. Kossuth, however, asked me to stay a little longer, as the first distribution of the recently created order of military merit was about to take place at his residence, and he should be pleased if I would assist in person on the occasion.

Soon afterwards the then civil and military coryphei of Hungary who were present at Debreczin assembled at Kossuth's.

Kossuth opened the ceremony by a short speech appropriate to the occasion; then called over the names of those who had been found worthy of having first conferred on them the order of the second class of military merit (there were three classes); and in conclusion decorated such of the persons named as happened to be present.

The ceremony was over, Vetter was present, and my time was short; I therefore availed myself of the occasion to state to him the reason for my being there; and after I had received his answer, that in spite of the delay in crossing the Theiss, the task of the seventh army corps in the operations for the next campaign remained *the one already mentioned,* I again left Debreczin—a few hours after my arrival there—and hastened back to my head-quarters at Egyek.

Among those who were decorated with the order of the second class of military merit were also Perczel and myself; nay—if I am not mistaken—even General Count Vécsei, whose merits in the field at that time, so far as I know, never sufficed to raise the standard of value above the freezing-point. General Klapka, on the contrary, was passed over, "*out of consideration*" *for Mészáros*—as was said.

In order to understand *how an injustice towards Klapka* could be demanded out of "*consideration*" *for Mészáros,* we must remember that Mészáros, after he had been repeatedly unmercifully beaten by Field-marshal Schlick, had transferred the command of his utterly demoralised corps to Klapka, and that he, a few weeks later, *with the same troops,* had successfully engaged *the same enemy* in several hot battles.

This "*consideration*" for Mészáros *at Klapka's ex-*

pense becomes perfectly *explicable,* if we consider that Mészáros himself, as war-minister, *could* NOT *play* A PASSIVE *part in the scrutiny of those who were to be decorated.* Nay, we are obliged to recognise such "consideration" positively as a *postulate* of the most tender *duty towards oneself,* when—*as in the present instance* —ONE AND THE SAME human skin encloses *him who is both the object and the agent in the "consideration."*

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE *tête-de-pont* between Tiszafüred and Poroszló had already received an adequate number of troops from the second army corps. Directly after my return from Debreczin, the whole seventh army corps consequently was marched from Egyek and Csege by Tiszapolgár, Szent-Mihály, Tiszalök, and Nagy-Falu to Rakamaz.

In the stead of the bridge on piles over the Theiss, uselessly destroyed by fire in the month of January out of excessive fear of an offensive against Debreczin on the part of Field-marshal Schlick, the passage over the Theiss between Rakamaz and Tokaj had been re-established by means of a floating bridge. Over the river Hernád at Gesztely was thrown a similar bridge, time enough to enable the seventh army corps, after its passage over the Theiss, to advance without impediment from Tokaj by Miskolcz to the main road of Gyöngyös, and pursuing it further, with the division of the right wing as far as Szikszó, with those of the centre and of the left wing as far as Szihalom and Mezö-Kövesd.

In Tokaj the army corps had suffered a diminution of eight squadrons of hussars, which, according to the order of the commander-in-chief, had to be sent to Czibakháza for the re-inforcement of the main body of the army.

In Miskolcz the army corps sustained another loss of from 300 to 400 infantry, one platoon of hussars, and two guns. Of these troops an independent column was formed and detached into the northern comitates against the Sclavonian militia, which the hostile brigades under Götz and Jablonowski had left there, when they marched, after Dembinski had retreated behind the Theiss, from Kaschau by Miskolcz into the district of the operations of their chief army.

It was also in Miskolcz that I saw for the first time the *octroyed* constitution of the 4th of March, with its boundless proviso; that OBTRUDED *gigantic bond*, with the clause, "*I will pay* WHEN IT PLEASES ME!"

In Mezö-Kövesd we received information from a scout that the nearest hostile corps was stationed at Heves, while on the main road before us, even as far as Gyöngyös, no enemy had been seen.

The demonstration had consequently to begin with the march to Heves; and the army corps at the height of Szikszó was directed from the main road in two columns towards the south, one of which advanced by Erdötelek, the other by Besenyö. An over-hasty patrol of hussars betrayed to the enemy our approach too soon. He drew back—so said the report—towards Jász-Apáti.

We thought we had now once more to continue our demonstration against the capitals parallel with the main road, to induce Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz—whose attention must have been already directed

to us in consequence of the reports of the column which had retreated from Heves—to detach larger forces against us, and thus facilitate in a direct manner the advance of our main army on the railway-line against the capitals. Vetter had, however, meanwhile crossed the Theiss at Czibakháza only to retreat again immediately behind it, and again to project a new plan of operations, the execution of which had to begin with marching back from Czibakháza to Tiszafüred, and passing the Theiss between this place and Poroszló. The seventh army corps was ordered, from its position at Besenyö and Erdötelek, to protect this passage.

This was the end of the demonstration of the seventh army corps against the capitals, as well as of the whole second offensive, which had scarcely begun.

About the same time I charged the small expeditionary corps, which had been detached from Miskolcz into the northern comitates against the Sclavonian militia, to direct its inroads mainly towards Komorn. Thereby, on the one hand, an end would be put to the patrolling about of hostile detachments in the valley of the Eipel (Ipoly); on the other, the enemy would be induced, by the bold marches of this insignificant expeditionary column, to suppose the approach of a stronger corps, as well as the intention *to relieve Komorn by its means.*

After two-thirds of the main army had debouched at Poroszló, the seventh army corps as vanguard lined the Tarna from Fel-Döbrö as far as Bod, and awaited in this position the approach of the main body.

Meanwhile divers rumours were heard about the details of the passage across the Theiss at Czibakháza, and the retreat behind the river immediately subsequent

thereupon; and these rumours, taken together, attributed to Field-marshal L. Vetter, if possible, still less ability for the post of commander-in-chief than Dembinski had shewn. I could not therefore but apprehend that I should see the just-impending offensive founder once more in consequence of incapacity in the command. This thought left me no peace.

While my army corps was stationed on the Tarna, and had every prospect of remaining inactive during some days, I started, about the end of March, from Kerecsend for Tiszafüred, where Kossuth, Vetter, Damjanics, Klapka, and Aulich were then staying. I hoped to succeed so far as that the new plan of operations, in case it was already adopted, as well as the nearest preparations for its execution, might previously be brought before a military council to be deliberated upon.

Of the persons just named, Generals Damjanics and Klapka were the first whom I met in Tiszafüred. Before them I gave vent in some severe remarks to my vexation at the purposeless moving to and fro of the army with which Field-marshal L. Vetter had entered on his new charge; and was not a little surprised when Damjanics interrupted me, in order to accuse *himself*, in Vetter's stead, of deserving the blame of the recent sudden abandonment of the plan of operations; for he it was who—*contrary to his former custom*—intimidated by the news that the enemy, 60,000 strong, stood opposite them, had proposed the immediate return of the troops, when they had scarcely effected their passage over the Theiss.

I had never before either seen or spoken to Damjanics. The manly frankness which he shewed by accusing himself in Vetter's stead—although averse to

him in his inmost soul—won for him at once my esteem and confidence; while, on the other hand, the certainty that Field-marshal L. Vetter had no part in the blame of the miscarriage of the late offensive deprived me of every reason for doubting the capability of the commander-in-chief for his post.

I naturally desisted now, without further hesitation, from my original design of having the project for the nearest operations submitted to the judgment of a military council, and confined myself to informing the President Kossuth, and the commander-in-chief of the army Vetter, that I had come, as presumptive leader of the vanguard, merely for the purpose of receiving oral information—consequently more circumstantial—relative to my special mission during the next advance.

Vetter informed me that he intended for the present to confine himself to a single compact advance along the main road as far as Gyöngyös, and to arrange the movements to be executed further on than Gyöngyös according to those of the enemy, but at all events to maintain the offensive until something decisive should happen.

Thus, in the end of March 1849, the Hungarian chief army—according to the documents, the baggage-train included, not quite 42,000 men strong, with about 160 pieces of artillery, two being twelve-pound batteries of six guns each—was concentrated in the near environs of the battle-field of Kápolna, in order for once to act at last in earnest.

On the 31st of March we had already reached, with the main body Gyöngyös, with the advanced troops (the seventh army corps) Hort, without drawing a blade.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

DURING our advance to Gyöngyös and Hort, Field-marshal L. Vetter suddenly fell ill; and the Hungarian army was again without a leader, facing the enemy, who was ready for fighting.

According to rank, it seemed to be due to *me* as a matter of course to act as Vetter's representative in the chief command. I felt, however, an inward repugnance to demanding that *here rank alone* should decide, while I *myself* adopted the principle of allowing the mere rank to exercise an influence in the choice of my sub-commanders *only* between candidates of almost *equal aptitude.*

I therefore insisted only on the speedy filling up of the vacant chief command; while Damjanics and Klapka expressly demanded that it should be transferred to *me,* as the senior in rank of the commanders of corps. Kossuth was consequently obliged to appoint me at least as Vetter's provisional substitute. He had thereby probably to overcome two concentrically-opposed sentiments, namely, *his childish fear of my presumptive rivalry,* and *his own longing for the staff of the chief command;* because *only thus* can it be explained how—in spite of the *pressing* necessity for a leader's being given to the army which was advancing on the offensive —*several days* could elapse from the arrival of the medical report stating Vetter's physical inability to take a personal share in the campaign, until my nomination as commander-in-chief *ad interim.*

I believe I make no mistake in asserting that it was on the evening of the 30th of March 1849, that Kossuth's order for me to appear in Erlau without delay reached me in Gyöngyös. I arrived at Erlau during the same night, received there on the morning of the 31st of March from Kossuth the charge to take the command of the army meanwhile, *until Vetter should recover*, and returned in the evening to Gyöngyös.

In the meantime we were informed by scouts that the enemy was about to concentrate his main forces at Gödöllö, and had established intrenchments on the points of passage across the little river Galga, as well as at the convent of Besenyö. Thus it seemed as if Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz intended to maintain the defensive, and await our principal attack on the main road from Gyöngyös to Pesth.

This line of attack being intersected by the two little rivers Zagyva and Galga, the marshy banks of which *of themselves* rendered the advance of an army uncommonly difficult, Klapka proposed to attack on the Gyöngyös main road only with the seventh army corps; while with the first, second, and third corps, from Gyöngyös by Arokszállás and Jász-Berény, to turn the defensive position of the enemy on the Galga in its right flank.

All attacks combined with far turnings expose, it is well known, one of the two parts of the army on the offensive, which are isolated from each other during the manœuvre of turning, to the danger of being attacked and beaten by a hostile superior force, whereupon the other part commonly shares the same fate.

The extent of this danger bears an exact relation to the extent of the circuit which the turning-column makes.

In the above-mentioned project of Klapka, for instance, the seventh army corps had by itself to be exposed during at least four or five days to the overpowering attack of the hostile main army presumed to be on the Galga; a space of time during which Prince Windisch-Grätz and his counsellors must necessarily have been *asleep* to be *too late* in remarking the movement of our principal column of attack.

But when I nevertheless voted *for* the execution of Klapka's project, I did so only because I had already repeatedly experienced—as, indeed, only a short while ago under Dembinski—that if *opposed to Prince Windisch-Grätz*, many a strategic sin might be committed altogether with impunity.

My appointment to Vetter's post obliged me to remit the command of the seventh army corps to the oldest commander of division in the corps, for whom again was substituted in his command the oldest staff-officer of the division.

Vetter having retained his staff in Tiszafüred, I also transferred to the chief of the general staff of the seventh army corps the management of the details of the collective operations of the army, and put in his place in the seventh army corps a staff-officer of hussars fortunately competent for the office.

It was understood as a matter of course that all these changes were to be considered only as temporary, so long as Vetter's return still remained in prospect.

Klapka's project of turning the enemy had received, besides my assent, also that of the provisional chief of the general staff of the whole army, and the beginning of the turning was fixed for the 2d of April. On the same day the seventh army corps was to commence, by

its advance as far as Hatvan on the Zagyva, its attacks on the position of the enemy on the main road from Gyöngyös to Pesth. The results of a reconnoitering, undertaken the day before (1st of April), from Hort towards this point, gave us reason to suppose that the enemy (the Schlick corps) would make a vigorous resistance.

Field-marshal Schlick did more than that. He even took up the offensive (on the 2d of April) simultaneously with our seventh army corps. The encounter between it and the Schlick corps took place half way from Hort to Hatvan.

The royal Hungarian seventh army corps conquered.

Hatvan and the line of the Zagyva from Szent-Jakab as far as Fénszaru were the immediate fruits of this victory, equally important to us in a strategic as in a tactic point of view: in a *strategic*, because the possession of the line of the Zagyva essentially facilitated the masking of the manœuvre of our principal column of attack; in a *tactic*, because the seventh army corps, about 15,000 strong, in the position of Hatvan could resist any repeated hostile attack that could be attempted far more successfully with half its strength, than in that at Hort with its whole.

I had purposely remained in my head-quarters at Gyöngyös during the battle at Hatvan, consequently far from the field, that I might not embarrass during the action my substitute in the seventh army corps on his *début* as independent commander. So that the favourable issue of this battle brought us, besides the material advantage, also the moral one of the satisfactory conviction that to the new commander of the seventh army corps could confidently be intrusted the accomplishment of the highly important mission which fell to the share

of this corps during the turning-manœuvre of the principal column of attack; and the already commenced turning was continued with so much the more confidence.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE first, second, and third army corps*—about 27,000 men in all—were stationed during the battle of Hatvan, on the 2d of April, at Arokszállás; in the evening of the 3d of April they reached Jász-Berény; Kossuth and I arrived simultaneously with them at the latter place, both having left Gyöngyös that morning.

General Klapka had meanwhile been informed that the corps of Ban Jellachich had been seen in the course of the day marching from Alberti towards Pilis along the railway line.

According to our plan of march we had to reach on the 4th of April, with the first corps Tápió-Bicske, with the third Nagy-Káta, with the second Tápió-Szele.

In consequence of the news about the proximity of the Croats, Klapka left at daybreak on the 4th of April the camp at Jász-Berény, in order to advance over Tápió-Bicske on the direct route towards Pesth, so as aggressively to cross the supposed movement of the Ban against Gödöllö, and thereby frustrate, if possible, his junction with Prince Windisch-Grätz. General Dam-

* The strength of these three army corps was at that time very unequal: the first (Klapka) amounted to from 11,000 to 12,000 men; the second (Aulich) reached about 9,000; the third (Damjanics) fluctuated between 6,000 and 7,000; the baggage-train included.

janics, with the third corps, followed close behind Klapka as far as Nagy-Káta. General Aulich moved with the second, as arranged, to Tápió-Szele.

The victory of our seventh army corps at Hatvan, which, as is known, had been gained without my personal co-operation, had determined me to adopt the plan of leaving in future the hands of all the commanders of corps *completely free* in the execution of the task assigned them, and to interfere only at critical times: for if my personal influence as commander-in-chief had a decidedly favourable effect, it ought to be reserved for moments of the most imminent danger; if it had not, then I undoubtedly did better the seldomer I made it felt.

Thus Klapka also was not to be embarrassed in the least by my presence during his offensive against the Ban. Not till late in the morning of the 4th of April did I leave Jász-Berény, in order to remove my head-quarters to Nagy-Káta, after having advised Kossuth—being concerned for his personal safety—rather to await the results of the day in the former place.

I was with my suite perhaps half way to Nagy-Káta, when we saw thick clouds of smoke ascending from behind it, appearing to indicate an artillery action; but hearing no thundering of cannon, although the distance was apparently short, we took these clouds of smoke to be merely the consequence of an accidental fire-brand, and troubled ourselves no more about it. This delusion, however, did not last long. In the next quarter of an hour I received a report, that Klapka had encountered the enemy near Tápió-Bicske, and was already retreating.

We now hastened our ride, and soon found this Job's-post unfortunately more than sufficiently confirmed;

for already in Nagy-Káta we met the first army corps fleeing *en débandade* from Tápió-Bicske back thither.

I inquired first of all for General Klapka, its commander; but he being no where to be found, I next attempted to stop and arrange again the frightened and dispersed battalions. My suite assisted me therein with great devotedness. From useless exhortations it came to flat, and at last to sharp strokes; however, the hostile projectiles had constantly far more effect than our blades. I had soon sufficiently convinced myself of it; and now sent to General Damjanics, who was with his corps in the camp behind Nagy-Káta, an order by the most severe measures to put a stop to the flight of the first corps, to arrange it, and send it again in advance. At the same time I ordered my suite to assist General Damjanics therein, whilst I continued my original route towards Tápió-Bicske, in order to make myself in the meanwhile acquainted with the position and strength of the enemy.

The last swarms of the first army corps had not quite passed me, when an officer, whom I remembered to have seen once in Klapka's suite, galloped on from the direction of the abandoned field of battle. With the intention of learning from him something more particular respecting the fate of his chief, I barred his way.

"Save yourself . . . Klapka has fallen . . . a battery is lost . . . all away . . . the enemy already here . . . !!!" cried he, while still far from me, and anticipating my questions. One might have taken this ill-omened man, from his laconic reports, for a Spartan, had he not been at the same time so anxiously endeavouring, first on the right, and then on the left, to get past me. I held the edge of my sabre across his

nose, that he might at last stop his horse and give me an answer. But now it was evident, that this pseudo-Spartan knew nothing certain either about Klapka or the army, least of all about the enemy; and I let him immediately continue his course.

In the next moment, quitting the south-western extremity of Nagy-Káta, I stood upon the field of battle abandoned by the fugitive first corps; at gun-range before me the little river Tápió, which cannot be forded on account of its marshy banks; on the other side of it, at the distance of about half a (German) mile, Tápió-Bicske; between it and the river the ground hilly and sandy, near the river more level; the only bridge across the river Tápió, and at the same time the single direct communication between these places, already crossed by a part of the enemy's infantry, under the protection of the hostile artillery planted along the opposite bank of the river; the openly displayed forces of the enemy small in proportion to those of the defeated first army corps; the regaining of the bridge by all means our next task: this was the sum of what I was able to perceive at a first glance.

General Damjanics had taken up a position before the south-western extremity of Nagy-Káta, which faced the field of battle, with half of his forces, the Visocki division, at the very commencement of Klapka's retreat, in order to receive him. These troops stood consequently already prepared for action, while those of Klapka were still fleeing. The numerical strength of the Visocki division certainly did not amount to a third part of the first army corps, but it comprised the third and ninth Honvéd battalions, besides a battalion of the Schwarzenberg regiment, under the command of the

high-spirited Count Charles Leiningen-Westerburg, and defeated forthwith the same enemy who had just discomfited Klapka's whole corps.

While a battery, planted along the river below the bridge, vigorously attacked the position of the hostile artillery, the third and ninth Honvéd battalions advanced concentrically against the bridge itself. The *tirailleurs* at the first onset drove back to the opposite bank the swarm of the enemy's sharp-shooters, who had already advanced to this side of the river. The serried sections of both battalions, full of emulation, prepared to storm the bridge; but instead of at once impetuously advancing over it, out of rivalry they ran foul of each other when close to it. The honour of first storming was vigorously contended for by the ninth and third battalions in turn. The commander of the third battalion fortunately put a speedy end to the dispute by a heroic impromptu action. With swift resolve he seized the banner of the ninth battalion, rode with it over the bridge amid the hostile grape-shot, and next moment the two battalions, exasperated against each other, stormed in unison, the third battalion following its brave commander, the ninth its banner.

The enemy quitted the position along the river, and retreated behind the nearest sand-hills. Here he offered indeed once more an energetic resistance; but it lasted no longer than the passage of the Visocki division over the bridge. As soon as this was effected, the enemy repulsed anew began his retreat, and having evacuated even Tápió-Bicske, posted himself for the last time on the heights to the south-west of this place; he did not, however, again await our attack, but preferred a hasty retreat towards Kóka to any further conflict.

When we arrived at the place of his last position, he had already got beyond the fire of our guns; he could only be reached by our cavalry. It was consequently my intention to have him pursued by them.

General Damjanics meanwhile—after he had succeeded in stopping and re-forming the Klapka corps, and had despatched it together with the remaining half of his own corps from Nagy-Káta towards Tápió-Bicske—hastening in advance of these troops with the rest of his cavalry, had arrived at the Visocki division. From him I requested that a troop might be detached in pursuit of the enemy. He appointed for this purpose the whole of his cavalry, the Hanover and Ferdinand hussar regiments, under the command of the then Colonel (afterwards General) Joseph von Nagy-Sándor.

Nagy-Sándor led the hussars brilliantly forward: it appeared to us as if the *queue* of the hostile column began to disband itself. Nagy-Sándor commenced the pursuit with some well-executed changes of direction, sometimes to the left, sometimes to the right: the fleeing enemy gained ever more ground. Nagy-Sándor made hereupon a decided turn to the left against the peaceful village of Pand, situated far from the line of the enemy's retreat, blockaded it, took it afterwards by storm; and finally returned from the pursuit with a few private servants as captives, and as booty the baggage of their masters. The fleeing enemy must have felt deeply indebted to him.

The first army corps and the rest of the third had meanwhile also arrived on the south-western heights of Tápió-Bicske. I ordered them to bivouac there; and rode back to the village, for the purpose of speaking with General Klapka, who, as I just learnt, had been

seen there. To my great satisfaction, I found that no mischance had happened to his person. Less satisfactory were his communications about the circumstances which had brought on the defeat of the first corps.

When just about entering Tápió-Bicske, it was surprised on the outskirts of this place by the fire of hostile infantry. The head of the column was dispersed like chaff before the wind, and the enemy, speedily developing his forces, immediately assumed the offensive.

Klapka, in order to gain time for deploying his long marching-column, ordered a part of his cavalry to charge the enemy. But the first regiment of hussars (Emperor), which he had appointed to make the attack, unfortunately belonged to the most uncertain troops in our army. Its staff-officers attacked, but their divisions turned back, threw themselves on Klapka's columns which were deploying, and spread terror and confusion among them. One single battery stood firm, while all the other parts of the corps, now seeking safety in flight, hastened back to the bridge over the Tápió. The enemy captured the abandoned battery, and could now direct the destructive fire of his guns, henceforth unobstructed, upon the masses, which, unable to resist, were already close to the entrance of the Tápió bridge, and thronged together in a densely entangled clew. Absolute despondency reigned in their ranks. Some sought refuge against the hostile balls in the marshes of the Tápió—escape from the roaring of the death that threatened, in the dismal silence of the extinction that awaited them.

All efforts on the part of Klapka to re-organise his troops for fight were in vain. He had at last to think of his own safety. He descended along the river towards

Tápió-Szele, and was fortunate enough to discover in this direction a second passage across the Tápió; on account of the great circuit he had to make, however, he did not reach Nagy-Káta till the Visocki division had already advanced to the attack.

However, the speedy and successful prosecution of this offensive tranquillised him at least as to the further fate of his own corps; and utterly exhausted, he now sought first of all the rest so urgently necessary to recruit him.

Those about him had probably kept that circumstance secret out of consideration for him: and this naturally explained the divers rumours afloat respecting his fate; one representing him as wounded and a prisoner, another as having fallen on the field of battle, a third as suffocated in the marshes of the Tápió; which altogether, considering the events of the day, appeared certainly more credible than the real cause of his long absence from the first army corps.

Klapka's loss on that day was therefore important in a material no less than in a moral point of view; for besides a considerable number of men able to bear arms and a whole battery,* he lost also a good part of our confidence in his wise foresight *before*, as well as in his steady perseverance *during* danger.

Both losses were naturally felt equally by all of us, but the moral perhaps more sensibly by us than by him.

* After the conflict at Tápió-Bicske, it was commonly said in our army that the Visocki division had regained from the enemy the battery taken from Klapka. I do not remember, however, to have received any official report to that effect; and as far as I could see with my own eyes, the enemy in his retreat before the Visocki division left behind on the field of battle only one long howitzer and an ammunition-chest which had caught fire.

We got over the material loss, however, and consoled ourselves for the moral one with the hope that Klapka, by the defeat of his whole corps, as well as by the victory gained directly afterwards by one half of the third corps, would be rendered more circumspect, and at the same time incited to endeavour to be in future more prudent and firmer.

The premature disclosure of our plan for the principal attack, however—in consequence of the participation of the Visocki division in the combat, rendered necessary by Klapka's defeat—could neither be undone by philosophising, nor could we console ourselves with any well-founded hopes respecting it; and it was only the apprehension of seeing our seventh army corps at Hatvan endangered in the highest degree by even the shortest interruption of the offensive, that determined us to persevere in the turning-manœuvre, though it had been betrayed.

For this reason, in spite of the uncommon fatigues of the preceding evening, the first army corps had to advance on the 5th of April as far as Süly, the third as far as Szecsö on the line of retreat of the enemy, leading towards Kóka, while the second corps was sent to Tó-Almás. The latter place was for us on that day the most important point to reach. For it was possible that the army of the Ban, with the rear-guard of which we had been engaged the day before near Tápió-Bicske, felt strong enough to attempt by itself near Fénszaru to cross the Zagyva, which was watched at this point on our part only by a standing patrol, and then, appearing to the south-east of Hatvan—consequently in the rear of our seventh army corps—with the simultaneous assistance of the Schlick corps in front, to take it between

two fires. To hinder this manœuvre, or in case the Ban, though it seemed not probable, should have employed already the night between the 4th and 5th of April in executing it, to take him in the same snare which he had laid for our seventh army corps,—was the strategic idea on which was based the above-mentioned direction to Tó-Almás, given to General Aulich with the second army corps.

I betook myself thither in the course of the afternoon, while my head-quarters remained behind in Szent-Márton-Káta, where at the same time Kossuth with his attendants arrived from Jász-Berény.

When I reached Tó-Almás, the corps of the Ban, coming from the west, was just passing Zsámbok, and moved in a single long column towards Fénszaru; thus confirming our previous supposition as to the next operation of this corps.

I was determined quietly to await the beginning of his passage over the Zagyva, and then immediately to attack with the second corps, at the same time sending the third from Szecsö to Dány, and the first from Süly to Kóka. The hostile column, however, when it reached the Zagyva, suddenly halted, and soon afterwards turned back again, directing its march in the opposite direction towards Gödöllö.

From the position of both armies decisive conflicts being in prospect for the next two days, I preferred now to reserve the strength of the second army corps, and confined myself to harassing the marching back of the hostile corps from the Zagyva only by two squadrons of hussars.

We could not explain to ourselves on that day what the Ban could have intended by the two contrary man-

œuvres which followed each other in so short a time; for this momentary appearing on the Zagyva was evidently not sufficient for a demonstration against our seventh army corps, and there were far too many troops for a mere reconnoitering of the passage across the river at Fénszaru, for which a common patrol would have been quite enough.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

On the 6th of April the first and third army corps were ordered to advance as far as Isaszeg, the second as far as Dány. My head-quarters adjoined the latter; whilst I intended to await with some attendants at Kóka either the uninterruptedly executed advance, or the commencement of a probable conflict.

Considering the short distance, we had not the least doubt that the thunder of an action with artillery, if fought at Isaszeg, would be quite distinctly heard in Kóka.

Early in the forenoon the forest of Isaszeg caught fire. The rural inhabitants of the district said that the Croats had set fire to it intentionally, in order to render it impossible for our army corps to advance through it.

About midday the Damjanics and Klapka army corps encountered the Ban near Isaszeg; the thunder of artillery, however, did not penetrate over to us at Kóka, and the clouds of smoke ascending from the burning forest

by their gigantic extent concealed from us the smoke of the battle at Isaszeg. Just as little prepared for the one as for the other event, I had neither made it known in the head-quarters at Dány, nor to the two army corps which had been directed to Isaszeg, that I was to be found in Kóka; and thus I did not receive till about three o'clock in the afternoon, by a hussar who had been sent in advance with my horses, a report of the commencement of the combat and of its unfavourable turn.

In alarm I hastened to reach the battle-field; having previously despatched an officer of my suite to General Aulich with an order to start immediately with the second army corps for Isaszeg.

I had no idea that Aulich was already on his way; that the chief of the general staff, who had remained behind in Dány, had made him advance soon after the commencement of the conflict. The more gloomily, during my anxious ride from Kóka to the battle-field, I felt my hope—to call the day still ours—shrouded in night by the apprehension that Aulich would arrive too late, the more joyously was it illumined, as by the stroke of a magic wand, when, about half a mile from Isaszeg, in the forest, which was still in flames in different parts, I suddenly saw before me the second army corps.

Almost at the same instant, an officer of hussars of the seventh army corps came galloping towards me—seemingly from the extreme left wing of the enemy—with a report that the enemy had abandoned the line of the Galga without drawing a blade, and that the seventh army corps had marched to Gödöllö. Now I believed I was quite certain of victory.

We could judge only approximately, by our ear, of the position of the battle; for the forest did not permit us to see far.

A little to the right from the direction of the forest-way on which the Aulich corps advanced to the battle-field, the thunder of cannon was the most lively, on both sides framed as it were by the crepitating fire of musketry. On the left wing the discharge of small arms seemed to be far more feeble, and the point from which it could be heard much further distant from the line of artillery-fire than that on the right.

Aulich, led by this indication, directed two battalions of his corps to the right, forward, to re-inforce the extreme right wing, while he pursued unceasingly with his main body the forest-way on which he was, which seemed to lead straight to the left wing of the line of artillery-fire, as perceived by the ear. Between this point and that of the engagement of tirailleurs, which was heard, as has been said, much more to the left, we supposed there was a wide interval in our line of battle: I now took likewise the same direction, and outstripping the Aulich column, had soon left it behind me, when there suddenly emerged before me some isolated battalions of the Klapka corps, which were once more retreating as they pleased.

Consequently our ideas as to the situation of the combat were unfortunately confirmed. The left wing under Klapka had already taken to flight; only the right under Damjanics, and on the extreme left two battalions—likewise sent thither by Damjanics for Klapka's assistance—still remained.

At the mere sight of the fleeing battalions of Klapka I could scarcely contain my indignation; for the recent

disgraceful behaviour of these troops before Tápió-Bicske was present to my mind.

Under threats of the most degrading punishments, I ordered them to return instantly to the battle-field.

Quickly and lightly they had stepped out while retreating; now that they had again to march forward, they dragged themselves toilsomely along, as if near sinking to the ground from weariness.

One of the commanders of these battalions seemed to have his heart in the right place. "My battalion retreats by the order of General Klapka!" he called to me in a haughty tone. I considered this assertion an empty excuse; but the commander of the battalion maintained it obstinately, and said that Klapka, who was not far off, and was retreating in person with his main body, would confirm it.

I hastened in search of him; and found him in the direction indicated, actually occupied with arranging his retreating main body.

To my question, what was the meaning of this retreat, while Damjanics, on the contrary, alone kept his ground on the battle-field; he declared he was forced to advise the giving up of the combat, for his infantry had not a single cartridge left, and was besides already too much exhausted. "Victory," he added, "no longer possible to-day, may be possible to-morrow;" and the expression on his features shewed me that he had but spoken out his inmost conviction.

Here my authority as commander-in-chief was at an end. Klapka's conviction of the necessity of the retreat had first to be shaken, before I could expect to see my order again to attack executed.

I consequently called upon General Klapka to con-

sider, that he himself had projected the plan of attack, from the execution of which he intended to desist to-day, to find it to-morrow undoubtedly still more difficult; that he himself had recognised as an indispensable condition, the execution most punctually of the ordered dispositions day by day, and at any cost; that the reasons on which he founded his dissuasion from the combat were not at all valid, for the infantry seemed, judging by its speed in the retrograde movement, to be by no means so much exhausted, as that it could not yet essay some attacks with the bayonet, and *for this* they had *still cartridges enough*, even if they had absolutely fired away the last. "Conquer to-day!" I called out at last, "or back behind the Theiss! Such is the alternative. I know of no third. Damjanics still continues the battle—Aulich advances: we *must* conquer!"

A resolute "Forward!" was the surprising reply of Klapka; and I now hastened again to the field of battle to animate the brave Damjanics to a still further perseverance by the joyful news of the speedy arrival of Aulich, and the renewed advance of Klapka.

The same way, which I had left a few moments ago for the purpose of finding Klapka, led me to the north-western edge of the forest. The field of battle was now extended before me, to the right and to the left bounded in form of a bow by this edge.

The line of battle which our troops occupied—in its eastern (right) half ever firmly maintained by Damjanics, in the western (left) already given up by Klapka—leant with both wings on the last northern spurs of the forest of Isaszeg lying in our rear, these spurs projecting towards the enemy.

Before the centre of our line of battle, at gun-range

distance, lay the point on which the brook Rákos, the course of which from Gödöllö thus far is a south-eastern one, suddenly turns westward to the village of Isaszeg, situated immediately in front of our left wing.

We stood consequently on the *left* bank of the Rákos, parallel with its lower (western) course and its imaginary prolongation towards the east; whilst the enemy was posted opposite to us—close above the deviation of the brook from south-east to west—*à cheval* of its bed: with the right wing beyond (to the north of) the burning village of Isaszeg, on the plateau of a high commanding steep ravine along the right bank, with the left wing, however, on the left bank, across the sloping ridge, which is here no longer wooded, and which, flanking the upper course of the Rákos, stretches northward to Gödöllö, and on the southern declivity of which lies that projection of the forest of Isaszeg which was occupied by our right wing.

The nature of the ground required on both sides the employment of the infantry on the extreme wings, while on the wide plain between them the battle was waged exclusively by the cavalry and the artillery.

At the moment when I arrived in the centre of our line, the point of support of our left wing (the height covered by the forest-spur to our left, which advances to the brook Rákos close below Isaszeg) had been taken by storm in spite of the obstinate resistance of the two battalions which Damjanics had detached thither, as above mentioned, to re-inforce Klapka. Between this point and General Damjanics' left wing (which lay in the centre of our original line of battle) opposite to the enemy's right wing gaped the immense interval caused by Klapka's precipitate retreat. The left wing of the

Damjanics army corps was consequently quite isolated. The greatest part of the cavalry of this corps, which had been concentrated here for the protection of Damjanics' left wing, was, however, already in retreat when I arrived on the spot.

I instantly stopped the retreat, and ordered the hussars immediately to march forward again at the same height as the far-advanced right wing.

While this was being executed, I rode towards that spur of the forest which—as our *right* point d'appui—the infantry of the third corps (Damjanics) still continued to defend firmly against the attacks with the bayonet made by the hostile *left* wing, and where Damjanics in person was also just then.

I found this brave man, in spite of the critical position in which Klapka's unjustifiable retreat had placed him, unshaken, undaunted. Nothing was further from his thoughts than giving up the combat; although the unsparing expressions in which he gave vent to his indignation at Klapka's behaviour, plainly shewed that he had by no means overlooked the danger of being taken in his left and opened out by the hostile right wing.

I tried to tranquillise Damjanics by assuring him that Klapka was again advancing. His confidence in Klapka, however—already greatly shaken in consequence of the day of Tápió-Bicske—seemed now to be completely destroyed.

"What avails this advance?" cried Damjanics; "if a drunken Honvéd complains of sickness, and another throws open the lid of his cartridge-box, Klapka will straightway lament afresh that his battalions are tired to death and have no more cartridges; will immediately turn back anew, and leave me again in the lurch."

The news of the proximity of Aulich, and of the two battalions, which, as has been mentioned, had been sent in advance from the second army corps to reinforce the extreme right wing, appeared the more to pacify General Damjanics.

The quick remark, that now it was possible to advance again, with which Damjanics received my communication that Aulich would soon arrive, not only now rendered superfluous every exhortation to continued perseverance, but it made me even fear that Damjanics intended to resume directly the offensive against the hostile left wing.

I say "fear," because by the first glance at the field of battle I had been convinced, that strategically the offensive was at present ordered *only to our left wing*, while the right had to content itself with maintaining its position.

In order to justify this conviction I must again mention the report which was made to me, before I met Klapka, by an officer of hussars of the seventh army corps, relative to the advancing of this corps towards Gödöllö, on the road of Gyöngyös to Pesth.

Admitting this report to be correct, and perceiving, from the strength of the enemy immediately in front of us, that he had left behind for the protection of Gödöllö but an insignificant force, I could confidently expect the speedy and victorious appearance of our seventh corps in the rear of the hostile left wing. It could not be doubted that a defeat awaited the latter in consequence of the double attack in front and rear, of which this expectation gave prospect. This wing could avoid the danger of this double attack only by a well-timed retreat to Gödöllö. A premature offensive on the part

of our troops nearest to it would have directly *forced* him to this saving retreat, and this the more certainly the more victorious they should be. By such a premature offensive of our right* wing we should consequently destroy our prospective defeat of the hostile left.

The chief duty of our right wing consequently was to remain on the defensive until the first discharge of cannon from the seventh army corps in the rear of the hostile left should be heard. Not till that welcome signal was our right wing allowed to assume the offensive.

Very differently stood affairs with our left wing and with the right of the enemy.

The latter was in possession of a strong position for artillery to the north of Isaszeg. From thence it protected the place itself as well as the road which passes through it to the capitals. This was indeed the task with which the enemy's right wing seemed willing mainly to content itself. Its delaying to advance from its strong position against General Damjanics' left wing, exposed by Klapka's retreat, betrayed this clearly enough.

Here, therefore, nothing was to be gained by the defensive on our part; while an energetic attack might obtain for our left wing possession of the right bank of the Rákos, and at the same time the possibility of keeping even pace with the *later* offensive of our right wing.

I now hastily communicated these views to General Damjanics; since, as has been mentioned, his animated exclamation, that the advance could now immediately begin again, made me *fear* a *premature* offensive of our right wing.

* In the original "linken," *left;* but evidently a misprint.—*Transl.*

Damjanics, however, shewed that he quite agreed in my views, and at once assured me that he would confine himself meanwhile to maintaining the forest-spur on our extreme right wing, while I hastened in the first instance to take the guidance of the battle in the centre.

The cavalry of the third corps, which I had only just ordered to advance, was once more in retreat when I reached it after the conversation with Damjanics.

Several hostile projectiles quickly succeeding one another had struck its ranks. The men intended to abandon this violently attacked point. I had to prevent them.

The head of the Aulich army corps was already so near the edge of the forest, that it could reach it in a few minutes, in order immediately to deploy *en front* to the left of the Damjanics corps. The opening, however, was situated just in the direction of the hostile front fire by which the hussars were then suffering.

A retreat of the latter would have brought the fire still nearer to the opening, and have indirectly endangered Aulich's deploying. At the same time large masses of cavalry emerged in front of our centre.

In order to anticipate their onset, and likewise for the purpose of silencing as quickly as possible this galling fire (if I remember rightly, it came from a rocket-battery), I sent the second regiment of hussars (Hanover) to attack.

(Whether a part of the third regiment of hussars (Ferdinand)—perhaps a division*—assisted also, I cannot now say with certainty.)

In the very beginning of the advance the hussars got into the line of the oblique fire of the enemy's guns

* Half of a regiment of cavalry.—*Transl.*

planted to the right of our centre; allowed themselves, from the dreaded activity of these guns, to swerve from the straight direction, and fell into a marked deviation to the left.

The masses of hostile cavalry in front of our centre, at first concealed from my sight by the beginning of the attack, now became visible again on the right of the hussars in consequence of this deviation to the left.

Fearing that the hussars might be overtaken in their right flank, I caused them, having at that moment no others at my disposal, to be followed *en débandade* by a platoon of the third regiment of hussars (Ferdinand), which was posted near there for the protection of the battery of the left wing of the third corps.

An uncommonly vehement fire of serried masses of infantry suddenly called my attention off from the centre to the extreme right wing.

The attack was in progress, the straight fire of the hostile centre was already silenced, the van of the Aulich army corps was debouching from the forest, and during it was not distracted by the oblique fire of the guns of the hostile left wing. I consequently thought I could leave without uneasiness the centre for some time, in order to convince myself personally how matters stood in the forest-spur to our right, where the battle, as has been mentioned, had now become very hot.

When I had advanced some distance into the wood which forms this forest-spur, towards the extreme right wing, it seemed to me as if I had come just between the enemy's and our line of tirailleurs; for I heard firing simultaneously to the right and to the left before me: I could not, however, perceive either to the right or left the tirailleurs themselves. I believed consequently that

our sharp-shooters had already retreated very far, and turned immediately to the right for the purpose of overtaking them and driving them again forward. I now met the two battalions sent in advance from the Aulich corps, when it was on its way to assist the right wing. Their *éclaireurs*, confused by the fury of the combat on the furthermost line, were firing at random before them during their advance. The brave battalions of the third corps—again repulsing just then a desperate attack of the hostile left wing with that vehement fire of tirailleurs which I had supposed, in the first moment of surprise, to come from the enemy—were thus taken in the rear by the fire of their own succourers.

I hastened to stop this dangerous confusion, and then returned again to the centre.

My first glance, when, on riding out of the forest-spur, I gained an unobstructed prospect, fell upon the opposite wooded declivity to our left.

The flashing of the separate shots in the twilight of the evening enabled me distinctly to perceive on that declivity two parallel lines of fire, which approached ever nearer the village of Isaszeg.

From this I discovered with satisfaction that Klapka had been in earnest with his resolute "Forward!" by which he had interrupted my representations against continuing his retreat. He had resumed the offensive in an energetic manner.

In front of our centre I saw the hussars returning from the attack. They were still so far off, that it was impossible to decide whether they were pursued or not. Fearing that the former might be the case, I intended just to ride towards them, for the purpose of trying if their flight could not be put a stop to, when the hussars

seemed suddenly to halt. And not without reason; for one of Aulich's batteries, having been planted in the centre, while they were attacking, and I was with the right wing, had taken the return of our cavalry for an attack of the enemy's horse, and had directed its fire against it. I discovered this mistake, so destructive to the hussars, soon enough to spare them its further sad consequences; unfortunately, however, they had suffered considerable loss from the fire of this battery *before* I again reached the centre.

In spite of this misfortune they had remained in good order, and returned—by no means pursued by the enemy—back again to the position they had occupied before the onset.

After this attack the enemy did not again disturb our centre. But on both wings the combat still raged, —most vehemently on our right. The hostile left wing had already repeated his vigorous attacks several times with scattering impetuosity, and hereby had soon rendered the defensive of our right wing, at first voluntary, now a necessity; for the combat in the forest, which lasted several hours, dispersed our battalions; so that if an offensive was to be assumed with them, they would first have to be rallied again, and for this some time was needed, which, with the repeated assaults of the hostile left wing, could not be spared.

In vain had I been expecting every minute till sunset the emerging of our seventh army corps in the rear of the dangerous enemy.

The seventh corps was nowhere to be seen; and the hostile left wing could unimpeded continue his attacks till the last gleam of evening twilight.

The deep darkness of the night at last commanded

the suspension of hostilities here also. The combat had already ceased on all sides. But still I knew not whether we had conquered. . . .

In the centre, where I commanded in person, the combat had not been decisive, the efforts of the enemy against this point being weak and inconsiderable.

The contest had been decisive only on both wings.

To call the day ours, Damjanics ought to have maintained his position, Aulich and Klapka taken Isaszeg by storm.

The painful feeling of uncertainty about this urged me to hasten first to the right wing. About it I was the most anxious; for, as is known, the erroneous report of the advance of our seventh corps had induced me, in spite of the attacks of the enemy here being the most dangerous, to have this point most feebly occupied, only with about the fourth part of the infantry, while the other three-fourths were employed against Isaszeg.

It seemed to me consequently to be a good omen for the issue of the battle, that I found Damjanics still in his former position. Neither himself nor his adversary had yielded. Both had encamped on the field of battle.

I had soon returned again to the centre, in the expectation that perhaps a report from the left wing had meanwhile arrived there. Its arrival, however, was delayed too long for my impatience: so, accompanied by some officers, I rode straight to Isaszeg, for the purpose of learning as soon as possible in whose possession the place was. Not far from it, a challenge in German made us start. It might be the enemy; but it might also be one of those old hussars, to whom the identity of the Hungarian "*Allj-ki vagy?*" with the German "*Halt! wer da?*" (Halt! who goes there?) was still not quite clear.

We replied in Hungarian. "Aulich" was the answer. It was he indeed. Returning from Isaszeg, he brought the joyful news, that the right wing of the enemy was retreating towards Gödöllö.

The victory was *ours!*

CHAPTER XL.

With the victory at Isaszeg, Hungary, alas, was already to have attained the culminating point of her greatness. So Kossuth willed it!

The enemy's victory at Kápolna had as its consequence the proclamation of the *octroyed* constitution of the 4th of March 1849 for United Austria.

This constitution on its birthday presupposed Hungary to be conquered, and while it gave a prospect to the peoples of Austria of constitutional happiness, after the expiration of a provisional eternity, it destroyed at the same time the Hungarian constitution of the year 1848, together with the ancient rights of the kingdom of Hungary, which it declared to be a political corpse, courageously mutilated this corpse, and by way of precaution poured over the wounded surfaces the permanently dissociating aquafortis of the equal right of the nationalities, that the amputated limbs might not unite again to the trunk, even on the day of the apocalyptically-promised constitutional resurrection.

The provisionally mutilated kingdom of Hungary, however, chanced still to number some soldiers with whom

the octroyed abortion of Austria's centralists availed no more than the value of the paper which imposed on the astonished world the assumption, that the battle of Kápolna had been the unexpected throes of this untimely birth, and that consequently Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz also had in some measure assisted at the delivery.

These soldiers of Hungary were of opinion that the Vienna ministers might continue till death octroying, centralising, and proclaiming equal rights, without thereby changing the limits of even one single *pussta*, so long as Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz remained captivated by the illusion that he had fulfilled his mission to Hungary *non plus ultra* by the victory at Kápolna, and that he could settle the rest merely by forcibly collecting declarations of submission.

These soldiers of Hungary greeted the octroyed constitution as the presumed deliverer from the painful incertitude in which they had been placed by the true Hegira of the Hungarian revolution—Kossuth's flight from Pesth to Debreczin; the incertitude, namely, whether the more decided enemies of the constitution of the year 1848 dwelt "*beyond the March and Lajtha*," or "*beyond the Theiss*;" whether they had chiefly to resist the troops of the former, the army of Prince Windisch-Grätz, or the champions of the latter, the Poles and republicans.

By the octroyed constitution, on the one hand, the duplicity with which Prince Windisch-Grätz called himself and his army within the frontiers of Hungary "constitutional," was indeed placed in the clearest light; on the other hand, the legality of the standing of these soldiers of Hungary was so clearly and distinctly proved,

that it immediately appeared incontestable even to the doubters by profession.

It would have been denying *ex professo* to President Kossuth every trace of mother-wit to suppose that, whatever were his political tendencies, after the appearance of the octroyed constitution he could even for a moment think to force Hungary from its defensive position—at an earlier period already imposingly firm, and by the new constitution become completely unassailable—into an offensive one, by which it could obtain, besides the approbation of fools, only Russo-Austrian blows, and at most the part—unworthy of a manly nation—of a competitor with the Polish emigration for the happiness of being pitied by sentimental Europe.

On the modest supposition consequently, that kind dame Nature had not withheld from President Kossuth such a small degree of mother-wit as sufficed for this latter recognition, the Poles and fatherland republicans —the champions, as has been mentioned, of those enemies of the constitution of 1848 living "*beyond the Theiss*" —appeared to *us* (I believe it is self-evident, that I reckoned myself also among those "soldiers" of Hungary here spoken of) as harmless cavaliers, to whom fate seemed to have assigned as the element wherein they had to live and move, hardly the living stream of the history, at most the marsh of the *chronique scandaleuse*, of Hungary.

We considered them hardly worth notice; but believed we had discovered *what* Hungary exclusively wanted, when we answered the octroyed constitution briefly and firmly with the days of Hatvan, Tápió-Bicske, and Isaszeg.

We believed, on the one hand, that Kossuth's over-

weening arrogance had been reduced within the bounds of attainable, reasonable aims by the unhappy conclusion of the year 1848, the warning proclamation of Waizen, the disgraceful *début* of Dembinski, the defeats of Bem from time to time, the realised attempt at Russian intervention in Transylvania; by the loss of the fortress of Esseg, of the Banat and the Bácska; but especially by the greatness of the sacrifices which the late successes on the field of battle had cost us: on the other hand, that his confidence in our honest resolve to defend to the last the rights of the country had been firmly established by these same successes of our arms.

We hoped, further, that Hungary would deem it her honour to resemble a man, who, conscious of his strength, and alike removed from arrogance and despondency, entering the lists in a good cause—and only in such—aspires to a noble prize, even should it be death on the shield.

Nay, we confidently expected that the nation with heart and soul would join us, who had not wavered in misfortune, who resolved not to grow giddy in prosperity.

Vain, however, was all our believing, hoping, expecting!

Kossuth thought on the unhappy conclusion of the year 1848, only to admire the ingenuity of his flight from Pesth to Debreczin. The warning proclamation of Waizen, Dembinski's disgraceful *début*, were considered by him as clear proof of *my* striving for the military dictatorship. From Bem's defeats, the losses of Esseg, Banat, and the Bácska, he deduced only the mischievous conclusion, that Hungary having not much more to lose, had the more to gain. In regard to the

attempt at intervention on the part of Russia, he fondly dreamt of the infallibility of the counter-interventions of France, England, Germany, America, and Turkey in favour of Hungary; and while he under-valued the heavy sacrifices which had purchased our recent victories, the victories themselves served only to raise his arrogance to absolute madness, and *Kossuth's madness was unfortunately the gospel of the credulous nation.*

Had Kossuth possessed the courage to share only once the dangers in the battle-field of those whose victories he—so full of his own importance—considered to be the immediate emanations of his personal presence at the head-quarters, the end of the next week would have found him, if not wiser, at least more prudent.

But he lacked this courage; and Hungary, as has been said, was to have attained with the victory of Isaszeg the culminating point of her greatness.

HAPTER XLI.

In consequence of the retreat of the enemy's right wing from Isaszeg to Gödöllö, their left also had necessarily to evacuate the field, and this during the night, which put an end to the battle of Isaszeg. The left retreated likewise to Gödöllö.

The advance on our part to the attack of the camp which the enemy had established in front of this place ought to have commenced very early in the morning of the 7th of April. Our reserve of ammunition, however, had not yet arrived, on account of the delay caused by

the precautionary measures rendered indispensable by its passage through the burning places of the Isaszeg forest, and our need of ammunition obliged us to await at Isaszeg till its arrival.

Meanwhile it was discovered that that part of the battle-field lying nearest to Isaszeg was thick-sown with still-unopened packets of cartridges, which the men of the Klapka battalions had thrown away on the previous day, without doubt during the first moments of the encounter, in order to induce General Klapka, by shewing him their empty cartridge-boxes, to give up the combat. Klapka having assigned as the principal reason for his first retreating from Isaszeg, that his battalions had no cartridges, I cannot forbear calling the sudden idea (although obsolete) of these battalions of unhesitatingly throwing away their cartridges a very successful one—but only in the case of Klapka.

The reserve of ammunition at last arrived at Isaszeg; but among the cartridges distributed to the infantry some were discovered the contents of which consisted for the most part of common road-dust. I never learnt who it was that had acquired for himself this new kind of merit in the eyes of the hostile army.

It may be conceived that separating the cartridges filled with sand delayed still further our advance against Gödöllö; and Field-marshal Windisch-Grätz found thus sufficient time to enter unmolested on his retreat from Gödöllö towards the capitals, chosen from strategic reasons (*sic*).

His rear-guard had already reached Kerepes, when we again united with the seventh army corps at Gödöllö, towards which it had been likewise advancing by Bag and Aszód.

The seventh army corps had received—if I mistake not—on the 5th of April an order to take Aszód in the course of the 6th, and to secure for itself the passage across the Galga for the 7th, on which day it had to advance on the offensive against Gödöllö.

On the 5th the enemy had advanced with numerous forces from Aszód towards Hatvan, and seemed at first to intend to attack the position of the seventh corps there, but under the protection of his cavalry he soon moved back again towards Aszód.

The commander of the seventh army corps now attacked this cavalry with two divisions of hussars, and was repulsed with loss.

Nevertheless, conformably to the received order, the day after (6th of April) he assumed the offensive with his whole corps—with the divisions of the left (Pöltenberg) and of the right wing against Aszód, and with that of the centre (Kmety) against Bag—but found these places already evacuated by the enemy. The officer who—as has been mentioned in Chapter XXXIX.—met me in the forest of Isaszeg, while on my way from Kóka to the battle-field, was sent to me by him from Aszód with a report that the advance of his corps to Aszód and Bag was accomplished. This officer, during his ride from Aszód towards the right wing of our position before Isaszeg, while crossing the main road to Bag, had probably remarked by chance the Kmety division marching along it, and taken it for the whole seventh army corps advancing against Gödöllö. Hence the positiveness with which he announced to me that the seventh army corps was already on its direct march to Gödöllö.

Colonel Kmety, arrived with his division in Bag, heard there the thunder of cannon from Isaszeg, which

was not audible at Aszód, and really importuned the commander of the seventh army corps to begin the offensive against Gödöllö *immediately*, although his orders fixed it not till the next day; but in vain! The commander thought he was obliged to confine himself to observing the orders received from the head-quarters.

However, Colonel Kmety did not allow himself by any means to be prevented by the scruples of his commander from advancing at least with his division alone against Gödöllö. But when half-way thither, before the convent of Besenyö, he encountered a hostile position, to force which his small body was not sufficient; and the Damjanics, Aulich, and Klapka army corps had consequently to gain the victory at Isaszeg without the co-operation of the seventh army corps.

It is true that now—in consequence of the excessive dread the commander of the seventh army corps had of undertaking any step which exceeded the distinctly prescribed line—the merit of these three army corps in the victory at Isaszeg, as well as the moral importance of this victory in favour of the Hungarian arms, seemed much raised; nevertheless we had the more seriously to regret that the commander of the seventh army corps had not followed Kmety's wise advice, because, by not doing so, time was given to the enemy to avoid a defeat which was more than probable, considering the reciprocal position of the armies on the 6th of April.

After the junction had been effected, on the 7th of April, in Gödöllö, between the army corps which were advancing from Isaszeg and the seventh corps, a part of the latter was charged with the pursuit of the enemy, who was retreating towards the capitals. This pursuit had, however, small result, and after the exchange of

some shots with the hostile rear-guard, was immediately abandoned again.

CHAPTER XLII.

In the course of the 7th of April, a few hours after our entry, Kossuth also, with his attendants, arrived at Gödöllö. He appeared satisfied with the services of the army, and spoke much and well of the eternal thanks of the nation.

After a while he desired to converse with me alone in his chamber. On this occasion I obtained the first indications of the leading tendency of his politics.

Now—said he—the time is come to answer the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March by the separation of Hungary from Austria.

The patience of the nation—he continued—was exhausted; if it would shew itself at all worthy of liberty, it must not only not tolerate the unreasonable assumption of the octroyed constitution, but it must moreover exact heavy reprisals. The peoples of Europe would judge of the worth of the Hungarian nation according to the answer it should give to that constitution. Their sympathies would depend upon that judgment (*sic*). England, France, Italy, Turkey, even all Germany itself, not excepting Austria's own hereditary states, were waiting only till Hungary should proclaim itself an independent state, to impart to it their material aid, and that the more abundantly, as they had hitherto

been sparing of it. The sore-tried, oppressed sister nation of the Poles would speedily follow the example of Hungary, and united with it would find a powerful ally, both for defence and offence, in the Porte, whose interests had so often suffered from the policy of Austria and Russia. With the freedom of Hungary, the freedom of Europe would fall; with Hungary's triumph there would be as many successful risings against hated tyranny as there were oppressed peoples in Europe.

"Our victory is certain," were nearly the words in which he continued; "but we can do much more than for ourselves alone; we can and must fight and conquer for the freedom of all who wish us the victory. Our word, however, must precede the deed, our cry of victory the assured victory itself, and announce its redeeming approach to all enslaved peoples, that they may be watchful and prepared, that they may not stupidly sleep away the moments destined for their salvation, and so afford time for our common enemies again to recover, to assemble and strengthen themselves anew. We cannot be silent now that the octroyed constitution has denied our very existence. Our silence would be half a recognition of these acts, and all our victories would be fruitless! We must therefore declare ourselves! But a declaration such as I should wish would raise the self-esteem of the nation, would at once destroy all the bridges behind the still undecided and wavering parties within and without the Diet, would by the proximity and importance of a common object force into the background mere party interests, and would thus facilitate and hasten the sure victory."

"All this is not quite clear to me," was nearly my answer. "Words will not make Hungary free; deeds

can alone do that. And no arm out of Hungary will execute those deeds; but rather armies will be raised to prevent their execution. Yet, granted that Hungary of itself were strong enough at the present moment to dissociate itself from Austria, would it not be too weak to maintain itself as an independent state in a neighbourhood in which the Porte, in spite of a much more favourable position, has already been reduced to an existence by sufferance only? We have lately beaten the enemy repeatedly—that is undeniable. But we have accomplished this only with the utmost exertion of our powers. The consciousness *that our cause was just* has enabled us to effect this. *The separation of Hungary from Austria would no longer be a just cause;* the struggle for this would not be a struggle *for*, but *against* the law; not a struggle for self-defence, but an attack on the existence of the united Austrian monarchy. And while we should hereby mortally wound innumerable ancient interests and sympathies; while we should hereby conjure up against our own country all the unhappy consequences of a revolution uncalled for by any circumstances; while we should hereby force the old troops, the very kernel of our army, to violate their oath, and thus morally shake them,—we should find ourselves weaker day by day; while at the same time in every neighbouring state a natural ally of our opponents would arise *against us*, THE DISTURBERS OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. 'We cannot put up with the octroyed constitution in silence!' Granted! but is what we have just done 'putting up with it in silence?' Could we have answered the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March more strikingly than we have done? I cannot decide what, or how much, is advantageous

to the peoples of Europe; but that to the peoples of Hungary the smallest victory on the battle-field brings more profit and honour than the most arrogant declaration, I see clearly enough; and I once more repeat, that battles *won* for the legitimate King Ferdinand V. and the constitution sanctioned by him, are the best answer that Hungary can give to the chimeras of the Austrian ministers."

Kossuth inquired doubtingly, whether I really believed that the old troops had ever thought seriously of Ferdinand V. and the constitution of the year 1848.

"Of what else should they have thought," I exclaimed, "when, immediately after the evacuation of the capitals, determined on a voluntary departure to the enemy's camp, the *only* means that remained to retain them for the Hungarian cause—which is principally indebted to them for its success hitherto—was my proclamation of Waizen? What was the real signification of that demonstration which my corps d'armée, without my participation or knowledge, proposed to make against General Dembinski, in Kaschau, but their anxiety lest in me they should lose a commander who respected their military oath? I have shared prosperity and adversity with these troops. I know their feelings. And should King Ferdinand V. stand here before us now, I would invite him, without the slightest hesitation, I—unarmed and unprotected—to follow me into the camp, and receive their homage; for I am certain there is not one in it who would refuse it to him."

Kossuth, apparently but little edified by my want of enthusiasm for his political ideas, abruptly broke off our conference; nor did he ever mention to me one syllable more of the separation of Hungary from Austria.

It is even now an unrevealed mystery to me whether he ever communicated these ideas to the other leaders of the troops, and if so, when, and with what success.

A second subject of discourse in Gödöllö between Kossuth and myself was, what means should be taken to secure a humane treatment to our officers made prisoners by the hostile army. It was reported that the Hungarians in general, but especially the officers, who had been captured, were treated in the enemy's camp with unexampled inhumanity; that the latter were considered as guilty of high-treason, no notice whatever being taken of those officially managed intrigues—not by Hungary, however—through which the troops who had sworn to the Hungarian constitution were forced into a hostile position against their former comrades.

This subject had already been discussed in Debreczin before the Committee of Defence, in consequence of which a letter from the war-minister to the commander of the hostile army reached our head-quarters, which was to be laid before the President Kossuth, and after his approval, forwarded to the hostile outposts.

The tone of this letter, however, would have been well calculated to convince Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Gratz, that on the 2d, 4th, and 6th of April he had in fact as totally beaten us as his memorable bulletins strove to make the world believe was the case.

It was consequently rejected; and I myself drew up a letter for the commander of the Austrian invading army in Hungary, wherein I assured him, among other things, that we intended to respond to every single execution of Hungarian officers taken prisoners, by the execution of three Austrian officers from among our captives.

This declaration was now forwarded—after Kossuth

had expressed his satisfaction with it—in several copies to the hostile outposts.

The third and at that time most pressing question which I discussed with Kossuth in Gödöllö related to the object to be next chosen for the operations of our army.

Kossuth was of opinion that we should immediately advance from Gödöllö by the shortest line against the capitals, and take them by storm. Not without difficulty could he be dissuaded from this idea. For—said he—all our victories had no real importance, so long as the capitals remained occupied by the enemy. Only their reconquest could afford to the country a real proof of the success of our work of liberation. This alone was able quickly to raise the spirit of the nation, and give it strength to endure. This, above all, must be kept in view;—for that with the failure of the nation's hope of a quick and favourable final result of these war-operations would fail also simultaneously all the resources so urgently demanded for the energetic continuance of the combat.

Nevertheless, how incontestable soever this assertion of Kossuth's, instead of the capitals, *Komorn* had to be chosen as the next object of operations, even though there was danger that the nation, through the delay hence resulting to the reconquest of Buda-Pesth, should fall back into its former condition of discouragement.

I endeavoured consequently to convince the President, that to pay immediate attention to the wishes of those who rated the reconquest of the capitals higher than the deliverance of Komorn, would be to commit a grave strategic error. Apart from this, that these wishes must find a satisfaction alike tragic and defective in the probable result of the operation for attacking the capitals

from the left bank of the Danube: a tragic one, because thereby the defenceless Pesth would be exposed to all the miseries of a besieged town; a defective one, because it was not conceivable that we should be able from Pesth to drive out the enemy, who, it might be foreseen, would settle in Ofen.

At the same time I thought it necessary to call the President's attention to the fact, that, on account of the peculiarity of our next movements, it would not henceforth be so easy as it had hitherto been, to find for him a perfectly safe abode in the proximity of the army, as it would be at the expense of the unembarrassed pursuit of our strategic aims.

After a long debate Kossuth seemed at last to be convinced of all this, and refrained afterwards not only from making any objection to the execution of our further operations—to be directed next to the deliverance of the fortress of Komorn—but also resolved on returning from Gödöllö to Debreczin, for which place he set out—if I mistake not—on the 10th of April.

But however ardently Kossuth while on the way may have mused over what was most for Hungary's benefit, two things, at all events, he appears to have overlooked:

1. That Hungary had already plenty to do, if it would guard itself meanwhile from the blessings of the octroyed constitution and its appendix of provisos—the tapeworm, by which, as soon as born, it was enfeebled—if it would remain in possession of its rights; and

2. That Hungary, if it strove to be independent of Austria, resembled a fool, who should wish to separate his head and arms from his trunk, that he might be able to walk about more easily.

CHAPTER XLIII.

I DO not remember that any one else of importance in the Hungarian camp, except Dembinski and Kossuth, had ever seriously entertained the idea of regaining the capitals by means of an actual attack, directed on the left bank of the Danube. But if, nevertheless, Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz, or his temporary substitute, believed the realisation of such an idea on our part to be probable, it was most opportune for us; since, while we had first only the deliverance of Komorn in view, it may easily be conceived that it must have been of very great importance to us to make the enemy believe that we thought of nothing else but the immediate reconquest of the city of Pesth.

With this view, the chief of the general staff of the army, who, like myself, was acting *ad interim*, projected the following plan of operations:

"The seventh army corps to gain the line of Fót-Dunakeszi, and interrupt the direct communication between Waizen and the capitals on the Danube, as well as on its left bank.

"The second army corps (Aulich)—reinforced by a small independent column, which, during the advance of the principal army on the road of Gyöngyös towards Gödöllö, had been left behind to secure the passages across the Theiss at Szolnok and Czibakháza, and had been ordered to follow on the railway-line of Szolnok only after the day of Tápió-Bicske—to occupy the main

road of Kerepes, the road of Keresztur, and the railway-line of Szolnok.

"Both these army corps to demonstrate from their positions in the direction of Pesth.

"Meanwhile the third (Damjanics) and first (Klapka) army corps to march on the shortest line from Gödöllö to Waizen, take this town, if it be occupied by the enemy, and continue their march without interruption by Rétság, Nagy-Oroszi, Ipolyság, to Lévencz (Léva).

"As soon as the two last-named army corps have taken Waizen, the two army divisions of the wings of the seventh corps to follow them from Dunakeszi, while the division of the centre (Kmety) continues by itself the demonstration against Pesth, thus masking the departure of the other two divisions.

"After the third, first, and the above-mentioned two-thirds of the seventh army corps have finally left Waizen on the road indicated towards Lévencz, the second army corps (Aulich) to undertake, besides the line of demonstration which had till then been assigned it, that likewise of the Kmety division, while the latter to start for Waizen, and remain there.

"The further operations of the main column directed by Waizen to Lévencz will be, to cross over the river Gran, and deliver the fortress of Komorn."

We could herein by no means assume so much passivity on the part of the commander of the hostile main army concentrated before Pesth, as, to our astonishment, he subsequently displayed. We had to expect that, weary at last of the ever-repeated demonstrations with which General Aulich had to regale him, he would exchange the defensive for the offensive, in order to rid himself once for all of his troublesome adversary. The

consequences of this must have been to threaten next the lines of communication which had hitherto existed between the main body of our army—on its march by Lévencz to Komorn—and the government as well as war-supplies existing behind the Theiss.

The most important of these lines of communication was the main road of Gyöngyös. However many were the advantages it offered us, both on account of its shortness and practicability, we had nevertheless to prepare to renounce the regular use of it during the continuance of the above-indicated operations. As a compensation for its loss, the road leading from Miskolcz by Putnok, Lossoncz, Balassa-Gyarmat, and Ipolyság to Lévencz, must serve our turn.

The rendering both lines of communication as secure as possible was the principal task of the Kmety division in Waizen; which moreover had to preserve the connexion between the main body of our army on the Gran and the second army corps before Pesth, as well as to serve the latter as a reserve in case of necessity.

I was firmly resolved to keep steadily in view the deliverance of Komorn, even at the risk of the hostile main army before Pesth meanwhile assuming the offensive against our isolated second army corps (Aulich).

In this latter case, as a matter of course there would remain for Aulich nothing else to do than—after disputing every inch of ground with the enemy as long as possible—to begin his excentric retreat towards Tiszafüred, Szolnok, and Czibakháza, and confine himself, if it came to the worst, to the occupation of the points of passage across the Theiss, particularly easy to maintain during the inundation.

In other respects, a continuous offensive on the part

of the hostile main army encamped before Pesth against Aulich, and consequently against the basis of our operations, appeared to me already less alarming, because Kossuth, before his departure from Gödöllö to Debreczin, had assured me, by all that is sacred, that General Bem was already on his march from Transylvania, which had meanwhile been completely reconquered, towards Baja on the lower Danube, and would certainly have crossed the river there by the middle of April with a force of at least 16,000 men, in order to turn immediately to the north towards Raab, and after effecting the junction of his troops with ours would take the chief command of the whole army in Vetter's place.

This certainty moreover considerably lessened the reasonable apprehension that the commander of the hostile main army before Pesth, by the first, best energetic offensive attempt against Aulich, would convince himself of the numerical weakness of the troops of his opponent, and therein immediately recognising our real intentions, would oppose them with energy on the shortest line from Pesth-Ofen by Gran (Esztergom) and the bridge over the Danube there; for in this case Bem's appearing in the rear of the enemy would easily release our main column in the valley of the Gran.

Thus the more confidently was the execution of the above-communicated plan of operations commenced on the 8th of April 1849 from Gödöllö.

In the meantime a hostile courier, sent from Waizen to Gödöllö, fell into our hands. His despatches confirmed the supposition that Waizen was garrisoned by the enemy; the imperial Götz and Jablonowski brigades were stationed there.

In the evening of the 10th of April I received in

Gödöllö, by an orderly officer of General Damjanics, a report that Waizen had been taken by storm by the third army corps (Damjanics) in the course of the forenoon, in spite of the obstinate resistance of the two imperial brigades.

That the hostile commander-in-chief did not, from this storming of Waizen, already discover what were our intentions, I can only explain on the supposition that he had really taken for a stronger corps that insignificant expeditionary column of the seventh army corps which—as has been said in the XXXVIth Chapter—had been sent about the middle of March from Miskolcz, originally against the Sclavonian militia, who at that time had been left behind in Kaschau and Eperjes by the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, which column, however, was afterwards directed towards Komorn.

The hostile Colonel Almásy, detached into the valley of the upper Eipel, probably to destroy this expeditionary column, with a force notoriously more than sufficient for the purpose, succeeded in reaching Lossoncz towards the end of March. Here, however, he allowed himself to be surprised in bright midday by this expeditionary column; a part of his troops, together with the military chest, to be taken from him; and himself for ever deterred from any further offensive.

Our slender expeditionary column—consisting, as is well known, of only a few hundred infantry, thirty-two hussars, and two guns—in the enemy's account of this mishap had probably increased to the bulk of an army corps, and thus led the commander of the hostile army, concentrated before Pesth, to suppose that this presumed Hungarian army corps—closely following after the column of the Austrian Colonel Almásy, which

after the sudden attack at Lossoncz was retreating helter-skelter towards the Danube — had suddenly appeared before Waizen, and had driven from thence the Götz and Jablonowski brigades, intending immediately to join the main body of our army in the attack on the position of the Austrian main army before Pesth.

The moral impression of this surprise at Lossoncz seemed moreover, during our offensive operations against Gödöllö, to have already influenced Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz in the disposition of his troops. At least the circumstance that the hostile army corps under Field-marshal Lieut. Csórich still continued to occupy Waizen during the battle of Isaszeg — which the enemy might have foreseen with certainty for at least thirty-six hours — can likewise be explained only on the assumption that the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps, which had surprised Colonel Almásy in Lossoncz, had been seen by him in the multiplying-glass of the first panic terror — a mockery indeed of all calculation — and its numerical strength at least twenty times over-estimated; and that Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz had necessarily been induced by the result of this exaggeration to dispose the Csórich army corps on the road from Waizen to Lossoncz.

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE news of the successful dislodgment from Waizen of the Götz and Jablonowski brigades determined me to transfer the head-quarters during the night between the 10th and 11th of April from Gödöllö to that town.

There I first learned the following important details of the engagement:

When General Damjanics, appearing with the third army corps before Waizen, observed the enemy's preparations for a serious defensive, he at the same time saw that the opportunity was favourable for completely destroying or forthwith capturing him.

With this view, the first army corps (Klapka), which followed close behind the third (Damjanics), was to turn the town of Waizen to the east, masked by the ground, and occupy the enemy's only line of retreat, the road from Waizen to Veröcze, while the third corps had to obstruct him in front until this manœuvre should be executed.

Klapka, agreeing in this plan, prepared immediately to execute the turning; but nevertheless did not reach the fitting centre of gravity of the hostile line of retreat until the enemy, meanwhile retreating from Waizen, had passed it.

Klapka now attributed to the undue haste of General Damjanics, the latter to Klapka's tardiness, the failure of the manœuvre calculated for the complete defeat of the enemy: while the mediating supposition, that Klapka's intention had been detected by the enemy

before it was too late, and had been frustrated by an accelerated retreat, seemed to be contradicted by the obstinacy with which the enemy had endeavoured to dispute with General Damjanics every foot of ground, nay even the town itself.

This disagreement between the two commanders of corps, Damjanics and Klapka, originating from the day of Tápió-Bicske, and considerably heightened by that of Isaszeg, assumed thus, in consequence of the day of Waizen, a character that gave rise to serious reflection.

Moreover, on this day, besides Klapka, the colonel and commander of the cavalry of the third corps, Nagy-Sándor, and the Polish legion, some hundred men strong, had also drawn upon themselves the most violent indignation of General Damjanics: Nagy-Sándor, because during the engagement he complied with an order to advance, perhaps in an equally satisfactory manner as that in which we remember he executed the order to pursue on the day of Tápió-Bicske; the Polish legion through the following:

The bridge at the southern extremity of Waizen—briskly defended by the hostile tirailleurs, who had been pressed back to the very skirts of the town—was to be taken by storm. The same Hungarian staff-officer, who on the 4th of April had so gloriously distinguished himself as commander of the third Honvéd battalion at the storming of the bridge across the Tápió, animated the Polish legion, stationed not far off, to the storm, and intended, by seizing their banner, to lead them on in person. The Polish standard-bearer, however, refused to part with the banner entrusted to him, and the whole legion declined to storm.

This bridge was now taken by the sections of the

third and ninth Honvéd battalions in just as resolute a manner as that across the Tápió on the 4th of April had been won; and the same heroic staff-officer, who here again led the storm with the banner, had his horse killed under him.

After the loss of the bridge the enemy was no longer able to hold the southern entrance of Waizen; the third and ninth battalions drove him back at first into the interior of the town, until at last he began to evacuate it without further resistance.

The battalions of the third corps now assembled themselves, and formed one marching-column arranged in the order in which they had penetrated into the town; but the Polish legion, who, as has been said, had refused to storm the bridge, and who, even during the further fight-like advance into the interior of the town, had only hobbled behind the third and ninth Honvéd battalions, now knew how to gain, during the rallying, the head of this column, and by this trick to make it appear as if the honour of the day belonged to it.

I had enough to do to put an end, on the one hand, to the disputes between Damjanics and the officers of both his cavalry regiments, who espoused the side of their commanders against him; on the other, to the serious collisions between the Polish legion and the Honvéd battalions.

The enemy numbered also among his losses in the combat of the 10th of April, Major-general Götz: mortally wounded, he fell into our hands, and died the day after.

According to our plan of operations, the main body of our army—the third army corps (Damjanics), the first (Klapka), and two-thirds of the seventh corps—after the

taking by storm of Waizen, began its march without delay to Lévencz; the army division under Kmety was removed from Dunakeszi to Waizen; and a part of the second army corps (Aulich) undertook in its stead the occupation of Dunakeszi.

For the protection, on the one hand, of the left flank of the main body marching to the north, on the other, of the Kmety division in Waizen, against the hostile attempts to be apprehended from the upper Danube, an expeditionary column, composed of two divisions of hussars and two pieces of artillery from the seventh army corps, was disposed along the Danube upwards to the lower Gran.

While the main body approached Lévencz, we learned that the former expeditionary column of the seventh army corps—which had surprised Colonel Almásy in Lossoncz, and immediately after this event had been charged to direct its expeditions towards the district of the northern mountain-towns and the Túrócz comitate—had in the meantime returned towards Eperjes, and been obliged, by a decree which had been sent to it from Debreczin, to place itself at the disposal of Lieut.-general Dembinski, who had again been employed by Kossuth, namely had been entrusted with the command of a new army corps formed in Kaschau.

The district of the mountain-towns being occupied by the enemy, and our main body seeming to be menaced thereby in its rear during its further movements from Lévencz towards Komorn, a new expeditionary column, under the command of my elder brother, the Honvéd Major Armin Görgei, was despatched to dislodge the enemy from the mountain-towns, on the 16th of April, in the first instance against Schemnitz (Selmeczbánya).

Our main body, which, in consequence of similar detachings and the losses it had already sustained during the campaign, now amounted to scarcely more than 25,000 men, had arrived on the previous day at the river Gran, with the first corps at the height of Lévencz at Szecse, with the third above this point at O-Bars, and with the two army divisions of the seventh corps below it at Zsemlér. At each of these three points bridges had speedily to be thrown across the river.

The enemy, however, by way of precaution, had removed or destroyed the greater part of the materials fit for this purpose that had existed in the near environs; and the single ready-made scaffold-bridge which we carried with us scarcely reached half-way across the river, just then swollen to an unusual height.

Of the three places for crossing above mentioned, that at O-Bars seemed to offer most facilities for the construction of a bridge. We intended to let the third army corps, which had been disposed hither, cross first, in order to protect, by descending along the right bank, the passage to be effected further down between Szecse and Kálna by the first army corps, and at Zsemlér by the two-thirds of the seventh corps.

For this purpose not only the ready-made scaffold-bridge, but also other chief requisites for bridge-building were placed at the disposal of the chief of the Hungarian pioneers, who was charged with the formation of a bridge at O-Bars.

He proved himself, however, incompetent for the task assigned him; and in spite of all the circumstances favourable to the construction of the bridge at O-Bars, that between Kálna and Szecse was finished soonest, though not till the night between the 17th and 18th.

On the 17th of April a courier from Debreczin appeared at my head-quarters at Lévencz with the news that the Diet had accepted Kossuth's proposition, that, as an answer to the octroyed constitution of the 4th of March 1849, the dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine be declared to have forfeited its hereditary right to the throne of Hungary; that the future form of government for Hungary, however, be an open question; and for the present that a provisional government be appointed.

However completely such a resolution on the part of the Diet corresponded with my national feelings—thanks to the manner in which the said dynasty had taken part against Hungary in the civil war, originally stirred up by the Croat Ban Baron Jellachich at his own instance—as it could nevertheless not find favour—which I had already by way of warning explained to the President Kossuth in Gödöllö—even before the tribunal of the most ordinary policy, much less before that of a rational love for one's country; so such a resolution was very far from being justified by the dynastic disposition of the old troops, and especially of the old officers of the army, on whom it is self-evident must devolve the task of procuring support for it, not only in the interior of Hungary, but also beyond it.

This resolution of the Diet moreover stood in direct contradiction to the declared conviction of Kossuth himself at Tiszafüred in the beginning of March, *that it was the most sacred duty of all who meant honourably by the country to venture on no step, the consequences of which might divide the nation into parties, and consequently only increase the power of the common enemy of all.* It stood in still more direct contradiction to what Kossuth had told me at the same time and place respecting the

desire of the majority of the Diet for cowardly submission, the real existence of which was in fact betrayed by the tone of the letter addressed to Field-marshal Prince Windisch-Grätz, on the subject of the Hungarian prisoners of war in the hostile army, which letter had been sent to Kossuth from Debreczin to Gödöllö, to be by him approved and forwarded to its destination.

In the face of these contradictions, as well as in the face of the remarkable silence with which in Gödöllö Kossuth had heard my objections against the expediency of an offensive step against Austria—without refuting them—and had made me believe that he had given up his *flagrant* idea of answering the octroyed constitution in any other way than by a still more energetic continuance of the defensive war, I had to doubt, if not the genuineness of the unofficial verbal communications of the Debreczin courier, at all events that this resolution of the Diet was unchangeable; and was thereby induced to bid the courier—who was immediately hastening back to Debreczin—orally inform the gentlemen of the Government and the Diet that it was high time they ceased to be *cowardly in adversity, insolent in prosperity.*

To undertake any energetic step against the Government and the Diet—however urgently such a step seemed to be demanded, partly by the general exasperation which the news of that resolution of the Diet called forth in my head-quarters, partly as a consequence of my proclamation of Waizen—was altogether impossible, from the circumstance that, on the one hand, I was, with the main body of the army above thirty (German) miles distant from Debreczin; on the other, that I was just then occupied with our most important strategic task, the relief of Komorn.

Yielding to what was unavoidable, I had rather chiefly to consider how most certainly to prevent the sudden dissolution of our army, the consequence mainly to be feared from that fatal political step.

Here, however, I frankly confess I was at my wits' end; and never should I have been able to exorcise again the spirit of division which Kossuth's political *non plus ultra* had conjured up in the ranks of the army, had not events come to my assistance in the hour of greatest need.

CHAPTER XLV.

Of the three bridges ordered to be thrown across the river Gran, only the middle one (between Kálna on the right, and Szecse on the left bank) was practicable on the 18th of April; the lower one, at Zsemlér, was to be finished on the 19th; while the completion of the upper one, at O-Bars, threatened to take several days still.

The enemy had not yet shewn himself on the right bank of the Gran opposite us, but it was impossible he could delay much longer; and if he made his appearance before we had effected the passage, although only with the fourth part of our troops, it would be easy for him effectually to obstruct us, since the right bank commanded the whole extent of the river occupied by us, namely on the middle and lower point of the passage.

We therefore, in the course of the 18th, made use of the only bridge that was ready, between Kálna and

Szecse, for occupying the right bank of the Gran, not only with the first corps (Klapka), but also with the third (Damjanics), which had meanwhile been ordered from O-Bars down to Szecse, and proceeded directly down the river towards Nagy-Sarló, to protect the passage across the Gran, which the two-thirds of the seventh corps had to effect at Zsemlér on the following day; whilst the Klapka corps was for the present charged with observing the main road towards Neutra (Nyitra) and the carriage-road towards Surány.

Early in the forenoon of the 19th of April a brisk thunder of artillery suddenly resounded from the south-west, from the right bank of the Gran, to Lévencz. It was the commencement of the battle of Nagy-Sarló.

The third army corps was to continue its march on this day, flanked on its right by the first, on the shortest line towards Komorn; the two-thirds of the seventh corps, after they should have crossed the river at Zsemlér, were to advance on the main road towards Gran (Esztergom)—if I am not mistaken—as far as Damásd, in order to protect the third corps on its left flank against a hostile attack; the head-quarters, however, were to be transferred to one of the nearest places north of Nagy-Sarló.

Now this conflict made it questionable whether our whole body should advance; because, with our utter want of information as to the strength of the enemy, its consequences could not be foreseen; and it appeared therefore more judicious to let the head-quarters abide in Lévencz till the battle should be decided.

I myself remained also in Lévencz, though, when the first thunder of artillery was heard, I was about to ride to Zsemlér, in order to expedite as much as possible

the completion of the bridge there, and the passage of the two-thirds of the seventh army corps.

I intended personally to assist in the conduct of the battle, but only if it should take a decidedly unfavourable turn; and in order in such case to be immediately at hand, I could not leave the head-quarters; besides, from the elevated ruins of the old castle at Lévencz the progress of the contest could be unobstructedly observed better than from any nearer point.

All the confusion which might have arisen from supposing me to be present in the station of the head-quarters, which had been appointed on the right bank of the Gran for this day, was obviated by my sending thither several orderly officers. These officers were to forward to Lévencz all the reports which should arrive for me at this place. In like manner other orderly officers were stationed in Zsemlér, with directions to keep me constantly acquainted with the progress of the bridge constructing there.

Finally, the bridge at Kálna was also manned with a strong section of the head-quarter troops, in order to stop and collect the fugitives of our two corps engaged in the combat, in case they should come there with the intention of fleeing back to the left bank of the Gran.

But on this day we had no runaways in our ranks; the enemy, on the contrary, had the more of that article.

In spite, however, of all the arrangements I had made for obtaining the speediest information of the progressive state of affairs on the battle-field, as well as respecting the construction of the bridge at Zsemlér, it was only late in the night between the 19th and 20th of

April that I learned from the written report of General Damjanics, that he had put the enemy to flight.

At the same time a convoy of the severely wounded of the seventh corps arrived from the battle-field by Zsemlér at Lévencz; whereby I was assured of the completion and practicability of the temporary bridge across the Gran at Zsemlér, as well as of the possibility of hastening after our main body by a much shorter route than that by Kálna.

Leaving Lévencz without further delay, I reached Zsemlér during the same night; but on account of the extreme darkness could not till the morning of the 20th overtake the army corps under Damjanics and Klapka, which, on the preceding evening, had already advanced beyond Cseke towards Komorn, in pursuit of the enemy.

Contrary to all expectation, I found Damjanics again violently excited against Klapka and the commanders of his cavalry. He accused the former of intending, at the very beginning of the battle, once more to betake himself to a hasty and disorderly retreat; the latter, of being incapable of being urged to any attack whatever, and of having done literally nothing during the action.

According to the details obtained from other sources, the commanders of General Damjanics' cavalry—so far as I can remember—seemed indeed to deserve in the fullest degree the reproach cast on them: General Klapka, however, less. It is true, that he had asserted at first that the enemy opposed to him was his superior in numbers; and on this account had repeatedly urgently demanded to be reinforced from the third army corps. But when his request had been most promptly acceded to on the part of General Damjanics, he held out firmly, and essentially contributed to the decisive

result of the day; the honour of which is certainly mainly due to General Damjanics, on the ground that he, as my substitute on the field of battle, had remained unshaken, in spite of the dubious behaviour of Klapka at the outset.

The battle at Nagy-Sarló (on the 19th of April 1849) was the consequence—unexpected by the enemy—of our having crossed the river Gran, the day before, on the 18th, with the first and third army corps, between Kálna and Szecse, and of the enemy's concentric offensive movement, from the west (out of the valley of the Neutra), and south (from the point where the Gran empties itself into the Danube), commenced against us simultaneously—consequently, in any case, too late—with the intention of preventing our crossing the river.

The following two facts clearly prove that the hostile commander had not been prepared for encountering two-thirds of our main body on the right bank of the river Gran. (On account of the late passage across the Gran at Zsemlér of the seventh army corps, only a part of its cavalry, under Pöltenberg's personal command, could take part in the action, near its close.)

1. His troops dispersed in disorder, after they had once begun to give way, in the most diverging directions towards the west.

2. Not till a long time after the commencement of this *débandade en gros* did hostile columns, marching upwards along the Gran, emerge from the south before our extreme left wing, which, moving downwards along the Gran, turned them on the right, and forced them now likewise to flee in a western direction.

The first of these facts justifies the supposition, that no definite line of retreat had been marked out, by way

of precaution, to the hostile troops. This, however, is omitted—immediately before an *expected* conflict—only when a leader is beside himself from absolute confidence of victory; and to suppose such a moral condition in the Austrian generals serving in Hungary, after the days of Szolnok, Hatvan, Tápió-Bicske, Isaszeg, and Waizen, is, I should say, somewhat too difficult.

In accordance with the first fact, the second also indicates that the hostile general, on the 18th of April, supposed that the greatest part of our main body was still on the other side the Gran, and consequently that he was prepared on the 19th for any thing rather than for a decisive conflict; for, on the contrary supposition, he must have taken care especially of the arrival in good time of his forces on the battle-field.

These two facts undeniably justify the supposition, that the Austrians were completely taken by surprise on the 19th of April by the Hungarian army corps of Damjanics and Klapka (at that time amounting together to 16,000 men): for should it be denied that they were *surprised*, then the Austrian offensive, wrecked on that day, would, both in its plan and execution, sink utterly below the level of criticism.

On the 20th Damjanics and Klapka continued their march towards Komorn as far as Jászfalu; but the two-thirds of the seventh army corps descended along the river Gran towards the Danube, encountered at Kémend a strong hostile column, attacked it without delay, and obliged it to retreat over the pontoon across the Gran to the right bank of the Danube.

In this contest the expeditionary column of the seventh army corps, which had been already despatched from Waizen towards the lower Gran, partly co-operated; for

being on the left bank of the Gran, and flanking the enemy, who was retreating along the opposite bank of the river, it directed against him the fire of both its guns, almost without intermission.

This expeditionary column was to have crossed the Gran after the battle at Kémend, and rejoined the main body of the seventh army corps. The bridge at Kémend was not, however, completed, and the column was consequently obliged to march as far as Zsemlér, that it might there at last gain the right bank of the Gran.

Of the enemy defeated on the previous day at Nagy-Sarló only some scattered groups shewed themselves on this side the little river Neutra, who preferred being made prisoners to wandering about longer without aim.

We had accordingly up to Komorn no longer to fear any resistance in masses. The nearer our main body approached it, however, the more our still indispensable line of communication by Lévencz with the left bank of the Theiss appeared to be exposed to such hostile attempts as were practicable from the north-west and south-east. The protection towards the south-east remained with the two-thirds of the seventh army corps —located for this purpose at Kémend, and afterwards at Köbölkut—until the Kmety army division, which had been ordered from Waizen up the Danube to Párkány, should have arrived there; whilst for protection towards the north-east, that expeditionary column, which, after the battle at Kémend, was obliged to march as far as Zsemlér to gain the right bank of the Gran, after having effected its passage, had to make reaching Verebély the object of its next isolated service. The present securing of our communication with Lévencz towards the north-west, however, was effected in the

meantime by two divisions of hussars, who started during the night between the 20th and 21st of April from Jászfalu towards Verebély.

General Guyon, since his nomination to the command of the fortress of Komorn, had several times unsuccessfully attempted to reach the fortress unobserved through the hostile surrounding line, and had thereupon retreated again within the circuit of the operations of our main body. In Jászfalu he resolved upon a renewed and forcible attempt to enter Komorn in spite of the hostile surrounding troops, and requested a squadron of hussars for this purpose. He broke through the hostile line on the 21st of April, and surprised the garrison, now very low-spirited, with the re-animating intelligence of the unexpected relief near at hand.

On the 22d this relief was effected on the left bank of the Danube. The Damjanics and Klapka army corps bivouacked before the Waag tête-de-pont of the fortress of Komorn.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE fortress of Komorn is known to lie on the left bank of the Danube, and to reach with only one of its outworks, the so-called fort or tête-de-pont of that river, across to its right bank.

The garrison, whose firmness during the siege deserves in general the most honourable mention, had fortunately maintained this important outwork, in spite of

repeated vigorous bombardments, and thereby secured to us the possibility of throwing a bridge across the Danube between it and the fortress, and thus of effecting deliverance on the right bank also in a very short time.

At the same place a bridge of boats had been thrown across some weeks before, but within a few days had been sunk by the enemy's batteries on the right bank.

To avert the recurrence of such a result, we had recourse to *solid* swimming supports instead of hollow ones, that is, we tried our fortune with a floating-bridge.

Taking into consideration the efforts of the hostile batteries to hinder the formation of the bridge, together with the circumstance that we found not the least thing prepared for such an undertaking, in consequence of the erroneous views prevailing generally in the fortress of Komorn, as well as in the town, *that to bridge over the Danube by means of rafts was impracticable;* we might certainly be well content to be able to open the offensive against the hostile blockading corps on the right bank of the Danube on the fourth day after the arrival of our main body within the range of the fortification.

This offensive was to begin with a nocturnal surprise on the hostile trenches.

Between the proper inner fortress of Komorn and its western outworks—the so-called Palatinal line—is situated the town of Komorn, with its southern rows of houses only a few steps distant from the bank of the stream.

Directly in front of the town, on the right bank of the Danube—therefore west of the fort—lay the village of Uj-Szöny, at that time, in consequence of the siege,

only a scene of conflagration. Westward (up the river) of it, the right bank of the Danube rises to a height, from which the opposite outwork (the Palatinal line), nay even the principal rampart of the fortress, are commanded; the latter wall, however, only within the widest range of the largest calibre. This commanding point is known in German by the name of "Sandberg," in Hungarian of "Monostor."

In the autumn of 1848 the Hungarian government had the then prosperous village of Uj-Szöny surrounded on the west, south, and south-east with earth-works, in form of a large curve, and reaching from the Monostor as far as the Danube fort. The extensive space between it and the river was to serve as an entrenched camp; but the country at the time of the victorious invasion of Prince Windisch-Grätz was still without an army for this camp, and the fortress of Komorn was destitute of the forces necessary for the occupation and maintenance of its gigantic line of defence.

The besieger could consequently take possession of the abandoned earth-works without drawing a sword, and partly appropriate them to his own purposes. He had cut his trenches along the main road from Raab to Ofen, which, parallel with the bank of the stream, crosses the fortified camp, and had planted his batteries, so formidable to the fortress, on the Monostor and south of the Danube fort; against these we directed the sudden attack by which we opened our offensive designed for the complete deliverance of the fortress.

In the night between the 25th and 26th of April, about 4,000 infantry, composed of the best troops of the Damjanics and Klapka army corps, under the command of Colonel Knézich, crossed the just-finished

floating-bridge. One half of the column took for the object of its attack the small market-town O-Szöny, east of the Danube fort; the other the hostile battery lying south of it.

Both points were in our hands by daybreak of the 26th of April; as was also the equipment of the battery, already reduced to four 24-pounders and two 18-pounders, together with its guard, consisting of about 200 men, who laid down their arms without further resistance.

In the same night, far above the Palatinal line, two battalions of the fortress troops crossed the Danube in boats, for the purpose of executing simultaneously a brisk tirailleur attack on the batteries posted on the Monostor. By this we intended to attract the enemy's attention thither, that the attack with the bayonet on the hostile battery erected to the south of the Danube fort might be more certainly successful. The commander of the two battalions from the fortress, however, was not equal to his task: the attack of tirailleurs on the Monostor did not take place; but the enterprise against O-Szöny and the batteries to the south of the Danube fort nevertheless completely succeeded.

As soon as the news arrived, the Damjanics and Klapka army corps, which had remained during the nightly expedition of Colonel Knézich on the left bank, commenced in their turn the passage over the floating-bridge to the right bank of the Danube.

Two or three days before, the Kmety division—as is known, sent from Waizen to Párkány—had reached the latter place, and the other two-thirds of the seventh army corps, which had remained behind in Köbölkut (at that time under the temporary command of Colonel

Pöltenberg), were to join immediately the Damjanics and Klapka army corps in Komorn; when suddenly there arrived intelligence of a hostile advance from Szered towards Neuhäusel (Ersek-Ujvár), which caused the detaching of Pöltenberg to Perbete and Bajcs, for the protection of our line of communication with Lévencz: this was so much the more necessary, as we were daily expecting an additional supply of ammunition by that route.

The favourable result of the surprise by night, however, suggested as our next enterprise, to transport as speedily as possible a stronger force to the right bank of the Danube; and while the Damjanics and Klapka army corps had to pass over the floating-bridge, a courier hastened to Perbete to inform Pöltenberg that he must reach Komorn with his troops without loss of time, and immediately follow these two army corps to the right bank of the Danube.

Meantime that half of our troops for the surprise which had been sent against the hostile battery situated to the south of the Danube fort, after taking it by storm, had turned eastward against the other earth-works, which were disposed in a large curve extending to the Monostor, and had captured those nearest to them one after another at the first assault. But the far-extended, isolated advance of this column of infantry, scarcely 2000 men strong, exposed it to the most dangerous assault on the part of the main force of the hostile besieging troops of all the three arms, before the right bank of the Danube was attained by the first sections of *our* main body.

Notwithstanding the solidity of the floating-bridge, it could not be made use of without such an amount of precaution as caused considerable delay; between the end of the bridge and the point on which these 2000

men of our troops of surprise were engaged in unequal combat against the three combined arms of the enemy, there existed an obstacle insurmountable for cavalry and artillery—the trench, the lowering of which at intervals occasioned another loss of time; and in this way more than an hour had already elapsed since the commencement of the attack of the hostile artillery against our isolated, weak section of infantry, before the first half-battery of the Damjanics corps could at last take part in the conflict.

During the following action Klapka had to command our left wing (towards O-Szöny and Mocsa), Damjanics the centre (towards Puszta-Csém and Puszta-Herkály), while I undertook the conduct of the combat on the right wing towards Acs.

The contest between the troops of surprise and the besieging army lay in the range of General Damjanics (in our centre). Thither the troops debouching by degrees on the right bank were first of all directed. We could not, however, by any means confine ourselves exclusively to strengthening our centre, because it remained nevertheless for a long time exposed to the danger of being overpowered—on the one hand, on account of the great superiority of the hostile forces already concentrated against it; on the other, from the slow arrival of our reinforcements by the floating-bridge; and because, if it should be overpowered, which was easily possible, we should lose our sole point of support, except the Danube fort, on the right bank, without having gained in the meantime a new one.

A new point of support, however, and one indeed most important for us—the Monostor—seemed just then to be neglected by the enemy, and while the centre still

held out, the more easily to be gained by us, as I supposed for certain, that the two battalions of the fortress, who were to keep up a distracting tirailleur attack against the Monostor, to favour the nightly surprise, but who had failed in doing so, would now—several hours after the time fixed—at least have arrived on the spot.

I accordingly interrupted for a time the concourse of troops proceeding from the outlet of the floating-bridge towards the centre, in order to turn off a half-battery, with a half-squadron of hussars for its protection, by themselves towards the Monostor. They found it already abandoned by the enemy, although the two battalions of the fortress had not yet appeared.

However enigmatical the—apparently voluntary—evacuation of the Monostor may seem, our surprise at the enemy's thus exposing himself did not prevent us from improving it as conscientiously as possible. The half-battery, with its slender protection of cavalry—although all that our right wing possessed—advanced immediately over the Monostor and along the main road towards Acs.

The object of this advance was evidently to divert a part of the hostile forces which were still acting with numerical superiority against our centre. Whether, and how far, this object was attained, I could, however, not perceive with my own eyes on account of the distance between our centre and the right wing. I only saw that my half-battery, during its isolated advance, was threatened by superior forces in its right flank as well as in front, and that it ran the risk of being separated from the centre and destroyed, unless the earth-works situated between the centre and the Monostor, but nearest to the latter, were speedily manned with infantry.

Without delay I employed for this purpose two battalions of the Klapka corps, which were just passing over the floating-bridge; for our left wing, under Klapka, was at that time the least menaced.

The far-advanced half-battery withdrew again in the meantime towards the Monostor.

At the same time the adversary seemed to have recognised — too late, however — the importance of the Monostor to him; at least this was indicated by the resolution with which the hostile left wing exchanged its hitherto passive demeanour for the offensive, in order to dispute with us the possession of the Monostor.

The reader is aware, from what precedes, that by the appellation "Monostor" is here meant the most commanding point of the right bank of the Danube above Uj-Szöny; at the same time, the point on which the fortified camp leans to the west. From this point the undulating ground descends towards the west (up the stream), and is covered, to the extent of about double gun-range,* only by vineyards and isolated fruit-trees. Where these end, the wood begins, known to me only by the name "Forest of Acs," which extends along the bank of the Danube, up the stream, as far as the brook Czonczó. The width of this forest gradually increases from the vineyards. At the distance of three or four gun-ranges from the Monostor, however, a large piece of forest branches off from the wood on the river-bank, about one or two gun-ranges in a southern direction

* By 'gun-range,' where this expression occurs in the present work without the addition of a defined calibre, is always meant the distance at which, in hostile encounters in the open field, batteries of six-pounders are most frequently used. This distance generally varies from 800 to 1000 paces.

towards Puszta-Herkály. This piece of forest is crossed near its southern limit by the main road from Raab. Between its eastern edge and the fortified camp the ground is free and open, as well as between its western edge and the brook Czonczó. Beyond the brook, on its left bank, lies the village of Acs, through which leads the main road from Raab.

This southern piece of forest, together with the whole forest on the river-bank adjoining it, as far as the vineyards of the Monostor, were in the possession of the enemy, and their line of retreat towards Acs was hereby completely secured. If we intended seriously to endanger this, we must evidently first drive him further into the forest of Acs, at least as far as beyond the southern piece of forest. My original attempt, to advance with a half-battery along the main road to Acs, without regard to the forest on the river-bank flanked by it, could be successful only as a feint. However, the resolute offensive, which the hostile left wing had now suddenly assumed, proved that the adversary had already sufficiently recovered from his first surprise—to the consequences of which we were probably indebted for the very welcome evacuation of the Monostor—no longer to allow himself to be imposed upon by mere firing with blank-cartridges.

While the artillery and cavalry of the hostile left wing pressed on—at an equal height with the eastern end (turned towards us) of the forest on the river-bank —after our half-battery on its retreat towards the Monostor along the main road, a swarm of tirailleurs rushed out from this eastern part of the forest towards the vineyards of the Monostor, which on our part was occupied only by two companies of the seventeenth Honvéd bat-

talion. These sufficed, it is true, to maintain the vineyards, but not for a successful counter-attack, which I intended. Consequently two other companies of the same battalion were ordered forward: this was one of the two battalions which I had sent from the Klapka corps on to the Monostor, to compensate for the still-missing battalions of the fortress.

The brisk shrapnell-fire of these hostile divisions of artillery, which had closely followed our retreating battery on the open ground bordering upon the south of the Monostor, rendered this attack difficult. It nevertheless succeeded; and soon after the four companies of the seventeenth Honvéd battalion had established themselves in the forest on the river-bank.

At the same time there arrived at the Monostor from our left wing, as a re-inforcement to our right, the first regiment of hussars (Kaiser), besides a half-battery. The battalions of the fortress, which had been in vain expected for a long time, also arrived at last. The forces at my disposal consisted consequently of four Honvéd battalions, eight squadrons of hussars, and eight guns. With these I believed I could now the more confidently assume the offensive against the hostile left wing in the forest, as well as in the open ground contiguous to the south, because Damjanics had already vigorously repulsed the attacks on our centre, nay was even acting on the offensive, so that the earth-works next the Monostor no longer needed to be defended by troops.

As the principal object of attack for the right wing I chose the above-indicated piece of forest, which extends from the forest on the river-bank in a southern direction towards Puszta-Herkály beyond the main road. I intended to attack it simultaneously from both

ends; in the south, its point, with the two battalions from the fortress; in the north, its basis (where it joins the forest on the river-bank), with the seventeenth battalion; while the other battalion of the Klapka corps had to remain in reserve. Of course the hostile forces of artillery and cavalry, developed on the open ground *à cheval* of the main road, had previously to be completely dislodged.

Occupied with the accomplishment of this task, I had already advanced nearly to gun-range distance of the piece of forest, when I was overtaken by a written report from General Damjanics, to this effect: "The enemy has been re-inforced. Nagy-Sándor with the main body of the cavalry has been overthrown. Klapka is retreating towards the fort of the Danube. If the right wing advances further, I am no longer able to protect it from being turned on the left, without exposing my own left."

These news obliged me to interrupt my advance; nay I immediately sent back the battalion of the reserve to the Monostor, that it might meanwhile again occupy the earth-works situated nearest to this point.

I wrote to Damjanics, that he, like myself, should give way, even to a superior force, only tardily; and if it came to the worst, maintain at any rate the earth-works of the fortified camp lying within his range.

The hostile left wing also seemed to have received meanwhile considerable reinforcements; for it now suddenly resumed, with superior force of artillery, the combat which had already ceased on its part; while of my eight guns, after a short reply to the hostile cannonade, six pieces were silent from want of ammunition. The chests, which had been sent for the purpose of

bringing us fresh supplies of ammunition, had all been returned to us empty. Only two guns had still some powder and ball remaining. The fire of these, however, had to be reserved for the possible case, that the enemy might intend to make a more energetic attempt than formerly to reconquer the Monostor.

I consequently withdrew all the eight guns from the combat, and sent them back to the Monostor. The commander of the first regiment of hussars had perhaps conceived this to be the desired signal for a general retreat, as he used the utmost speed in reaching the Monostor with his regiment, and even outstript the guns. The two battalions of the fortress would have followed the example of the hussars: fortunately, however, I perceived this intention time enough to prevent it.

I had both the battalions of the fortress marched up *en front* opposite the hostile cannonade, and forced them to stand it without flinching. By this open display, as it were, of contempt of death, I intended beforehand to make the success of storming our position on the Monostor appear doubtful to the enemy. I had great difficulty in this matter with the troops, who were accustomed to the protecting breast-works of the ramparts of the fortress; still more, however, with the staff-officer who commanded these battalions. And after all, the attempt to impose upon the enemy by a passive resistance turned out to be superfluous; because, notwithstanding the vehemence of his renewed attack, he had no intention whatever of assuming the offensive; since, had he purposed the reconquest of the fortified camp, he could not have forborne a simultaneous advance in the forest along the bank of the Danube against the Monostor; but no such advance was attempted.

As soon as I discovered this circumstance—not, it is true, till the battalions of the fortress had sensibly suffered—I released them from their painful situation, allowing them to retire by degrees out of the reach of the fire of the artillery.

By this means the foremost line of battle of our right wing reached the same height with that of the centre under Damjanics, who, although stopping his advance, in consequence of Nagy-Sándor's flight and Klapka's retreat at the commencement, had nevertheless firmly maintained himself on the ground he had already gained.

By our giving up the offensive, the day's battle came to an end early in the afternoon. An unconcerted armistice took place.

The enemy, satisfied that he was no longer menaced by us, wholly desisted from further attacks on our position in front of the fortified camp; while the two army corps under Damjanics and Klapka were condemned to an equal inactivity from the want of ammunition, which had already been generally felt; and the two-thirds of the seventh army corps, hastening hither from Perbete, and having still a pretty good supply of ammunition, did not make its appearance on the right bank of the Danube, on account of its great distance from Komorn, until night had set in, namely long after the enemy had effected his retreat from the field of battle.

The day, however, remained ours; for we had taken the fortified camp together with the enemy's trench, the equipment of a besieging battery, and considerable stores of pioneers' tools and projectiles, nay even the tents of the hostile camp; and had completely delivered the fortress: while the enemy, far from disputing with us the

possession of all this, contented himself with the hurried protection of his retreat from the field of battle by Raab to Wieselburg; in which indeed the greatest service was rendered to him by the scarcity of ammunition on the part of the artillery of both the army corps (Damjanics and Klapka) engaged in this day's action, which prevented them from attacking him, as well as by the too late arrival of Pöltenberg on the field of battle.

With the complete deliverance of Komorn, the execution of the plan of operations projected in Gödöllö—after the battle of Isaszeg—by our chief of the general staff had satisfactorily succeeded; thanks to the unshaken firmness of General Damjanics during the battle of Nagy-Sarló, as well as to the admirable perseverance and rare masterly skill with which General Aulich knew how so long to fetter the Austrian principal army concentrated before Pesth, and to deceive it as to our real strategic intentions, until the subsequent perception of them appeared to be only the more calculated to lead our bewildered adversary to his disgraceful defeat at Nagy-Sarló.

END OF VOL. I.

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